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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EXTERNAL AUDIT ON 
CONSTRAINING EARNINGS MANAGEMENT PRACTICE IN THE UK 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Agency theory predicts that corporate governance and external audit enhance the convergence of interests 
between shareholders and managers. The primary objective of this thesis is to investigate the effect of 
corporate governance and external audit on constraining earnings management practice in the UK. 
 
In this thesis, earnings management is measured using the magnitude of discretionary accruals as estimated by 
the performance matched discretionary accruals (Kothari et al., 2005) model. A review of the corporate 
governance literature reveals sixteen attributes that can impact on shareholders‟ perception of earnings quality 
due to their role in enhancing financial reporting integrity. The corporate governance attributes are organized in 
four categories: 1) Board Composition; 2) Audit Committee Effectiveness; 3) Non-Executive Directors‟ 
(NEDs) Commitment; and 4) Ownership Structures. The external audit factors include auditor independence 
and audit quality. 
 
Two models are constructed and a set of hypotheses are stated. These models are tested using a sample 
consisting of the top 350 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. Firms in the financial, mining and 
regulated industries are excluded due to different accrual choices and valuation processes. The study covers the 
period of four financial years (2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006). Nineteen hypotheses are derived from both models.  
These hypotheses are tested using univariate and multivariate techniques to determine if corporate governance 
attributes and external auditor factors significantly constrain discretionary accruals. 
 
The results reveal that board size and independence, audit committee independence and expertise, nomination 
committee independence, chairman independence, the level of NED fees and an independent and specialised 
external auditor are negatively associated with earnings management at significant levels.  
 
The primary contribution to knowledge of this research is its extension of the literature on the role of corporate 
governance and the external auditor in constraining earnings management practice in the UK. This study‟s 
results are useable by stock market participants in their evaluation of corporate governance and the role of the 
external auditor in enhancing earnings quality. The findings will also assist regulators in defining effective 
corporate governance attributes and assessing the disclosure of corporate governance practices.  
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Chapter One 
 Introduction 
 
1.1 Earnings Quality and Earnings Management 
The end of the 1990s and the beginning of 21st century have witnessed a series of corporate 
accounting scandals across the United States and Europe. Examples include Enron, HealthSouth, 
Parmalat, Tyco, WorldCom and Xerox.  At the core of these scandals was usually the phenomenon 
of earnings management (Goncharov, 2005). Earnings management has been a great and consistent 
concern among practitioners and regulators and has received considerable attention in the 
accounting literature.  It has been argued that earnings management masks the true financial results 
and position of businesses and obscures facts that stakeholders ought to know (Loomis, 1999).  
 
The accounting numbers are deemed value relevant if they have significant association with equity 
market value (Barth et al., 2001).  Previous studies use equity market value as the valuation 
benchmark to assess the effect of accounting numbers on information used by investors and they 
suggest that shareholders use accounting earnings to estimate future returns (e.g. Lev, 1989; Beaver, 
1998; Choi et al., 1997; Kallunki and Martikainen, 1997). 
 
Reported earnings are considered by shareholders to be value relevant and useful in estimating 
future returns and thus earnings and share returns are expected to be related.  A long line of 
empirical research has demonstrated that accounting earnings are related to share returns (Easton 
and Harris, 1991; Das and Lev, 1994; Liu and Thomas, 2000). 
 
The general problem of this association is still a concern for accounting researchers.  A weak 
earnings-returns association has been linked with low information content of reported earnings and 
several empirical studies provide evidence to support this view (e.g. Easton et al., 1992; Kallunki 
and Martikainen, 1997).  These studies observe that the low information content of earnings 
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significantly contributes to this weak association and that this low earnings quality is due to 
management manipulation activities. 
 
Lev (1989) conducted a comprehensive review of 'market-based accounting research' on the 
information content of reported earnings and concludes that the explanatory value of earnings for 
share returns, and subsequently the usefulness of earnings disclosures, tends to be very low and 
sometimes negligible.  Several explanations have been suggested for these disappointing results. 
However, Lev (1989) contends that the most likely cause of the poor statistical performance 
consistently found in the return-earnings research is bias, introduced by accounting measurement 
practices or creative "abuses" of the earnings measurement process.  
 
Hence, Lev (1989) recommends that research on motives and consequences of financial reporting 
manipulation should be a fundamental part of the earnings quality research agenda.  This has led to a 
large and growing body of empirical research that investigates the existence of earnings 
management. 
 
Therefore, earnings quality becomes questionable when managers have an incentive to manage 
reported earnings opportunistically (e.g. Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Rosenfield, 2000; Dechow and 
Skinner, 2000.).  This opportunistic behaviour alters shareholders‟ perception of the quality of 
reported earnings. 
 
1.2 Corporate Governance, External Audit and Earnings Management: 
As discussed earlier, opportunistic earnings management practice produces less reliable accounting 
earnings that do not reflect a firm‟s financial performance. Earnings management is likely to reduce 
the quality of reported earnings and its usefulness for investment decisions, thus reducing investor 
confidence in the financial reports.  However, accounting earnings are more reliable and of higher 
quality when managers‟ opportunistic behaviour is reduced using monitoring systems (e.g. Wild, 
1996; Dechow et al. 1996).  Thus, stock market regulators and other investor protection agencies are 
concerned about earnings management, especially after the collapse of several large firms in recent 
decades and they have responded by enhancing corporate governance and the independence of 
external auditors. 
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One important monitoring system is corporate governance. Its primary objective is not to directly 
improve corporate performance, but to resolve agency problems by aligning management‟s interests 
with the interests of shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).  Gul and Tsui (2001) support the 
effectiveness of corporate governance as a monitoring system.  Xie et al. (2001) and Klein (2002b), 
among others, show that corporate governance reduces management‟s ability to manage earnings. 
 
External audit is perceived to be another important monitoring system that may help to align the 
interests of managers and shareholders and reduce the potential for opportunistic managers‟ 
behaviour.  Cohen et al. (2007) note that the auditor bears great responsibility for reliable financial 
reporting when the audit committee‟s role is primarily ceremonial, although the committee‟s 
symbolic efforts can lead to effective questioning of management.  Frankel et al. (2002) and 
Krishnan (2003) show that monitoring offered by an independent and high quality external auditor 
reduces management‟s ability to manage earnings. 
 
Corporate governance and external audit therefore assist investors by aligning the objectives of 
management with the objectives of shareholders, thereby enhancing the reliability of financial 
information and the integrity of the financial reporting process (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).   
 
1.3 Addressing the Problem: 
This study‟s primary objective is to investigate the effect of corporate governance and external audit 
on earnings management.  Earnings management will be measured using the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals as estimated by the performance adjusted accruals model (Kothari et al., 
2005).  Additionally, a review of the corporate governance literature reveals sixteen attributes that 
can impact on shareholders‟ perception of earnings quality due to their role in enhancing the 
integrity of the financial reporting process.  These attributes represent four categories of corporate 
governance: Board of Director Composition, Non-Executive Director (NED) Commitment, Audit 
Committee Effectiveness and Ownership Structures.  The external auditor factors include auditor 
independence and audit quality.   
 
These attributes are selected based on any of the following reasons: 
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1-Corporate governance attributes that are expected to have an effect on earnings management 
behaviour based on the agency theory perspective that will be illustrated in chapter four. This 
includes the internal monitoring by boards of directors (Fama, 1980 and Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
Monitoring is performed by external audit (Anderson et al,. 1993), audit committees (Pincus et al., 
1989 and Bradbury, 2006) and the use of NEDs (Fama, 1980 and Anderson et al., 1993). 
 
2. Corporate governance attributes that the review of the prior literature reveals a scarcity of 
research in them. This includes attributes such as NED commitment, the composition of nomination 
and remuneration committees, independent and specialised auditor and gender diversity. 
  
These attributes are used in this research to assess the impact of corporate governance and external 
auditors on earnings management. In line with the above illustration, the primary research question 
is: 
 
“Do corporate governance and external audit constrain earnings management practice in the 
UK?”  
 
     In the light of the previous discussion, this research will examine the proposed research question 
using the UK inviroment. This choice is made due to the following justifications: 
 
1. In November, 2003 the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK has introduced the first 
comprehensive corporate governance code named Corporate Governance Combined Code (2003) 
which includes various new recommendations. However, comparing to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
(SOX) recommendations to US firms, the effectiveness of the recent amendments and 
recommendations of the UK code are still empirically untested.  
 
2. There are a considerable number of studies that investigate the effectiveness of corporate 
governance on financial reporting quality, see for example (Xie et al. 2001, Klein 2002, Ashbaugh 
et al. 2003,  Abbott et al. 2004, Yang and Krishnan 2005, Lin et al. 2006) in the U.S.  (Koh 2003, 
Davidson et al. 2005, Hsu and Koh 2005, Benkel, et al. 2006, Baxter and Cotter 2009) in Australia. 
However, research on the effect of corporate governance on earnings management in the UK is very 
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scarce and there are only two studies (see, Peasnell et al. 2000a and Peasnell et al. 2005) that have 
studied this association and they used a sample period before the new corporate governance code 
recommendations and only covered very few corporate governance attributes.  
 
3. The UK environment differs from USA and Australia in many ways that could affect the inferences 
of this research. For example, IFRS rather than domestic accounting standards are compulsory in the 
UK as adopted by other EU countries (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002). UK firms are also subject 
to different corporate governance recommendations and listing requirements.  
 
     In addition, socialigical and cultural studies such as Hofstede (2001) has documentd that, while the 
UK and the US are similar in many respects, various organisational differences exist.  In terms of 
corporate governance recommendations, there are considerable number of differences in the 
structure and composition of boards, executive compensation levels and audit committee functions 
(Monks and Minow, 2004; Coffee, 2005; Ferguson et al., 2004). Not only corporate governance but 
also the notion of earnings management is different in the two countries.  Brown and Higgins (2001) 
argue that the extent to which US managers manage earnings is significantly higher than that by 
their counterparts in the UK.   
 
4. Since the researcher is based on the UK, it might be more relevant to conduct this research using a 
sample of firms from the same country as it makes the researcher more aware of the country 
legislations, culture and business environment that are related to the research. Furthermore, the data 
availability of the UK firms makes it achievable to conduct such a heavily hand-collected based 
research. 
 
1.4 Study Motivations 
There are three main motivations for this study: 
 
1.    A review of the earnings management literature reveals a scarcity of research relating the 
phenomenon of earnings management to various corporate governance attributes such as NED 
commitment, the composition of nomination and remuneration committees and gender diversity.  
This review also reveals a scarcity of research relating to the role of the independent and specialised 
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auditor in constraining earnings management practice.  There is, therefore, a strong incentive to 
investigate, empirically, the affect of these attributes on earnings management.  
 
2.    A review of the earnings management literature also reveals a scarcity of research relating to 
earnings management in the UK.  There are very few studies that have investigated UK firms.  The 
studies that do exist used old data and have some methodological limitations, such as using mis-
specified earnings management measurements and neglecting some fundamental control variables, 
such as performance and growth.  Therefore, a comprehensive study that considers the limitations of 
prior research is needed to improve and update earnings management research in the UK context. 
 
3.    Corporate governance codes in the UK have gone through long processes of amendment and 
improvement to form the current code.  However, the effectiveness of the recent amendments and 
recommendations are still empirically untested. This research investigates the effectiveness of the 
Corporate Governance Combined Code (2003).  
 
1.5 Contributions of the Study 
Firstly, this research provides a novel contribution to earnings management literature, as it is the 
first to examine the affect of several corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management.  
This study contributes to the literature both by examining new corporate governance variables and 
by using more representative measures for previously used variables as follows: 
 
1.   Previous literature focuses mainly on NED independence.  This research explores the effectiveness 
of NEDs‟ commitment using two different measures.  First, the number of private meetings of 
NEDs without the presence of executive directors.  Secondly, NEDs‟ fees as a sign of NED efforts 
and commitments.  No previous study has tried to examine the effect of NEDs‟ commitment on 
earnings management. 
 
2.    There is no single published research that has addressed the issue of the effectiveness of the 
independent chairman in monitoring the firm‟s management with respect to earnings management.  
In this regard, this study makes a significant contribution towards understanding the interacting roles 
of the chairman and other NEDs.  
7 
 
 
3.   Moreover, though previous studies have investigated the duality role of the chairman who is also the 
CEO, none has investigated the chairman‟s independence according to the Code‟s independence 
criteria.  This study applies two different measures to capture the effect of the chairman‟s 
independence.  According to the UK Corporate Governance Combined Code (2003), the chairman 
has certain criteria for independence.  This study applies these criteria to each firm‟s chairman to 
determine his or her independence.  This study also measures chairman independence according to 
the Code‟s independence criteria for NEDs.  In particular, this study finds a result that suggests that 
the Code‟s criteria for chairman independence are too loose. 
 
4.    Prior research on corporate governance has addressed the role and effects of audit committees and 
the presence of independent directors (e.g. Dalton et al., 1998 and Klein, 2002b).  The few existing 
studies on nomination committees look at characteristics and qualifications of board committee 
members or at the factors determining the introduction of such committees (Piderit, 1994; Vafeas, 
1999; Carson, 2002).  However, this is the first study to examine the effect of the independent 
nomination committee and the independent remuneration committee on the incidence of earnings 
management using UK data. 
 
5.  Very limited research has addressed the relationship between gender and the quality of reported 
earnings.  No study has directly investigated the relationship between earnings management and 
gender diversity.  It is worth mentioning that the findings of previous studies on this issue may not 
apply to the UK.  Kang et al. (2007) argue that the generalisation of findings about board diversity 
and independence may not extend across national boundaries due to different regulatory and 
economic environments, cultural differences, the size of capital markets and the effectiveness of 
governance mechanisms.  This is the first study to examine the relationship between the presence of 
women on company boards and earnings management practice as measured by discretionary 
accruals. 
 
6.    Unlike previous UK studies by Peasnell et al. (2000a, 2005) that use the number of shares owned by 
institutional investors over total number of shares outstanding as a measure for institutional 
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ownership, this study will measure institutional investors using a more representative measure of the 
average percentage of shares outstanding owned by institutional investors, as in Liu (2006). 
 
Moreover, Hsu and Koh (2005) find that the association between institutional ownership and 
earnings management is not systematic across all firms and is context dependent.  Cheng and 
Reitenga (2009) assert that the characteristics of institutional investors should be considered when 
examining the relationship between institutional investors and earnings management.  Thus, besides 
using different measures of institutional investors from those used in previous UK studies, this is the 
first study to investigate the effect of the long-term and the short-term institutional investor in the 
UK. 
 
7.    This study will attempt to examine the relationship between earnings management and managerial 
ownership using a different measurement of managerial ownership from previous UK evidence by 
Peasnell, et al. (2005), but following some prior research (e.g. Hutchinson and Gul, 2004; Gul et al., 
2002). 
 
Peasnell, et al. (2005) measured managerial ownership as equal to one when managerial share 
ownership is less than 5%, whereas managerial ownership in this study is measured by a more 
representative continuous variable.  This study uses the percentage of total shares held by executive 
directors divided by the total number of shares. 
  
8.    In terms of audit committee characteristics, the UK Corporate Governance Code (2003) introduced 
audit committee expertise as a new recommendation.  This is the first study to examine the effect of 
audit committee expertise on earnings management in the UK. 
 
9.  Studies that examine the mere presence of an audit committee, such as those of Peasnell et al. 
(2005), Osma and Noguer (2007), Siregar and Utama (2008), Baxter and Cotter (2009) and Lo et al. 
(2010), show inconclusive and conflicting results.  The previous UK study (Peasnell et al., 2005) 
examines the mere presence of an audit committee.  This is the first study to examine the effect of 
an independent audit committee on earnings management in the UK.  
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10.  In addition to extending the very limited research on the effect of audit committee size and as part 
of testing the effectiveness of the new Code recommendations, this study is the first to examine the 
effect of audit committee size on earnings management in the UK. 
 
11.  Larcker and Richardson (2004) argue that the previous mixed findings on the relationship between 
auditor independence and earnings management are due to overlooking the role of corporate 
governance.  However, they omit a very important governance variable as they did not include audit 
committee characteristics (composition, expertise, diligence) in their investigation of the auditor 
independence and earnings management relationship.  The audit committee plays a direct role in 
controlling earnings management and monitoring audit and non-audit services fees paid to the 
auditor.  Therefore, this study extends the work of Larcker and Richardson (2004) and incorporates 
audit committee characteristics and auditor independence in the same model in order to investigate 
their effects on earnings management. 
 
12.  In the UK, the literature on audit quality and earnings management tends to focus on audit quality 
differences between the Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors and implicitly treats the Big 4 auditors as 
homogeneous in terms of audit quality.   This study takes the literature on the earnings management 
and audit quality relationship in the UK a step forward by using auditor industry specialisation as a 
proxy for audit quality and, for the first time, testing its relationship with earnings management in 
the UK.   
 
13. This is the first study that controls for the effect of audit committee characteristics when testing the 
relationship between an industry specialist auditor and earnings management. 
 
14.  This study is the first to control for the effect of the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) when testing the effects of corporate governance and external audit on earnings 
management.  This study also controls for a wide range of other important variables and it is the first 
study in the UK that controls for the growth, performance and cross-listed firms, which strengthens 
the validity of the research results.  
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Secondly, in terms of the dependent variable, this research represents the first attempt to measure 
earnings management in UK firms using a performance adjusted discretionary accruals 
methodology.  The second significant distinction between this study and prior research in terms of 
earnings management estimation is that earnings management is measured using two primary 
estimates.  Both performance adjusted discretionary accruals (Kothari et al., 2005) and current 
accruals (Ashbaugh et al., 2003) are employed. Current accruals are more direct proxy for 
management discretion, whereas discretionary accruals measure indirect and proxy for long term 
discretion exercised by management (Ashbaugh et al., 2003).  The use in this research of both 
proxies for earnings management enhances the validity and reliability of the results.  The consistent 
results found between both proxies strengthen the conclusions drawn from this study‟s statistical 
analysis.  
 
Thirdly, an interesting aspect of investigating this issue in the UK context is that the corporate 
governance codes in the UK have gone through a long process of amendment and improvement to 
form the current code.  This research conducts the first examination of the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and the extent of earnings management practice in the UK since 
the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) was introduced.  It will shed light on the 
effectiveness of the recent corporate governance recommendations on enhancing reporting quality in 
the UK.  
 
Fourthly, the previous literature is mainly US-based.  To the best of my knowledge, there is little 
research into the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and managers‟ 
engagement in earnings management in the UK (see for instance, Peasnell et al., 2000a, 2005).  
Hofstede (2001) documents that, while the UK and the US are similar in many respects, various 
organisational differences exist.  In terms of corporate governance recommendations, numerous 
international accounting research reports have identified a number of differences in the structure and 
composition of boards, executive compensation levels and audit committee functions (Monks and 
Minow, 2004; Coffee, 2005; Ferguson et al., 2004). 
  
Not only corporate governance but also the notion of earnings management is different in the two 
countries.  Brown and Higgins (2001) argue that the extent to which US managers manage earnings 
11 
 
is significantly higher than that by their counterparts in the UK.  It is useful to extend previous 
empirical evidence by reference and comparison to the UK context.  
 
Finally, this research provides evidence of the effect of corporate governance and the external 
auditor on earnings management practice and it identifies specific aspects of a firm‟s corporate 
governance and external audit that can attenuate agency costs imposed upon shareholders by 
managerial opportunism in the management of earnings.  These are (a) independence of the board, 
independent chairman, independent audit committee and independent nomination committee, (b) 
large boards, committed NEDs and audit committee expertise, (c) an independent and industry 
specialised auditor and (d) firm size, cash flows and performance. 
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This chapter has discussed the background and rationale for this study, outlined the study's motives 
and specified the research question.  The contributions made by this study have also been 
highlighted.  
 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter two provides a general understanding 
of the nature of earnings management and what motivates managers to practice it.  Once this is 
established, this chapter will discuss the various methods of measuring earnings management. Then 
the monitoring devices of corporate governance and external audit will be illustrated and linked to 
earnings management. 
 
The literature on the association between earnings management and both corporate governance and 
the external audit is reviewed in chapter three, which also provides a critical and comprehensive 
review of the various corporate governance attributes and external audit factors.  The review of each 
variable concludes with identifying the literature gap and suggestions to bridge this gap.  
 
Chapter four discusses the most common theoretical frameworks, such as agency theory, 
stakeholder theory, stewardship theory and institutional theory, that researchers have employed to 
explain and analyse the association between earnings management and both corporate governance 
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and external audit factors.   Illustrations of agency theory, the theory adopted for this study, will be 
offered and its selection will be justified.  
 
Chapter five outlines the methodological methods adopted in this study.  Methods of measuring the 
selected dependent variable (earnings management) are illustrated.  Then, each monitoring device is 
theoretically and empirically associated with earnings management, followed by research 
hypotheses.  This chapter also illustrates the operationalisation of independent variables, identifies 
the data sources and describes the sample selection process.  Analytical procedures are presented 
and choices of analytical methods are justified.  
 
Chapters six presents and discusses the research results.  It starts with descriptive statistics and 
correlation analysis; this is followed by the presentation of the results of the tested models and the 
inferences drawn from tests of the hypotheses.  Findings are compared with prior research findings 
and differences are explained.  Further analyses and robustness checks highlight extra findings and 
test the sensitivity of the main findings.  
 
Chapter seven presents a summary of this research study and draws conclusions and implications.  
This chapter also highlights the study's potential limitations and it provides recommendations for 
various parties and avenues for future research. 
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Chapter Two 
Background 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Earnings management can take many forms and include numerous deceitful actions.  This chapter 
will provide a general understanding of earnings management and what may encourage managers‟ 
to practice it.  On this basis, this chapter will then discuss methods of measuring earnings 
management.  Then the monitoring devices of corporate governance and the external audit will be 
illustrated and linked to earnings management. 
 
2.2 Earnings Management Definition 
The literature does not offer a single accepted definition of the term „earnings management‟.  One of 
the most used definitions is  “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999, p.365). 
 
Another common definition is offered by Schipper (1989, p.92), who observes that “By earnings 
management I really mean „disclosure management‟ in the sense of a purposeful intervention in the 
external financial reporting process, with a view to obtaining private gain for shareholders or 
managers”.  
 
Field et al. (2001) state that earnings management occurs when managers exercise their discretion 
over accounting numbers, with or without restrictions.  Such discretion can be either firm value 
maximising or opportunistic.  Thus, there are two types of earnings management, opportunistic and 
informative. 
 
14 
 
Opportunistic earnings management means that managers seek to mislead investors by pursuing the 
management‟s interests.  The literature on this type of earnings management mainly originated with 
Healy (1985) who finds that managers use accruals to strategically manipulate bonus income.  
Stockholders lose when earnings management results in abnormal private gains for managers. This 
could take the form of increased compensation (Healy, 1985). 
 
Indeed, evidence supports a widespread association between managerial compensation and higher 
degrees of earnings management.  Burns and Kedia (2006), Cohen et al. (2004), Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006) and Cheng and Warfield (2010) document that the use of  discretionary accruals is 
more common at firms where top management compensation is closely tied to the value of stock and 
that this applies particularly when stock options are involved.  
 
Informative earnings management which aims to enhance value maximisation was first enunciated 
by Holthausen and Leftwich (1983, cited in Beneish, 2001). Here, managerial discretion is a means 
for managers to reveal to investors their private expectations about the firm‟s future cash flows.  
Stockholders gain when earnings management is used to signal managers‟ private information 
(Healy and Palepu, 1995) or to reduce political costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
 
Earnings management extends to cover manipulations other than accounting choices. Though Fields 
et al.‟s (2001, p.16) research review concerns accounting choice, their discussion included the 
comment that, “Although not all accounting choices involve earnings management, and the term 
earnings management extends beyond accounting choice, the implications of accounting choice to 
achieve a goal are consistent with the idea of earnings management.”  
 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) criticise the above definitions of earnings management because they do 
not clearly distinguish between „earnings management‟ and „fraud‟. Fraud can be defined as "the 
intentional, deliberate, misstatement or omission of material facts, or accounting data, which is 
misleading and, when considered with all other information made available, would cause the reader 
to change or alter his or her judgment or decision" (The National Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners, 1993, p.12). 
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Dechow and Skinner (2000) discuss the differences between the concepts of earnings management 
and fraud and suggest that there is only a fine line between them.  Their attempt to distinguish 
between earnings management and fraud is presented in figure 2.1. 
Therefore, there is wide variety of earnings management activities, and they cannot always be 
classified easily.  There is a continuum that ranges from very conservative accounting and complete 
legitimacy at one extreme to fraud at the other.   
 
However, Dechow and Skinner (2000) indicate that, in the case of aggressive accounting choices, it 
is difficult to differentiate between opportunistic earnings management and the legitimate exercise 
of accounting discretion without identifying the managerial incentives to manage earnings.  This led 
to research on managers‟ incentives to manage earnings and this will be discussed in the following 
section of this chapter. 
 
Of all the above definitions, Schipper‟s (1989) seems to be the most comprehensive as it emphasises 
that earnings management is a deliberate action, and that it includes any sort of manipulation that 
can affect financial reporting either through earnings numbers or any other accounting items, and 
can be either legitimate (within the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)) or 
illegitimate (accounting frauds).  This manipulation can be committed to meet management 
objectives (opportunistic earnings management) or shareholders‟ objectives (informative earnings 
management). 
 
Kaplan (2001, p.3) states that “If earnings management is considered unethical by financial 
statement users, then managers‟ and companies‟ reputations may suffer and companies‟ credibility 
in the financial markets may be damaged”. Kaplan investigates whether shareholders and non-
shareholders of a company perceive earnings management as more or less unethical, depending on 
the intent and technique of earnings management.   
 
His experiment shows that it cannot be simply assumed that non-shareholders always perceive 
earnings management as unethical while shareholders‟ opinions depend on the earnings 
management‟s intent (individual managerial benefit versus company benefit). 
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These definitions agree that the prerequisite for earnings management is managers‟ intent, but there 
is no agreement about whether or not this intent is opportunistic.  Subramanaym (1996) examines 
whether earnings management smoothing is opportunistic and he refers to earnings management 
only in relation to opportunistic behaviour but not when managerial discretion is used to improve 
earnings persistence and predictability. 
 
Another point that can be drawn from the above definitions is that earnings management is not 
directly connected only with reported earnings, but it can impact on other accounting numbers.  
Thus, earnings management could occur in supplementary disclosures and may for instance target 
financial ratios instead of earnings. 
 
An essential question here is what activities can be regarded as earnings management? The nature of 
accrual accounting gives managers a great deal of discretion in determining the actual earnings a 
firm reports in any given period.  The most common practice is to manipulate the timing of 
expenditures such as advertising expenses or outlays for research and development.   
 
Firms can also, to some extent, alter the timing of recognition of revenues and expenses by, for 
example, advancing recognition of sales revenue through credit sales, or delaying recognition of 
losses by waiting to establish loss reserves.  Other judgments which can come within the definition 
of earnings management include estimation of, for instance, the economic lifetime of assets and 
assets impairments. 
 
Like most earnings management studies, this research uses Healy and Wahlen's definition, which 
assumes that earnings management occurs only for the purposes of masking deteriorating financial 
performance; the word 'mislead' in Healy and Wahlen's definition appears to exclude the possibility 
that earnings management can be informative for shareholders.  Thus, in this study, the term 
„earnings management‟ implies management opportunism. 
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Figure 2.1
1
  
The distinction between earnings management and fraudulent financial reporting 
 
Within GAAP 
"Conservative" 
Accounting -    Overly aggressive recognition of provisions or reserves. 
 -    Over valuating of acquired in-process R&D in purchase acquisitions 
 -    Overstatement of restructuring charges and asset write-offs. 
 
 
"Neutral" 
Accounting          Earnings that result from a neutral operation of the process. 
 
 
 
"Aggressive" 
Accounting -    Understatement of the provision for bad debts. 
- -    Drawing down provisions or reserves in an overly aggressive manner. 
 
 
Violates GAAP 
"Fraudulent 
Accounting" -     Recording sales before they are "realisable". 
- -    Recording fictitious sales. 
                                                             
1 Source: adobted from Dechow, P. M and Skinner, D. J (2000, p. 239). 
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- -    Backdating sales invoices. 
- -    Overstating inventory by recording fictitious 
 
 
2.3 Earnings Management Incentives 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) argue that, despite the popular wisdom that earnings management exists, 
it is remarkably difficult to document it convincingly.  They recommend that analysts should first 
identify conditions in which managers' incentives to manage earnings are likely to be strong, and 
then test whether patterns of unexpected accruals are consistent with these incentives. 
 
Prior literature has examined many different incentives for earnings management, but Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) identify three main types, namely, capital market, managers‟ contracts written in 
terms of accounting numbers, and political and regulatory requirements. Following this 
classification, the following section will illustrate these main types of incentive.  
 
2.3.1 Stock Market Incentives 
The interaction between reported earnings and stock prices can indeed push management towards 
earnings management.  Kim and Yi (2006) find that discretionary accruals for publicly traded firms 
are greater than those for privately held firms by a magnitude of 1.2 percent of lagged total assets.  
This result supports the notion that stock markets create incentives for public firms to engage in 
earnings management. 
 
Prior investigations of capital market incentives are typically concerened about these four main 
issues: (1) incentives for managers to meet stock market participants' expectations; (2) incentives for 
managers to manipulate earnings before initial public or seasoned equity offerings; (3) tests of 
whether investors are deceived by earnings management; and (4) evidence on the capital market 
consequence of earnings management.  The incintives issues are discussed, in turn, in the following 
sub-sections. 
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Developed countries such as the UK are known for their widespread share ownership and their 
liquid and efficient stock markets.  Investors often rely on the forecasts of stock market analysts to 
put together a portfolio of potentially successful firms. 
 Meeting the analysts‟ expectations is important as firms that meet or beat expectations generate 
higher returns, even when it is likely that this is achieved through earnings management (Bartov et 
al., 2004).  On the other hand, missing an earnings benchmark has considerable negative 
implications for stock returns (Matsunaga and Park, 2001). 
 
Thus, meeting or beating the analysts‟ forecasts to attract potential investors is considered highly 
important, and may encourage companies to engage in earnings management.  If pre-managed 
earnings are below the forecast, managers could use income-increasing earnings management and 
when pre-managed earnings are higher than the forecast, managers might use income-decreasing 
earnings management to defer these returns to future reports. 
 
Recent research also considers earnings management in specific stock market situations, such as an 
initial public offering (DuCharme et al., 2001).  Companies that make an initial public offering do 
not have a previous stock price and their initial stock prices are mainly based on their financial 
performance before going public.  Therefore, managers of 'going public' firms have an incentive to 
manage their earnings before their initial public offering in order to receive higher prices for their 
stocks. 
 
The opposite of an equity offering, a share repurchase, can also incentivise managers to engage in 
earnings management.  Bens et al. (2003) find that corporate managers use stock repurchases as an 
earnings management tool when earnings are below the level required to achieve the desired growth 
of earnings per share.  
 
In relation to incentives for managers to meet stock market expectations, accounting earnings tend 
to be managed towards expectations in general, and towards earnings forecasts in particular. In this 
respect, the US evidence indicates that managers attempt to meet or beat four main earnings 
benchmarks.  These earnings benchmarks are: meeting analysts' forecasts, reporting positive profits, 
sustaining last year's performance, and meeting management's expectations. 
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Payne and Robb (2000) study the effect of analysts' forecasts on earnings management, 
hypothesising that managers have incentives to use their discretion over accounting accruals to 
eliminate negative earnings surprises. They find that managers manage earnings upwards when pre-
managed earnings are below analysts' forecasts.  However, when pre-managed earnings exceed 
analysts' forecasts, managers either keep discretionary accruals for future periods by employing an 
income-decreasing strategy or preserve a positive earnings surprise with the aim of achieving a 
favourable share price reaction.  
 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) use financial analysts' stock recommendations of buy, hold or sell to 
predict the direction of earnings management. They find that firms that receive "buy" 
recommendations are more likely to manage earnings to meet or exceed analysts' forecasts, while 
firms that receive "sell" recommendations are more likely to engage in income-decreasing earnings 
management, suggesting that these firms have more incentives than other firms to create accounting 
reserves using earnings baths.  
 
In terms of stock market incentives to report positive profits and maintain last year's performance, 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) examine the distribution of reported earnings around incentives to 
avoid reporting losses or a fall in earnings.  They find that using earnings management to avoid 
annual losses and earnings decreases is common. More specifically, they find that 30-44 percent of 
firms with small pre-managed losses manage earnings to raise reported net income to a positive 
figure. Similarly, Degeorge et al. (1999) find that managers avoid losses but, once profitability is 
reached, they attempt to meet analysts' earnings forecasts. 
 
Holland and Ramsay (2003) examine whether listed Australian companies manage earnings to 
report positive profits and to maintain the previous year's profit, and they find evidence of 
discontinuities in the distribution of reported earnings and changes in earnings.  
 
Overall, it would seem that, for any specific period, managers prefer to manage reported earnings or 
to reduce analysts' earnings expectations with the intent of beating these expectations, rather than 
reveal disappointing earnings (Soffer et al., 2000).  
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2.3.2 Management Compensation Contracts Incentives 
The studies quoted in section 2.3.1 illustrate incentives for managers to engage in earnings 
management to meet or beat expectations and thus to influence stock prices.  This type of 
opportunistic behavior may be even more likely when managers also gain financial benefits from the 
firm‟s financial performance.  
 
Therefore, it is argued that, in order to reduce agency costs and align shareholders‟ interests with 
managers‟ objectives, managers will enter into monitoring and bonding contracts which will help to 
align the interests of managers and shareholders.  An example of such contracts is the management 
compensation plan which ties part of the management's rewards to its reported earnings. 
 
In this respect, accounting numbers are usually used to establish the covenant conditions of 
compensation contracts and to monitor whether or not these conditions are breached. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) argue that managers in firms with earnings-based compensation contracts have 
incentives to report earnings results that maximise the value of their bonus awards. 
 
The first study to investigate the impact of executive compensation plans on accrual decisions and 
accounting choices were conducted by Healy (1985) and it find that managers have an economic 
incentive to manipulate earnings in order to increase their cash compensation.  He concludes that 
there is a strong association between accruals and managers' income-reporting incentives under a 
management bonus plan.  
 
Leuz et al. (2003) investigate other types of managerial opportunistic behaviour such as excessive 
compensation for managers.  They assert that such behaviour ultimately shows up in the firm‟s 
earnings.  If compensation, stock option, bonus and other performance related payments are tied to 
earnings, there is an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings and an information asymmetry 
problem is created by offering unreliable and irrelevant financial statements.  This scenario creates 
agency costs and leads to opportunistic management behaviour, such as earnings management. 
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The association between earnings management and insider trading is documented by Beneish and 
Vargus (2002), Park and Park (2004) and Cheng and Warfield (2010).  Other studies, such as those 
of Baker et al (2003) and Bartov and Mohanram (2004), document the association between earnings 
management and management compensation using stock options. 
 
2.3.3 Debt Contracts Incentives 
In addition to possible conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers, there can also be a 
conflict between the interests of shareholders and those of debt holders; decisions that consider 
shareholders interests, for example excessive dividend payments, may not be in debt holders‟ 
interests. 
  
Thus, this conflict can cause agency costs of debt. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that these 
costs can be borne by shareholders/managers if no action is taken to reduce them by monitoring and 
bonding contracts.  It is assumed that managers have incentives to enter into monitoring and 
bonding contracts in order to reduce these agency costs of debt. Writing restrictive covenants in debt 
agreements is an example of these costs. 
 
In this respect, accounting numbers are usually used to establish the covenant conditions of debt 
contracts and to monitor whether or not these conditions are breached.  This implies that accounting 
policies that generate the accounting numbers are selected as a part of the wealth-maximizing 
process.  Therefore, managers' wealth could be affected by any changes in the accounting policies 
and, hence, there are always incentives for managers to use specific accounting policies which 
enhance the firm‟s or their own future cash flows.  Most of the prior research has focused on the 
contracting effects of mandatory changes in accounting policies. 
 
Kasanen et al. (1996) examine whether firms close to violating their dividend covenant restrictions 
change their accounting techniques to increase those limits.  They find evidence of dividend-based 
earnings management in Finnish companies that have owners who prefer stable dividends. 
 
The main purpose of management compensation contracts is to limit management's ability to benefit 
investors over creditors. Therefore, debt contracts often contain restrictive covenants to limit  
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potential conflicts of interest between shareholders and debt holders.  These covenants normally 
restrict the ability of management to pay dividends or issue new debt, or give debt holders the right 
to demand early repayment of the debt issue if minimum accounting numbers are not achieved.  
 
Some other prior research investigates the impact of accounting restrictions in debt contracts on the 
managers' choice of accounting techniques. However, Fields et al. (2001) review the empirical 
research on accounting choices and conclude that the evidence on whether accounting choices are 
motivated by debt covenant concerns is inconclusive. 
 
Hunt (1990) examines the debt covenants for a random sample of 187 firms and reports that more 
than half of the sample have a dividend covenant, about one third have a working capital covenant, 
28% have a debt-equity ratio covenant and 18% have a stockholders' equity covenant.  Therefore, 
using dividend covenants in debt contracts suggests that bondholders believe that, without this 
covenant, managers will not cut dividends to protect bondholders' interests. 
 
Furthermore, Beatty and Weber (2003) provide convincing evidence on the effect of debt contracts 
in borrowers‟ accounting choices.  They document that borrowers are more likely to make income-
increasing rather than income-decreasing changes.  Additionally, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find 
that their sample firms accelerated earnings one year prior to the covenant violation. 
 
2.3.4 Political and Regulatory Requirements Incentives 
In addition to earnings management in order to influence shareholders‟ opinions and decisions, 
managers can also manage reported earnings in response to other stakeholders‟ concerns.  Banking 
and governmental regulations that are based on accounting numbers, and tax laws, may be 
considered as possible sources of motives for earnings management. 
 
Regulatory rules can put pressure on firms that would make them more prone to earnings 
management practice.  For example, Haw et al (2005) investigate income-increasing earnings 
management in China as a response to governmental regulations demanding a minimum of 10% 
return on equity (ROE) for firms that desire to offer shares or issue bonds, and find a strong 
motivation for earnings management practice. 
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Johnston and Rock (2005) document evidence of income-decreasing earnings management in 
companies threatened by the Superfund Act.  Moreover, D‟Souza, Jacob and Ramesh (2001) present 
evidence for firms using earnings management to reduce labour renegotiation costs. 
 
In terms of industry regulations, Key (1997) studies the role of accounting information in the 
political process surrounding regulation of the cable television industry.  He investigates whether 
cable TV managers select accounting choices to mitigate congressional scrutiny and potential 
regulations and he find that such political costs can motivate earnings management practice. 
 
In addition, Han and Wang (1998) provide evidence that oil companies used income-decreasing 
accounting policies during the Gulf War to avoid the political consequences of showing a higher 
profit from increased retail prices. 
 
In terms of regulated financial institutions, prior research documents that managers have several 
incentives to manage earnings such as matching financial reporting with regulatory constraints.  For 
example, Beaver and Engel (1996), and Liu et al. (1997) indicate that banks which are very close to 
minimum capital competence requirements are likely to manipulate accruals. 
 
Jones and Sharma (2001) compare old economy firms and new economy firms listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange over a ten-year period.  They employ four different accruals proxies for 
earnings management and find that new economy firms have significantly less earnings 
management than old economy firms.  They attribute this result to the stringent disclosure regime 
imposed on new economy firms by the Australian Stock Exchange Listing Rule 4.713, which 
requires a detailed quarterly cash flow statement under the direct method.  
 
In the same respect, Black et al. (1998) examine the effects of accounting regulation on the level of 
earnings management in Australia, New Zealand and the UK.  They find no evidence of earnings 
management in Australia and New Zealand; in contrast, they find strong evidence of earnings 
management in the UK before the change in the accounting standard on asset revaluation. Thus, 
managers may find deficiencies in the regulations as an incentive for earnings management. 
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2.4 Earnings Management Measurement Methods 
Earnings management propensity is invisible and it can be considered successful only if it goes 
undetected.  This makes earnings management measurement a challenging task for researchers.  It is 
hard for investors to detect earnings management from looking at single cases but detection is less 
difficult if this phenomenon is studied using a large set of data to uncover systematic patterns. 
 
Many empirical accounting studies examine whether managers manage earnings and under what 
conditions earnings management can be expected.  In these studies it is commonly believed that 
accruals provide management with the opportunity to alter earnings. Therefore, abnormal accruals 
are used as an empirical indicator of earnings management (Bowman and Navissi, 2003; Batov et 
al., 2001; Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b; Dechow et al., 1995; DeFond and Jimbalvo; 1994; Boynton et 
al., 1992; Jones, 1991).  Accounting accruals are the favoured instrument for earnings management 
rather than cash earnings, which are less likely to be managed because they are hard to manipulate 
(Schipper, 1989; Burilovich and Kattelus, 1997). 
  
Therefore, measuring the proportion of earnings that are not managed is the first step in measuring 
earnings management in a firm.  Discretionary and non-discretionary accruals are used to measure 
managed and unmanaged earnings, respectively.  As pointed out by Healy (1985), management 
exercises discretion over discretionary accruals only. 
 
Earlier studies examine a specific accounting method choice or a single accrual (Zmijeswki and 
Hangeman, 1981; McNichols and Wilson, 1988).  However, the second generation of earnings 
management studies, such as those of Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) focus on total accruals.  
Total accruals are defined as the difference between cash from operations and net income.  
Accounting accruals are affected by choices of accounting method and accounting estimates made 
by managers in the past and currently.  
 
In earnings management studies, it is important to segregate discretionary accruals from total 
accruals.  In his information content study, Subramanyam (1996b) regress annual stock returns on 
operating cash flows, non-discretionary income and discretionary accruals.  He finds that 
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discretionary accruals were associated with annual stock returns. The author interpreted this as 
implying that discretionary accruals are informative with respect to stock returns.  Many studies 
show that accrual based accounting earnings are more informative with respect to stock returns than 
cash flows (e.g., Ebybum (1986) and Dechow (1994)). 
Since discretionary accruals are not directly observable, many proxies and estimation techniques for 
detecting them are suggested.  For example, Healy (1985) uses total accruals as a proxy for 
discretionary accruals and DeAngelo (1986) uses the change in total accruals as a proxy for 
discretionary accruals. Jones (1991) employs a more sophisticated approach to estimating earnings 
management and this is described in section 2.4.1.1 below. 
 
McNichols (2000) discusses the research designs of the three most commonly applied designs in the 
earnings management literature: aggregate accruals, specific accruals and the distribution of 
earnings.  One of the main arguments against using aggregate accruals models is that there is 
insufficient knowledge on how these accruals „behave‟ in the absence of earnings management.  
Thus, McNichols argues that the way forward in earnings management research is specific accruals 
research design.  
 
The frequency distributions approach introduced by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) is another 
method used to distinguish between companies who are thought to practice earnings management 
and those who are probably not doing so.  This method, although quite easy to put into practice, also 
attracts some criticism.  This will be addressed in following section. 
 
2.4.1 Aggregate Accruals Models 
This is the most commonly used method by previous studies to measure earnings management.  As 
mentioned earlier, accounting accruals consist of discretionary accruals, which are management 
determined, and non-discretionary accruals, which management cannot determine because they are 
economically determined.  Discretionary accruals allow managers to exercise their discretion over 
accounting choices and estimates, and the literature documents that firms use discretionary accruals 
to practice earnings management (e.g. Bowman and Navissi, 2003; Batov et al., 2001, Kasznik, 
1999; Dechow et al., 1995; Gaver et al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995; Warfield et al., 1995; 
DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeny, 1994; Cahan, 1992; Jones, 1991; Healy, 1985). 
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This method therefore requires a separation of accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary 
components in order to use the discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management.  One 
major limitation of this method is the difficulty of identifying and separating total accruals into its 
unmanaged and managed components. 
 
Aggregate accruals have several models ranging from the simple, in which the change in total 
accruals is used as a proxy for discretionary accruals, to the relatively sophisticated, which separate 
accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary components using regression analysis. 
 
The models most frequently used by academic researchers for separating discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals are the Jones (1991) and the modified Jones (Dechow et al. 1995) models, as 
documented by prior literature (e.g. Kothari et al., 2001; Bartov et al., 2001; Kasznik, 1999; Becker 
et al., 1998; Beneish, 1997; Guay et al., 1996; Subramanyam, 1996a; Dechow et al., 1995; DeFond 
and Jiambalvo, 1994).   
 
There follows a brief explanation of the assumptions and limitations of each model followed by a 
discussion of the reasons for using or eliminating each model. 
 
2.4.1.1 Jones (1991) model: 
Following Kaplan's (1985) suggestion that total accruals are likely to result partly from managerial 
discretion and partly from changes in a firm's economic conditions, Jones (1991) proposes a model 
which controls for changes in the economic circumstances of a firm. Unlike Healy (1985) and 
DeAngelo (1986), who assume that non-discretionary accruals are zero or constant, here non-
discretionary accruals are modelled as a linear function of the change in revenues and fixed assets. 
 
It is assumed that while sales growth controls a firm‟s non-discretionary working capital, the level 
of property, plant, and equipment controls the firm‟s non-discretionary depreciation expense 
(Bernard and Skinner, 1996).  The change in revenues is used as a proxy for the unmanaged change 
in revenues.  
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The Jones model regresses total accruals on gross property, plant and equipment and changes in 
revenues which provide coefficients that are then used to estimate unmanaged accruals.  The 
regression residuals are considered to be managed accruals (Xiong, 2006). 
Equation 1:  Jones (1991) non-discretionary accruals model: 
TAC it = α (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it / TA it -1) + β 2 (PPE it / TA it -1) + ε it                  
Where: 
-     TAC it  is total accruals. 
- TA it -1 is the book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t -1,  
-  Δ REVit / TA it -1 is sales revenues of firm i in year t less revenues in year t – 1 scaled by TA it -1, 
- PPE it / TA it -1 is gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of year t scaled by TA it -1,  
- α β1 β 2    are estimated parameters. 
        -      ε it         is the residual 
 
The non-discretionary and discretionary accruals are computed as the forecasted value and the 
prediction error respectively.  One major limitation of this model lies in the assumption that 
managers do not exercise discretion over revenues and this can lead to misspecification of the 
discretionary accruals when managers do exercise discretion over revenues.  It may also provide 
biased accruals because it omits expenses.  More details will be presented in the discussion of 
modified Jones model below, as it is considered to be an extension of the Jones model. 
 
2.4.1.2. Modified Jones Model  
Dechow et al. (1995) realised that the weakness of the Jones (1991) model lies in its assumption that 
total revenues are non-discretionary and they assumed that only collected revenues are non-
discretionary.  Dechow et al. (1995) provide evidence that their model is more powerful than the 
Jones model at detecting cases of revenue manipulations.  Under the modified Jones model, total 
accruals are regressed on gross property, plant, and equipment and the change in revenues are 
adjusted for changes in receivables.  
 
A number of studies examine the relative performance of discretionary accrual models.  For 
example, Dechow et al. (1995) examine five discretionary accrual models including those of Healy 
(1985), DeAngelo (1986), the industry model by Dechow and Sloan (1991), the Jones (1991) model 
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and the modified Jones model suggested by Dechow et al. (1995). They compare the performance of 
the five models using four samples: (i) a random sample; (ii) a sample of firm-years experiencing 
extreme financial performance; (iii) a sample of firm-years with artificially induced earnings 
management; and (iv) a sample of firm-years in which the SEC alleged that earnings were 
overstated.  They find that the Jones model and Dechow et a1.‟s (1995) modified Jones model are 
best in detecting earnings management. 
 
The Jones (1991) and Dechow et al. (1995) models were originally introduced as time series. 
However, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) propose a cross-sectional Jones model rather than a time 
series model and many recent studies have used cross-sectional discretionary accruals (e.g. 
Subramanyam, 1996a; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Becker et al., 1998; Peasnall et al., 1998; 
Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b; Klein, 2002b; Xie et al., 2003; Abdul Rahman, 2006; Jiang et al., 2008; 
Siregar and Utama, 2008; Chang and Sun, 2009; Jaggi et al., 2009 and Baxter and Cotter, 2009). 
Some of these studies‟ arguments will be summarised in the following discussion, and the selection, 
for the purposes of this study, of the cross-sectional version rather than the time-series version will 
be justified. 
 
Peasnell et al., (2000b) discuss the appropriateness of the assumption in the time series Jones model 
that coefficient estimates on change in sales and the level of property, plant and equipment remain 
stationary over time. They add that using cross-sectional accruals models help to avoid the 
survivorship bias problems inherent in the time-series approach.  Moreover, under time-series 
models, the self-reversing property of accruals may introduce specification problems in the form of 
serially correlated residuals.  Lastly, they state that this model allows the inclusion of firms with 
short histories.  
 
Subramanyam (1996b) and Bartov et al. (2001) used the Jones (1991) and modified Jones (Dechow 
et al., 1995) models to evaluate whether cross-sectional models are similar to time-series models in 
providing reliable estimates of discretionary accruals.  They find that the cross-sectional Jones and 
the cross-sectional modified Jones models perform better than their time-series counterparts in 
detecting earnings management.  
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The cross-sectional model is usually estimated by year and industry.  Therefore, the cross-sectional 
Jones model controls for year and industry specific effects.  Additionally, Subramanyam (1996b) 
and Peasnell et al. (2000b), elaborate that cross-sectional models usually yield larger samples and 
more observations and do not assume the stationarity of the discretionary accrual models.  
 
Subramanyam, (1996b) argues that all studies that use the Jones model prefer the cross-sectional 
version of the model over the time-series version for three main reasons.  First, the time-series 
method requires an estimation period for each firm of at least 8-10 years; the cross-sectional version 
usually produces a larger sample.   Secondly, the long period that is required to estimate the time-
series method uses an estimation which makes it more exposed to serial correlation statistical 
problems that increase the possibility that model will be mis-specified due to non-stationarity.  
Finally, due to the overlap between estimation and event periods, the time-series method weakens 
the power for tests when earnings management is examined for different periods. 
  
Dechow et al. (1995) conclude that their version of the modified Jones model is superior to all other 
currently available models, though it remains imperfect.  One disadvantage is the implicit 
assumption made by the cross-sectional model that the discretionary accrual model is the same for 
every firm in an industry, regardless of its operating strategy or the stage in its product life cycle. If 
firms in an industry are not homogeneous, the estimated discretionary accrual model will suffer 
from measurement errors.  
 
The modified Jones model regresses total accruals on gross property, plant, and equipment and 
changes in cash revenues to provide coefficients that are then used to estimate unmanaged accruals 
as follows: 
 
Equation 2: Dechow et al. (1995) modification of the cross-sectional Jones non-discretionary 
accruals model: 
TAC it /A it = γ0 (1/A it-1) + γ1 ((ΔREV it - ΔREC it)/A it-1) + γ 2 (PPE it /A it-1) + ε it                  
Where: 
-     TAC it   is total accruals. 
-     TA it -1 is the book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t -1,  
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-  Δ REV it / TA it -1 is sales revenues of firm i in year t less revenues in year t – 1 scaled by TA it -1, 
-    Δ REC it is the change in accounts receivables. 
- PPE it / TA it -1 is gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of year t scaled by TA it -1,  
- α β1 β 2    are estimated parameters. 
        -      ε it         is the residual 
 
2.4.1.3 Performance Matched Discretionary Accruals 
Dechow et al. (1995) and Kasznik (1999) find that the results estimated by the Jones model indicate 
that discretionary accruals are significantly positively associated with the return on assets (ROA).  
To overcome this problem of performance related misspecification, some recent studies by Kasznik 
(1999), Bartov et al. (2001) and Kothari et al. (2005) remove the potential effects of this correlation 
between discretionary accruals and earnings performance by employing a matched-firm or portfolio 
technique to adjust the discretionary accruals.  
 
Kothari et al. (2005) argue that the discretionary accruals, as estimated by both Jones and modified 
Jones models, may result in severe measurement error in discretionary accruals when these models 
do not control for the prior performance of the company.  They propose a model that includes an 
intercept and control for the firm‟s performance using the lag of return on assets (ROA) to mitigate 
the problematic heteroskedasticity and mis-specification issues of the Jones and modified Jones 
models in estimating accruals. 
 
Kothari et al. (2005) examine the power of the Jones and modified Jones discretionary accruals and 
retested them after adjusting for performance.  Their results suggest that performance-matched 
discretionary accruals enhances the reliability of inferences from earnings management research 
when the hypothesis being tested does not imply that earnings management will vary with 
performance, or where the control firms are not expected to engage in earnings management. 
 
They suggest adding the return on assets of the previous year (ROA) as an additional regressor to 
the cross-sectional modified Jones model.   As this study does not examine a specific event, and 
consistent with Kothari et al. (2005) and Kasznik (1999), it also deducts the receivables change 
from the revenues change in estimating the coefficients.  Therefore, this study will estimate the 
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discretionary accruals based on the Kothari et al. (2005) model by the residuals of the following 
cross-sectional regression using firms within the same two-digit industry SIC code to estimate the 
parameters.   Thus, the discretionary accruals will be estimated by the residuals of the following 
cross-sectional model: 
 
Equation 4: Kothari et al. (2005) performance matched accruals model 
TAC it = ά (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it   - Δ REC it) / TA it -1 + β 2    (PPE it / TA it -1) + β 3   ROA it -1 + ε it                       
 
2.4.2 Measuring Total Accruals 
As mentioned earlier, total accruals need to be computed first in order to estimate discretionary 
accruals.  The literature offers two methods for computing total accruals. The first is the traditional 
balance sheet approach that is used in the majority of prior studies (e.g. Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991; 
Dechow et al.; 1995; Peasnell et al.; 2000b; Kothari, 2001). The second method is the cash flow 
approach used by recent studies (e.g. Subramanyam, 1996b; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; 
Becker et al., 1998; Klein, 2002b; Xie et al., 2003; Abdul Rahman, 2006; Huang et al., 2007 and 
Jaggi et al., 2009).  One of the reasons for the popularity of the balance sheet approach may be the 
availability of balance sheet statement data compared to cash flow statement data. 
The balance sheet approach measures accruals as follows: 
TACt = ΔCAt - ΔCasht - ΔCLt + ΔDCLt - DEPt 
Where: 
ΔCAt     Change in current assets in year t 
ΔCasht     Change in cash and cash equivalents in year t 
ΔCLt     Change in current liabilities in year t 
ΔDCLt   Change in debt included in current liabilities in year t. 
DEPt     Depreciation and amortization expense in year t 
 
While the balance sheet approach omits non-current accruals (except for depreciation and 
amortization), the cash flow approach accounts for both current and non-current accruals. Omitted 
non-current accruals transfer accruals from current earnings to future earnings and are not captured 
by the balance sheet approach.  
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Under the cash flow approach, total accruals are measured as follows: 
 
TACt = EBXAt – OCt 
Where: 
EBXAt              Earnings before extraordinary and abnormal items in year t 
OCt   Operating cash flow in year t 
 
Collins and Hribar (2002) compare these two approaches in four different sample characteristics, 
and find empirical evidence that the balance sheet approach is less efficient than the cash flow 
approach when firms experience mergers or acquisitions. They argue that some non-articulation 
events such as mergers and acquisitions may break down the linkage between changes in balance 
sheet working capital accounts and accrued revenues and expenses on the income statement. This 
may result in the total accruals estimated using the balance sheet method including significant 
measurement errors compared with total accruals as measured directly using the cash flow statement 
method.  
 
Collins and Hribar (2002) also find that the balance sheet approach has a high frequency and 
magnitude of significant errors.  They add that the balance sheet approach is biased in measuring 
accruals for firms with discontinuing operations that can be considered discretionary items.  This is 
also due to the break down in the presumed articulation in the balance sheet approach. 
 
As the Kothari model detects the net effect of all accounting estimations and choices that influence 
reported earnings, this approach will be used in this study because the corporate governance and 
auditing literature does not specify that certain accounting manipulations can be directly related to 
either corporate governance or external audit. McNichols (2000) argues that the aggregate accruals 
models approach allows for control of additional variables, including corporate governance and 
external audit attributes.  
 
2.4.3 The Specific Accrual Method 
Most of the earnings management research relies upon total accruals rather than specific accruals to 
detect the incidence of earnings management.  Healy and Wahlen (1999) argue that there is 
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remarkably little evidence on earnings management using specific accruals.  They add that specific 
accruals research can provide useful information for standard setters about the deficiency of 
standards.  Similar to the aggregate accruals studies, this alternative approach models the behaviour 
of each specific accrual in order to identify its discretionary and non-discretionary components  
 
Some studies examine earnings management using only a specific accrual, such as bad debt 
provisions (e.g., McNichols and Wilson, 1988), depreciation (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998b), and deferred 
tax (e.g., Philipps et al., 2003 and Teoh et al., 1998b).  For example, Philipps et al. (2003) suggest 
using deferred tax expense accruals to detect earnings management, along with discretionary 
accruals. They provid evidence that this expense is incrementally useful, beyond total accruals and 
discretionary accruals derived from two Jones-type models, in detecting earnings management 
which aims to avoid a small loss or an earnings decline. 
 
This specific accrual approach has some disadvantages; if the accrual being examined is managed, 
earnings management can be detected but otherwise there will be a misleading conclusion of no 
earnings management.  Moreover, it is usually difficult to identify the specific accrual used to 
manage earnings.  Even if the specific accrual is managed, the effect of managing any one accrual 
by itself may not be large enough to achieve statistical significance.  
 
It is logical to assume that managers use more than one accrual when managing earnings. Therefore, 
while the single accrual method is effective in detecting earnings management in some 
circumstances, it fails to detect earnings management under most circumstances (McNichols and 
Wilson 1988).  Moreover, construct validity is lower for the single accrual method than for the total 
accrual method because a single accrual can be easily influenced by other variables.  For example, 
an income-increasing change in a firm‟s bad debt provision could be the result of earnings 
management but it could also be the result of a change in the firm‟s credit policies or simply a 
change in overall economic conditions. 
 
McNichols (2000) shows that the specific accrual models approach is not flexible in investigating 
additional variables, such as corporate governance and external audit attributes.  Thus, for research 
that aims to explore the association between earnings management and other hypothesised factors, a 
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specific accrual model is meaningless because it requires a separate model for each accrual likely to 
be influenced by the hypothesised factors. 
 
Beneish (1999) also mentions some limitations of this model; it highly mis-classifies earnings 
manipulators, and it can only be employed in research examining income-increasing earnings 
manipulation.  McNichols (2000), additionally argues that using a specific accrual model may limit 
the generalisability of the findings, because of the small number of firms for which a specific 
accrual is managed. Another significant disadvantage is that, if it is not clear which accrual 
management might be used to manage earnings, and then the power of a specific accrual test for 
earnings management is reduced. 
 
Therefore, the specific accrual approach does not serve the aim of this study as no prior study has 
identified a particular accruals item that is specifically associated with either corporate governance 
attributes or external audit factors. 
 
2.4.4 The Distribution Method 
The distributional approach proposes that managers have incentives to meet certain earnings 
thresholds such as reporting positive profits, or avoiding losses.  The distribution of reported 
earnings around these thresholds can identify if the incidence of amounts above and below the 
thresholds are distributed smoothly, or if they reflect discontinuities due to earnings management. 
 
Some recent studies use this method to test the prevalence of earnings management in order to avoid 
reporting losses and/or earnings declines.  Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) examin the distribution of 
earnings changes and reported earnings.  They find a higher frequency of firms with slightly positive 
earnings (or earnings changes) than firms with slightly negative earnings (or earnings changes).   
 
Ayers et al. (2006) examine whether the association between discretionary accruals and beating 
earnings benchmarks hold for comparisons of divided groups based on earnings, changes in earnings 
and earnings surprises.  Their results suggest that the positive association between discretionary 
accruals and beating the earnings benchmark extends to other points in the distribution of both 
earnings and earnings changes.  This means that a mere positive association between discretionary 
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accruals and meeting or beating earnings targets is not sufficient to conclude that discretionary 
accruals detect earnings management. Dechow et al. (2003) observe that since both firms that report 
a small profit and firms that report a small loss show similar positive discretionary accruals, it is 
doubtful that the desire to achieve benchmarks is the only explanation for the curve in the 
distribution of earnings.  They propose other explanations, such as real action to beat the benchmark 
and the effect of the denominator. 
 
Xiong (2006) claim that this approach is more objective in terms of detecting the prevalence of 
earnings management than the other methods previously discussed.  Conversely, Healy and Wahlen 
(1999) conten that this approach has failed to detect the extent of earnings management and the 
specific methods or accruals that are used for earnings management.  
 
Durtschi and Easton (2005) argued that there is no unequivocal evidence supporting the pervasive 
presumption that the discontinuities at zero in the frequency distribution approach are merely due to 
earnings management practice.  They provide evidence suggesting that the discontinuity is likely to 
reflect a tendency for analysts to avoid coverage of firms with small loses, rather than being an 
indication of earnings management. 
 
The assumption of symmetry used by the frequency distribution approach in Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) to test for the prevalence of earnings management is criticised by Holland (2004) who 
concludes that this assumption can only be justified where there is a known symmetrical distribution 
for the data in question. 
 
Durtschi and Easton (2005) conclude that the shape of the distribution pattern is not sufficient 
evidence of earnings management.  They provide evidence that the shape of frequency distributions 
around zero earnings is affected by deflation, by sample selection criteria and/or by differences 
between the characteristics of observations to the right and to the left of zero. Their findings 
contradict those of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) for the distribution of deflated earnings who find 
no discontinuities around zero in the distribution of net income, earnings per share and diluted 
earnings per share.  This might be caused by the deflator if it is different for firms above and below 
the earnings benchmark.  
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McNichols (2000) argues that the frequency distribution approach does not differentiate between 
discretionary and non-discretionary accruals, so it does not satisfy the need to measure 
management‟s incentives to manage earnings.  She adds that the frequency distribution approach 
provides results specifying which group of firms will manage earnings rather than forming a better 
measure of discretionary accruals, which the propositions of this study require. 
 
To conclude, aggregate accruals models seem to have significant advantages over other models, 
both theoretically and empirically.  Furthermore, the large number of studies that used aggregate 
accruals models indicates a wide acceptance of the aggregate accruals approach as a proper proxy 
for earnings management.  As a result, the measurement of total accruals in this research is based on 
aggregate accruals (the cross-sectional performance matched discretionary accruals model) using the 
cash flow approach, which will be used to divide accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary 
items.  The level of discretionary accruals will then be used as an empirical indicator of earnings 
management. 
 
2.5 Earnings Management Monitoring Devices 
2.5.1 Corporate Governance Effectiveness as a Monitoring Device 
In a speech to the Global Corporate Governance Forum (2000), cited in (Cadbury, 2002, p.13), Sir 
Adrian Cadbury defines the aims of corporate governance, saying “The corporate governance 
framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability 
for the stewardship of those resources.  The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of 
individuals, corporations and society”. 
 
Additionally, the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defined 
corporate governance as “The system by which business corporations are directed and controlled.  
The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among 
different participants in the corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs.  By 
doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance” (OECD, April 1999). 
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As will be detailed in chapter 4 on the theoretical framework of this research, the separation of 
ownership and control in modern corporations can give rise to the potential for conflicts of interest 
between owners and their agents who manage the day-to-day operation of the company. Jensen and 
Meckling, (1976) argue that managers (the agent) act on behalf of the shareholders (the principal), 
who are the actual owners of the firm.  This relationship empowers the managers‟ position and 
leaves the firm‟s shareholders with no control over the decision-making processes.  
 
Jiraporn et al. (2008) argued that firms that are more informationally opaque may engage in more 
earnings management because a higher degree of asymmetric information makes it more difficult 
for shareholders to monitor managers.  Thus, in the absence of effective control procedures within 
the firm, managers are more likely to take decisions that deviate from the interests of shareholders.  
As a result, managers may be better able to abuse their discretion over earnings, such as engaging in 
earnings management, thereby increasing agency costs. Hence it is argued by Fama and Jensen 
(1983b) that firms need a system that can separate decision management from decision control in 
order to limit agency costs. Corporate governance can provide this desirable system or at least part 
of it.  Such a system limits the power of management to disregard the interests of shareholders, 
thereby decreasing agency costs. This claim is also documented by Fama, (1980), Fama and Jensen, 
(1983b) and Williamson (1988).  These studies argue that corporate governance mechanisms 
constrain managerial opportunism.  According to Hart (1995), a major part of corporate governance 
is designing checks and balances on opportunistic behaviour by managers. 
 
Over the last two decades, large and growing consideration has been given to the importance of 
different corporate governance mechanisms for monitoring managers‟ discretion, including their 
discretionary financial reporting.  Investors and regulators believe strongly that corporate 
governance mechanisms such as independent directors on the board and audit committees help to 
protect the shareholders‟ interests and alleviate any conflict of interest between shareholders and 
managers. For example, the former SEC chairman (Levitt, 1998) recommends that the SEC needes 
to pay more attention to the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on financial reporting.  
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) suggests that corporate governance should impact on shareholders‟ 
perception of the information content of accounting earnings.  The UK Corporate Governance 
Combined Code (2003) emphasises the impact of these mechanisms in enhancing the quality of 
accounting information.  The Code (2003, p.4) states that, “the board members should satisfy 
themselves on the integrity of financial information and those financial controls and systems of risk 
management are robust and defensible”.  The same Code (2003, p.16) added that the “audit 
committee‟s role is to monitor the integrity of the financial statements of the company, and any 
formal announcements relating to the company‟s financial performance, reviewing significant 
financial reporting judgments”.  
 
Empirically, it is widely accepted that governance practices limit a manager‟s ability to manipulate 
earnings (see Beasley, 1996; Dechow, et al., 1996; McMullen and Raghunanadan, 1996; Peasnell et 
al., 2000a; Chtourou et al., 2001; Xie et al., 2003; Park and Shin, 2004; Peasnell et al., 2005; Kim 
and Yi, 2006; Chen et al., 2007; Huang et al., 2007 and Jaggi et al., 2009). 
 
Accordingly, in order to constrain any divergence in interests and to ensure appropriate 
accountability of resources, an organization needs a comprehensive structure of controls that 
encourages efficient performance and responsible behaviour. Corporate governance is used to deter 
any conflict of interests between shareholders and managers that may result in earnings management 
behaviour causing a reduction in shareholder wealth. 
  
In today‟s corporate environment, good governance structures include an adequately functioning 
audit committee, a thoughtfully composed board of directors, a balanced ownership structure, and an 
independent and vigilant external auditor.   
 
Cohen, et al (2002, p.587) recognises that “…one of the most important functions that corporate 
governance can play is in ensuring the quality of the financial reporting process”. Thus, effective 
oversight of the financial reporting process by the aforementioned monitoring mechanisms is 
thought to improve the accuracy of reports to shareholders and act as a deterrent against possible 
opportunistic behaviour by managers. 
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The enhancement of corporate governance practice can be observed in the increase in the 
appointment of independent or non-executive directors (NEDs) on corporate boards.  Stockholders 
have exerted an escalating pressure on their firms to reduce the number of inside directors on their 
boards under the assumption that NEDs provide more objective oversight of the financial reporting 
process.  For example, Heidrick and Struggles (1990) reports that the proportion of executive 
directors of the largest US corporations gradually decreased during the 1980s from 31 percent to an 
average of 21 percent.   
 
Additionally, in terms of the role of NEDs, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the role of the board 
of directors is to protect the interests of shareholders by monitoring the firm‟s management.  Fama 
(1980) also argues that outside directors are “referees” between shareholders and managers.  These 
outside directors are disciplined by the market for their services; the increasing litigation directed at 
boards enhances this argument.  For example, only 1 in 20 boards was sued in the 1960s, 1 in 9 was 
sued in the 1970s, and 1 in 5 faced a lawsuit during the 1980s (Kesner & Johnson, 1990). 
 
The monitoring role of independent directors is also exercised through their membership of the 
board‟s sub-committees.  Thus a high representation of NEDs in the audit, nomination, and 
remuneration committees provides an oversight of the firm‟s financial reporting process on behalf of 
the board of directors.  The independence of the chairman of the board from the CEO and other 
executive managers is also considered to be a good corporate governance practice. 
 
It is not only the independence of directors that enhances corporate governance practice but also 
their commitment.  An active board and active board sub-committees with committed NEDs are 
essential characteristics of effective corporate governance.  Independent NEDs who devote little 
time to, or interest in, monitoring the company may not carry out their responsibilities.  
  
In addition to the effect of independent directors on the board and board sub-committees, other 
effective corporate governance factors include the company‟s ownership structure. Where 
institutional investors and blockholders hold a large percentage of the shares, their voting power 
may enable them to supervise managers‟ decisions.  
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2.5.2 External Audit as a Monitoring Device 
External audit is a governance mechanism that reviews and evaluates a firm‟s internal controls and 
audits its financial statements in order to prevent material mis-statements.  Auditors of higher 
quality are less willing to accept doubtful accounting methods and are more likely to report errors 
and irregularities revealed during the audit work.  Thus, the external auditor is considered to have an 
impact on the efficacy of a firm‟s monitoring function, and hence constrains the incidence of 
earnings management. 
  
Wallace (1980) argues that investors demand audited financial statements because these statements 
provide information that is useful for their investment decisions; thus external audit is supposed to 
serve as a monitoring device that reduces managers‟ incentives to manipulate reported earnings.  
Therefore, the audit process is valued as a way of improving the quality of financial information; 
hence it is expected that higher audit quality will be associated with lower earnings management 
activities by managers.   
 
The role of the auditing process is empirically tested in several studies.  For example, Moorland 
(1995) examines the effect of enforcement actions or sanctions against the auditor by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) on the perceived credibility of audited earnings numbers.  The 
study compares the earnings response coefficient of the clients before and after enforcement action 
was taken against the auditor and shows a negative market response to the client‟s accounting 
information, indicating a decline in its perceived credibility.   
 
Stockholders rely upon the external auditor to provide some assurance that the financial statements 
of a firm are not misleading.  It is crucial that the monitoring provided by external auditors is not 
impaired and thus the most important factor for the proper discharge their auditing function is their 
independence. Auditor independence can be compromised when the auditor provides non-audit 
services to the client.  Non-audit fees (NAF) have been used in prior research (Becker et al., 1998; 
Sharma and Sidhu, 2001; Beeler and Hunton, 2002; Quick and Warming-Rasmussen, 2009), and by 
accounting regulators, as a proxy for the impairment of auditor independence. 
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Although academic research results are mixed, many accounting regulators clearly believe that NAF 
have the potential to impair auditor independence.  Following the financial scandals involving 
Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing and many others, the SEC attributed these to audit failures due 
to the lack of auditor independence and, in turn, the SEC demands for greater independence for the 
external auditor.  Consequently, the SEC implemented new auditor independence criteria requiring 
the disclosure of audit and non-audit service fees and banned the provision of certain non-audit 
services that are considered to be a threat to auditor independence (see SEC Final Rule S7-13-00, 
2000). 
 
Nelson et al. (2003) surveyed 515 auditors within a big 5 firm on their experience with attempts at 
earnings management and document that the following attempts are frequently observed: 
recognising reserves, asset impairment, capitalising or deferring too much or too little, reducing 
previous accruals such as deferred tax, asset valuation allowance, adjusting depreciation,  deferring 
revenue, bill-and-hold sales, sale-and-lease-back transactions, misestimating percentage-of-
completion, income statement classification, avoiding consolidation and many others.   
 
Therefore, earnings management can occur in many forms, including unusual or complex 
accounting transactions and the use of discretion in accounting estimates.  To deal adequately with 
these types of issues, a professional, high quality and independent auditor is required. Auditing 
research uses several proxies for audit quality, such as auditor size (DeAngela, 1981), the tenure of 
auditors (Johnson et al., 2002), audit qualified report (Craswell, 1988; Francis and Krishnan, 1999) 
and industry specialised auditor (Balsam et al., 2003 and Krishnan, 2003). 
 
In addition, Choi and Jeter (1992) find that the earnings response coefficient declines significantly 
after the client receives a qualified audit report.  Teoh and Wong (1993) find that the earnings 
response coefficient of companies audited by big audit firms (as a proxy for high quality audit 
services) is higher than the earnings response coefficient of companies audited by smaller audit 
firms, indicating that a high quality audit enhances the reliability and informativeness of accounting 
earnings. 
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Recent auditing research has made much use of audits by industry specialists and finds more 
consistent and reliable results.  Solomon et al. (1999) argue that industry specialist auditors make 
more accurate audit judgments and thus conduct higher quality audit work. Similarly, O'Keefe et al. 
(1994) report that specialist auditor‟s exhibit greater compliance with auditing standards than non-
specialist auditors.  Dunn and Mayhew (2004) find that clients of industry specialist auditors are 
ranked higher in terms of disclosure quality by financial analysts.  Moreover, Carcello and Nagy 
(2004) find a negative association between audit firm industry specialisation and SEC enforcement 
actions.  
 
Therefore, in order for the external auditor to provide satisfactory oversight with regard to reducing 
the incidence of earnings management, it is proposed that two crucial factors may affect the 
functionality of the external auditor, namely, independence and quality.  In this study, external 
auditor independence will be measured, following the prior literature, using the magnitude of non-
audit services fees, while external auditor quality will be measured, according to the prior literature, 
using both audit fees and industry specialisation.  Figure 2.2 illustrates external audit factors that 
may contribute in constraining earnings management practice. 
 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter has provided a general understanding of earnings management.  Definitions of earnings 
management were discussed and motivations for earnings management were explored. There 
followed a discussion of methods of measuring earnings management with the aim of providing a 
more comprehensive understanding of the nature of earnings management and of specifying the 
method of measuring earnings measurement that best serves the purpose of this study. 
 
This study will consider the assumption about the opportunistic nature of earnings management and 
will employ the most sophisticated earnings management measurement method provided by the 
literature, namely, performance matched discretionary accruals. A common theme in prior studies is 
the belief that effective corporate governance and high quality auditing may assist in restraining the 
incidence of earnings management.  The following chapter undertakes a further review of the 
literature on the association between earnings management and both corporate governance attributes 
and external audit factors. 
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Chapter Three 
Literature Review Chapter 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter one identified the problem and the research question of this study.  Chapter two defined and 
discussed its main components, including the nature of earnings management, management‟s 
incentives to practice it, how earnings management might be measured and monitoring devices to 
constrain it. This chapter will review and discuss the prior literature on earnings management, 
corporate governance attributes and external audit factors.  The methodological issues and 
limitations will be discussed when conflicting results are found.  Consequently, this review will be 
used to identify, for each reviewed attribute, the literature gap and to provide suggestions for 
bridging it. 
 
Independent variables have been grouped into four categories: board of directors‟ composition, audit 
committee effectiveness, ownership structures and external auditor factors. Each category will be 
discussed in turn and the chapter will conclude with an overall summary of the literature review 
including a table that summarises the prior literature.   
 
3.2 Board Composition 
A substantial body of research exists with respect to corporate governance and it has mainly focused 
on the role of the composition of the board of directors.  The board of directors is considered to be 
the first defence for shareholders‟ interest against aggressive management actions.  The roles of the 
board are not only to monitor management actions but also to work with senior management to 
achieve corporate legal and ethical compliance (BRC, 1999).  
 
Board composition not only refers to its size and the independence of directors but also to the 
processes for nominating new members and to the remuneration system for board members.  The 
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independence of the chairperson of the board and the commitment of independent directors are also 
important factors. It is also argued that diversity of gender influences the behaviour of the board.  
In relation to these attributes of boards of directors, there is a small amount of literature that exists to 
support their effectiveness, though no prior study has investigated the direct relationship between 
these attributes and earnings management. Therefore, it is important to identify whether these 
proposed attributes of boards of directors have a bearing on the incidence of earnings management.  
There follows an examination of relevant prior research in order to study the effects of each of these 
variables. 
  
3.2.1 Board Independence: 
Most of the prior studies on the relationship between corporate governance and earnings 
management document a negative relationship between the presence of outside directors and the 
occurrence of fraudulent financial statements or discretionary accounting accruals (Peasnell et al., 
2000a, 2000b; Peasnell et al., 2005; Bedard et al., 2004; Klein, 2002b; Xie et al., 2003; Benkel, et 
al., 2006; Niu, 2006 and Osma, 2008) 
 
Xie et al. (2003) examine the effect of various characteristics of boards and audit committees on 
constraining earnings management.  They use discretionary current accruals (using the Jones 1991 
model) to measure earnings management for a sample of 282 US firms for the years 1992, 1994 and 
1996.  They hypothesise that companies with a larger proportion of independent directors will be 
less likely to engage in earnings management than those whose boards which have a majority of 
executive directors. Their results support their hypothesis. One remarkable limitation of their study 
is the use of only two control variables.  They only control for firm size, using the log of the market 
value of equity, and year, using two dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the analysis year is 
1992 or 1996.  Other studies show that there are many other important control variables, such as 
managerial ownership, leverage, audit quality and a presence of block holders (e.g., Dechow et al., 
1996; Peasnell et al., 2000a; Klein, 2002b; Bedard et al., 2004).  The inclusion of more control 
variables may provide more explicit explanations and reveal meaningful relationships.  
 
Klein (2002b) investigates the effectiveness of characteristics of the board and the composition of 
the audit committee using data from 1991 to 1993 on earnings manipulation for a sample of 687 
47 
 
large, listed U.S. firms.  For earnings management, she used discretionary accruals (modified Jones 
(1991) cross-sectional model). Unlike, Xie et al. (2001), her study controls for the effects of firm 
size, growth, performance, leverage, managerial ownership and blockholders‟ ownership.  
 
Klein (2002b) finds a significant negative association between discretionary accruals and the 
proportion of independent directors on the board, and whether the board has a majority of 
independent director. This finding is consistent with her finding for audit committees.  It is rational 
to assume that independent directors on the audit committee are independent external directors on 
the board itself since the audit committee is a sub-committee of the board.  If the composition of the 
board is related to the composition of the audit committee, then the two variables might be highly 
correlated. Xie et al. (2001) avoid this problem of high collinearity by setting two separate models, 
one for board of director variables and the other for audit committee variables, whereas Klein 
(2002b) does not provide a correlation matrix between the board and the audit committee variables. 
 
In the UK, Peasnell et al. (2000a), examine the relation between earnings management and 
corporate governance, employing UK data and comparing pre-managed earnings with earnings 
thresholds (either zero earnings or last year‟s reported earnings).  The results show that firms with a 
higher proportion of outside directors have less income-increasing accruals when earnings fall 
below the threshold.  However, when earnings exceed the threshold, there is strong evidence of 
income-decreasing accruals.  This evidence is consistent with outside directors being more 
concerned with constraining income-increasing accruals. 
 
Another interesting UK study carried out by Peasnell et al. (2000b), examine whether the 
association between board composition and earnings management differs between the pre and post-
Cadbury periods.  They find evidence of accrual management to meet earnings targets in both 
periods.  However, only the post-Cadbury period indicates less income-increasing accrual 
management to avoid earnings losses or earnings declines when the proportion of non-executive 
directors is high.  These results offer clear evidence of the impact of independent outside directors 
on constraining earnings management in the UK. 
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The results of a further UK study by Peasnell et al. (2005) indicate that the likelihood of managers 
making income-increasing abnormal accruals to avoid reporting losses and earnings reductions is 
negatively related to the proportion of outsiders on the board.  They also find that the opportunity to 
turn a loss into a profit, or to ensure that profit does not decline, is significantly lower for firms with 
a high proportion of outside board directors.  
 
More recently, Osma (2008) explores different types of earnings manipulation and analyses the 
effect of independent boards on constraining research and development (R&D) spending 
manipulation.  They use all UK non-financial firms and their sample consisted of 3,438 firm-years, 
for the period 1990 to 2002. The results indicate that independent directors are capable of 
identifying and constraining earnings management represented by R&D cuts and can see through 
this type of manipulation.  
 
In Canada, Park and Shin (2004) investigate the effect of board composition on the level of earnings 
management in a sample of 539 firm-years. Using the modified Jones model as a proxy for earnings 
management, they find that independent outside directors per se do not reduce discretionary accruals 
whereas outside directors from financial intermediaries and active institutional shareholders do 
reduce earnings management.  They also find evidence that officers of financial intermediaries on 
the board and the tenure of outside directors restrain earnings management. 
 
Niu (2006) examine the association between corporate governance mechanisms (including board 
composition, management shareholding, shareholders‟ rights and the extent of disclosure of 
governance practices) and earnings quality, measure in two ways, namely, earnings management 
and earnings informativeness. Using a sample of Canadian firms in years 2001-2004 and applying 
Kothari et al. (2005) and Larcker and Richardson (2004) as earnings quality measurements, her 
empirical tests demonstrate that the level of independence of board composition is negatively related 
to the level of abnormal accruals. 
 
Looking further at these Canadian studies by Park and Shin (2004) and by Niu (2006), the latter‟s 
findings are more robust and reliable for two reasons.  First, Park and Shin (2004) adopt a basic 
earnings management model (modified Jones) that, according to Kothari et al. (2005), is mis-
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specified as it does not control for the effect of a firm‟s performance on abnormal accruals. Niu 
(2006) uses a more sophisticated measure of earnings management that controls for performance, 
using Kothari et al. (2005), and robustness, using the Larcker and Richardson (2004) alternative 
measure of earnings management. Secondly, the first study was conducted before the issue in 2002 
of SOX, which included some major corporate governance reforms that enhance the role of 
independent NEDs in Canadian firms.   
 
SOX has had a great impact on the corporate governance and earnings management relationship. 
This is supported by the empirical finding of Chang and Sun (2009) that the passage of SOX marks 
the beginning of the mandatory disclosure of corporate governance information for cross-listed 
foreign firms (most large Canadian firms are also listed in the US market).  Their study reveals a 
negative association between earnings management and audit-committee independence after SOX, 
an association that is not found in the pre-SOX period.  Their results also show that earnings 
informativeness is significantly associated with audit-committee independence, the CEO duality and 
board independence in the post-SOX period.  
 
Benkel, et al. (2006) study whether boards of directors and audit committees with a high proportion 
of independent members are associated with the incidence of earnings management in Australia. 
They use a sample of 666 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 2001, 2002 and 2003 and apply 
the DeAngelo (1986) model for their earnings management proxy.  They find that boards and audit 
committees with higher independence are associated with reduced levels of earnings management.  
 
Some recent Asian-based studies also examine the effectiveness of board independence in 
constraining earnings management behaviour.  Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) investigate the extent 
of the effectiveness the board of directors, the audit committee and concentrated ownership in 
constraining earnings management among 97 Malaysian listed firms over the period 2002-2003.  
Their study reveals that earnings management is positively related to the size of the board of 
directors but finds an insignificant relationship between either board independence or audit 
committee independence and earnings management. 
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Siregar and Utama (2008) investigate the effect of ownership structure, firm size and corporate 
governance practices on earnings management using Indonesian companies listed on the Jakarta 
Stock Exchange.  They do not find evidence that firms with independent boards engage in 
informative earnings management. Their sample contains 144 firms and covered the periods 1995–
1996 and 1999–2002.  They used Jones (1991), modified Jones (1995), Kasznik (1999) and 
Dechow, et al. (2002) as measures of earnings management. 
 
Jaggi et al. (2009) investigate whether independent boards provide effective monitoring of earnings 
management in firms operating in the family ownership environment of Hong Kong.  Their final 
sample consists of 770 firm-year observations and uses Kothari et al. (2005) and Francis et al. 
(2005) as proxies for earnings management. They document that independent boards provide 
effective monitoring of earnings management.  However, they find that the monitoring effectiveness 
of independent boards is moderated in family-controlled firms, which suggests that increasing the 
proportion of independent directors to strengthen board monitoring is unlikely to be effective in 
family-controlled firms. 
 
Lo et al. (2010) investigate whether good governance structures help constrain management's 
opportunistic behaviors measured by transfer pricing manipulations in China. Their sample covers 
266 listed companies on the Shanghai stock exchange in 2004. They find that firms with 
independent boards‟ are less likely to engage in transfer pricing manipulations.  
 
The question that obviously arises is why the results of some of these Asian-based studies conflict 
with Western results.  Their earnings management estimation methods can not be the reason, even 
though the first study (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006) employs a basic earnings management 
estimation method that uses the modified Jones model. The second and third studies, namely, 
Siregar and Utama (2008) and Jaggi et al. (2009), use more sophisticated measures of earning 
management that control for performance but find similar results.  Thus earnings management 
estimation methods do not seem to be the reason why their results conflict with those of Western 
based studies.   
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More importantly, the first and second studies agreed that board independence is an ineffective 
monitoring mechanism in reducing earnings management, while the third study find that board 
independence is effective in the whole sample but not in family controlled firms.  The first two 
studies do not control for family controlled firms, which seems to distinguish the third study. 
Another possible reason is that the first and second studies have relatively small samples, consisting 
of 97 firms and 144 firms respectively, while Jaggi et al. (2009) use a larger sample of 770 firm-
year observations.  Thus, sample size may have slightly affected the difference in the results of Jaggi 
et al. (2009) and the first two studies, since it allowed Jaggi et al. (2009) to control for family-
controlled firms. However, more importantly, most Asian economies are largely dominated by 
family-controlled firms and this type of firm may have different types of earnings management that 
is not aggressive but is known as “informative earnings management”.  This is supported by Siregar 
and Utama (2008) who find evidence that earnings management in firms with a high family 
ownership, and which do not belong to business groups, is more efficient than in firms with different 
ownership structures.  
 
Thus, earnings management in these countries may not be considered bad or agency costs and this 
would make corporate governance attributes have a weak or positive relationship with earnings 
management.  This association is also documented by Jaggi et al. (2009) who states that the 
monitoring effectiveness of independent boards is moderated in family-controlled firms. 
Additionally, in family-controlled firms, boards are more vulnerable to dominance by family 
members and this, together with weak corporate governance regimes in some countries, reduces 
independent directors effectiveness. 
 
A European study by Osma and Noguer (2007) tests whether board composition is effective in 
constraining earnings manipulation in a sample of Spanish quoted companies during the period 
1999–2001.  Their final sample contains 155 firm-year observations, and uses the Jones (1991) 
model and the marginal model (Peasnell et al. 2000b).  Whereas in the UK and US independent 
directors play a significant role, they find that, in Spain, the key practice to constrain earnings 
management is the appointment of institutional directors. Considering that their study period covers 
years 1999–2001, which was before the recent corporate governance reforms that enhance the role 
of NEDs, such as SOX in the USA and The Higgs Report in the UK, and their small sample of 155 
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firm-year observations, this research may not reveal very reliable results. On the basis of their 
findings, they conjectured that importing the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance is 
probably not the best solution for code-law countries, such as Spain.  They support their argument 
by quoting the empirical findings of Recalde (2003).  Spanish firms have very different governance 
structures from their American counterparts, including important family and institutional 
blockholders that effectively supervise managers.  
 
Another European study is conducted by Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) who examine the 
impact of board independence on earnings management for 97 non-financial firms listed on the 
Athens Stock Exchange in Greece for the years 2000 through 2004. They use discretionary current 
accruals (using the modified-Jones model) to measure earnings management and consistent with 
Anglo-American countries‟ studies, they find that board independence is significantly and 
negatively related to their EM proxy. 
 
All in all, the vast majority of previous empirical findings suggest that boards with a high proportion 
of independent outside directors enhance the integrity of the financial reporting process and provide 
assurance to shareholders on the quality of reported earnings.  However, while studies from the US, 
UK, Canada and Australia, that is Anglo-American countries with slender differences in their 
institutional environments, advocate board independence as essential in ensuring financial reporting 
quality, the Spanish and Asian studies draw attention to the argument that different institutional 
contexts have different needs in corporate governance and there is no one model that fits all 
environments. 
 
3.2.2 Board Size 
Prior studies provide evidence on the role of board size in enhancing the monitoring of management.  
Monks and Minow (1995) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that larger boards are able to 
commit more time and effort, and smaller boards are able to commit less time and effort, to 
overseeing management.  Klein (2002a) extends this argument by suggesting that board monitoring 
is positively associated with larger boards due to their ability to distribute the work load over a 
greater number of observers. The majority of the previous literature supports this argument, by 
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finding that larger boards are strongly associated with lower levels of earnings management 
(Peasnell et al., 2000a; Bedard et al., 2004; Xie et al., 2003; Yu, 2008). 
 
Xie et al. (2001) examine the characteristics of the board in constraining earnings management 
using discretionary current accruals (using the Jones (1991) model) to measure earnings 
management for a sample of 282 US firms for the years 1992, 1994 and 1996.  Their results show 
that earnings management is less likely to take place in firms with larger boards.   
 
Yu (2008) find that small boards seem more prone to failure to detect earnings management.  One 
interpretation of this effect is that smaller boards may be more likely to be “captured” by 
management or dominated by blockholders, while larger boards are more capable of monitoring the 
actions of top management (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
 
On the other hand, Alonso et al. (2000) argue that large boards exhibit poorer coordination and 
communication between members, and their results display a significant positive association 
between larger board size and earnings management. However, the findings of this study were 
inconsistent and should not be generalised due to several limitations.  Firstly, the study covers only 
one year.  Secondly, their study sample uses mixed data from ten different countries without 
controlling for different external factors, such as accounting standards and regulatory rules and, 
consequently, their study may be biased. 
 
Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) investigate the extent of the effectiveness of the board of directors, 
the audit committee and concentrated ownership in constraining earnings management among 97 
Malaysian listed firms over the period 2002-2003.  Their study reveals that earnings management is 
positively related to the size of the board of directors. 
 
Kao and Chen (2004) examine the relationship between board characteristics and earnings 
management in Taiwan.  They find that large board size is related to a higher extent of earnings 
management.  Their sample consists of 1,097 observations and they apply the cross-sectional Jones 
model to measure earnings management. 
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Hence, both Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) and Kao and Chen (2004) find a significant positive 
relationship between board size and the empirical indicator of earnings management. Both studies 
use the basic earnings management estimation method (Jones and modified Jones models 
respectively) that does not control for a firm‟s performance when estimating accruals. However, this 
may not be the reason for their conflicting results with the majority of the literature, as Xie et al. 
(2001) also use the Jones model but found a negative relationship between earnings management 
and board size.   Their different results might be due to different types of earnings management 
adopted in these countries as discussed previously, or to the differences in markets and corporate 
governance practice that are revealed by these authors.  
 
Considering the earlier discussion of the findings of Asian-based studies that board independence is 
less effective in constraining earnings management than in Anglo-American countries, and that 
large boards in some Asian studies show a positive association with earnings management, a further 
comment can be made. In less developed countries, boards may contain less effective independent 
directors because some may have been appointed through social connections rather than through 
ability and competition.  In such boards, the advantages of size, namely the presence of more 
independent directors with valuable experience and diverse backgrounds, will be missing. Boards 
may be large in size but some outside directors may not be independent or very effective which in 
turn will demolish the effect of board size on EM.  
 
3.2.3 Board Meetings 
Directors on boards that meet frequently are more likely to discharge their duties in accordance with 
shareholders‟ interests because more time can be devoted to monitoring issues such as earnings 
management, conflicts of interest and monitoring management.  Conversely, boards that rarely meet 
may have no time to find out about such complex issues and may perhaps have time only to rubber-
stamp management plans. 
 
Though there is extensive prior research on the independence and size of boards of directors, to the 
best of my knowledge there are few studies of the impact of board meeting frequency on earnings 
management.  Xie et al. (2003) argue that a board that meets rarely may only have time for signing-
off management plans and listening to presentations; therefore, they may not have the time to focus 
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on issues such as earnings management.   Xie et al. (2003), using a sample of 282 firm-year 
observations, find that earnings management is significantly negatively related to the number of 
board meetings. 
   
Ebrahim (2007) uses a sample of manufacturing firms for years 1999 and 2000 and expected a 
negative relation between earnings management and both board and audit committee independence 
to be mediated by their activity.  His results support the expectation that discretionary accruals are 
much lower when independent audit committees are more active but they do not show any evidence 
that board activity mediates the relationship between earnings management and board independence.  
 
However, meetings may not always be a characteristic of an effective board of directors. Adams et 
al. (2009) conducts a large survey to investigate outside directors‟ roles as advisors and monitors of 
management.  He finds that directors who primarily monitor management perceive that they 
participate less in boardroom discussion than other directors and that the CEO often asks them for 
advice.  
 
3.2.4 Chairman Independence 
The prior literature investigates the duality role of chairman and CEO.  Duality occurs when the 
same person occupies both the CEO and chairman positions on the board. These studies test the 
chairman‟s independence and the concentration of power on the board. It is argued in the 
governance literature that the objectivity and quality of board oversight may suffer if the CEO also 
chairs the board. Centralisation of power in a company can result in the CEO being able to exercise 
excessive influence over the board by setting board agendas, managing meetings and controlling the 
flow of information to its members (Persons, 2006). 
 
However, this study does not investigate the duality role because firms in this study‟s sample exhibit 
very high compliance with the corporate governance recommendation that the two roles should be 
separated.  About 98% of firms in this sample separate the positions of chairman and CEO; thus, 
any test would be statistically unreliable.  
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This study applies different measures to capture the effect of chairman independence. The UK 
Corporate Governance Combined Code (2003) specifies the criteria for chairman independence and 
this study applies these criteria to each firm‟s chairman to determine his or her independence.   
 
Since this study is not testing the effect of duality on earnings management, a brief discussion of 
previous studies is used to illustrate that the chairman influences the quality of reported earnings.  
 
Dechow et al. (1996) examine 96 U.S. firms subject to earnings manipulation enforcement action by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and find that firms whose CEO is also chair of the 
board of directors are more likely to be subjected to accounting enforcement action by SEC for 
alleged violations of GAAP. 
 
In addition, Klein (2002b) finds that EM is positively related to the CEO holding a position on the 
board‟s nominating and compensation committees.  Anderson et al. (2003) find that the separation 
between CEO and board chair positions appears to positively influence the information content of 
accounting earnings.  
 
On the other hand, other empirical studies found no association between CEO duality and EM.  
Peasnell et al., (2000a) examine this association between CEO dominance and earnings 
management in the UK‟s largest 1000 listed firms and find no association. Bedard et al. (2004) and 
Xie et al. (2003) also find no association. 
 
However, no previous study has investigated the chairman‟s independence according to the 
independence criteria set out in the UK Corporate Governance Combined Code (2003).  The 
methodological chapter will look at these independence criteria and the method to be used for 
measuring this variable. 
 
3.2.5 Gender Diversity of Board 
Gender is arguably the most debated diversity issue, not only in terms of board of directors, but also 
in many other societal situations.  Board diversity has been a growing area of corporate governance 
research in recent years. To date, only three papers address the relationship between the quality of 
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earnings and gender.  However, no study directly investigates the relationship between earnings 
management and gender diversity. 
 
Clikeman, et al. (2001) survey accounting students to determine whether gender or nationality 
impacts on attitudes toward common techniques used to manage reported earnings.  They use 
responses to hypothetical situations to determine attitudes toward earnings management behaviour 
and find no significant differences in the attitudes of men and women. 
 
Al-Hayale and Lan (2004) question a number of company managers and external auditors in Jordan 
to ascertain their views of income increasing and income decreasing earnings management 
techniques.  They find no significant differences in the attitudes of men and women about earnings 
management. However, the limitation of these two studies is that they did not examine the actual 
behaviour that is directly related to financial reporting or earnings quality.  Krishnan and Parsons 
(2008), however, extend those studies by examining actual reported financial numbers and 
comparing the earnings quality in companies with higher percentages of women directors to those 
with fewer women on their boards. They examine a set of data that covers the period from 1996 to 
2000 and use accounting conservatism as a measure for earnings quality.  They find that companies 
with more female senior managers are more profitable and have higher stock returns after initial 
public offerings than those with fewer females in the management ranks.  They use the Catalyst 
annual censuses of women as corporate officers and top earners for 353 of the Fortune 500 
companies.  They assert that the improved performance for companies with more women senior 
executives is not produced through earnings management practice.  Instead, they find that earnings 
quality is positively associated with gender diversity. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the findings of previous studies may not apply in the UK. Kang, et al. 
(2007) argue that board diversity and independence findings may not extend across national 
boundaries due to different regulatory and economic environments, cultural differences, the size of 
capital markets and the effectiveness of governance mechanisms.  However, this is the first study to 
examine the relationship between women on boards and earnings management practice as measured 
by discretionary accruals. 
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3.2.6 Nomination Committee Independence 
Two studies investigate the effect of nomination committee independence on earnings management.  
The first study is by Klein (2002b), and is based on previous findings by Klein (1998, 2000) that 
there is a negative association between board independence and whether the CEO sits on the board‟s 
nomination committee.  Using a dummy variable, she tested if earnings management is positively 
related to the CEO‟s membership of this committee using data from 1991 to 1993 on earnings 
manipulation for a sample of 687 large, listed U.S. firms. She finds no association exist. One of the 
limitations of this study is that it does not provide a correlation matrix between the board and the 
audit committee variables; a high correlation is expected when testing various board sub-committees 
such as nomination committee independence in the same model with audit committee independence. 
 
The second study is conducted by Osma and Noguer (2007) and tests whether the existence of board 
monitoring committees constrains earnings manipulation for a Spanish sample of quoted companies 
during the period 1999–2001. Their final sample contains 155 firm-year observations and uses the 
Jones (1991) model and the marginal model (Peasnell et al. 2000a).  They find that the independent 
nomination committee has a positive significant relationship with earnings management, 
contradicting agency theory predictions.  However, they find that the significant positive 
relationship between board independence and earnings management is moderated by nomination 
committee independence. 
 
Considering that their study period covered years 1999–2001, which was before the recent corporate 
governance reforms that enhances the roles of independent NEDs, such as SOX in the USA and the 
Higgs Report in the UK, and that their sample of 155 firm-year observations is small, their results 
may not be very reliable. They explain the conflict between their results and their prediction by 
arguing that the corporate governance system is different in the law code countries like Spain and 
they assert that the Anglo-Saxon model is probably not the best solution for such countries.  Their 
argument is supported by the empirical findings of Recalde (2003) that Spanish firms have very 
different governance structures from their American counterparts, with important family and 
institutional blockholders that effectively supervise managers.  
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Therefore, this is the first study to examine the effect of nomination committee independence on the 
incidence of earnings management in the Anglo-Saxon context, using UK data. 
 
 
3.2.7 Remuneration Committee Independence 
To date, there has been little research into the role of remuneration committees in general and only 
one study that explores the effect of the presence of the CEO in the remuneration committee on the 
incidence of earnings management.  However, no study to date has explored the direct effect of the 
independent remuneration committee‟s influence on the incidence of earnings management.  
 
Based on their previous findings (Klein, 1998, 2000) that there is a negative association between 
board independence and whether the CEO sits on the board‟s compensation committee, Klein 
(2002b) tests if earnings management is positively related to the CEO‟s membership of this 
committee using a dummy variable. She uses data from 1991 to 1993 on earnings manipulation for a 
sample of 687 large, listed U.S. firms but one of the limitations of this study is that it did not provide 
a correlation matrix between the board and the audit committee variables.  A high correlation is 
expected when testing remuneration committee independence in the same model with audit 
committee independence.  She finds a positive relation between the presence of the CEO in the 
remuneration committee and earnings management.  Hence, this is the first study to examine the 
effect of the independent remuneration committee on the incidence of earnings management. 
 
3.2.8 Non-executive Directors Commitment 
One perspective of corporate governance that has not been sufficiently explored is NED 
commitment. In general, NED‟s commitment can be measured by their involvement in board 
meetings.  However, as shown in the previous part of this chapter, not many researchers have used 
this mechanism as it does not fully reflect the diligence of the board.  There are many other 
measures of the board diligence but they cannot be captured by quantitative research methods.  
Carcello et al. (2002) concede that board diligence includes many more factors than mere board 
meetings including, for instance, preparation before meetings, participation during meetings and 
post-meeting follow-up.  However, the only piece of publicly disclosed information to indicate 
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board diligence is the number of board meetings.  Therefore, this study explores two new 
measurements of the NED commitment, namely, NEDs‟ private meetings and their activity fees.  
 
Prior research has extensively investigated independence and size factors for board of directors.  
This study narrows the focus from the roles of the board in general to the roles of NEDs in 
particular, in governing the company.  To date, there is no single study that has investigated the 
effect of NEDs‟ private meetings and NEDs‟ fees either on earnings management or on financial 
reporting in general. 
3.2.8.1 Non-executive Directors Private Meeting Frequency 
This study also examines whether the frequency of NEDs‟ private meetings, without the presence of 
executive directors, constrains managerial opportunistic behaviour towards the firm earnings.  
According to the UK Corporate Governance Combined Code (2003), the responsibilities of NEDs 
include satisfying themselves on the integrity of financial information and ensuring that financial 
controls and systems of risk management are robust and defensible.        
 
One important method of NEDs‟ performance evaluation, according to the UK Code (2003, P.10), is 
“Individual evaluation should aim to show whether each director continues to contribute effectively 
and to demonstrate commitment to the role (including commitment of time for board and committee 
meetings and any other duties).”  
 
NEDs‟ private meetings are a requirement of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2003, p.5), 
which says that, “The chairman should hold meetings with the non-executive directors without the 
executives present”.  The exercise by NEDs of their responsibilities should have a direct impact on 
shareholders‟ perception of the firm‟s financial reporting integrity and quality, which, in turn, may 
constrain the inclination of managers to engage in earnings management. 
 
There is no study that has examined the effect of these private meetings; this will be the first study 
to explore the impact of this activity in general, and on earnings management in particular. 
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3.2.8.2 Non-executive Directors’ Fees 
The Hampel Report (1998, p.11) notes that, “NEDs remuneration can be a useful and legitimate way 
of aligning the directors‟ interests with those of shareholders”.  Empirically, on a different but 
related line, Gerety and Lehn (1997) and Beasley (1996) find a negative association between 
financial reporting fraud and NEDs‟ ownership.  Bedard et al. (2004) also find a negative 
association between earnings management and NEDs‟ ownership. 
 
Mallin, (2007) concedes that NEDs should be paid a fee commensurate with the amount of time that 
they are expected to devote to their role, but she argues that remunerating NEDs with share options 
is inappropriate as it may give NEDs a rather unhealthy focus on the short term share price of the 
company.  
 
Additionally, Adams and Ferreira (2004) use a large panel data set on director attendance at board 
meetings in publicly-listed firms for the period from 1996 to 2003.  They provide robust evidence 
that directors are less likely to have attendance problems when board meeting fees are higher.  They 
suggest that directors appear to do their jobs even for very small financial rewards.  
 
There is no prior study on the effect of NEDs‟ fees and this research will be the first to examine the 
effect of NEDs‟ fees in general and on earnings management in particular. 
 
3.2.9 Summary 
Overall, the corporate governance and earnings management literature suggests that board of 
directors governance mechanisms influence the credibility of financial statements by constraining 
earnings management.  This review of the results of that research indicates that independence, large, 
diverse and active boards are associated with less earnings management.  
 
Furthermore, the independence of the board‟s subcommittees (remuneration and nominating 
committees) is negatively associated with earnings management.  However, there are some 
conflicting results in relation to board composition between Anglo-Saxon countries and the rest of 
the world. These differences may be due to the methodologies of individual studies and/or to 
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differences in each country‟s ownership structure, legal system, corporate governance regulations 
and culture.  
 
Thus, the composition of the board of directors is paramount to effective corporate governance.  
There is strong evidence that the quality of oversight generated by this monitoring body benefits 
when it has more directors, more directors who are independent and committed, and an independent 
chairman.  
 
3.3 Audit Committee Effectiveness 
The purpose of the audit committee is to ensure the accuracy of the financial reports (Buchalter & 
Yokomoto, 2003).  Regulators around the world have acknowledged the important function of audit 
committees in financial reporting even before financial scandals occurred at the end of the last 
decade. For instance, in the 1980s the NYSE introduced a requirement for all companies listed on 
the major American stock exchanges to maintain an audit committee.  Its existence is seen as 
providing an essential monitoring that will protect investor interests and maintain confidence in 
stock markets. 
 
Parker (1992), as cited in Collier and Gregory, (1996) defined an audit committee as 'A committee 
appointed by a company as a liaison between the board of directors and the external auditors, this 
committee normally has a majority of non-executive directors and is expected to view the company's 
affairs in a detached and dispassionate manner.'  
 
The audit committee is a sub-committee of the board of directors and it provides formal 
communication between the board, the internal monitoring system and the external auditor; in 
effect, it acts as an arbiter between management and auditors. Consequently, audit committees 
should be independent from management so as to be able to conduct effective monitoring, which 
results in less opportunistic management behaviour such as EM. The quality and credibility of 
financial reporting can be badly affected when there is low or no audit committee independence. 
  
The UK (2003) Corporate Governance Code emphasised the need for audit committee independence 
from managers, saying “while all directors have a duty to act in the interests of the company the 
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audit committee has a particular role, acting independently from the executive, to ensure that the 
interests of shareholders are properly protected in relation to financial reporting and internal 
control”. 
 
The audit committee has an overseeing and monitoring function of managers‟ discretion over the 
accounting policy.  An effective audit committee adds to the quality of the audit process at two 
levels.  First, by overseeing the financial reporting process and examining major accounting 
measurement and choices, and this enables the committee to mitigate earnings management 
practices.  Secondly, by coordinating the internal and external audits and, above all, assuring 
external auditors‟ independence and freedom from managerial pressure (McMullen and 
Raghunanadan, 1996). 
 
Based on the recommendations of regulatory and corporate governance codes such as SOX, the 
Blue Ribbon Committee Report (BRC) and The UK (2003) Corporate Governance Combined Code, 
this study examines the vital characteristics of effective audit committees, namely, independence, 
expertise, meeting frequency and size.  The following sections discuss prior studies on these four 
characteristics. 
 
3.3.1 Audit Committee Size 
The number of audit committee members is used as an indication of resources available to this 
committee.  The UK Corporate Governance Combined Code suggests that the minimum number of 
audit committee members should be three directors. 
 
The findings of prior studies for the effect of audit committee size on earnings management are 
mixed and inconclusive.  Xie et al. (2001) used a sample of 282 US firms for the years 1992, 1994 
and 1996 and Bedard et al. (2004) use a sample of 300 US firms in the year 1996.  They apply 
different methods to capture earnings management incidence, and control for different factors, but 
both find that there is no significant association between audit committee size and aggressive 
earnings management. 
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Baxter and Cotter (2009) investigate whether the size of audit committees is associated with 
earnings quality for a sample of Australian listed companies in 2001, prior to the introduction of 
mandatory audit committee requirements in 2003.  They use two measures of earnings quality based 
on the Jones (1991) and Dechow and Dichev (2002) models.  Their results indicate no association 
between audit committee size and earnings quality in either measure. 
 
Abbott et al. (2004) examine 41 firms that issued fraudulent reports and 88 firms which restated 
annual results in the period 1991-1999.  They find that audit committee size had no significant 
impact on financial reporting quality. This study did not use discretionary accruals as a measure for 
earnings quality.  Instead, it used financial restatements for a very small sized sample of 41 firms. 
However, a more recent study with a larger sample (Lin, et al. 2006) finds a negative association 
between audit committee size and financial restatement. 
 
Lin, at al. (2006) examine the association between certain characteristics of audit committees that 
were recommended by the BRC in 1999 such as size, independence, financial expertise, activity, 
and stock ownership.  They test year 2000 using 106 publicly-held corporations in the USA.  Their 
dependent variable is reported earnings restatement and their findings suggest a negative association 
between the audit committees‟ size and earnings restatement.  
 
Additionally, Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) investigate the extent of the effectiveness of the audit 
committee in reducing earnings management among 97 Malaysian listed firms over the period 2002-
2003.  Their study reveals no significant relationship between audit committee size and earnings 
management. This is the only study that documents a positive relationship between audit committee 
size and earnings management.  One of many possible reasons is that discussed in section 3.4 above, 
namely that, because many Malaysian firms are family-controlled, they may have different types of 
earnings management that is not aggressive but rather “efficient earnings management” as reported 
by Siregar and Utama (2008). Other plausible explanations for this conflicting result are offered in 
section 3.4 above include the small sample, or the different economic and stock market background. 
 
In addition to extending the very limited research on the effect of audit committee size, this study is 
the first to examine the effect of audit committee size on earnings management in the UK. 
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3.3.2 Audit Committee Meetings  
Song and Windram (2004) evaluate the audit committee recommendations of the Cadbury 
Committee (1992) in the UK and Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) in the US; they examine the 
effectiveness of UK audit committees in monitoring financial reporting.  They find that UK audit 
committees play a significant role in monitoring the effectiveness of financial reporting.  They also 
find that low frequency of meetings could undermine audit committee effectiveness. 
 
Xie et al. (2001) argued that board and audit committee meeting frequency is associated with 
reduced levels of discretionary current accruals and expected that more active audit committees are 
more effective monitors.  They study a sample of 282 US firms for the years 1992, 1994 and 1996 
and find that audit committee meeting frequency is associated with reduced levels of earnings 
management.  
  
Ebrahim (2007) examines the relation between earnings management and the activity of both the 
board and the audit committee.  Using a sample of US manufacturing companies for two years, 1999 
and 2000, he finds that earnings management, as measured by the modified Jones model, is 
negatively related to both board and audit committee independence and he documents that this 
relation is stronger when the audit committee is more active.  
 
Abbott et al. (2000) examine the relationship between audit committee activity and fraud.  They 
used 78 firms that were subject to SEC sanctions and 78 matched non-fraud firms in the period 1980 
to 1996.  They measure audit committee effectiveness using a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if the audit committee consists entirely of outsiders and meet at least two times per year, and 
a value of zero otherwise.  They find a negative relationship between their audit committee measure 
and corporation fraud.    
 
Abbott et al. (2004) examine 41 firms that issued fraudulent reports and 88 firms which restated 
annual results in the period 1991-1999.  They find audit committees that meet at least four times per 
year exhibit a significant and negative association with the occurrence of financial reporting 
restatements.  
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However, there are some single year studies that did not document any relation between an active 
audit committee and earnings quality.  Beasley, et al. (2000) examine the relationship between 
frequency of audit committee meetings and likelihood of financial statement fraud.  They find that 
the nature of fraud differs by industry.  They do not find convincing evidence that companies 
involved in fraud have fewer audit committee meetings. 
 
Lin et al. (2006) examine the effectiveness of certain characteristics of audit committees, as 
recommended by the BRC in 1999, such as size, independence, financial expertise, activity and 
stock ownership.  They test for year 2000 using 106 publicly-held corporations in the USA.  Their 
dependent variable is reported earnings restatement.  Their study evidence suggests no negative 
association between the frequency of audit committees meetings and earnings restatement.  
 
Baxter and Cotter (2009) investigate whether audit committees are associated with earnings quality 
for a sample of Australian listed companies in 2001, prior to the introduction of mandatory audit 
committee requirements in 2003.  They use two measures of earnings quality based on the Jones 
(1991) and Dechow and Dichev (2002) models.   Their results indicate that a greater number of 
audit committee meetings do not seem to reduce either earnings management or to enhance earnings 
quality measures.  
 
Also in the Australian context, Davidson et al. (2005) investigate the role of governance structures 
in reducing the level of discretionary accruals using a cross-sectional sample of 434 listed Australian 
firms for the financial year ending in 2000.  Their findings do not support the view that active audit 
committees are associated with a lower likelihood of earnings management.   
 
There are three possible reasons why the four studies just discussed found no relationship between 
active audit committees and lower earnings management.  First, all of these studies look at only one 
financial year and this makes the statistical tests and generalisation of their findings unreliable. 
Secondly and more importantly, the last three studies discussed were conducted before 2002, that is, 
prior to the issue of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX).  Some recent research suggests that SOX has 
improved the audit committees‟ effectiveness. Chang and Sun (2009) argue that the passage of 
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(SOX) marks the beginning of the mandatory disclosure of audit-committee composition and other 
corporate governance information for cross-listed foreign firms.  They posit that the provisions of 
SOX improve the effectiveness of an independent audit committee and other corporate-governance 
functions in monitoring the earnings quality of cross-listed foreign firms.  
 
Chang and Sun (2009) use a better specified earnings management measure, based on Kothari et al. 
(2005), and compare 2002 and 2003 financial reports.  Their study reveals a negative association 
between earnings management and audit-committee independence after SOX, an association that 
was not found in the pre-SOX period.  Their results also show that earnings informativeness is 
significantly and positively associated with audit-committee independence, the CEO duality and 
board independence in the post-SOX period. 
 
Another plausible explanation for the absence of findings on the effect of the frequency of audit 
committees meetings is that the number of audit committee meetings may not reflect committee 
diligence.  This is supported by some recent evidence such as that of Turley and Zaman (2007) who 
use a case study approach, interviewing nine individuals at one U.K. company, including the audit 
committee chair, internal and external auditors and senior managers. They find that the audit 
committee‟s greatest impact comes through informal processes. The audit committee tends not to 
raise complex, probing questions or views during board or audit committee meetings, but it 
influences governance outcomes through informal meetings with auditors. Gendron and Bédard 
(2004), Spira (2002) and Turley and Zaman (2007) also find that a great deal of audit committee 
activity occurs outside of formal meetings. 
 
3.3.3 Audit Committee Independence 
Xie et al. (2001) examine the effect of some characteristics of the audit committee on constraining 
earnings management.  They use discretionary current accruals (using the Jones (1991) model) to 
measure earnings management for a sample of 282 US firms for the years 1992, 1994 and 1996. 
They study the composition, activity and financial literacy of audit committees. Their results show 
audit committee independence is not significantly associated with reduced levels of earnings 
management. This study has remarkable limitations that were discussed in the board independence 
variable section above. 
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Klein (2002b) controls for a large set of internal and external factors and investigates the 
effectiveness of characteristics of the audit committee on earnings manipulation.  She measured 
earnings management using discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones (1995) cross-
sectional model, and used a sample of 692 US firms-years with audit committees listed on the S&P 
500. She finds a negative association between discretionary accruals and the proportion of 
independent directors on the audit committee.  However, no association between a fully independent 
audit committee and discretionary accruals was found, while the extent of discretionary accruals is 
more pronounced for firms with audit committees comprising of less than the majority of 
independent directors. Thus, Klein (2002b) concludes that it is not necessary to have an audit 
committee composed entirely of independent directors. 
 
Bedard et al. (2004) investigate the effect of audit committee characteristics, namely, expertise, 
independence and activity, on the extent of earnings management.  They use the level of income-
increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals applying the modified Jones (1995) cross-
sectional model for a sample of 300 US firms in the year 1996. Their tests divide the sample into 
three groups; one with high income-increasing earnings management, one with high income-
decreasing earnings management, and one with low levels of earnings management.   
 
Their model has a comprehensive set of control variables that included a firm‟s characteristics.  
However, their measures of discretionary accruals may introduce some bias to their study.  The 
results obtained from logistic regression analyses suggest that aggressive earnings management is 
negatively related to fully independent audit committees.  However, no significant association was 
found between audit committee size or the frequency of its meetings and aggressive earnings 
management. 
 
Bradbury (2006) examine the relation between board and audit committee characteristics and 
accounting quality, as measured by discretionary accruals, using a sample of 139 firms from 
Singapore and 113 firms from Malaysia.  He finds audit committee independence is related to higher 
earnings quality.  This relationship exists only when the discretionary accruals are income-
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increasing, which suggests that audit committees are effective in the financial reporting process by 
reducing the level of income-increasing earnings management.  
 
In Australia, Benkel, et al. (2006) study whether independent directors on boards and independent 
audit committees are associated with the incidence of earnings management. They use a sample of 
666 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 2001, 2002 and 2003.  They find that higher levels of 
audit committee independence are associated with reduced levels of earnings management.  
 
In the same institutional context, Davidson et al. (2005) investigate the role of governance structure 
in reducing the level of discretionary accruals using a cross-sectional sample of 434 listed Australian 
firms for the financial year ending in 2000. Their findings support the view that independent audit 
committees are significantly associated with a lower likelihood of earnings management.   
 
In France, Piot and Janin (2007) examine the SBF 120 Index of French companies between 1999 
and 2001, of which approximately half had set up an audit committee by the end of 1998. They find 
that the presence of an audit committee, as well as its independence, mitigates earnings 
management.  
 
Although the vast majority of empirical studies show that the independence of the audit committee 
is negatively associated with the occurrence of EM, some papers produce no results on tests of 
whether the existence or independence of audit committees reduces the incidence of EM.  
 
In the UK, Peasnell, et al. (2005) examine whether the incidence of earnings management by UK 
listed firms in the fiscal years ending between 1993 to1996 depends on outside board members and 
the audit committee.  They find no evidence that the presence of an audit committee directly affects 
the extent of income-increasing manipulations to meet or exceed EM thresholds.  Nor do audit 
committees appear to have a direct effect on the degree of downward manipulation, when pre-
managed earnings exceed thresholds by a large margin.  
 
However, they do find that the association between income-increasing accruals and the monitoring 
role of outside directors is more pronounced when there is an audit committee. The conjecture that 
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Peasnell, et al. (2005) offer for their failure to detect the effectiveness of audit committees is that it 
might be because the great majority of firms in their sample had an audit committee.   
 
Additionally, Osma and Noguer (2007) test whether the existence of an audit committee is effective 
in constraining earnings manipulation for a Spanish sample of quoted companies during the period 
1999–2001.  They find that it does not do so. 
  
Baxter and Cotter (2009) investigate whether audit committees are associated with earnings quality 
for a sample of Australian listed companies in 2001, prior to the introduction of mandatory audit 
committee requirements in 2003.  They use two measures of earnings quality and found that the 
formation of an audit committee reduces earnings management but has no effect on earnings quality. 
 
The inconclusive findings of these last three studies are not surprising, because the mere existence 
of an audit committee, without ensuring its independence and competence, cannot guarantee the 
efficiency of the monitoring process, or its ability to detect and reduce earnings management.  
 
Lin, et al. (2006) examine the association between certain characteristics of audit committees that 
were recommended by the BRC in 1999 such as size, independence, financial expertise, activity, 
and stock ownership.  They tests year for 2000 using 106 publicly-held corporations in the USA.  
Their dependent variable is the reported earnings restatement. Their study finds no evidence of an 
association between audit committees independence and earnings restatement. This study does not 
use discretionary accruals as a measure for earnings quality; it used financial restatements for one 
year only with a relatively small sized sample of 106 firms.  Thus, their findings may not be 
generalised or compared with the previously discussed evidence due to the major limitations of the 
study. 
 
Siregar and Utama (2008) investigate the effect of some corporate governance practices on earnings 
management using Indonesian companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange.  Their sample 
contains 144 firms and covers the periods 1995–1996, and 1999–2002.  They used the Jones (1991), 
modified Jones (1995), Kasznik (1999) and Dechow, et al. (2002) models as measures of earnings 
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management.  They find no evidence that firms with audit committees engage in efficient earnings 
management.  
 
Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) investigate the extent of the effectiveness of audit committees in 
constraining earnings management among 97 Malaysian listed firms, over the period 2002-2003.  
Their study reveals an insignificant relationship between independent audit committees and earnings 
management.  
 
However, Indonesian and Malaysian business is largely dominated by family-controlled firms, and 
there is a high possibility that this type of firm may have different types of earnings management 
that is not aggressive but rather “efficient earnings management”.  This view is supported by Siregar 
and Utama (2008) and has been discussed in the board independence variable section. 
 
In the UK, (Peasnell, et al., 2005) examine the mere presence of an audit committee. This is the first 
study to examine the effect of independent audit committees on earnings management in the UK.  
 
3.3.4 Audit Committee Expertise 
Song and Windram (2004) evaluate the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee (1992) in the 
UK and Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) in the US and examine the effectiveness of UK audit 
committees in monitoring financial reporting.  They find that UK audit committees play a 
significant role in monitoring the quality of financial reporting.  They also find that financial literacy 
is an important determinant of audit committee effectiveness.  
 
Abbott et al. (2004) examine 41 firms that issued fraudulent reports and 88 firms that restated 
annual results in the period 1991-1999.  They find a significant positive association between audit 
committees that lack a member with financial expertise and the occurrence of financial reporting 
restatements. 
 
Bedard et al. (2004) investigate the effect of audit committee characteristics, namely, expertise, 
independence and activity, on the extent of earnings management.  They use the level of income-
increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals, applying the modified Jones (1995) cross-
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sectional model for a sample of 300 US firms in the year 1996.  They demonstrate empirically that 
the presence of at least one member with financial expertise on the audit committee is negatively 
related to the level of earnings management.  
 
Motivated by the SEC Panel Report's conclusion that audit committee members need a financial 
sophistication, Xie et al. (2003) examine the role of the audit committee in preventing earnings 
management.  They classify audit committee members into six groups and found that board and 
audit committees that included members with corporate or financial backgrounds are associated with 
firms that have less earnings management. They do not find a relationship between EM and the 
presence of an audit committee director who was CEO of another firm, a banker, or a venture 
capitalist.  Additionally, they find a negative relationship between other non-accounting financial 
experts and earnings management, but no relationship between earnings management and senior 
business executives of other firms.  
 
Lo, et al. (2010) investigate whether good governance structures help constrain management's 
opportunistic behaviors measured by transfer pricing manipulations in China. Their sample covers 
266 listed companies on the Shanghai stock exchange in 2004. They find that audit committees with 
financial experts are less likely to engage in transfer pricing manipulations.  
 
The previously mentioned studies used different samples, different time periods, different countries 
and different earnings quality proxies.  However, they are unanimous in finding that financial 
experts on audit committees contribute to higher quality financial reporting.  
 
Additionally, Abdul Rahman, et al. (2006) argue that it is important to have competent and 
experienced directors, particularly in financial aspects, on audit committees since the committee‟s 
primary function is to monitor the financial reporting process of an organisation. However, they find 
insufficient evidence to allow them to accept the negative relationship between earnings 
management and the competence of the audit committee, as measured by the presence of financial 
experts.  This result may be explained by the type of earnings management they examine and their 
small sample, which is the 97 top companies for the two years 2002-2003, as illustrated earlier. 
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Moreover, as the authors acknowledged, the institutional characteristics of Malaysia, where the 
study was conducted, are different from those of Western countries.  
 
In addition, Lin et al. (2006) examine the effectiveness of certain characteristics of audit committees 
such as size, independence, financial expertise, activity and stock ownership, in line with the 
recommendations made by the BRC in 1999.  They test the year 2000, using 106 publicly-held 
corporations in the USA.  Their dependent variable was reported earnings restatement.  Their study 
evidence suggests no negative association between audit committee expertise and earnings 
restatements. This study covers a single year and has a small sample, which makes the 
generalisation of their findings unreliable.  Furthermore, as discussed earlier, it was conducted 
before 2002, prior to introduction of SOX, when, as Chang and Sun (2009) argue, audit committees 
are less effective. Hence, this is the first study to examine the effect of the audit committees‟ 
financial expertise on the incidence of earnings management in the UK. 
 
3.3.5 Summary 
Overall, the corporate governance and earnings management literature suggests that audit committee 
mechanisms influence the credibility of financial statements and prevent aggressive earnings 
management practices.  In particular, the literature indicates that audit committee independence and 
expertise are effective in constraining earnings management.  
 
There are few studies of the effect of audit committee size and frequency of meetings and their 
results are inconclusive with little support for the effectiveness of these two factors in constraining 
earnings management.  
 
Additionally, some Asian-based studies, along with studies that tested for the effect of the mere 
presence of an audit committee, show inconclusive and conflicting results. Some of the exceptions 
and conflicting results may be due to the adoption of different dependant variables or the use of 
different measures of earning management. Prior studies have used different measures of audit 
quality, including financial restatement, fraud and informativeness.   Furthermore, there are some 
methodological problems with samples, periods and models that were discussed earlier.  
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3.4 Ownership Structures 
The ownership structure of a company could be of critical importance to the effectiveness of 
oversight mechanisms employed to reduce the likelihood of earnings management practice.  It is 
argued that an effective mechanism to constrain earnings management is the development of an 
appropriate ownership structure. 
 
There are two streams of thought regarding an effective ownership structure.  Firstly, insiders or 
managers of the firm act also as shareholders if they acquire a considerable portion of the entity‟s 
shares, and this is deemed to be useful in reducing agency conflicts and aligning the interests of 
management and shareholders.  Secondly, outsiders who own a significant number of the firm‟s 
shares, have more power and more incentive to monitor management activity, particularly the 
financial reporting process, thereby reducing the likelihood of earnings management. 
 
This section illustrates three types of ownership, internal ownership by managers, external 
ownership by institutional investors and ownership by blockholders. There follows a discussion of 
the relevant prior studies on the effectiveness of these ownership structures on reducing earnings 
management. 
 
3.4.1 Managerial Ownership 
The overwhelming majority of empirical studies found a positive association between insiders‟ 
ownership and earnings management.  
 
Using Australian data, Koh (2003) examine the association between managerial ownership and 
Australian firms' aggressive earnings management practice.  They test only income-increasing 
accruals for a sample of 107 firm-year observations from 1993 to 1997.  The main finding are a 
positive association, with a smaller magnitude of income-decreasing accruals for all specifications, 
consistent with the view that high managerial ownership encourages managerial accruals discretion. 
  
Hsu and Koh (2005), extend Koh (2003) by examining the effect of both short-term and long-term 
institutional ownership on the extent of earnings management in Australia.  The final sample 
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consists of 201 firm-year observations for years between 1993 and 1997. They test both income-
increasing and income-decreasing earnings management and find that managerial ownership is 
statistically significant for all linear specifications but insignificant for the non-linear models.  
However, managerial ownership is positively associated with income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals and negatively associated with income-increasing accruals. 
 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) examine the relationship between accruals and managerial 
ownership for one year, 1996, and find evidence that the more closely a CEO‟s compensation is tied 
to the value of stock and options, the more likely it is that discretionary accruals will be used to 
manipulate profits.  
 
Teshima and Shuto (2008) examine the effect of managerial ownership on earnings management 
using discretionary accruals.  They test a large sample of 18,790 Japanese firm-year observations 
from 1991 to 2000 and used the Kasznik (1999) model to measure discretionary accruals, which 
controls for CFO. They find that this relationship is significantly positive within intermediate 
regions of ownership, which suggests that the entrenchment effect is dominant in these regions. 
However, they also find that the relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary 
accruals is significantly negative within low and high regions of ownership, suggesting that the 
alignment effect is dominant in these regions.  
 
The above studies suggest that monitoring seems to be weaker at higher managerial ownership 
levels and, therefore, a positive association is documented between the managerial ownership 
variable and earnings management.   
 
In the UK context, Peasnell, et al (2005) study this relationship by hypothesising that the 
constraining association between earnings management, on the one hand, and an independent board 
of directors and the existence of an audit committee, on the other hand, will be more pronounced 
when the level of managerial share ownership is low.  They measure the managerial ownership as 
equal to one when managerial share ownership is less than 5%, whereas the directors‟ ownership 
measured by the number of shares beneficially owned by inside directors over total number of 
shares outstanding.  They did not document a direct relationship between earnings management and 
76 
 
managerial ownership.  However, they find little support for these conjectures, suggesting that 
boards continue to have a constraining influence on earnings management, even when shareholders 
and managers interests are better aligned. 
 
Providing further evidence using UK data, Laux and Laux (2009) investigate the board of directors‟ 
equilibrium strategies for setting CEO incentive compensation and overseeing financial reporting 
and the effects of these on earnings management.  Their results show that an increase in CEO equity 
incentives does not necessarily increase earnings management due to the directors adjusting their 
oversight effort in response to a change in CEO incentives. 
 
However, there are few studies that argue the high managerial ownership is an effective governance 
device that results in reducing earnings management.  Warfield et al. (1995) hypothesise that the 
level of managerial ownership affects both the informativeness of earnings data and the magnitude 
of discretionary accounting accrual.  They use the three-year period 1988-1990 for 4,778 US firm-
year observations.  Their results show that the magnitude of accounting accrual adjustments is 
significantly higher when managerial ownership is low.  Specifically, the absolute value of accrual 
adjustments is twice as high when managerial ownership is under 5 percent than when managerial 
ownership is above 45 percent.  
 
There are at least two plausible explanations for Warfield et al.‟s (1995) contradictory result.  First, 
they measure non-discretionary accruals as the five-year average of prior period accruals whereas 
other studies measure the discretionary accruals using models based on Jones (1991). The difference 
in the dependent variable measure is significant as they report a mean of absolute discretionary 
accruals of 26%, which is much higher than that reported in the previously discussed studies, for 
example 7% in Koh (2003), 0.006% in Hsu and Koh (2005) and 3% in Teshima and  Shuto (2008). 
The second plausible explanation is that Warfield et al. (1995) do not control for institutional 
ownership, which may be a correlated omitted variable in ownership and earnings management 
research.  Rajgopal et al. (1999) advocate the importance of controlling for managerial ownership 
while examining the effects of institutional ownership and vice-versa. 
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Additionally, Klein (2002b) investigates the effectiveness of characteristics of the board and the 
composition of the audit committee on earnings manipulation, controlling for CEO ownership 
among other control variables, for a sample of 687 large, listed U.S. firms from 1991 to 1993.  For 
earnings management, she uses discretionary accruals (the modified Jones (1995) cross-sectional 
model).  She finds inconclusive results that show positive in two out of five models at 0.10 p-value.  
 
This study will attempt to examine the relationship between earnings management and managerial 
ownership using a different measurement of managerial ownership from previous UK evidence by 
Peasnell, et al. (2005). Following other prior research (e.g. Gul et al., 2002; Hutchinson and Gul, 
2004), this study will measure managerial ownership as the percentage of total shares held by 
executive directors divided by the total number of shares.  
 
3.4.2 Blockholders’ Ownership 
Blockholders‟ ownership takes various forms, including individual investors, pension funds, mutual 
funds, corporations, private equity firms, fund managers, banks and trusts.  All these, except 
individual investors, are also known as „institutional investors‟ (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2008).  
 
Zhong et al. (2007) consider two competing views when studying the association between 
blockholders and earnings management.  First, consistent with the agency theory perspective, small 
blockholders can sell their stocks quickly if they are not pleased with the performance of managers, 
whereas large blockholders find it hard to sell a large block of stock without it having considerable 
impact on the firm, including lowering its stock price.  Thus, large blockholders normally adopt a 
long-term strategy and, thus, they need to monitor managers to produce more benefits from their 
equity ownership. 
 
Blockholders have the ability to monitor and „voice‟ their concerns and objections as a result of their 
large voting rights.  This, in turn, provides some monitoring over managers, which enables the 
blockholder to also affect the board of directors‟ composition (Person, 2006). 
 
Secondly, unlike small shareholders, large blockholders can put pressure on managers to report a 
favourable financial performance and create another threat of intervention to perceived 
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underperforming management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 and Barclay and Holderness, 1991).  
Consequently, the existence of large blockholders may pressure firms' managers to engage in 
income-increasing earnings management to report a favourable financial performance. 
  
Some prior studies support this view. Bethel et al. (1998) find that the majority of block trades have 
a positive association with more management turnovers and Ely and Song (2000) find that 
blockholders put pressure on managers to take specific actions or they call for the dismissal of the 
managers whenever the company performs below its potential.  
 
These two competing views of the effect of blockholder ownership are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive.  The dominating factor in both views is the cost and benefit of the earnings management 
to the blockholders.  
 
Zhong et al. (2007) examine the two views on the effect of blockholders on earnings management.  
They apply their study to 5,475 firm-year observations from 1994 to 2003 using pooled cross-
sectional data and they used the modified Jones model to measure the magnitude of earnings 
management.  Their results are consistent with the second view, indicating that blockholder 
ownership is positively associated with discretionary accruals.  
 
In addition, Klein (2002b) investigates the effectiveness of characteristics of the board and the 
composition of the audit committee while controlling for the effects of blockholders‟ ownership. To 
measure the effect of blockholders on discretionary accruals, she looks at firms whose audit 
committees included representatives of blockholders with more than 5% of the equity. She finds a 
negative association between 5% blockholders sitting on audit committees and earnings 
management.  
 
In addition to the limitations of Klein (2002b) mentioned earlier in the board independence section, 
another limitation regarding this test is that the measurement of the blockholder in her study 
includes only blockholders who sit on the audit committee and discriminated the effect of external 
blockholders.  Her result might have been driven by the independence of the directors on the audit 
committees, regardless of their block ownership. 
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Dempsey et al. (1993) divide their sample of owner-controlled firms into two types: owner-managed 
firms in which managers own a substantial block of equity, and externally-controlled-firms where 
outside blockholders own a substantial block of equity.  They find that owner-managed firms have 
less income-increasing earnings management compared to externally-controlled firms, which 
suggests that insider blockholders have more effective governance attributes to reduce earnings 
management than outside or external blockholders. 
 
One limitation of Dempsey et al. (1993) is the measurement of their dependent variable (earnings 
management). They use one particular type of accounting choice, namely, extraordinary item 
reporting, and this may not capture the extent of earnings management as managers usually use a 
variety of methods to manage earnings and these can be more elusive than extraordinary items.  
 
Furthermore, some other prior studies controlled for blockholders in their tests of corporate 
governance and earnings management. Dechow et al. (1996) investigate firms that were charged by 
the SEC with earnings overstatements that violate GAAP. They find a negative association between 
outside blockholders and earnings overstatements that violate GAAP.  
 
In the UK, Peasnell et al. (2005), using UK data from 1993 to 1996, examine blockholders using an 
indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm has an external stockholder owning 10% of the 
outstanding shares and zero otherwise.  They find that no relationship exists between earnings 
management and blockholders.  
 
Wang (2006) investigate the relationship between the incidence of fraud and the presence of 
blockholders.  Her results show that larger block ownership is associated with a higher likelihood of 
fraud detection and a propensity to commit fraud.  In particular, she finds that a 10% increase in 
blockholder ownership tended to decrease the probability of fraud by 3.8%.  This result suggests 
that blockholders play an important role in protecting financial reporting quality.   
 
However, large shareholders may expropriate other investors and stakeholders by colluding with 
management, as documented by Shleifer and Vishny (1997).  Claessens et al. (2000) argue that 
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concentrated ownership enables blockholders to use accounting information to their own advantage, 
for instance through income–decreasing devices in order to diminish the other shareholders‟ residual 
claims. 
  
Even if large shareholders monitor managers‟ behaviour to some extent, there is a possibility that 
they expropriate minority shareholders by hiding the firm‟s real performance, this ownership 
concentration may also badly affect minority shareholders and this, in turn, negatively affects the 
future value of the firm (Bebchuk, 1994).  
Additionally, there is empirical evidence that concentrated ownership (e.g., one ultimate owner) is 
one of the main causes of Asian companies‟ poor governance practice and poor accounting 
disclosure (Claenssens, et al., 2000; Fan and Wong, 2001). 
 
Yu (2008) uses large shareholders and the percentage of size of the largest block of stock and tested 
their association with discretionary accruals. It is found that the earnings management level of a firm 
with large shareholders is higher than that of a firm without large shareholders by 17% of the 
sample mean and by 30% of the sample median.  
 
3.4.3 Institutional Ownership 
The previous literature illustrates that institutional investors can be considered as sophisticated 
investors who typically serve a monitoring role in reducing pressures for myopic behaviour.  For 
instance, Bushee (1998) examine whether institutional investors create or reduce incentives for 
corporate managers to reduce investment in research and development (R&D) to meet short-term 
earnings goals.  The results indicate that managers are less likely to cut R&D to reverse an earnings 
decline when institutional ownership is high.   
 
It is a global view that institutional investor involvement in corporate governance is a 
complementary corporate governance mechanism.  Ferreira (2007) investigate the role of 
institutional investors around the world using a comprehensive data set of equity holdings from 27 
countries.  It was found that firms with higher ownership by foreign and independent institutions 
(unlike other institutions) have higher firm value, higher operating performance and lower capital 
expenditures. 
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Institutional investors were classified into two main groups by recent studies. Firstly, long-term 
institutional investor, who invest in firms with the intention of holding their ownership stake over a 
long period.  Hence, they have strong incentives to monitor those firms. 
 
Secondly, short-term oriented institutional shareholders, or, as some studies referred to them, 
myopic, or transient, institutional investors.  This group of investors is the dominant type and they 
focus mainly on current earnings rather than long-term earnings in determining stock prices 
(Bushee, 2001).  They engage less in the management monitoring process and, if they are unhappy 
with the firm‟s results, they prefer to sell their stakes rather than to monitor or remove inefficient 
managers (Coffee, 1991). 
 
Bushee (2001) provides a method for classifying institutional ownership into short-term holdings 
and long-term holdings based on portfolio turnover and engagement in momentum trading.  Recent 
studies used the level of institutional ownership (Koh, 2003) and the average percent of shares 
outstanding that are owned by institutional investors (Liu, 2006). 
 
The literature shows that short-term and long-term institutional holdings have opposite effects on 
earnings management.  While long-term institutional holdings have a significant negative effect on 
the level of earnings management, short-term institutional holdings have a positive effect. Bushee 
(2001) shows that the characteristics of institutional investors should be considered when examining 
the relationship between institutional investors and earnings management. 
 
Bushee (2001) examines the differential effects of institutional non-blockholders and active 
institutional blockholders on earnings management behaviour.  As measured by discretionary 
accruals, he proposes that institutional non-blockholders are more interested in short-run 
performance than are institutional blockholders and that this interest creates pressure on 
management to deliver high earnings. 
 
Moreover, Cheng and Reitenga (2009) examine the differential effects of institutional non-
blockholders and active institutional blockholders on earnings management measured by 
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discretionary accruals for S&P 500 firms. They find that active institutional blockholders exercise 
their monitoring power only when there is pressure to increase earnings, but when there is strong 
pressure to decrease earnings, evidence for the effect of active institutional blockholders is 
inconclusive.  This may suggest that active institutional blockholders are conservative since they 
appear to be more likely to limit income-increasing accruals than income-decreasing accruals. 
 
Charitou et al. (2007), using a sample of 859 U.S. bankruptcy-filing firms over the period 1986– 
2004, examine the earnings behaviour of managers during the distressed period. Their results 
provide evidence that the management of distressed firms with lower (higher) institutional 
ownership have greater (lesser) tendency to manage earnings downwards.  
 
In Australia, Koh (2003) examines the association between institutional ownership, measured by the 
level of institutional ownership, and aggressive earnings management in a sample of 107 Australian 
firms between 1993 and 1997.  The modified Jones model is used to measure earnings management 
for positive discretionary accruals. The main finding is a positive association at lower levels of 
institutional ownership and a negative association at higher levels of institutional ownership, and 
this is consistent with the view that monitoring by long-term institutional investors' limits 
managerial accruals discretion. 
 
Hsu and Koh (2005) extend Koh (2003) by examining the effect of both short-term and long-term 
institutional ownership on the extent of earnings management in Australia.  The final sample 
consists of 201 firm-year observations of years between 1993 and 1997. Unlike Koh (2003), they 
test both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management and found that managerial 
ownership is statistically significant for all linear specifications but insignificant for the non-linear 
models. Their results suggest that transient and long-term institutional investors co-exist and have 
differential effects on earnings management.  Transient institutions are associated with upward 
accruals management, while long-term institutions constrain this activity.  
 
Osma and Noguer (2007) test whether corporate governance mechanisms are effective in 
constraining earnings manipulation for a Spanish sample of quoted companies during the period 
1999–2001.  They mainly use the Jones (1991) model to measure earnings management for 155 
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firm-year observations.  They find that the key constraint on earnings management is institutional 
directors, unlike the UK and US where independent directors play a significant role.  
 
Cheng and Reitenga (2009) examine the differential effects of institutional non-blockholders and 
active institutional blockholders on earnings management, measured by discretionary 
accruals.…They find that active institutional blockholders need to exercise their monitoring power 
only when there is pressure to increase earnings, but when there is strong pressure to decrease 
earnings, the evidence regarding the effect of active institutional blockholders is inconclusive. This 
may suggest that active institutional blockholders are conservative since they appear to be more 
likely to limit income-increasing accruals than they are to limit income-decreasing earnings 
management.   Cheng and Reitenga (2009) assert that the characteristics of institutional investors 
should be considered when examining the relationship between institutional investors and earnings 
management.  
 
Chung et al (2002) also investigate the relationship between institutional ownership and earnings 
management practice.  They use the modified Jones model to measure earnings management and 
apply signed earnings management to test the effect of different possible directions. Their dependant 
variable is measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the institutional ownership is 
above the cross sectional sample median and zero otherwise.  Their result does not show a 
significant relationship between institutional investors and earnings management, but this may have 
been caused by their biased measurement of the institutional ownership. 
 
Peasnell et al. (2005), using UK data from 1993 to 1996, examine institutional investors using as a 
measure the number of shares owned by institutional investors over the total number of shares 
outstanding.  They find that no relationship exists between earnings management and institutional 
investors.  
 
From the previous studies, it can be seen that institutional shareholders with a high ownership stake 
can play a significant role in monitoring and mitigating management opportunistic behaviour such 
as earnings management.  This seems not to happen when the institutional ownership stake is low. 
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Besides using different measures of institutional investors than those used by prior UK studies, this 
is the first study to investigate the effect of long-term and short-term institutional investors in the 
UK. 
 
3.4.4 Summary 
Overall, the governance and earnings management literature suggests that ownership structures 
influence the credibility of financial reporting.  Regarding managerial ownership, the overwhelming 
majority of prior studies suggest that low managerial ownership is a good governance attribute, and 
this runs counter to the proposition of agency theory. However, the review of the results indicates 
that high institutional ownership is associated with less earnings management in accordance with 
agency theory.   
 
The review of the prior studies of the association between blockholders‟ ownership and earnings 
management shows inconclusive results.  Some results suggest that blockholders may behave in 
aggressive ways and collude with managers against the shareholders‟ interests, while other 
researchers argue and some find the opposite, but this may be based on their market and their 
ownership stake.  
 
 
3.5 External Audit Factors 
External audit is an external governance mechanism that reviews and evaluates client internal 
controls and audits their financial statements in order to prevent material mis-statements.  Auditors 
of higher quality are less willing to accept doubtful accounting methods and are more likely to 
report errors and irregularities revealed during the audit work.  Thus, the external auditor is 
considered to have an impact on the efficacy of the firm‟s monitoring function, and hence the 
incidence of earnings management.  
 
Stockholders rely upon the external auditor to provide some assurance that the financial statements 
of a firm are not misleading.  It is crucial that the monitoring provided by this procedure is not 
impaired. Thus, independence is the first and most important factor for external auditors in 
adequately discharging their auditing function. 
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Moreover, earnings management can occur in many forms, including unusual or complex 
accounting transactions and the use of discretion in accounting estimates.  To deal adequately with 
these types of issues, a professional, high quality auditor is required.  
 
Therefore, in order for the external auditor to provide satisfactory oversight with regard to reducing 
the incidence of earnings management, it is proposed that two crucial factors affect the functionality 
of the external auditor, namely, independence and quality.  In this study, external auditor 
independence will be measured, following the prior literature, using the magnitude of fees for non-
audit services, and the quality of the external auditor will be measured, according to the prior 
literature, using both audit fees and industry specialisation.  
 
This section of the literature review is organised as follows. The discussion on auditor independence 
looks at studies that examine auditor independence in general before exploring studies that examine 
non-audit fees (NAF) and audit fees (AF) in the context of earnings management.  Subsequently, the 
discussion on the industry specialised auditor is organised similarly. 
 
3.5.1 Non-Audit Services Fees and Auditor Independence  
Another issue addressed by this study is whether the provision of audit fees (AF) and non-audit fees 
(NAF) as measures of audit quality and auditor independence impacts on the effectiveness with 
which the auditors constrain earnings management.  In the UK, auditors are allowed to provide non-
audit services (NAS) to their clients and these clients are required to disclose the amount of auditor 
fees in their financial statements.  
 
The Companies Act 1989 (Disclosure of Remuneration for Non-audit Work) 1991 Regulations in 
the United Kingdom requires UK companies (other than small and medium-sized ones) to disclose 
in a note to their annual accounts, the remuneration paid to their auditors for non-audit work, 
separately from the audit fees. 
 
The prior literature suggests that the magnitude of NAF could impair auditor independence as NAS 
have the following drawbacks that threaten that independence.  
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The first drawback is the self-interest threat.  The auditor may become more reliant on the client 
when considering future revenues from non-audit services to that client (Becker et al., 1998). Thus, 
auditors may be willing to ignore clients‟ violations and breaches in order to protect their 
prospective revenues.  Research on this issue showed diverse results.  However, some previous 
studies have documented that auditors are less likely to issue a going-concern modified audit 
opinion for clients that pay higher NAF (Sharma and Sidhu, 2001; Wines, 1994). 
 
The second drawback is the intimidation threat, represented by the client‟s ability to choose a 
different auditor in the future.  This threat exists in a normal auditor-auditee relationship but it 
becomes stronger when the auditor can also lose fees from consulting services (Mayhew and 
Wilkins, 2003).  Several studies (DeAngelo, 1981a; Antle, 1984; Simunic, 1984; Acemoglu and 
Gietzmann, 1997) have also argued that NAS may reduce independence if auditors expect future 
fees and there is a threat to replace them if audit reports are not positive.  
 
A third major drawback of NAF is the self-review threat.  Auditors are responsible for evaluating 
internal control and accounting systems.  Thus, auditors are actually evaluating their own work, 
which can affect their independence.  Auditors may be unwilling to criticise the work carried out by 
their consultancy colleagues, because doing so may lead to the audit firm loosing lucrative 
consultancy services (Bartlett, 1991). Therefore, during the audit, auditors may jeopardise their 
independence by ignoring errors that may have resulted from advisory services provided by their 
own firm.  
 
A further drawback of providing NAS is the threat of familiarity. Rouckle (1995) argues that the 
trust established between auditor and client through NAS may lead to excessive trust that, in turn, 
leads to less testing of the client‟s accounting data. 
 
On the other hand, NAS may provide some additional insights into the firm, which may increase 
audit efficiency.  The audit findings are available to the advisory service, and knowledge spillovers 
can not only enhance efficiency but also the quality of both audit and consulting services (Peel and 
O‟Donnell, 1995).  Thus, the total quasi-rents from auditing and consulting services might be higher 
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than the quasi-rents from auditing services. Therefore, the auditor‟s independence can be increased 
if the auditor also provides NAS. 
 
In terms of practical studies, the prior literature on the relationship between the provision of NAS 
and auditor independence can be differentiated into two research streams: studies on the relationship 
between NAS and independence in mind and studies on the relationship between NAS and 
independence in appearance. 
 
The first stream of research argues that, because auditor independence in mind is difficult to 
observe, previous studies in this area have used proxies for auditor independence, such as NAS.  
Relevant studies have used different dependent variables to test the effect of non-audit fees, such as 
qualified or going-concern opinions, earnings management and financial restatement.  
 
The following section will illustrate and discuss some of these key empirical studies, except for 
those related to earnings management; the latter will be illustrated and discussed extensively in 
section 3.6.2 below following the general argument of NAF and auditor independence. 
 
In the USA, Craswel et al. (2002) investigate whether fee dependence within the audit firms‟ offices 
jeopardises auditor independence.  They argue that if fee dependence affects auditors‟ independent 
judgment, then auditors are less likely to qualify the accounts.  Fee dependence is examined at both 
national and local office levels in audit firms. They focus on audit fee dependence, and control for 
the effects of non-audit service fee dependence after the 1989 mergers.  They measure the 
independent judgment in auditing by the tendency to issue qualified audit opinions.  Their results 
show that the level of auditor fee dependence does not affect an auditor‟s tendency to issue qualified 
audit opinions. 
 
However, Beeler and Hunton (2002) find that audit partners exhibited more biased decision-making 
in the presence of potential non-audit services, and this creates a perceived lack of auditor 
independence.  They find evidence that the audit fee structure affects the partners‟ evaluation of 
evidence and their going-concern judgments. 
 
88 
 
Beck et al. (1988) hypothesises that non-recurring NAS impair audit independence more than 
recurring NAS but finds no evidence that auditor independence is impaired significantly by NAS.  
Arrunada (1999a) finds that auditor independence is not impaired by the provision of NAS and, 
contrarily, it may enhance the auditor‟s independence if he has a diversified clientele. Similarly, 
DeFond et al. (2002) finds no evidence that the level of non-audit fees affects auditor reporting 
decisions or their propensity to issue going-concern audit opinions.   
 
The previous author explains in another study, Arrunada (1999b), that an auditor with a large and 
diversified clientele is collectively dependent on all his clients but more independent of each 
individual client.  He suggested that NAS increase the auditor specific assets, in another words, 
increase the auditor‟s size and reputation, which enhances the incentive for the auditor to keep high 
levels of audit quality as any failure to do so would create large potential losses. 
 
Jenkins and Krawczyk (2002) test a wide range of non audit services in the USA such as actuarial 
services, legal services and software training and find a positive relationship between accounting 
professionals and investors‟ perceptions of auditors‟ independence and objectivity and additional 
non-audit fees.  
 
In the UK, Lennox (1999) examines the association between audit qualifications and NAS, using 
2,244 UK firm-years over the period 1988 to 1994.  He measures NAF as the level of non-audit fees 
and as the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees.  Audit quality is measured by a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the auditor discloses a fundamental uncertainty or gives a qualified audit 
report due to going-concern issues and 0 otherwise.  The result shows a positive but insignificant 
relation between audit qualifications and NAS, which may support the theoretical argument of the 
possible impairment of the auditor independence by NAS. 
 
Four Australian studies used data from different periods to investigate the association between the 
incidence of a going-concern opinion decision and NAF. Barkess and Simnett‟s (1994) sample 
consists of 371 publically listed companies from 1986 to1990. They find that NAS fees are not 
related to the audit opinion decision.  Craswell (1999) tests audit opinions using 885 Australian 
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listed companies in 1984, 1,477 in 1987 and 1,079 in 1994.  NAS fees are found to be not related to 
the audit opinion decision. 
 
On the other hand, the other two studies found that NAF affects auditor independence.  Wines 
(1994) used 76 Australian companies over a period of 10 years from 1980 to 1989, and conclude 
that auditor independence is impaired for clients generating higher levels of NAF.  Sharma and 
Sidhu (2001) used 49 Australian bankrupt companies between 1989 and 1996 and provide evidence 
of significant positive associations between NAF and the propensity of the auditor to issue a 
qualified going concern opinion. This result suggests potential independence threats.  
 
In New Zealand, Hay et al. (2006) examine the effect of NAF on auditor going concern opinion.  
They define NAF as the ratio of NAF to AF and audit opinion as firms receiving a qualified or 
modified report.  Their sample consists of 644 New Zealand companies from 1999 to 2001.  Their 
results show no significant association between audit qualification or modification and NAF.  
 
This result is inconsistent with their expectation that New Zealand‟s small and limited growth 
market for audit and non-audit services would increase the client pressure on the auditor in order to 
preserve their client base and fee revenues.  A plausible explanation for their results is the low 
power of their study analysis; only 28 companies, less than 5% of their sample, had a going concern 
qualification, and thus their test reliability may not be powerful.  
 
The positive impact was also found in an empirical study in New Zealand by Gul (1989) who finds 
that bankers had higher confidence in auditors who conduct NAS, such as designing and installing 
financial and cost accounting systems.   
 
The second stream of research has investigated the effect of the provision of NAS on auditor 
independence in appearance. These studies argue that, since auditor independence is hard to 
measure, even if independence is not really affected, independence in appearance is affected and the 
public may perceive that the auditor‟s independence is impaired, which is more dangerous.  These 
studies are mainly based on surveys and experiments.  
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External auditors have market pressures and incentives to maintain their integrity and objectivity 
because they may lose their client base if they lose their reputation. Thus, the economic 
consequences of reputation loss provide incentives to auditors to sustain and demonstrate a high 
level of independence.  At least, auditors should appear independent to the capital market because 
independence of mind cannot be observed (Mautz and Sharaf 1961).  
 
Solomon, et al. (2005) examine the extent to which the perceived credibility of financial statements 
is a function of the public‟s perception of the auditor‟s independence, using an experimental case on 
ninety five participants.  The results illustrate that participants have less confidence in financial 
information audited by firms that at the same time provide significant NAS, suggesting that auditors 
are perceived to be less independent when they also provide NAS. 
 
In Europe, Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2009) empirically investigate the impact of NAS on 
investors‟ perceptions of auditor independence in Germany, considering the recent number of 
changes to NAS regulations that have occurred in Germany, USA and other countries.  
 
Their findings support the negative impact view, which is in line with most of the previous studies 
of auditor independence in appearance that were performed in Anglo-American countries, 
particularly the US.  The effects of 19 different services were analysed and they find that 
shareholders generally perceive a negative effect on auditor‟s independence if NAS are provided. 
 
In an earlier study, Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2005) investigate the impact of NAF on 
perceived auditor independence in Denmark.  They find that shareholders, bank loan officers and 
journalists perceive a negative effect on auditor independence if NAS are provided.  Their findings 
show that the type of NAS influences auditor independence.  
 
Many other studies have documented the same negative association. Firth (1980) finds that there is a 
perception of auditor independence impairment when the amount of NAF is large in relation to AF.  
Beck et al (1988) also states that the increasing bond between auditors and their clients, due to the 
provision of NAS, leads to a public perception of impaired auditor independence.  
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From the above illustrations, it can be observed that the vast majority of empirical studies of auditor 
independence in mind, as measured by issuing going concerns or qualified reports, failed to find 
evidence that NAF jeopardise auditor independence, while the vast majority of studies of auditor 
independence in appearance find that NAF impair the auditor independence. 
 
Francis (2006) asserts that non-findings of a relation between NAF and earnings management may 
not extrapolate to the U.S. setting due to institutional differences between countries.  He reviews the 
NAS research literature over the past 40 years and concludes that even though there is no clear 
evidence linking the provision of NAS with audit failures, the literature finds that NAS can 
adversely affect the appearance of auditor independence, and this may be more than just a "mere 
perception" problem, because there is also evidence that stock prices are significantly lower for 
companies that pay their auditors large fees for NAS. 
 
Although academic research findings are mixed, many accounting regulators clearly believe that 
NAF has the potential to impair auditor independence.  Following the financial scandals involving 
Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing and others, the SEC attributed these to audit failures due to the 
lack of auditor independence.  Consequently, the SEC implemented new auditor independence 
criteria requiring the disclosure of audit and non-audit service fees and banned the provision of 
certain non-audit services that are considered as a threat to auditor independence (see SEC Final 
Rule S7-13-00, 2000). 
 
3.5.2 Association between Earnings Management and Non Audit Services Fees 
The previous discussion shows that NAF can be used as a proxy for a non-independent auditor, and 
may directly affect the flourishing earnings management practice.  Next, the relation between 
earnings management and NAF will be explored, then the effect of audit fees (AF) on earnings 
management is discussed. 
 
To begin with USA based studies, Frankel et al. (2002) examine the association between NAF and 
earnings management. Their sample consists of data collected from 3,074 proxy statements filed 
with the SEC between February 5, 2001 and June 15, 2001.  They develop three measurements of 
NAF.  The first is the ratio of NAF to total fees.  The second measure disaggregates fees into non-
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audit and audit components, both of which are measured as percentile ranks for each client of a 
specific auditor.  The third measure is the percentile rank of total fees for each client of a specific 
auditor. 
 
Their findings reveal significant positive associations between two of the three proxies of NAF and 
the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals and both the magnitude of income-increasing and 
income-decreasing discretionary accruals.  Their results are robust to alternative measures of 
earnings management.  
 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) challenge the findings of Frankel et al. (2002) and conduct the same three 
sets of empirical tests to explore if Frankel et al.‟s (2002) results are sensitive to research design 
choices.  They looked at fees for a sample of 3,170 firms from U.S. registrants‟ 2000 proxy 
statements.  They measured NAF as the ratio of NAF to total fees, and AF as the audit work fee. 
 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) investigates the robustness of Frankel et al.‟s (2002) discretionary accrual 
measurement by using Kothari et al. (2005), which controls for firm performance.  They find no 
association between NAF ratio and performance-adjusted income-increasing discretionary accruals.  
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) argue that Frankel et al.‟s earnings management measurement error due to 
not controlling for firm performance in the estimate of income-increasing discretionary accruals 
confounds the relationship between discretionary accruals and the fee ratio. 
 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) find two results that are similar to those of Frankel et al. (2002).  First, they 
find no association between the fee ratio and the likelihood of firms reporting small earnings 
increases.  Secondly, they find a negative association between total fees and the likelihood of firms 
reporting small earnings increases.  But, unlike Frankel et al. (2002), they do not find a significant 
relationship between either the NAF fee ratio or total fees, and firms meeting analysis‟ forecasts.  
Overall, Ashbaugh et al.‟s (2003) findings do not support Frankel et al.‟s (2002) conclusion that 
auditors‟ independence is impaired as a result of clients purchasing relatively more non-audit 
services.   
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Chung and Kallapur (2003) study the association between a client‟s importance, in terms of fees, 
and earnings management.  They estimate discretionary accruals using the cross-sectional modified 
Jones model as their measure of earnings management, and measured the client‟s importance by the 
ratio of total client fees to audit firm's total revenues, the ratio of non-audit fees from the client to 
audit firm's total revenues, the ratio of total client fees to revenues of the audit firm office through 
which the audit was conducted, and the ratio of non-audit fees from the client to revenues of the 
audit firm office through which the audit was conducted.  
 
They used a sample of 1,871 US firms in the year 2000, and control for industry and determinants of 
discretionary accruals.  They consider both full sample and sample partitions to examine whether 
client importance is associated with abnormal accruals.  They find no significant association 
between their client importance measures and earnings management.  Thus, they find that auditor 
independence is not impaired by non-audit fees.  Their results proved to be robust when they used 
partitions of the sample based on client incentives to manage earnings, auditor expertise, and 
management influence on the board of directors.   
 
Larcker and Richardson (2004), aiming to shed light on the prior mixed results on the association 
between NAF and earnings management, examine the relation between both AF and NAF and 
discretionary accruals.  Earnings management is measured as discretionary accruals using the 
modified Jones model.   
 
They argue that the previous mixed findings are not surprising because prior research overlooked 
the important role of corporate governance, along with the external auditor, as a potential 
monitoring mechanism to mitigate the inherent agency problems in publicly traded corporations.   
 
They suggest that, if auditor independence, measured by the provision of NAF, is studied in 
isolation from alternative corporate governance mechanisms, it will give a deficient analysis of 
earnings quality.  They conclude that, if a firm has strong governance, then there will be no or a 
weak relationship between NAS and earnings management. 
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They use 3,424 firms for years 2000 and 2001 and examine NAF along with some corporate 
governance variables such as institutional ownership, management ownership and board 
independence.  
 
Consistent with prior studies, they find mixed results for associations between NAF and 
discretionary accruals.  However, they divide their sample into three clusters based on their 
corporate governance variables.  The cluster that has weak corporate governance levels, which 
represents approximately 8.5 percent of the total sample, exhibits a statistically significant positive 
association between NAF and discretionary accruals.   
 
This cluster of firms has lower institutional ownership, higher management ownership, and a lower 
percentage of independent board members.  These results imply that the provision of NAF is a 
problem only for a small subset of firms that appear to have weak corporate governance resulting 
from management control.  Therefore, it is important to understand the role of corporate governance 
in either mitigating or exacerbating the relation between payments for NAS and earnings 
management.  
  
Even though Larcker and Richardson (2004) argue that the previous mixed findings are caused by 
neglecting the role of corporate governance and suggest that if auditor independence, measured by 
the provision of non-audit fees, is studied in isolation from alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms, it will give a deficient analysis of earnings quality, they neglected an extremely 
important governance variable, namely, audit committee characteristics.   
 
The audit committee is an internal governance system that monitors the credibility of the firm‟s 
financial reporting process and oversees external auditor independence.  Thus, the audit committee 
plays a direct role in constraining earnings management, the appointment and dismissal of the 
external auditor and supervising the level of audit and non-audit fees paid to the auditor.  These 
previous studies did not consider the extent to which the auditor and the audit committee interact 
and thus jointly affect the quality of financial reporting.  
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Another attempt to explain the previous conflicting results is offered by Lim and Tan (2007) who 
document that industry specialist auditors are more likely than non-specialists to be concerned about 
reputation loss and litigation exposure, and to benefit from knowledge spillovers from the provision 
of NAS, as well as higher earnings-response increases, with the level of NAS purchased from 
industry specialist auditors, compared to non-specialist auditors. 
 
They used Ashbaugh et al. (2003) to measure discretionary accruals for a sample of 9,501 USA 
firm-years observations for fiscal years 2000–2001.  They find that earnings management is 
positively and significantly associated with the natural log of non-audit fees, but not with the 
percentile rank of a particular client‟s NAF, they also document a negative association between 
negative EM and NAF. 
 
In the UK context, there are three studies that investigate the impact of auditor independence on 
earnings management and both find that NAF has a positive relation with earnings management.  
Gore, et al. (2001) investigate the relationship between earnings management and NAF.  They use 
the simple Jones model as a proxy for earnings management.  They define NAS as the ratio of NAF 
to total audit fees.  Using a sample of 4,779 UK companies in the period 1992 to 1998, they 
document a positive association between NAF and earnings management for non-Big 5 clients but 
not for Big 5 clients.  
 
Antle, et al. (2006) study economic bonding in the auditor-client relationship by investigating the 
association between earnings management and total fees paid to the auditor.  They use a sample of 
2,294 UK firms from 1994 to 2000 and 1,570 US firms in the year 2000.  They define NAF as the 
ratio of non-audit to audit fees and to total fees. Earnings management is measured using the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated from the modified Jones model.  They report that 
NAF decrease abnormal accruals in both the US and the UK samples.  
 
Ferguson, et al. (2004) using a sample of 610 UK firms for the period 1996-98, they provide 
empirical evidence on the relation between NAF and three proxies for earnings management: the 
public criticism of a firm accounting practices, financial statements and the mean absolute value of 
client discretionary working capital accruals over the sample period. The level of NAS purchase is 
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measured, alternatively, as the ratio of NAF to total auditor fees, the natural log of NAS fees, and 
the deciles rank of a particular client's NAS fees given all NAS fees received by the audit firm 
practice office. In general, they find that all three measures of earnings management are positively 
and significantly associated with the three measures of NAS purchase. 
 
They offered an explanation for their conflicting results with the previous US studies stating that 
audit litigation costs in the United Kingdom likely differ significantly from those in the United 
States and other regimes, and thus auditors' willingness to acquiesce to client pressures across 
regimes may not be comparable. This argument is also supported by some previous studies such as 
(Ball, et al. 2000). 
 
In New Zealand, Cahan et al. (2008) examine the association between levels of NAF as client 
importance measures and earnings management.  Their sample covers the period 1995 to 2001 and 
reveals mixed results.  They find client importance is associated with earnings management in some 
regressions and not in others.  They also report that significant growth in NAF exhibits less earnings 
management.  However, the latter result is not reliable because the OLS produced a negative 
adjusted R2, which suggests that the OLS is highly mis-specified.  
 
Additionally, the Cahan et al. (2008) study suffers from the problem of small sample size and that 
may be another plausible explanation for their mixed results and questions about the reliability of 
their results.  Their sample ranges from 31 to 64 for most of their OLS models. Another criticism of 
Cahan et al. (2008) is that they do not control for the effect of foreign firms in their samples.  This is 
an important issue because foreign firms are subject to different disclosure regulations and legal 
systems.  Their sample includes large cross listed foreign companies and their effect on the 
magnitude of AF is not excluded.  
 
In terms of the relationship between non-audit services and earnings management behavior in 
developing countries context, using Korean firms, Choi et al. (2009) report evidence of a negative 
relationship between NAF (tax services type) and discretionary accruals, suggesting that auditors‟ 
provision of tax services limits aggressive accounting practices. However, there are some reasons 
that may explain this contradictory result.  First, their measure of NAF is only for tax services fees 
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and not the total amount of NAF.   Another possible reason for their result is that Korea has different 
legal and cultural business environments from western countries. One of the significant differences 
between Korea and other countries is the high book-tax conformity in Korea as documented by their 
study authors.  
 
Habib and Islam (2007) study the relationship between non-audit services and earnings management 
using Bangladesh.  Their sample consists of 530 firm-year observations covering the period from 
1996 to 1999. They apply both univariate and multivariate regression methodologies to test their 
hypotheses. They measure EM using Kothari et al. (2005) and used three measures for NAF, namely 
the natural log of NAF; NAF ratio and natural log of total audit fees. Their results show that no 
relationship between NAF measures and discretionary accruals is found. Their findings further 
strengthen the notion that there is a spill-over effect of providing non-audit services. This result of 
no relationship between EM and auditor independence might be due to the weak corporate 
governance practice and investor protection in developing countries such as Bangladesh, compared 
to the US, which in turn will affect this association as argued by Chung and Kallapur (2003). 
 
A similar stream of research investigates the relationship between financial restatements and the 
provision of NAS.  Kinney et al. (2004) for instance, examine the relationship between financial 
restatements and NAF.  They define NAS as the ratio of NAF to total fees.  The sample includes 
617 restating SEC registrants matched with a non-restating firm that has the same SIC code, the 
same auditor and a similar size measured by total revenue, covering 1995-2000. They do not find 
any statistically significant association between NAS and restatements.  
 
Bloomfield and Shackman (2008) study the relationship between NAF and the occurrence of 
financial statement restatements for 250 financial statement restatements announced by public 
companies from January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2002.  They find limited evidence to support the view 
that firms with higher NAF are more likely to restate earnings; however, their study finds stronger 
evidence that the level of total fees paid to the audit firm is significant in the predictability of a 
restatement.  
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In terms of the relationship between NAF and earnings quality, Srinidhi and Gul (2007), using a 
sample of 4,282 firm-years for 2000 and 2001, examine the effect of both AF and NAF on accrual 
quality. They measure accrual quality using a modification of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model, which estimates the absolute value of the residual from regressions relating current accruals 
to cash flows, change in revenue, property, plant and equipment (PPE). 
 
Their results show that accrual quality is negatively associated with both expected and unexpected 
NAF but is positively associated with expected AF.  These results suggest that NAF result in 
economic bonding and consequent loss of audit quality, and AF results in higher accrual quality.  
 
In the Australian context, there is one study that investigates the relationship between NAF and 
earnings management, as measured by conservatism.  Ruddock et al. (2006) examine whether the 
provision of NAS is associated with news-based conservatism.  They examine Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) listed firms from 1993 to 2000.  They find that higher than expected levels of NAS 
are not associated with reduced conservatism. 
 
However, Francis (2006) assesses the previous evidence provided by Ruddock et al. (2006) and he 
disagrees with their conclusion that NAS have no adverse effect on audit quality.  He asserts that 
their result may not extrapolate to the U.S. setting due to institutional differences between the two 
countries. 
 
Overall, the survey of the related literature suggests that the provision of NAF does impair auditor 
independence and reduce financial reporting quality in countries that have less litigious 
environment. In the USA, auditors are expected to constrain aggressive earnings management 
because of the high cost of litigation in the event of audit failure as supported by Nelson (2004) that 
the incentives to prevent aggressive reporting are provided by the threat of litigation, reputation loss 
that reduces audit firm‟s ability to attract clients and maintain higher fees for audit services.  
 
3.5.3 Association between Earnings Management and Audit Fees 
 In terms of audit fees (AF), Bedard and Johnstone (2004) find that auditors increase effort and 
billing rates for clients with earnings manipulation risk and  they find positive relationships between 
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billing rates and both earnings manipulation risk and heightened corporate governance risk.  These 
findings suggest that auditors assess situations involving both an aggressive earnings management 
and inadequate corporate governance and that there is a relationship between those assessments and 
auditors‟ fees. 
 
They offered some examples. Auditors could use more specific tests to detect certain entries that 
could be manipulated to manage earnings in a particular industry.  They could also increase the 
extent of testing in particular areas that are highly susceptible to earnings manipulation, such as end 
of financial period transactions.     
 
Srinidhi et al. (2007) argue that the auditing market is more regulated than the non-audit services 
market as the audit of listed firms is mandatory, whereas non-audit services are not.  They assert that 
AF is more likely to reflect auditing efforts, which in turn produces better accrual quality.   
 
Gul et al. (2003) examine the linkages between discretionary accruals and AF.  Using 648 
Australian firms, OLS regression results show that there is a positive association between earnings 
management and AF. 
 
Abbott et al. (2006) examine the association between AF and earnings management, hypothesising 
that, due to asymmetric litigation effects, AF decrease (increase) with a client‟s risk of income-
decreasing (increasing) earnings management.  They use a sample of 429 public, non-regulated, Big 
5 audited companies for the year 2000.  They find that downward earnings management risk, 
(negative discretionary accruals) is associated with lower AF.  Positive discretionary accruals are 
associated with higher AF.  
 
Stanley and DeZoort (2007) investigate the relation between audit firm independence and financial 
restatements.  AF is used as one of the measures of auditor independence.  Using matched-sample 
logistic regression and 382 companies with and without financial restatements during 2000–2004, 
the results indicate that AF is negatively related to the likelihood of restatement.  This result is 
consistent with concerns about reduced audit quality due to a lack of client-specific knowledge and 
low AF on new audit engagements. 
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3.5.4 Industry Specialised Auditor and Audit Quality 
DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the multiple probability of the auditor discovering, 
observing and reporting financial statement errors.   However, audit quality is hard to measure.  
Audit research has applied a variety of proxies to measure audit quality.  For example, DeAngelo 
(1981) argues that larger auditors are more independent and, therefore, provide a higher quality of 
audit.  Large audit firms have more concern to protect their reputations and more resources, which 
enable them to perform better auditing services, compared to small audit firms (Palmrose, 1988; 
Menon and Williams, 1991) 
 
Empirically, some researchers, such as Becker et al. (1998), Francis et al. (1999) and Chia et al. 
(2007), provide evidence for the use of auditor size as a proxy for audit quality. However, Johnson 
et al. (2002) adopt the tenure of auditors with their clients as a proxy for audit quality as auditors 
who have served their clients for a longer time would know their clients‟ accounting systems and 
internal controls better. Their results show that short audit tenure of two or three years is associated 
with lower quality financial reporting. 
 
This long-term relationship between auditor and client may actually create aggregated awareness 
that helps auditors to limit earnings management behaviours and other irregularities in financial 
reporting processes. Mansi et al., (2004) suggest that, under the current system of voluntary auditor 
rotation, audit quality does not appear to deteriorate with longer auditor tenure.   
 
Nevertheless, Ghosh and Moon (2005) argue that the tenure of auditors may have a negative impact 
on audit quality, as auditors who have served their clients for a longer time may surrender their 
independence to maintain close relationships with their clients.  
 
Other researchers apply the number of audit qualified reports as an indicator of audit quality; some 
researchers call this measure the unclean auditor opinion. Thus, higher-quality auditors will usually 
issue more unclean opinions than lower-quality auditors (Craswell, 1988; Francis and Krishnan, 
1999). 
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The first wave of research described above views the large audit firms (Big 4) as a homogenous 
group. The second wave of research relaxes this assumption and has started to examine potential 
differences in audit quality within the Big 4 group of accounting firms.  
 
Francis (2004) argues that there is a need for audit quality measure development as the Big 4 market 
shares continues to expand globally and now exceeds 90% for publicly listed companies in the US 
markets.  From a statistical point of view, this means that studies that adopt Big 4 audit firms as a 
measure of audit quality have a weakness in their research designs because there is a very low 
variance in this variable as most observations are audited by Big 4 auditors. 
 
Francis (2004) empirically observes that industry market shares are not evenly distributed among 
the large audit firms.  He uses the new US audit fee disclosures for 2000–2001 and computes 
industry fee leaders for 63 non-financial industries based on two-digit SIC industry codes.  On 
average, he finds that industry leaders have 50% of the industry fees, while the second-ranked firms 
have about 20%.  
 
Recently, a more sophisticated measure of audit quality was introduced in the literature, namely, the 
industry specialised auditor.  It is argued that each of the Big 4 auditors is specialised in certain 
industries and thus more familiar and effective in conducting higher quality audit work for firms in 
that particular industry.  
 
Solomon et al. (1999) argue that industry specialist auditors have a deeper knowledge than non-
specialist auditors due to greater experience in the industry, and this enables experts to make more 
accurate audit judgments and thus to conduct higher quality audit work.  They find that specialist 
auditors have more accurate non-error frequency knowledge than non-specialists. 
 
Owhoso et al. (2002) show that industry experienced auditors are better able to detect errors within 
their industry specialisation than outside that industry.  Similarly, Maletta and Wright (1996) 
observe fundamental differences in error characteristics and methods of detection across industries.  
In addition, specialised auditors are more likely to invest more in staff recruitment and training, 
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information technology and audit technologies than non-specialist auditors (Dopuch and Simunic, 
1982). 
 
Additionally, O'Keefe et al. (1994) report that specialist auditors exhibit greater compliance with 
auditing standards than non-specialist auditors.  Dunn and Mayhew (2004) find that clients of 
industry-specialist audit firms are ranked higher in terms of disclosure quality by financial analysts.  
Carcello and Nagy (2004) find a negative association between audit firm industry specialisation and 
SEC enforcement actions.  
 
Green (2008) compares specialised auditors in manufacturing industry with non-specialised auditors 
on conducting some audit processes.  Both groups conducted analytical procedures tasks within the 
same industry.  The results show that differences were noticeable in later stages; specialised auditors 
had a more focused and efficient information search as they were more able to detect the correct 
causes of problems during the task, and identified the correct these causes more often.  
 
3.5.5 Association between Earnings Management and Industry Specialised Auditor  
Krishnan (2003), using a sample of 4,422 firms audited by Big 6 auditors from 1989 to 1998, 
examines the association between auditor industry expertise and a client's level of earnings 
management.  It is found that clients of non-specialised auditors report absolute discretionary 
accruals that are higher than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of specialised auditors. 
 
Balsam et al. (2003) compare the absolute level of discretionary accruals and earnings response 
coefficients of firms audited by industry specialists with those of firms not audited by industry 
specialists.  They investigate years between 1991 and 1999 for more than 50,000 firm-year 
observations and used the modified Jones model to measure discretionary accruals.  They use 
multiple proxies for industry specialist auditors and find that clients of these specialist auditors have 
lower earnings management than clients of non-specialist auditors. 
 
Chen et al. (2006) investigate whether the empirical results that Big 5 auditors and industry 
specialists constrain earnings management in the USA can be extended to Taiwan given the 
significantly different audit market and legal environments. They measured EM applying the 
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modified Jones model and use 2324 observations during 1998–2002. They document that industry 
specialist auditors constrain income-increasing earnings management. 
 
Stanley and DeZoort (2007) investigate the relation between audit firm tenure and financial 
restatements.  The effects of short tenure, expertise and independence are measured using audit firm 
industry specialisation and audit fees as proxies whereas the effects of long tenure independence are 
measured using non-audit fees as a proxy.  They use a matched-sample logistic regression for 382 
companies with and without financial restatements for years 2000 to 2004.  Their results indicate 
that industry specialised auditor and audit fees are negatively related to the likelihood of 
restatement.  This result is consistent with concerns about reduced audit quality due to a lack of 
client-specific knowledge and low audit fees on new audit engagements. 
 
Bloomfield and Shackman (2008) study the relationship between audit firm industry specialisation 
and the occurrence of financial statement restatements in 250 public companies that announced 
financial statement restatements from January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2002.  They find strong and 
conclusive evidence of a negative association between the occurrence of financial statement 
restatements and industry specialised auditor.  
 
Lim and Tan (2007) use Ashbaugh et al. (2003) to measure discretionary accruals for a sample of 
9,501 USA firm-years observations, for fiscal years 2000–2001.  They document that industry 
specialist auditors are more likely than non-specialists to be concerned about reputation losses and 
litigation exposure, and to benefit from knowledge spillovers from the provision of non-audit 
services.  They also find that earnings-response increases with the level of non-audit fees purchased 
from industry specialist auditors compared to those purchased from non-specialist auditors.  
 
Gul et al. (2009) examine whether industry specialised auditors and low balling affect the 
association between auditor tenure and earnings quality.  They apply their study on the large number 
of US firm-year observations, from 1993 to 2004.  They find that the association between shorter 
auditor tenure and lower earnings quality is weaker for firms audited by industry specialists 
compared to non-specialists.   They use Ball and Shivakumar‟s (2006) measure of earnings 
management and some other models for robustness checks.  
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From the demonstration of prior studies in this section of external audit factors, several gaps can be 
identified.  First, in the UK, the literature on audit quality and earnings management tends to focus 
on audit-quality differences between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors and implicitly treats the Big 4 
auditors as a homogeneous group in terms of audit quality.  This study will take the literature on the 
relationship between earnings management and audit quality in the UK a step forward by using 
auditor industry specialisation as a proxy for audit quality, and test its relationship with earnings 
management for the first time.  Secondly, this is the first study that controls for the effect of the 
audit committee when testing the relationship between NAF, industry specialist auditor with 
earnings management.  
 
Larcker and Richardson (2004) argue that the previous mixed findings are caused by neglecting the 
role of corporate governance and suggest that if auditor independence, measured by the provision of 
non-audit fees, is studied in isolation to alternative corporate governance mechanisms; it will give a 
deficient analysis of earnings quality. However, they neglect an extremely important governance 
variable, namely, audit committee characteristics.   
 
The audit committee oversees the external auditor‟s independence and it is involved in the 
appointment and dismissal of the external auditor.  It also supervises the level of audit and non-audit 
fees paid to the external auditor.  Prior studies have not considered the extent to which the auditor 
and the audit committee interact and thus jointly affect the quality of financial reporting.  Therefore, 
this study extends Larcker and Richardson (2004) by incorporating audit committee characteristics 
and auditor independence in the same model.   
 
3.5.6 Summary 
In section 3.6, the literature on external auditor factors was divided into three sections. The first part 
looked at previous studies on the relationship between NAF and auditor independence impairment 
in both mind and appearance. The first stream of these studies, which examines the relationship 
between non-audit fees and going concern reports, qualified reports and restatements, show mixed 
and inconclusive results. The second stream of studies that examine auditor independence in 
appearance show more convincing results, namely, that auditors may lose their independence in 
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appearance when providing NAS.  However, regulators, such as the SEC, still believe that the 
provision of non-audit services by the firm that performs the external audit is a major threat to 
external auditor independence.  
 
The second part reviewed the association between NAF and earnings management, the majority of 
the evidence from the US suggests that NAF do not impair auditor independence.  Auditor 
independence studies in Australia reveals inconclusive results, though there are no direct studies that 
have tested the relationship between NAF and discretionary accruals.  The majority of the evidence 
in the UK suggests NAF do impair the auditor's independence.  
 
One plausible explanation of these conflicting results is the measurement errors inherent in 
discretionary accruals compared to other measures of financial quality (Dechow et al., 1995; Defond 
at al., 2002; Kinney and Libby, 2002). Another possible explanation is the variance level of 
litigation risk that auditor faces in different environment as discussed earlier. 
 
The methodological choice differences in the prior studies may have also contributed to these 
inconclusive results. For example, they use various measurements of NAF, control for different 
internal and external factors and condition their studies to various factors such as specialised 
auditor, strong corporate governance and audit turner. 
 
Finally, in terms of the industry specialised auditor, most of the prior research documented the 
positive impact of a specialised auditor on audit quality.  There is scarcity of prior research on the 
link between specialised auditor and earnings management, and most studies in this regard showed a 
negative association. 
  
3.6 Overall Summary  
This chapter‟s review of prior studies shows that research in financial reporting quality is still at a 
developmental stage.  This is because of the limitations of those studies and their conflicting results. 
 
Four categories of corporate governance were covered in this review, namely, board of directors‟ 
composition, ownership structure, audit committee effectiveness and external auditor factors.  
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Research of particular relevance to each of the four categories was thoroughly reviewed, limitations 
were discussed and, when possible, links were established.  
 
The review of studies on board composition and audit committee effectiveness shows different 
results for Anglo-Saxon and other countries, especially those where family-controlled firms flourish.  
The review of ownership structures shows that the UK exhibits different institutional and 
blockholder investors‟ behaviour compared to other countries. In terms of external auditor factors, 
NAF studies reveals inconclusive results that have various complex explanations, whereas 
specialised auditor studies are consistent in their findings that specialised auditors are in general 
effective in enhancing audit quality and earnings quality. 
 
There are two notable limitations in the prior studies in general.  Most look at either a single year 
period or a small sample number.  This may weaken the power of the statistical analysis and make 
the results less reliable and less universal. 
 
The deficiencies in the literature were identified at the end of the discussion of each variable and 
this was followed by suggestions to bridge these gaps.  This chapter does not aim to provide 
justifications for the effect of all independent variables, but it critically discusses related prior 
literature for all variables. However, the methodological chapter will present the theoretical 
argument followed by the empirical justifications for the independent variables and demonstrate 
how they could be related to earnings management after discussing the suitable theoretical approach 
in the next chapter.  
 
The following table summarises the key studies in the previous literature that investigates the 
relationship between corporate governance, external audit factors and earnings management. 
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Figure 3.1: Summary of Key Studies Investigating the Relationship between Corporate Governance, External Auditor and Earnings Management 
 
Study Dependent Variable(s) Independent 
Variable(s) 
Sample Analysis 
Technique 
Main Findings 
Gore et al. (2001) Discretionary accruals 
measured by Jones (1991) 
model. 
Auditor fees. A sample of 4,778 UK          
companies between 1992 
and 1998. 
OLS 
regression. 
Positive relation between non-audit fees and earnings 
management for non-Big 5 clients but not for Big 5 
clients. 
Xie et al.  (2001) Discretionary accruals 
measured by modified Jones 
(1995). 
Board 
composition, 
audit 
committee 
and the 
executive 
committee. 
A sample of 282 firms from the 
S&P 500 index for years 1992, 
1994 and 1996. 
Simple and  
multiple  
OLS  
regression. 
Earnings management negatively related to board i 
ndependence and boards with corporate directors.  
Audit committees comprising members with some 
corporate or investment banking background is 
associated with a reduced level of earnings 
management.  No association between lower levels of 
earnings management and the meeting frequency of 
boards and audit committees 
Klein (2002b) Discretionary accruals 
measured by modified Jones 
(1995). 
Board 
composition 
and audit 
committee. 
A sample of 692 US publicly 
listed firms with annual 
shareholder meetings between 
July 1, 1991 and June 30, 1993. 
OLS  
regression. 
No association between audit committee comprised 
solely of independent directors and abnormal accruals 
but a negative association between audit committees 
comprising less than a majority of independent 
directors and abnormal accruals and percent of 
outside directors on the board, and a board comprised 
less than a majority of outside directors. 
Frankel et al. 
(2002) 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by Jones (1991) 
model. 
Auditor fees. A sample of 3,074 US proxy 
statements between February 5, 
2001 and June 15, 2001. 
OLS 
regression 
 
 
 
 
Positive association between non-audit fees and 
reporting a small earnings surprise, for absolute 
discretionary accruals, and positive and negative 
discretionary accruals. Negative association between 
audit fees and earnings management. 
Krishnan (2003) 
 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by Jones (1991), 
and modified Jones models. 
Auditor 
industry 
expertise. 
A sample of 4,422 US firms 
audited by Big 6 auditors from 
1989 to 1998. 
Means 
differences 
and OLS 
regression. 
Clients of non-specialist auditors report absolute 
discretionary accruals that are higher than the 
discretionary accruals reported by clients of specialist 
auditors. 
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Study Dependent Variable Independent 
Variable 
Sample Analysis 
Technique 
Main Findings 
Chung and 
Kallpur (2003) 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by modified Jones 
(1995) model. 
Auditor fees. A sample of 1,874 firms 
that filed proxy statements 
between Feb 5, 2001 and 
June 30, 2001. 
OLS 
regression. 
No significant association between client importance 
ratios and discretionary accruals either for the full 
sample or sample partitions. 
Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003) 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by portfolio 
performance, adjusted 
discretionary current 
accruals (PADCA) and 
ROA in estimated 
discretionary current 
accruals (REDCA ) 
Auditor fees A sample of 3,170 US firms 
during November and 
December 2001. 
OLS 
regression. 
No relation between positive discretionary accruals 
and any of the auditor fee metrics. 
Park and Shin 
(2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by modified Jones 
(1995) model 
 
Board 
composition. 
A sample of 539 firm-years 
in Canada. 
OLS 
regressions. 
Outside directors, as a whole, do not reduce 
discretionary accruals while directors from financial 
intermediaries and active institutional shareholders 
reduce earnings management. Also evidence that 
officers of financial intermediaries on the board and 
the tenure of outside directors restrain earnings 
management. 
Larcker and 
Richardson (2004) 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by variation of 
modified Jones (1995) 
model. 
Auditor fees 
and corporate 
governance. 
A sample of 3,424 firms 
from S&P for the years 
2000 and 2001. 
OLS 
regression 
and means 
difference 
tests. 
Mixed evidence of associations between non-audit 
fees and discretionary accruals.  Three distinct 
clusters of firms made where one cluster exhibits a 
statistically significant positive association between 
non-audit fees and abnormal accruals. 
Kao and Chen 
(2004) 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by Jones (1995) 
model. 
Board 
composition. 
A sample of 1,097 
observations using 
Taiwanese firms. 
OLS 
regression 
Large board size is related to higher earnings 
management and independent board is negatively 
associated with earnings management practice. 
Bedard et al.  
(2004) 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by modified Jones 
(1995) model. 
Board 
composition 
and audit 
committee. 
A sample of 300 US firms 
in 1996. 
Logistic 
regression 
Upwards earnings management is negatively related 
with fully independent audit committee, independent 
boards, audit committee financial expertise and a 
clear mandate of the audit committee.  Larger boards, 
stock ownership by non-executive directors and 
experience as a board member reduce downwards 
earnings management. 
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Study Dependent Variable Independent 
Variable 
Sample Analysis 
Technique 
Main Findings 
Ferguson et al. 
(2004) 
Three proxies for earnings 
management: the public 
criticism of a firm 
accounting practices, 
financial statements and the 
mean absolute value of 
client discretionary working 
capital accruals measured by 
the modified Jones model. 
Auditor fees. 
 
A sample of 610 UK firms 
for the period 1996-98. 
Logistic  
and OLS 
regressions 
In general, they find that all three measures of earnings 
management are positively and significantly associated 
with the three measures of NAS purchase. 
Davidson  et al. 
(2005) 
 
 
 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by the modified-
Jones (1995) model and 
small profits or small 
changes in earnings 
(Holland and Ramsay, 
2003). 
Board 
composition 
and audit 
committee. 
A sample of 434 listed 
Australian firms for the 
financial year ending in 
2000. 
OLS 
regression 
 
A majority of non-executive directors on the board and 
on the audit committee are significantly associated 
with a lower likelihood of earnings management.  
However, voluntary establishment of an internal audit 
function and the choice of auditor are not significantly 
helpful in constraining earnings management. 
Niu (2006). 
 
 
Equality measured in two 
ways: earnings management 
and earnings 
informativeness, using 
Kothari et al. (2005), and 
Larcker and Richardson 
(2004) models. 
Board 
composition, 
management 
shareholding, 
and 
shareholders‟ 
rights) 
A sample of 519 firm-year 
observations from  
S&P/TSX composite index 
as of 1 September 2002, 
2003, 2004 and 2005. 
OLS 
regression 
analysis. 
The magnitude of discretionary accruals is negatively 
associated with board independence and the extent of 
alignment of management compensation with interests 
of shareholders and the strength of shareholder rights. 
 
Abdul Rahman and 
Ali (2006) 
 
Discretionary working 
capital accruals measured by 
the cross-sectional modified 
version of Jones (1995) 
model. 
Board 
composition, 
audit 
committee and 
concentrated 
ownership 
A sample of 97 Malaysia 
listed firms over the period 
2002-2003. 
OLS 
regression 
Earnings management is positively related to the size 
of the board of directors but there is insignificant 
relationship between independence of board and audit 
committee with earnings management. 
Benkel et al. (2006) 
 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by DeAngelo 
(1986) 
 
Independent 
board and 
audit 
committee 
A sample of 666 Australia 
firm-year observations, over 
the fiscal years 2001, 2002 
and 2003. 
 
OLS 
regression. 
A higher independence of board and audit committee is 
associated with reduced levels of earnings 
management. Interestingly, they only find these 
relationships exist in large firms but not small firms. 
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Study Dependent Variable Independent 
Variable 
Sample Analysis 
Technique 
Main Findings 
Abbott et al. (2006) 
 
 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by Dechow et al. 
(1995) and Kothari et al. 
(2005) models. 
Audit fees. A sample of 429 public, 
non-regulated, Big 5 
audited companies, for the 
year 2000. 
OLS 
regression. 
Downward earnings management risk, (negative 
discretionary accruals) is associated with lower audit 
fees. Positive discretionary accruals are associated with 
higher audit fees. 
Antle et al. (2006). Discretionary accruals 
measured by modified Jones 
(1995) model. 
Auditor fees. A sample of 2,294 UK 
firms from 1994 to 2000 
and 1,570 US firms in the 
year 2000. 
OLS 
regression 
Positive association between non-audit services fees 
and discretionary accruals. 
Piot and Janin 
(2007) 
 
Discretionary current 
accruals measured by Jeter 
and Shivakumar, (1999) and 
Jones (1991) models. 
Auditor 
reputation and 
tenure, audit 
committee 
existence and 
independence. 
A sample of 120 French 
(SBF) Index companies 
over three consecutive 
financial years: 1999, 2000 
and 2001. 
Means 
differences 
and time-
series 
adjusted 
regressions 
The presence of an audit committee but not the 
committee‟s independence constrains upward earnings 
management; the presence of a large audit firm makes 
no difference to earnings management activities. 
Shen and Chih 
(2007) 
 
 
 
Earnings smoothing 
 
Index with 
corporate 
governance 
rankings 
measured by 
firm-level 
governance 
A sample of 495 firms 
across 25 emerging markets 
and 18 sectors in 9 Asian 
countries from April 2001 
and February 2002. 
 
Multiple 
regression 
Firms with good corporate governance tend to have 
less earnings management. 
 
 
Chen et al. (2006) Discretionary accruals 
measured by modified Jones 
model. 
Specialised 
Auditor 
Asample of 2324 
observations during 1998–
2002. 
Means 
differences 
and OLS 
They document that industry specialist auditors 
constrain income-increasing earnings management 
Osma and Noguer 
(2007) 
 
 
 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by Jones (1991) 
model, the Jones cash-flow 
model And the marginal 
model (Peasnell et al. 
2000b) 
 
Board 
composition 
and the 
existence of 
board 
monitoring 
committees. 
A sample of 155 Spanish 
quoted companies during 
the period 1999–2001. 
OLS 
regression. 
In Spain, the key practice to constrain earnings 
management is institutional directors, unlike UK and 
US, where independent directors play a significant 
role. The existence of an independent audit committee 
does not affect earnings management, whereas the 
existence and composition of a nomination committee 
affects the role of independent directors in constraining 
earnings management. 
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Study Dependent Variable Independent 
Variable 
Sample Analysis 
Technique 
Main Findings 
Zhong et al. 
(2007) 
 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by modified Jones 
(1995) model 
Ownership 
structures. 
A sample of 5,475 US 
firm-year observations 
from 1994 to 2003. 
 
Pooled 
cross-
sectional, 
time-series  
OLS 
regressions 
Outside blockholder ownership is positively 
associated with discretionary accruals. Blockholders 
are not effective monitors of income-increasing 
earnings management that is generally within the 
bounds of GAAP. 
 
Liu and Lu (2007) 
 
 
 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by modified Jones 
(1995) model. 
Corporate 
governance 
index. 
A sample of 5,977 firm-
year observations using 
China's listed companies. 
OLS 
regression. 
Firms with higher corporate governance levels have 
lower levels of earnings management.  Good 
corporate governance mitigates agency conflicts 
between the largest shareholders and the minority 
shareholders. 
Ebrahim (2007) 
 
 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by the modified 
Jones (1995) model 
 
The activity of 
both the board 
and audit 
committee. 
A sample of US 
manufacturing companies 
in 2000. 
 
t-tests and   
OLS 
regression . 
 
Earnings management is negatively related to both 
board and audit committee independence; this 
relation is stronger when the audit committee is more 
active. However, this result is not valid for the board 
activity. 
Srinidhi and Gul 
(2007) 
 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) and Francis et 
al. (2005). 
Auditor fees. A sample of 4,282 firm-
years for 2000 and 2001, 
from AMEX, NYSE, and 
NASDAQ. 
OLS 
regression 
Accrual quality is negatively associated with both 
expected and unexpected non-audit fees but is 
positively associated with expected audit fees. 
Whereas non-audit fees result in economic bonding 
and consequent loss of audit quality, audit fees result 
in higher accrual quality. 
Choi (2009) 
 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by Kothari et al. 
(2005). 
 
Auditor fees. A sample of 374 firms 
listed on the Korea Stock 
Exchange (KSE) for the 
fiscal years from 2000 to 
2006. 
OLS 
regression 
NAF (tax services type) are negatively associated 
with earnings management of tax expense when audit 
committees are more effective. However, this 
association turns to a positive relation if the audit 
committee is less effective. 
Habib and Islam 
(2007) 
 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by Kothari et al. 
(2005) 
Auditor fees. A sample of 530 firm-
year observations, from 
1996 to 1999 in  
Bangladesh. 
Univariate 
and  OLS 
regression 
No relationship between NAF measures and 
discretionary accruals is found. 
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Study Dependent Variable Independent 
Variable 
Sample Analysis 
Technique 
Main Findings 
Lim and Tan (2007) Discretionary accruals 
measured by Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003). 
Industry 
specialist 
auditor. 
A sample of 9,501 US firm-
years for fiscal years 2000–
2001. 
OLS 
regression 
Industry specialist auditors are more likely than non-
specialists to be concerned about reputation loss and 
litigation exposure. 
Jiang et al. (2008) 
 
 
 
 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by Kothari et al. 
(2005) 
A 
Government-
Score 
developed by 
Brown & 
Caylor (2006) 
A sample of 4,311 US 
observations, covering 
2002, 2003 and 2004. 
Univariate 
analysis and 
OLS 
regression 
 
In the post-Sarbanes–Oxley period, higher levels of 
corporate governance are associated with lower 
absolute discretionary accruals. 
 
 
Cahan et al. (2008) Discretionary accruals 
measured by the modified 
Jones (1995) model. 
Auditor fees. A sample of 237 New 
Zealand firms during the 
period 1995-2001. 
OLS 
regression 
No relationship between growth in NAF and earnings 
management. Interaction of the non-audit fee time-
period measures and client importance is positive and 
significantly associated to discretionary accruals. 
Siregar and Utama 
(2008) 
 
 
 
Discretionary accruals 
measured by Jones (1991), 
Dechow et al. (1995); 
Kasznik (1999) and Dechow 
et al. (2002) models. 
Ownership 
structure, firm 
size, Board 
composition 
and audit 
committee. 
A sample of 144 firms 
1995–1996, and 1999–
2002. 
 
Multiple 
regressions. 
 
Earnings management in firms with high family 
ownership that do not belong to business groups is 
more competent than in firms with different 
ownership structures. However, no evidence those 
larger firms, firms audited by the Big 4, firms with 
independent boards, and firms with audit committees 
engage in efficient earnings management. 
Zhao and Chen 
(2008) 
 
 
Absolute value of 
unexpected accruals and 
fraud. 
Staggered 
boards, as a 
type of weak 
governance. 
A sample of 4,292 firm-
year observations from 
1995 to 2001 using US 
firms. 
Mean 
differences 
and logistic 
regression. 
Staggered boards are associated with lower 
likelihoods of committing fraud and smaller 
magnitudes of absolute unexpected accruals. 
Osma (2008) 
 
 
 
Research and development 
(R&D) spending 
manipulation. Dependent 
equals 1 if R&D spending is 
lower than previous period 
spending; 0 otherwise. 
Independent 
boards of 
directors 
A sample of 3,438 UK 
firm-years that spans 29 
different industries. 
OLS 
regressions. 
Independent directors are capable of identifying and 
constraining earnings management represented by 
R&D cuts, and of detecting this type of manipulation. 
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Study Dependent Variable Independent 
Variable 
Sample Analysis 
Technique 
Main Findings 
Chang and Sun 
(2009) 
 
 
 
 
Earnings informativeness and 
earnings management, using 
the modified Teoh and Wong 
(1993) model for earnings 
informativeness and Kothari et 
al. (2005) model to measure 
earnings management. 
Audit 
committee and 
board 
composition. 
A sample of 106 firms 
in 2002–2003, a post-
SOX sample of 93 
firms and 89 pre-SOX 
firms. 
 
Means 
differences 
and OLS 
regression. 
 
A negative association between EM and audit-committee 
independence after SOX, an association that is not found 
in the pre-SOX period. Earnings informativeness is 
significantly associated with audit-committee 
independence, the CEO duality and board independence 
in the post-SOX period, but no significant association 
between earnings informativeness and audit-committee 
independence in the pre-SOX period. 
Gul et al. (2009) Discretionary accruals measured 
by Ball and Shivakumar (2006) 
and Francis et al. (2005), Jones 
model and the performance-
adjusted model (e.g. Ashbaugh et 
al., 2003; Kothari et al., 2005). 
Industry 
specialisation 
auditor and 
tenure auditor. 
A sample of 32,777 US 
firm-year observations 
from 1993 to 2004. 
 
OLS 
regression. 
The association between shorter auditor tenure and 
lower earnings quality is weaker for firms audited by 
industry specialists compared to those audited by non-
specialists. 
 
 
Jaggi et al. (2009) Discretionary accruals 
measured by Kothari et al. 
(2005) and Francis et al. (2005) 
 
Independent 
boards. 
A sample of 770 firm-
year observations from 
1998 to 2000 using 
Hong Kong companies. 
 
OLS 
regression 
Independent boards provide effective monitoring of 
EM. However, this is moderated in family-controlled 
firms, which suggests that an increase in the proportion 
of independent directors to strengthen board 
monitoring is unlikely to be effective in family-
controlled firms. 
Baxter and Cotter 
(2009) 
 
Two measures of earnings 
quality based on discretionary 
accruals measured by Jones 
(1991) and Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) models. 
Board 
composition 
and audit 
committee. 
A sample of 309 
Australian firms in 
2001. 
 
Pooled OLS 
regression 
The formation of an audit committee reduces EM but 
audit committee accounting expertise is not associated 
with EM. No association found between other audit 
committee characteristics, such as independence, size and 
meetings, and both earnings quality measures. 
Dimitropoulos and 
Asteriou (2010) 
Discretionary current accruals 
(using the modified-Jones 
model) 
 
Board size and 
independence. 
97 non-financial firms 
listed on Athens Stock 
Exchange in Greece 
from 2000 to 2004. 
OLS 
regression. 
They find that board independence is significantly and 
negatively related to their EM proxy. 
Lo et al. (2010) Transfer pricing manipulations Board and 
audit 
committee 
characteristics. 
266 Chinese listed 
companies on the 
Shanghai stock 
exchange in 2004. 
Means 
differences 
and OLS 
regression 
 
They find that firms with independent boards‟ and 
audit committees with a financial expert are less likely 
to engage in transfer pricing manipulations. 
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Chapter Four 
Theoretical Framework 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters outline the subject matter of this research, namely, earnings management and 
its association with corporate governance and external audit factors. The research question has been 
specified, the relevant research literature has been explored and gaps in that research have been 
identified. Before developing the research hypotheses and testing them, it is necessary to develop a 
theoretical base for this research. That is the aim of this chapter.  
 
Though there is no agreed theoretical base for research on corporate governance (Parum, 2005), a 
review of the literature indicates that four main theoretical frameworks have been used to explain 
and analyse the association between earnings management and both corporate governance and 
external audit factors. These are agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory and 
institutional theory.  This chapter reviews these four theories and their applicability to the research 
question of this study. 
 
4.2 Agency Theory 
The agency theory is based on the relationship between the principal (owners) and the agent 
(managers). The separation of ownership from management in modern corporations provides the 
context for the function of the agency theory.  Modern organisations have widely dispersed 
ownership, in the form of shareholders, who are not normally involved in the management of their 
companies.  
 
In these instances an agent is appointed to manage the daily operations of the company. This 
distinction between ownership and control creates the potential for conflicts of interests between 
agents and principals, which result in costs associated with resolving these conflicts (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976 and Eisenhardt, 1989).   
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The most important basis of agency theory is that the managers are usually motivated by their own 
personal gains and work to exploit their own personal interests rather than considering shareholders‟ 
interests and maximising shareholder value.   For example, managers may be attracted to buying 
lavish offices, company cars and other extravagant items, since the cost is borne by the owners.   
 
Thus, the key predicament indicated by agency theory is ensuring that managers pursue the interests 
of shareholders and not only their own interests.  Eisenhardt (1989, p. 58) explains that agency 
problems commence when “The goals of the principal and agent conflict and it is difficult and costly 
for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing”.  Controversy occurs because principals 
are unable to monitor the performance of agents (Jensen & Meckling 1976).  
 
This pursuit of self interest increases costs to the firm, which could include the costs of the 
formation of contracts, loss due to decisions being taken by the agents and the costs of observing 
and controlling the actions of the agents.  Leuz et al. (2003) assert that the effects of such behaviour 
ultimately reflect in the company earnings.   
 
Consequently, management have an incentive to manage the company‟s reported earnings in order 
to meet or beat earnings targets and, thus, to receive any bonuses that may be tied to the company‟s 
earnings (performance-related pay).  This creates an information asymmetry in that managers can 
exercise the discretion they have on accruals, which in turn reduces the relevance and reliability of 
reported earnings, and the whole financial statements. Davidson et al. (2004) argues that when 
management provides inaccurate financial reporting information, it introduces earnings management 
as a type of agency cost.    
 
As a result, managers cannot be fully trusted. Therefore, strict monitoring of managers by the 
principals or their representatives, such as the firm‟s board, is seen as fundamental to protecting 
shareholders‟ interest from being compromised when managers maximise their self interest at the 
expense of the organisation‟s profitability.   
   
In order to effectively limit agency costs caused by the separation of ownership and control, Fama 
and Jensen (1983b, p.309) propose that firms need a system that can separate decision management 
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from decision control. This would limit agency costs by controlling the power of management and 
ensuring the proper consideration of shareholders‟ interests. 
 
Corporate governance may be seen as such a system. Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983b), 
Williamson (1988) and Shilefer and Vishny (1986) contend that managerial opportunistic behaviour 
is constrained by corporate governance mechanisms, and note that there are both internal and 
external corporate governance mechanisms that can minimise such agency costs. McKnight and 
Weir, (2009) also confirms that corporate governance mechanisms reduce agency costs. 
 
The agency theory provides a basis for the governance of firms through various internal and external 
mechanisms (Weir et al., 2002; Roberts et al., 2005).  The governance mechanisms are designed to 
ensure agent-principal interest alignment, protect shareholder interests and thus minimise agency 
costs (Davis et al., 1997, p.23). 
 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) support this argument as they consider that the primary objective of 
corporate governance is not to directly improve corporate performance, but to resolve agency 
problems by watching management‟s behaviour and inspecting the financial reporting process.  
Therefore, corporate governance mechanisms are able to mitigate agency costs and protect 
shareholders interests by monitoring management activities and, thus, align the interests of 
management with those of shareholders. 
 
Some studies (e.g, Davis et. al., 1997) suggest alternative governance structures using control and 
monitoring devices, such as audits and performance evaluations, to minimise agency costs and 
protect shareholder interests.  Some effective governance structures to control managers include 
independent boards of directors predominantly made up of NEDs who have no personal relationship 
with management, an independent chairperson of the board who is not an executive manager of the 
company, and a chief executive officer and executive directors whose personal interests are aligned 
with shareholders through stock ownership (Donaldson 1990, p.376). 
 
Among the governance mechanisms that have been studied are the board of directors and an 
ownership structure to align the interests of the agent and the principal.  The literature on the board, 
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as a governance team, reports on issues such as board size, board independence, and the separation 
of CEO and chair positions with the aim of improving the effectiveness of the overall oversight 
(Dalton et al., 1998; Coles & Hesterly, 2000; Daily et al., 2003).   
 
Most of researchers that examine the association between earnings management and corporate 
governance relied upon agency theory to examine the role of boards and related governance 
mechanisms in affecting a firm‟s management involvement in earnings management (Xie et al., 
2003; Kao and Chen, 2004; Davidson et al, 2005; Benkel et al, 2006 and Goodwin et al, 2009). 
 
The use of an audit committee can be considered an important part of the decision control system for 
internal monitoring by boards of directors (Fama, 1980 and Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Requirements 
for monitoring suggest the need for external audits (Anderson et al., 1993), audit committees 
(Bradbury, 2006) and the use of NEDs (Fama, 1980 and Anderson et al., 1993).  
  
Fama (1980) believes that governance mechanisms are more economical in controlling management 
than alternatives such as takeovers. Studies on management ownership concentrate on ways in 
which managers are compensated so that their interests are aligned with those of shareholders 
(Davis et al., 1997; Tosi, et al. 2003).  
 
The role of corporate governance here is to protect the shareholders by monitoring managers 
through various corporate governance mechanisms.  This is supported by the view of the UK 
corporate governance codes. 
 
Thus, corporate governance, through mechanisms such as audit committees, boards of directors and 
external auditors, enables shareholders to closely monitor the actions of managers.  Weak 
monitoring of managers may encourage them to pursue their own interests by activities such as 
managing earnings but effective corporate monitoring through good corporate governance can 
reduce this type of deceptive behaviour. 
 
In addition, principals hire external auditors who, as agents under contract, are expected to be 
independent of the agents who manage their company.  The role of the external auditor is to reduce 
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agency costs by cutting information asymmetry in financial reporting (Poit, 2001).  Agency theory 
recognises external auditing as the most important monitoring mechanism because it controls 
conflicts of interest and diminishes agency costs.  Watts and Zimmerman (1983) confirm that high 
quality external auditing will undermine the opportunistic behaviour cost (agency cost) introduced 
by management. 
  
These monitors act on behalf of the shareholders.  As a result, high audit quality involving a 
specialised independent auditor can decrease opportunities for managers to pursue self-interest at the 
expense of owners and, thus, principals obtain more favourable returns. 
 
Taking agency theory into consideration, earnings management may be indicative of an agency 
problem.  As a consequence, enhancing corporate governance should result in a reduction in the 
practice of earnings management.  Given these agency assumptions, independent variables will be 
identified with the aim of detecting associations between corporate governance attributes and 
earnings management. 
 
4.3 Stewardship Theory 
Unlike agency theory, stewardship theory, based on a psychological and sociological approach, 
maintains that the interests of corporate executives (as stewards) are aligned with those of the 
organisation and its owners (Albrecht et al., 2004).  The stewardship theorists focus on structures 
that empower and facilitate rather than monitor and control. They reject the highly individualistic 
model of agency theory that promotes a suspicious “policeman's” attitude, assumes that principals 
and agents have different interests and sees agents as essentially self-serving and self-centred. Thus 
they also reject the view that principals need to invigilate the opportunistic agents by monitoring 
them and apply sanctions or incentives as means of control.  
 
Stewardship theory takes an opposite perspective.  It suggests that the agents are trustworthy and 
good stewards of the resources entrusted to them, which makes monitoring unnecessary (Donaldson, 
1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Davis et al., 1997). Since managers are not opportunistic and act 
in the best interests of owners, they should also be given autonomy based on trust, and this reduces 
the cost of monitoring and controlling their behaviour.   
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Donaldson and Davis (1994, p. 51) observe, “organisational role-holders are conceived as being 
motivated by the need to achieve and exercise responsibility and authority, to gain satisfaction 
through effectively performing essentially challenging work, and to gain recognition from peers and 
bosses”.  
 
According to stewardship theory, the behaviour of the steward is collective, because the steward 
seeks to achieve the organisation‟s goals (e.g. profitability).  This, in turn, benefits the principals 
through the positive effects of profits on dividends and share prices (Davis et al. 1997).  Managers 
believe that their interests are aligned with those of the firm‟s owners. 
 
Thus, stewardship theory maintains that the optimum governance structures are those that enable 
effective coordination in the enterprise.  The stewardship perspective sees directors, as well as 
managers, as stewards of the firm and thus likely to increase the shareholders‟ wealth.  Davis et al. 
(1997) posit that stewards gain greater satisfaction from achieving organisational goals than through 
pursuit of their own goals.  Davis et al. (1997) argue that the attainment of organisational success 
also satisfies the personal needs of the stewards. Thus, the stewardship theory considers that 
managers‟ decisions are also influenced by non-financial motives, such as need for achievement and 
recognition, the intrinsic satisfaction of successful performance, and respect for authority and the 
work ethic.   
 
According to this theory, corporate governance should be based on the view that the directors, on 
behalf of stakeholders, want to be good stewards of the corporate assets, and there is no conflict of 
interest or opportunistic behaviour at the expense of stakeholders.  They work diligently to gain high 
levels of corporate profit and shareholder return.  These concepts have been documented in 
organisational studies, such as in Muth and Donaldson (1998).  
 
Stewardship theory considers the board of directors as an instrument of assistance to a steward CEO 
rather than a controlling mechanism (Albrecht et al., 2004).  It also considers that management is 
less likely to practise earnings management.  However, the problem lies in the extent to which the 
management aspires to attain a good corporate performance.  
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Davis et al. (1997) suggest that managers identify with the firm and that leads to a personal 
relationship with success or failure of the firm.  Daily et al. (2003) argue that managers and directors 
also want to protect their reputations as expert decision makers.  As a result, managers run the firm 
in a manner that amplifies financial performance, including shareholder returns, as the firms‟ 
performance impacts directly on perception of their individual performance.   
 
From the stewardship theory perspective, a firm‟s superior performance is linked to the board 
having a majority of executive directors since these directors understand the business better than 
outside directors, and can therefore make superior decisions (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 
1994).  
 
Stewardship theory also argues that the effective control held by professional managers empowers 
them to maximise the firm‟s performance and corporate profits.  Consequently, boards that are 
dominated by executive directors are preferable because of their expertise and knowledge, access to 
essential information and commitment to the firm.  Several studies support the view that managers 
make superior decisions because they possess more and better information (e.g. Boyd, 1995). 
 
Similarly, CEO duality, that is, the same person holding the position of chair and chief executive, is 
viewed favourably since, it is argued, it leads to better performance by the firm due to clear and 
unified leadership (Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Davis, et al., 1997).  Bhagat and Black (1999) find 
that firms with boards consisting of a higher number of outside directors (representing the agency 
theory perspective) perform worse than firms with fewer outside directors. 
 
Thus, some support exists for the stewardship perspective both theoretically (e.g., Davis et al., 1997) 
and empirically (Bhagat & Black, 1999). In summary, it argues that the responsibility and authority 
of executive managers provides a better focus on company objectives, leadership and 
implementation of operational decisions, leading to more effective corporate governance and 
corporation. Donaldson & Davis (1994) contend that the stewardship theory remains the theoretical 
foundation for better regulation and legislation in corporate governance.  Muth and Donaldson 
(1998) compare the predictions of agency theory with those of stewardship theory and find support 
for the latter as a good model of reality.   
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However, there is strong opposition to the stewardship theory by those who argue that NEDs 
dominated boards should play a major role in corporations (Donaldson & Davis, 1994).  The 
benefits of independent boards, are promoted by influential and powerful sources, such as the 
Council of Institutional Investors in the US and the UK, corporate governance codes and existing 
professional directors (Mace M, L,. 2004). 
 
Furthermore, managers will not always act to align their own interests with those of shareholders. 
Choo and Tan (2007) argue that, psychologically, a board‟s lack of non executive directors may 
encourage managers to commit fraud.  Albrecht et al. (2004) also highlight the fact that the 
relationship between principals and their agents based on the stewardship perspective may provide 
opportunities for management to commit fraud.  
 
4.4 Stakeholder Theory 
Mary Parker Follett put forward the idea of stakeholder theory around 60 years ago (Schilling, 2000) 
and it re-emerged in the 1980‟s.  Freeman (1984, p.52 quoted in Schilling 2000, p.225) defines a 
stakeholder as “any group or individual who can influence or is influenced by the achievement of 
the organisation‟s objectives”. The term „stakeholder‟ may, therefore, include a large group of 
participants, in fact anyone who has a direct or indirect „stake‟ in the business (Carroll 1993, p.22 
quoted in Schilling 2000, p.225).  
 
Direct stakeholders are shareholders, employees, investors, customers and suppliers whose interests 
are aligned with the company.  An example of an indirect stakeholder is the government, which is 
indirectly affected by the company‟s function (Kiel and Nicholson 2003b). 
 
Clarke. (2004) defines ‟stakeholder theory‟ as follows. "Stakeholder theory defines organisations as 
multilateral agreements between the enterprise and its multiple stakeholders.  The relationship 
between the company and its internal stakeholders (such as employees, managers, owners) is framed 
by formal and informal rules developed through the history of the relationship. While management 
may receive finance from shareholders, they depend upon employees to accomplish the productive 
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purpose of the company.  External stakeholders (customers, suppliers, and the community) are 
equally important, and also constrained by formal and informal rules that business must respect". 
 
Stakeholder theory advocates that “companies and society are interdependent and therefore the 
corporation serves a broader social purpose than its responsibilities to shareholders” (Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003a, p. 31).   
 
Additionally, Donaldson and Preston (1995, p. 85) recognise stakeholders as “persons or groups 
with legitimate interests in procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity”.  Wheeler  
and Sillanpaa (1997) identify the stakeholders that should be taken into consideration in the 
governance structure as investors (including banks), managers, employees, customers, business 
partners (e.g. suppliers and subsidiaries), local communities, civil society (including regulators and 
pressure groups) and the natural environment. 
 
Mitchell et al.  (1997) argue that stakeholders can be identified by one, two or all three of the 
attributes of: (1) power to influence the firm, (2) the legitimacy of relationship with the firm, and (3) 
the urgency of their claim on the firm.  This typology allows managers to pay attention and react to 
various types of stakeholder.  Stakeholder refers to each group or individual whose goals are 
recognised by a firm or who exert influence on the firm‟s goal attainment. These include employees, 
clients, suppliers, banks, local government and agencies, political parties and community 
organisations.  
 
This theory gained strength during the 1970s and 1980s to reflect the fear at a societal level that 
large national corporations were becoming too powerful and beyond accountability to stakeholders, 
including governments.  With time, the topic raised increased social awareness and the tendency 
toward triple bottom line reporting. 
 
Stakeholder theory is an extension of the agency view, which expects board of directors to look after 
the interests of shareholders.  However, this narrow focus on shareholders has been expanded to take 
into account the interests of many different stakeholder groups, including interest groups related to 
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social, environmental and ethical considerations (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
Freeman et al., 2004).  
 
However, Margaret Blair (1995) argues that, although stakeholder theory has more substantial 
historical roots, practical applications, and intellectual appeal than agency theory, it has had much 
less impact on thinking and policy-making about corporate governance.  
 
The common criticisms for stakeholder theory is that how  to align the stakeholders conflicting 
interests since the difficulties result from how to administers different stakeholders with various 
needs demands and if it does, can it treat all stakeholders equally? (Hoque, 2006).  Moreover, 
Etzioni (1998) suggests that it is not practical for all stakeholders to be effectively represented in 
corporate governance recommendations as this may undermine the welfare of company. 
 
Additionally, Sternberg (1997) concludes that stakeholders approach is incompatible with 
organizations fundamental objectives and it is not fundamentally able to provide better corporate 
governance. He convinces that balancing stakeholder interests is not likely to be successful objective 
and its accountability is unjustified.  
 
On the other hand, the linkage between stakeholder theory and earnings management is explained by 
Prior et al (2006) who document that management may manipulate earnings in order to improve 
their private interests via expense of shareholders and additionally the rest of stakeholders.  
 
Stakeholders‟ theory views corporate governance and external audit as effective monitoring systems 
that could protect all stakeholders‟ interests. Mattingly et al (2009) also find good corporate 
governance is associated with high earnings quality and low earnings management in origination‟s 
stakeholder management. However, in terms of audit quality, Baker et al (2002) suggest that the role 
of external auditor as monitoring mechanisms is not only directed for shareholders‟ benefit, but also 
for the interests of all stakeholders.      
 
This change in the role of the boards has led to the development of stakeholder theory.  Stakeholder 
theory can be seen as not necessarily supporting the view that amplifying shareholder value is the 
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top priority for a business.  Managers may legitimately follow objectives that do not increase 
shareholder wealth.   
 
Furthermore, managers‟ incentives may not necessarily be associated with the interests of 
shareholders.  However, managers who claim that this is due to consideration of other stakeholders‟ 
objectives “may be using stakeholder claims as a smokescreen to obscure what is really their 
inability to deliver value to the company‟s shareholders” (Healy 2003, p.24).    
 
Freeman et al. (2004) suggest that managers should try to produce as much value as possible for 
stakeholders by resolving conflicts among them so that stakeholders do not exit the deal.  
Management theories tend to centre on the firm‟s profit motives and responsibility to its 
shareholders (Schilling, 2000).  Stakeholder theory proposes that the emphasis of managerial 
activity should be on the growth and maintenance of all stakeholder relationships, not just that with 
shareholders.  
 
There is extensive debate among scholars on whether to take a broad or narrow view of a firm‟s 
stakeholders.  Freeman (1984, p. 46) proposes a broad view covering a large number of entities, and 
includes almost all types of stakeholders, including „involuntary‟ stakeholders who may be placed at 
risk as a consequence of a firm‟s activities. The concept of risk gives stakeholders a rightful claim 
on a firm‟s decision making, regardless of their power to influence the firm.   
 
Stakeholder theory recognises that many groups have links with the firm and are affected by a firm‟s 
decision making.  Freeman et al. (2004) suggest that the idea of value creation and trade is closely 
connected to the idea of creating value for shareholders.  They observe, “Business is about putting 
together a deal so that suppliers, customers, employees, communities, managers, and shareholders 
all win continuously over time.”  
 
Freeman et al. (2004) centre on two core questions: „what is the purpose of the firm?‟ and „what 
responsibility does management have to stakeholders?‟  They posit that both questions are consistent 
and managers must build up relationships, inspire their stakeholders, and create communities where 
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everyone strives to do their best to deliver the value that the firm promises.  Thus the stakeholder 
theory is believed to better equip managers to articulate and foster the shared purposes of their firm. 
 
Carver and Oliver (2002) examine stakeholder perspectives of non-financial outcomes.  For 
example, while shareholders usually define value in financial terms, other stakeholders may seek 
benefits “such as the satisfaction of pioneering a particular breakthrough, supporting a particular 
kind of corporate behaviour, or, where the owner is also the operator, working in a particular way”.  
It means that some stakeholders have „non-equity stakes‟ and management should create and 
maintain all stakeholder relationships, and not just the one with shareholders.  
 
This suggests the need to extend performance evaluation, based on traditional measures of 
shareholder wealth and profits, to include measures relating to diverse stakeholder groups who have 
non-equity stakes.  Many firms do strive to maximise shareholder value while, at the same time, 
trying to take into account the interests of the other stakeholders.  
 
Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a) argue that shareholder value amplification matters because it is the 
only objective that leads to decisions that enhance outcomes for all stakeholders.  They argue that 
identifying a large number of stakeholders and their core values is an unrealistic duty for managers.  
Proponents of the stakeholder viewpoint also argue that shareholder value maximisation will lead to 
expropriation of value from non-shareholders to shareholders.   
 
4.5 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory suggests that internal operating processes loosely coupled with the observable 
structures accomplish the real work of an organisation.  As a result, organisations with the 
appropriate structures in place will avoid deep investigations of their function by external parties 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  Institutional economics tends to study an economic phenomenon within 
its entire surrounding environment, including social, cultural, political and any other related factors. 
 
Organisations are subject to rules and regulations to which they must conform in order to ensure 
their legitimacy and thus have access to resources and ensure their survival (DiMaggio and Powell, 
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1983).  However, these rules and regulations do not necessarily guarantee that organisations will 
continue to operate efficiently (Meyer and Rowan, 1977 and Scott & Meyer, 1983). 
 
According to institutional theory, the basic purpose of corporate governance is to assert that an 
organisation is linked to an environment by clarifying and defining its goals, which should accord 
with expectations of the environment (Judge and Zeithaml, 2004). Thus, according to this theory, 
corporate governance should be involved in defining the organisational goals of the corporation in 
the context of an existing value system within the firm. 
 
The institutional theory view of corporate governance considers changes in organisational processes 
over time and how governance structures “fulfil ritualistic roles that help legitimise the interactions 
among the various actors within the corporate governance mosaic” (Cohen et al. 2007b, p11).  
 
The institutional theory suggests that the adoption or rejection of changes should be studied in 
relation to historical, social and political issues that are relevant to understanding organisational 
changes in their full complexity (Scapens (1991) and Cohen et al. (2002, 2007b).  Therefore, 
implementing a new system, such as corporate governance recommendations, will succeed to the 
extent that there is broad similarity between the new system and existing systems in the 
organisations (Yazdifar, 2003).  
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that institutional pressures drive organisations to take on 
similar characteristics through the need to organise themselves in a manner that is similar to other 
organisations in the same environment.  This process is known as isomorphism, and it assumes that 
organisations adopt structures and management practices that are considered legitimate and socially 
acceptable by similar organisations, regardless of their actual effectiveness (Saudagaran & Diga, 
1997). 
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that a process of isomorphism could take place in three ways, 
namely, coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism and normative isomorphism.  Coercive 
isomorphism represents the political pressure and the organisation‟s need for legitimacy.  It includes 
pressures applied to comply with corporate governance recommendations by regulators or stock 
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exchanges.  As a result, an increasing number of organisations have applied recent corporate 
governance recommendations, such as a more independent board and the establishment of an audit 
committee. 
 
Mimetic isomorphism is a method of change initiated internally by the organisation (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983).  Organisations tend to copy other organisations that are considered to be legitimate 
and successful.  Under this view, corporate governance processes may become more similar over 
time (Barreto and Baden-Fuller, 2006; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), as organisations are coerced to 
become similar through regulation (such as SOX), or choose to follow “best practices,” or mimic 
other organisations, to enhance their legitimacy (Cohen et al. 2007b).  
 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1998, p.131) state that, under this view, “Organisational structures become 
symbolic displays of conformity and social accountability”. These ceremonial efforts may not be 
closely related to how a given task is actually accomplished.  Cohen et al. (2007b) note that the 
auditor bears great responsibility for reliable financial reporting when the audit committee‟s role is 
primarily ceremonial, although the committee‟s symbolic efforts can lead to effective questioning of 
management. 
 
Mimetic change happens when organisations perceive that certain corporate governance attributes 
contribute to the governance structure within successful organisations and follow similar accounting 
treatments and choices, and this will increase compliance with accounting standards and corporate 
governance recommendations over time. 
 
Normative isomorphism is derived from the professionalism of involved individuals. Burns (2000) 
argues that organisations feel obliged to adopt structures that are advocated by professional bodies 
in their field. Thus, accountants and auditors, through their professional bodies, have pushed for 
more compliance with accounting and auditing standards, listing rules and corporate governance 
recommendations.  
 
Fogarty (2005) concludes that the key attribute of institutional theory lies in its capacity to highlight 
the distinction between what organisations actually accomplish and what their structures suggest to 
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the external environment.  This suggests that this theory is very useful for researchers who aim to 
compare the best practice for the corporate governance attributes with the actual performance for 
such attributes.  
 
Empirically, Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) use both agency theory and institutional theory to 
investigate audit committees and argued that the use of agency theory alone can not distinguish 
qualitative differences of the audit committee as a corporate control mechanism. Moreover, they 
find that audit committee effectiveness is more attributable to internal issues than to external issues, 
such as agency variables. 
  
However, they do not specify internal issues in their study.  Instead, they considered the failure to 
document relationships between the audit committee and agency variables as an indicator of the 
great influence that internal factors could have on audit committee work.  Kalbers and Fogarty‟s 
(1998) argued that neither theory alone is as useful as their synthesis.  As a result, they suggest the 
use of both theories in any attempt to evaluate audit committee effectiveness, but they did not 
specify a theoretical framework that could link the two theories together.  
 
4.6 Summary 
Among the various theories discussed, agency theory is the most popular and has received the most 
attention from academics and practitioners.  The influence of agency theory has been instrumental in 
the development of corporate governance standards, principles and codes.  Mallin (2007) provides a 
comprehensive discussion of corporate governance theories and argues that the agency approach is 
the most appropriate because it provides a better explanation for corporate governance roles in the 
UK context considering the complexity of the legal system, culture, ownership and other structural 
differences. 
 
However, the alternative theories of stewardship theory, institutional theory and stakeholder theory 
have become prominent in recent times.  As discussed above, agency theory focuses on conflicting 
interests between principals and agents.  The decision making process is delegated by shareholders 
to the managers.  Hence, due to managers pursuing their own interests, various corporate 
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governance mechanisms are needed in „monitoring managerial decision-making and performance, 
especially through NEDs (Roberts et al., 2005).  
 
Stewardship theory outlines a co-operative and optimistic view of relationships within the 
corporation by assuming that managers are good stewards and do not misappropriate corporate 
resources; their behaviour is also conditioned by non-financial motives such as the need for 
recognition of their achievements and performance (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004).  Thus the 
directors‟ role is to counsel and advice rather than to monitor. 
 
While stewardship theory considers managers as stewards and proposes an alignment of interest 
between the managers and organisational objectives, stakeholder theory explores the interests of 
different stakeholders. 
 
Stakeholder theory does not revolve around the directors monitoring roles or value maximisation of 
shareholder wealth, but around social responsibility and ethical considerations. Unlike the agency 
theory that places primary emphasis only on shareholders‟ interests, stakeholder theory places 
emphasis on considering the interests of all stakeholders. 
 
The Stakeholder theory is also subjected to great criticism. For example, Sternberg (1997) argue that 
Stakeholder theory is incompatible with business as it ignore that business is the activity of 
maximising long-term owner value by adding competing stakeholders interests such as customers, 
suppliers and employees into this objective. 
 
He added that Stakeholder theory of accountability is unjustified and criticised this theory for being 
incompatible with corporate governance as an organisation that is accountable to everyone is 
actually accountable to no one. Finally, he argued that the stakeholder theory concept face a problem  
of  identifying the information needs when  an individual represent various stakeholders by having 
multiple stakes in the business as employee, consumer, shareholder and a member of the local 
community.  
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While Stakeholder theory undermines private property, agency and wealth, the Institutional theory 
and Stewardship theory neglect the power of interest-based behavior. Yazdifar (2003) and Albrecht 
et al. (2004) also highlight the fact that the relationship between principals and their agents based on 
the stewardship or institutional theory perspectives may provide opportunities for management to 
commit fraud. Hence, Agency theory is the only perspective that recognises human being self-
interest behavior that managing earnings to achieve personal financial rewards is part of it.  
 
 
The institutional theory has also been subject to great criticism, Yazdifar (2003) criticises the 
institutional theory, arguing that it suffers from inadequate consideration of the relation between 
environmental determinism and cultural and political factors within organisations.  He discussed 
three main deficiencies of this theory.  First, it neglects the power of interest-based behaviour.  
Secondly, it fails to explain the processes of organisational change. Thirdly, it neglects the internal 
generation of institutionalised forms.  He adds that the institutional theory must be complemented by 
other perspectives. 
 
Each of these four theories presents significant insights into corporate governance problems.  For 
instance, stakeholder and institutional theories explore common interactions between the 
organisation and its environment (Judge & Zeithaml 2004). 
 
Culpan and Trussel (2005) confirm that agency theory is useful in clarifying the dimensions of 
unethical practices in the accounting and financial issues (such as EM), while stakeholder theory is 
helpful in explaining the unethical practices which damage employee, creditor, investor, 
government, and society.  
 
Others studies (e.g. Boyd, 1995; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) take a different approach, not limited to a 
distinctive theory. Boyd (1995) argues that the seemingly contrasting perspectives of the agency and 
stewardship theories can both be correct, but under different environmental conditions, by using a 
contingency approach.  Hendry and Kiel (2004) illustrate that the selection of a particular theoretical 
approach depends on „contextual factors‟ such as board power, environmental uncertainty and 
information asymmetry.  
 
                   
 
                 
131 
 
Thus, each of these theories is useful in considering the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
monitoring and control functions of corporate governance (Hung, 1998).  Daily et al. (2003, p.372) 
take the view that “many of these [other] theoretical perspectives are intended as complements to, 
not substitutes for, agency theory.” 
 
To conclude, this study will draw on agency theory to test whether hypothesised relationships exist 
between corporate governance and external audit monitoring attributes and the incidence of earnings 
management.  The agency theory framework has the ability to explain the motivations for earnings 
management. It also explains the expected association between corporate governance and external 
auditor monitoring mechanisms and earnings management as shown in the flow chart 4.1 below. 
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Chapter Five 
Research Hypotheses and Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Previous chapter illustrated different theoretical approaches and highlighted the most suitable theory 
for this research. The aim of this chapter is to develop a theoretical link between each of corporate 
governance and external audit variables and earnings management. It also provides a description and 
analysis of the methods applied in collecting and preparing the data deemed necessary to test for the 
existence of a relationship between earnings management and the attributes of corporate governance 
and the external audit. 
 
Firstly, after highlighting the theoretical perspective of this research, the measurement of the 
dependent variable (earnings management) will be demonstrated.  Then, a full description of how 
each of the independent variables will be measured and hypotheses will be developed and stated.  
This study classifies the independent variables into five broad categories, namely, board 
composition, non executive directors‟ (NEDs) commitment, ownership structures, audit committee 
effectiveness and external audit factors, and this is followed by a description of how the control 
variables are measured.  Secondly, this chapter discusses the sample selection and the selection 
process.  Databases used to collect the information necessary to conduct this study will then be 
specified.  Thirdly, different possible analytical procedures will be discussed to determine their 
suitability and relevance.  Then, the analysis procedures undertaken will be detailed.  Finally, a 
summary of the variables, models and hypotheses of the study will be presented.  The results 
emanating from those choices will be presented in chapter six. 
 
5.2 Research Philosophy 
An essential step in conducting social science research is to determine and justify the chosen 
research philosophy adopted by the researcher. Inter-related paradigmatic assumptions regarding the 
nature of reality (ontological assumption), the researcher's role (epistemological assumption) and the 
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research process (methodological assumption) trigger scientific research. The researcher's position 
vis-ä-vis these assumptions infuse the research, and will determine the research philosophy adopted 
in data collection, analyses and interpretation of results.  
 
Research philosophy has two paradigms, these are positivistic and the interpretative paradigms 
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Patton, 1990). These paradigms represent the end of a continuum in 
social science research which illustrates the links between these ontological, epistemological and 
methodological assumptions. Research philosophy can also be broadly alienated into three views 
(i.e. positivism, interpretivism and realism) depending on the researcher‟s philosophical thinking 
(Saunders et al. 2003) 
 
The philosophy of positivism prefer „working with an observable social reality and that the end 
product of such research can be law-like generalizations similar to those produced by the physical 
and natural scientists‟ (Remenyi et al. 1998 cited in Saunders et al. 2003, p.83). This paradigm 
assumes that an apprehensible reality exists that is driven by immutable natural laws and 
mechanisms (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p. 109). This paradigm is described by quantitative or 
scientific approaches to explain, predict and analyse testable hypotheses relating to associations 
between measurable variables since it assumes that reality is `objective' or independent of observers.  
 
The interpretative paradigm, on the other hand, assumes that reality is `subjective' or dependent on 
observers as they are actually part of what is being observed (Patton, 1990). This paradigm is 
therefore described by qualitative approaches. Interpretivism has a range of alternative names 
including hermeneutic, qualitative, phenomenological and inductive research (Ticehurst and Veal 
1999, p.20). 
 
Unlike positivism, interpretivism, attempts to understand the point of view from the subjects‟ 
perspective and is based on the view that researchers study meaningful social action, not just the 
external or observable behaviour of people in order to capture the rich complexity of social 
situations (Saunders et al. 2003, p.84). The interpretative approach proponents argue that it is 
appropriate to adopt this philosophical approach in business research due to the constant changes in 
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the surrounding environment. Hence, generalizations based on the positivist approach may not 
explain the uniqueness of particular situations.  
 
Alternatively, the realistic approach also called dialectical materialism, class analysis and 
structuralism- combines positivistic and interpretivistic paradigms since some argue that positivistic 
and interpretivism approach assumptions are unrealistic (e.g. Ryan et al., 2002). In other words, 
realism criticizes positivism for „failing to deal with the meanings of real people and their capacity 
to feel and think‟ and the „interpretivism approach for being too subjective and relativist‟ (Neuman 
1997, p.74). 
 
Realism approach recognizes the „social reality‟ like positivism but it focuses on change and conflict 
which may not always be apparent. It is more concerned with beliefs, assumptions and moral values, 
thus researchers need to understand history, adopt a set of values, and know where to look for 
underlying structure to interpret the facts (Neuman 1997).Therefore, the realistic paradigm 
recognises the subjective reality and attempts to understand people's socially constructed 
interpretations at the same time (Saunders et al., 2000).  
 
5.2.1 Research Theoretical Approach 
This research will adopt the positivism approach due to its relevance to this type of research. Clarke 
(2004) provides a summary of the main methodologies for research on corporate governance namely 
data base surveys, questionnaire surveys, interview surveys and observation. Each method has its 
pros and cons. The main method which is appropriate to the positivism approach is data base 
surveys based on analysis of published sources (Clark 1998) which will be used by this research 
study. 
 
The deductive approach tends to be preferred more by positivist researchers than interpretivist 
(Ticehurst and Veal 1999). The deductive research process involves the development of a theory or 
hypothesis to test the hypothesis. The inductive approach is used when data is collected first, and a 
theory is developed as a result of the data analysis. 
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Positivism is associated with scientific, experimental, quantitative and deductive frameworks where 
researchers seek specific quantifiable observations thus regularly using statistics and experiments to 
test their hypotheses (Neuman 1997). Thus, this research uses a deductive approach. It is an 
explanatory study. Previous research has been mostly conclusive in the role of corporate governance 
and external audit in reducing earnings management which help in developing testable hypotheses 
and research propositions. 
 
Quantitative methods such as the analysis of financial data are often used to determine corporate 
governance effectiveness in empirical studies. In corporate governance research, board composition 
measures such as board independence and audit committee independence- measured by the ratio of 
non-executive directors to total number of directors- is used in interpreting the impact of board 
composition on the extent of a company earnings management level.  
 
There is a scarcity of research on corporate governance which uses qualitative approaches. This is 
may be due to the limited information available as to how boards really work due to the confidential 
nature of board meetings and process, which in turns makes it hard for researchers to capture the 
relative information on how a corporate board may contribute in enhancing earnings quality.  
 
However due to the difficulty of obtaining access to this information, the interpretivism and realism 
approaches have only been used in limited case studies and therefore research tends to be on 
material that can be readily obtained from outside sources such as published reports and media 
releases (Leblanc and Gillies 2005). 
 
This research aims to examine the effectiveness of corporate governance and external audit 
mechanisms to detect earnings management in the UK and attempts to establish the relationship 
between these components. Consequently, the research employed a quantitative approach where 
relationships between discretionary accruals and a set of independent financial and non-financial 
variables on listed companies were tested using analysis of data. The main purpose of this method is 
to identify the relationship between earnings management and a set of explanatory variables, 
namely, board composition, audit committee effectiveness, ownership structures, external audit 
variables and a comprehensive set of control variables. This approach enables the researcher to test 
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the adopted theory against unique and large sample observations that make findings more 
generalised to the study population as a whole. 
 
5.3 Hypotheses Development 
5.3.1 Measurements of the Dependant Variable (Earnings Management) 
Chapter two illustrated the nature and types of earnings management, such as timing the recognition 
of certain events concerning revenues and expenses and accounting choices and changes.  However, 
the use of these techniques must be disclosed in the financial statements.  Another way to practice 
earnings management is through accruals management, which managers may prefer because it is 
less visible and more difficult to detect.  
 
The accruals method has been used extensively in earnings management research as it is not only 
captures the effect of accruals management but also the effect of some of the earnings management 
techniques, such as changes in accounting estimates and manipulating recognition timing, as 
mentioned above. 
 
The vast majority of recent earnings management literature relies primarily on discretionary accruals 
as a proxy for earnings management and it applies various models to isolate discretionary accruals 
within the total accruals (see Dechow et al., 1995).  This study uses the discretionary accruals 
portion as a proxy for earnings management.  Discretionary accruals are defined as the difference 
between actual and expected accruals.  
 
This study illustrates the development of discretionary accruals as a measure for earnings 
management by examining previous key studies that suggests and develops this measure and more 
recent suggested amendments for this measure.  
 
To begin, Healy (1985) argues that the amount of non-discretionary accruals is basically the mean of 
total accruals over an estimation period prior to the event period as follows: 
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 NDA it = ∑ j TA it /T 
Where: 
NDA=  Non-discretionary accruals, 
j       =   year of the event period. 
TA   =  Total accruals scaled by lagged total assets, 
T       =  years included in the estimation period, 
 
Thus, the discretionary accrual in the event period is the difference between total accruals in that 
period and non-discretionary accruals. 
 
DeAngelo (1986) uses the last period‟s total accruals scaled by lagged total assets, as a measure of 
non-discretionary accruals as follows: 
NDA it = TA it-1 
Where all the notations are as previously defined, the difference between total accruals in that period 
scaled by lagged total assets and that estimation of the non-discretionary accruals is the amount of 
discretionary accruals in the event period.  The DeAngelo (1986) model assumes that this first 
difference in total accruals has an expected value of zero under the null hypothesis of no earnings 
management. 
 
Both the Healy (1985) and the DeAngelo (1986) models use event studies where earnings 
management is assumed to take place only in the event period.  They are applied on a time-series 
basis by using an estimation period before the event period to estimate coefficients used in 
computing non-discretionary accruals in the event period.  The models are also applied on a cross-
sectional basis through an estimation industry sample of the same two-digit Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) code, and the residuals of the cross-sectional regression are used to indicate 
discretionary accruals. 
 
Jones (1991) introduces a new methodology to separate discretionary accruals using a regression 
analysis approach by relating non-discretionary accruals to the changes in a firm's economic 
conditions that may induce such accruals, such as the gross property, plant and equipment (PPE) and 
the change in revenues (Δ REV) as explanatory variables to reflect changes in a firm's economic 
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conditions before managerial manipulation.  Gross PPE adjusts for expected depreciation expense 
and the change in revenues adjusts for expected changes in working capital accounts. 
 
The Jones (1991) model differs from the previous two studies in that it does not assume that non-
discretionary accruals are consistent over time but assumes that these accruals are affected by 
changes in the firm‟s economic conditions.  The model introduces the change in revenues and the 
level of the gross property, plant and equipment to capture these economic conditions.  Therefore, 
non-discretionary accruals in the Jones model are estimated as follows: 
NDA it = α (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it  / TA it -1) + β 2 (PPE it / TA it -1)           (1) 
Where: 
TA it -1 is the book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t -1,  
Δ REVit / TA it -1 is sales revenues of firm i in year t less revenues in year t – 1 scaled by TA it -1, 
PPEit / TA it -1 is gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at end of year t scaled by TAit-1,  
α β1 β 2    are estimated parameters. 
 
In this model, the parameters are estimated using a time-series model for each firm using at least 8 
firm-year observations by applying the following model (equation 2) in the estimation period: 
 
       TAC it = α (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it / TA it -1) + β 2 (PPE it / TA it -1) + ε it                 (2) 
 
The Jones (1991) and Dechow et al. (1995) models were originally introduced as a time series.  
However, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) propose a cross-sectional Jones model rather than a time 
series model and many recent studies estimated equation (2) using cross-sectional discretionary 
accruals (e.g. Klein, 2002b; Xie et al., 2003; and Abdul Rahman, 2006). 
 
Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) compare both the Jones' time-series model and a modified cross-
sectional model in their investigation of earnings management close to debt covenant violations.  
They find that both models reveal the same results as the magnitude of coefficients from the cross-
sectional models is quite similar to those obtained from the time-series models.  Bartov et al. (2001) 
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reconfirm the previous findings that the cross-sectional model is superior to the time-series model in 
detecting earnings management.   
 
Dechow et al. (1995) test several models for detecting earnings management and conclude that 
adding the change in receivables to the Jones model leads to a more powerful model.  They argue 
that managers can manipulate earnings through the discretionary revenues by timing the recognition 
of these revenues, such as recording them at year end when the cash has not yet been received.  The 
total accruals will be affected through the increase in receivables; thus the change in receivables is 
assumed to be discretionary.  In other words, revenues are not completely exogenous and they may 
be manipulated by managers through fraudulent credit policies.  
 
Therefore, Dechow et al. (1995) suggest that the change in receivables should be deducted from the 
total change in revenues when estimating the non-discretionary accruals using the Jones model.  
This adjustment is intended to remove the effects of managerial discretion over credit sales from 
non-discretionary accruals, thereby improving the model‟s power to detect revenue-based earnings 
manipulation. 
 
Based on this modification of the Jones model, equation (3) estimates non-discretionary accruals in 
the event period as follows: 
NDA it = ά (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it   - Δ REC it) / TA it -1) + β 2     (PPE it / TA it -1)     (3) 
 
Where Δ REC it, is the change in receivables as measured by net receivables in  the event period, 
less net receivables in year -1 scaled by total assets at year -1. 
 
The estimation of the parameters α, β1, β2 in the modified Jones model are the same as in the 
original model in equation (2), assuming that earnings management occurs only in the event period 
and non-systematic earnings management takes place during the estimation period.  Dechow et al. 
(1995) find that this modified Jones model is relatively more powerful in detecting the discretionary 
accruals than the original Jones model and other models suggested in the earnings management 
literature. 
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The modified Jones model deducts the change in receivables from the change in revenues only in 
the event period, assuming that the change in receivables represents a discretionary portion of the 
total change in revenues.  The model estimates the deferred acquisition costs by the residuals of the 
following cross-sectional regression using firms within the same two-digit industry SIC code. The 
UK Corporate Governance Code (2003) to estimate the parameters (equation 4):   
 
TAC it = ά (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it   - Δ REC it) / TA it -1 + β 2 (PPE it / TA it -1) + ε it      (4) 
 
Kothari et al. (2005) argue that the DAC, as estimated by both the Jones and modified Jones models, 
may result in a severe measurement error in DAC when these models do not control for the prior 
performance of the company.  They propose a model that includes an intercept and control for the 
firm‟s performance using the lag of return on assets (ROA) to mitigate the problematic 
heteroskedasticity and mis-specified issues of the Jones and the modified Jones models in estimating 
accruals.  They suggest adding the ROA of the previous year as an additional regressor to the cross-
sectional modified Jones model.   
 
As the Kothari model detects the net effect of all accounting estimations and choices that influence 
reported earnings, this approach will be used in this study because the corporate governance and 
auditing literature does not specify that certain accounting manipulations can be directly related to 
either corporate governance or external audit. McNichols (2000) argues that the aggregate accruals 
models approach allows for control of additional variables, including corporate governance and 
external audit attributes.  
 
The present study does not examine a specific event, so, consistent with Kothari et al (2005) and 
Kasznik (1999), it also deducts the receivables change from the revenues change in estimating the 
coefficients.  Therefore, this study estimates the DAC, based on Kothari et al (2005) model; thus, 
the DAC will be estimated by the residuals using firms within the same two-digit industry SIC code 
to estimate the parameters of the following cross-sectional model (equation 5):   
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TAC it = ά (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it   - Δ REC it) / TA it -1 + β 2    (PPE it / TA it -1) + β 3   ROA it -1 + ε it                      
(5) 
 
This study uses the cash flow approach to measure total accruals (TAC). Thus, TAC is the 
difference between income before extraordinary items,  discontinued operations (NI) and net cash 
flows from operating activities (CFO) as follows (1): 
 
TACit     =   NI it – CFO it  
Where: 
NI it      = is the earnings before extraordinary items of firm i in year t,  
CFO it = is the net cash flows from operating activities of firm i in year t,  
 
In addition to applying the Kothari et al. (2005) model of estimating DAC using TAC, this study 
also applies the same model using only the current accruals (CAC) instead of TAC following 
Ashbaugh et al (2003). 
 
Guenther, (1994) and Becker et al. (1998) suggest that management have greater discretion over 
CAC than over long-term accruals.  Sloan (1996) reports that most of the variations in TAC are 
driven by CAC.  Current accrual adjustments involve current assets and liabilities that support the 
daily operations of the firm.  CAC can be manipulated easily by managers, for example, through 
advancing revenues recognition before receiving the cash or by delaying expenses recognition 
through low provision for bad debts.  Therefore, discretionary current accruals may be a better proxy 
for earnings management than discretionary long-term accruals. 
 
Due to the fact that this study does not examine any particular event and focuses on the magnitude 
rather than the direction of earnings management, the absolute value of different measures of DAC 
as a dependent variable is used in the main test, however, directions of earnings management will be 
tested in the further analysis section in the next chapter.  Examples of recent studies that use this 
measure include Chung & Kallapur (2003), Benkel et al. (2006) and Choi and Lee (2009). 
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5.3.2 Development of Hypotheses and Measurement of the Independent Variables 
The following section provides detailed information about the measurement of each independent 
variable.  The variables are grouped into five categories, each incorporating individual variables 
depicting specific attributes pertaining to board of directors‟ composition, non executive directors‟ 
commitment, ownership structure, audit committee effectiveness, and external audit factors.  The 
individual variables for each of these categories are discussed below. 
 
5.3.2.1 Board of Directors’ Composition 
This section will discuss various board characteristics that are expected to have an effect on earnings 
management behaviour based on the agency theory perspective that was illustrated in chapter four, 
namely board size, independence, meetings, diversity, chairman independence, and nomination and 
remuneration committee independence. 
   
It is worth mentioning that this study makes an assumption regarding the judgment of independence 
and size of the board of directors.  This study sets a period of at least six months of service by a 
board director in order for him or her to be considered as a member.  Also, any director who is 
appointed or who resigned from the board before the end of the year is not included in the 
measurement either of board size or of the proportion of the independent directors on the board.  
This is because firms report their corporate governance status in the end of the financial year 
whereas the monitoring effect of those directors should have been for the whole year in order to 
ensure that they have been involved in a sufficient number of board meetings and have developed 
enough knowledge of the business to enable them to discharge their monitoring roles.  
 
Board Independence 
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) describe the board of directors as the most important 
mechanism in the internal corporate governance structure.  They argue that establishing a board that 
provides effective monitoring of management actions depends on its composition. 
 
From an agency perspective, an independent board is more likely to be vigilant for agency problems 
as it includes a substantial number of non-executive directors (NEDs) who are dedicated to 
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monitoring management‟s performance and behaviour (e.g. Johnson et al., 1996; Bainbridge, 1993; 
Fama, 1980).  
 
One of the major responsibilities of the board is to exercise a monitoring function over executive 
management on behalf of shareholders (Johnson et al., 1996; Bainbridge, 1993; Fama, 1980). This 
function is expected to have a direct impact on shareholders‟ perception of the firm‟s financial 
reporting integrity.  Boards of directors monitor management by ensuring that executive managers 
fulfil their duties in a manner that serves the best interests of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
 
Fama (1980) asserts that boards which are dominated by insider directors are subject to self-
monitoring problems and have weak monitoring of executive directors.  Lawler et al. (2002) 
empirically support the expectation that board independence enhances the monitoring function of 
the board. In addition, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) assert that not only does board independence have 
a direct impact on a firm‟s performance, but also that it affects financial disclosure as outside 
directors can force management to improve the quality of the firm‟s disclosure. 
 
In the UK, the importance of independent boards has been stressed by the Cadbury Report (1992), 
which recommends a minimum of three independent directors on the board to ensure that 
independent directors make a significant contribution to carrying out the board‟s responsibilities.  
The Higgs Report on the Corporate Governance Combined Code (2003) further stressed the 
importance of independent directors and recommends that at least half of the board members should 
be independent NEDs. 
 
According to the same Code, one of the responsibilities of NEDs is to satisfy themselves on the 
integrity of financial information and that financial controls and systems of risk management are 
robust and defensible.  These roles of the NEDs should have a direct impact on shareholders‟ 
perception of the firm‟s financial reporting integrity and quality, which, in turn, may constrain 
management opportunistic behaviour towards the firm‟s reported earnings. 
 
UK listed companies sometimes determine, in their corporate governance reports, the independence 
status of their NEDs according to the recommendation of the UK Corporate Governance Combined 
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Code (2003), which stated that “The board should identify in the annual report, each non-executive 
director it considers to be independent.  The board should determine whether the director is 
independent in character and judgment and whether there are relationships or circumstances which 
are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, the director‟s judgment”.  However, the independence 
issue in this study is not determined by relying totally on what firms disclose in their annual reports.  
This study follows The UK Corporate Governance Combined Code (2003) definition for 
independence to determine the independence of directors.  (See the chairman independence variable 
in this section for a definition of independence).  
 
In this study, each independence criterion is applied to each NED to determine his or her 
independence.  Any divergence from any of The UK Corporate Governance Combined Code (2003) 
independence criteria disqualifies the director from the status of an independent director.  For 
example, if a firm claims that a director who has served on the board for over nine years is 
independent; this study will classify this director as non-independent. 
 
Prior studies find that board members who are independent from management can have a positive 
effect on the governance of a company, particularly in relation to fraud and discretionary accounting 
accruals (Beasley, 1996; Peasnell et al., 2000a; Peasnell et al., 2005; Chtourou et al., 2001; Klein, 
2002b; Xie et al., 2003; Bradbury, 2006; Jaggi et al., 2009 and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 2010).  
Therefore, consistent with most of the previously mentioned studies, board independence 
(BRDIND) is operationalised in this study as the proportion of independent NEDs to the total 
number of board members.  Due to the varying size of boards, a percentage variable provides a more 
accurate and comparable measurement. Additionally, while this variable can be measured in a 
dichotomous manner, for example, depicting whether or not the majority of the board is considered 
independent, or whether or not the board is fully independent (both have been used in prior studies), 
it is believed that the scale type variable used in this study gives greater precision in tests. 
Consequently, the following hypothesis is proposed.  
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between independent boards and earnings management. 
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Board Meetings 
One essential measure of the effectiveness of a board is how often the board members meet to 
discuss the various issues facing a firm (Vafeas, 1999; Carcello, et al. 2002 and Latendre, 2004).  
Diligent boards enhance the level of oversight, resulting in improved financial reporting quality.  
Carcello, et al. (2002) find that quality of audit work is associated with the number of board 
meetings. 
 
In addition to the number of board meetings, board diligence includes other aspects such as 
preparation before meetings, attentiveness and participation during meetings and post-meeting 
follow-up (Carcello et al. 2002).  However, of these, only the number of board meetings is 
documented publicly. 
 
Conger et al. (1998) and Vafeas, (1999) view board meetings as an essential resource in improving 
the effectiveness of the board and they use this to represent the intensity of board activity.  Many 
other studies, for example, Lipton and Lorsch (1992), suggest that one of the major impediments to 
board effectiveness is the lack of time to carry out the board‟s responsibilities. They add that boards 
that meet frequently are more likely to discharge their duties diligently and in accordance with 
shareholders‟ interests. This makes management monitoring more effective, resulting in improved 
earnings quality.  
 
Therefore, from the agency perspective, a board that is more diligent in discharging its 
responsibilities enhances its effectiveness and the level of its oversight.  
 
Xie et al. (2003) find that EM is significantly negatively related to the number of board meetings.  
However, Uzun, et al. (2004) do not find any significant differences in board meeting frequency 
between firms involved in fraud and other firms. 
 
Overall, board meetings are considered as a resource that leads to board diligence. Various prior 
studies examine the impact of board meetings by considering the frequency or number of meetings 
(Vafeas, 1999; Beasley et al., 2000; Carcello et al., 2002).  This study uses the same approach and 
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measures board meetings (BRDMEET) by the number of board meetings held annually by the board 
of directors.  This discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The number of Board meetings is negatively associated with earnings management. 
 
Board Size 
There has been continued debate on the role of board size from different perspectives (Jensen, 1993; 
Yermack, 1996; Dalton et al., 1998; Hemalin & Weisbach, 2003).  From an agency perspective, 
larger boards are more likely to be vigilant for agency problems because a substantial number of 
experienced directors can be deployed to monitor and review management actions (Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003).  
 
The agency theory perspective also conceives that larger boards support effective monitoring by 
reducing CEO dominance within the board and, thus, they protect shareholders‟ interests (Singh & 
Harianto, 1989).  Larger boards improve the bargaining position of the board with regard to the 
CEO and, thus, larger boards are more effective in monitoring the management.  
 
Therefore, board size has been shown to be a significant part of the ability of boards to effectively 
monitor management and to work efficiently together to oversee the running of the business 
(Persons, 2006).  Board size is an indicator of both its monitoring and advisory roles, both of which 
may contribute to its insight into management behaviour (e.g., Anderson et al. 2004; Coles et al. 
2008).  Larger boards are likely to provide more expertise and diversity and to increase the board‟s 
monitoring capacity (Dalton et al., 1998; Pearce and Zahra, 1992 and John and Senbet, 1998).  
Additionally, larger boards are more likely to include more independent directors with valuable 
experience and, hence, they are able to delegate more responsibilities to board committees than 
smaller boards; this also can prevent or limit managerial opportunistic behaviour (Menon and 
Williams, 1994 and Xie et al., 2003).   
 
Ebrahim (2007) finds that the independence of the audit committee is actually derived from the 
board‟s size because the probability of having a totally independent audit committee is more 
                   
 
                 
148 
 
pronounced in firms with large boards.  Klein (2002a) also argue that small board size limits the 
number of independent directors available to serve on the audit committee, and they report evidence 
that audit committee independence increases with the size of the board.  
 
While most of the researchers suggest larger boards improve reporting quality (e.g. Peasnell et al., 
2000a; Chtourou et al., 2001; Xie et al., 2003; Yu, 2008; Klein, 2002a), a few others suggest that 
smaller boards may result in enhancing reporting quality (e.g. Yermack, 1996; Alonso et al., 2000; 
Nguyen et al., 2007).  
 
In short, both large and small sized boards have their shortcomings. Smaller boards may suffer from 
having fewer independent directors and are more likely to be ‟captured‟ by management or 
dominated by management or outsiders, thus making them less effective in detecting earnings 
management.  Larger boards may suffer from bureaucracy and from conflicting interests and views 
that may not help independent directors to discharge their monitoring duties. 
 
The majority of the literature has examined board size from the strategic perspective. For instance, 
Lipton and Lorsh (1992) and Jensen (1993) suggest that large boards face difficulties in 
coordination and communication and this hinders the board‟s ability to advise, take decisions and 
engage in strategic planning.  
 
However, this study is more concerned about the monitoring role of the board.  John and Senbet 
(1998) and Klein (2002a) suggest that the board‟s monitoring capacity increases as the size of board 
increases.  Adams and Mehran (2002) advocate that some firms need larger boards for effective 
monitoring.  Other studies support the argument that large boards provide more monitoring and 
advice (e.g. Anderson et al. 2004; Coles et al. 2008). 
 
Moreover, previous empirical studies that examine the monitoring effect of the board by testing the 
relationship between board size and earnings management find that larger boards are more effective.  
Xie et al. (2003) and Chtourou et al. (2001) find that larger boards are strongly associated with 
lower levels of discretionary accruals. 
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To examine this effect, various studies measure board size by the total number of the firm‟s 
directors (e.g., Yermach, 1996; Beasley, 1996; Vafeas, 2000; Abbot et al., 2004 and Coles et al., 
2008).  The present study uses the number of members on the board as a measure of board size 
(BRASIZE). Consequently, this study proposes the following hypothesis:  
H3: There is a negative relationship between large board size and earnings management 
 
Chairman’s Independence 
“The chairman is pivotal in creating the conditions for overall board and individual director 
effectiveness, both inside and outside the boardroom”. (The UK Corporate Governance Code 2003, 
p.63).  The chairman of the board has the power to control the agenda and board meetings and is 
likely to influence the market‟s perception of the extent of managerial monitoring and of the 
financial reporting process.  Jensen (1993) argues that the role of the chairman is to monitor the 
chief executive officer (CEO) but if these two posts are held by the same person (known as 
„duality‟) the CEO can control the information available to other board members and thus impede 
effective monitoring.  The non-independent chairman becomes problematic if the chairman‟s 
interests are different from shareholders‟ interests.  
 
Thus, the presence of an independent chairman indicates that more control is likely to be exercised 
over management‟s activities and behaviour (Dechow et al., 1996).  An independent chairman 
(neither founder nor CEO) is expected to improve board monitoring by providing an independent 
monitoring of the CEO‟s work (Abbott et al., 2004; Fama & Jensen, 1983).   
 
From the agency theory perspective, the chairman should be independent of the company‟s affairs 
and this is a useful check on a CEO‟s over-ambitious plans (Blackburn, 1994). Moreover, Jensen 
(1993) argues that the board chair‟s independence enables the board to discharge its oversight 
responsibilities, especially with respect to the CEO. 
 
Chau et al. (2006) argues that concentrated decision-making power, as a result of a non-independent 
chairman, may impair the board‟s oversight and monitoring roles. Thus, vesting the power of the 
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CEO and the chairman in separate persons reduces any strong individual power base, which 
enhances the board‟s ability to exercise effective control.   
    
This study argues that, with regard to improving the financial reporting quality and integrity of 
firms, it is not ideal if the hierarchical head of the company is not really independent. The chairman 
is likely to behave with less bias if he or she has no previous relationship with the firm.  
 
In the prior literature, the commonly used measure for chairman independence is whether or not the 
roles of the chairman and CEO are combined.  However, empirical findings reveal that a change in 
the duality status does not influence the market Daily and Dalton (1997) find that CEO duality does 
not have a significant effect on performance. 
 
Additionally, the vast majority of the literature finds no association between CEO duality and 
earnings management (see, for instance, Dechow et al., 1996; Peasnell et al., 2000a; Chen and Kao, 
2004; Lee et al., 2006; Chtourou et al., 2008 and Chang and Sun, 2009). Chang and Sun (2009) state 
that they did not find evidence indicating that CEO duality is associated with increased earnings 
management in either the pre- or post-SOX periods. 
 
Another shortcoming of duality as a measure of chairman independence is the high proportion of 
firms with/without duality in the previous studies; thus, they may not capture variance in the 
discretionary accruals.  In the U.S., Brickley et al. (1997) and Xie et al. (2003) find more than 81% 
and 85%, respectively, of their sample firm-years have CEO duality, whereas non duality is very 
high in other research contexts such as 88% no duality in China (Liu and Lu, 2007) and it is about 
94% in the Australian context (Benkel et al., 2006).  In the UK, Peasnell et al. (2005) find that no 
duality occurs in 76% of their sample between 1993 and 1996.  
  
The findings of these previous studies may lead to the conclusion that CEO duality may not be an 
accurate measure of chairman independence. Thus, a better measure of the independence of 
chairmen is needed in order to measure whether they discharge their duties adequately. Therefore, 
this study uses the independent chairman criteria of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2003) to 
judge the chairman‟s independence.  
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The chairman independence criteria recommended by that Code are, arguably, quite lenient 
compared with its NED independence criteria.  For instance, the chairman‟s independence is tested 
only on appointment; subsequently, the chairman can be considered independent even he or she is 
the founder of the firm or is entitled to receive extra remunerations like options or a significant share 
ownership.   
 
Therefore, in this study, the chairman‟s independence is also measured using the 2003 UK 
Corporate Governance Code‟s independence criteria for non-executive directors. The expectation is 
a negative relationship between chairman independence, measured in this way, and earnings 
management.  According to the Code, an independent non-executive director should not have been 
an employee of the company or group within the last five years; not have, or had within the last 
three years, a material business relationship with the company either directly, as a partner, 
shareholder, director or senior employee of a body that has such a relationship with the company;  
not receive or have received additional remuneration from the company apart from a director‟s fee, 
not participate in the company‟s share option or performance-related pay scheme, or be a member of 
the company‟s pension scheme;  not have close family ties with any of the company‟s advisers, 
directors or senior employees;  not hold cross-directorships or have significant links with other 
directors through involvement in other companies or bodies; not represent a significant shareholder; 
and not served on the board for more than nine years from the date of his or her first election.  
Within firms' corporate governance reports, chairman's details will be judged by the NED 
independence criteria to determine his or her independence, thus, a dummy variable is introduced 
that takes the value of one if the chairman is independent and zero otherwise, which leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H4:  There is a negative association between the chairman’s independence and earnings 
management. 
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Board Gender Diversity 
Gender diversity can be taken to represent the concept of board diversity in general (Milliken and 
Martins, 1996).  Gender diversity on boards is also supported by agency theory and other theoretical 
perspectives.  The agency theory emphasises the board balance, thus, representation from diverse 
groups provides a more balanced board that is likely to prevent an individual or a small group of 
individuals from dominating its decision-making (Hampel, 1998). 
  
It is argued that female members on the board benefit the firms‟ governance through an influx of 
skills, abilities and fresh perspectives and by bringing new dynamics to board deliberations (Jamali 
et al., 2007).  Different backgrounds (usually non-corporate)  and qualifications may make women 
more likely to hold unique and rare views that provide a valuable different perspective during board 
discussions and weave new dynamics into board deliberations.  
 
This complements and empowers the skills possessed by male directors who are more likely to be 
specialists in functional areas such as operations, marketing and accounting (Zelechowski & 
Bilimoria, 2004).  The varied range of experiences brought by women is found to be good for 
governance (Huse & Solberg, 2006).   Women are also more likely to question conventional wisdom 
and promote more open discussions (Fondas & Sassalos, 2000; Huse & Solberg, 2006).  Such 
diverse discussions and viewpoints improve boardroom effectiveness and enhance the quality of 
financial reporting. 
 
In the UK, corporate governance codes have not commented on diverse corporation boards as a 
corporate governance practice.  However, in the USA, the National Association of Corporate 
Directors and Blue Ribbon Commission recommend that gender, race, age, and nationality diversity 
should be considered in the selection of directors.  
 
Nguyen, et al. (2007) analyse the relationship between a firm‟s market value and the size and gender 
diversity of its board of directors using a sample of 832 observations over two years from 2000 to 
2001 of publicly listed Australian firms.  Their results indicate that gender diversity promotes 
shareholders' value, as woman director variables are both significantly and economically related to 
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higher market value of the firm.  Similarly, Carter, et al. (2003) studies the diversity of boards of 
directors and documents significant relationships between the proportion of women on the board and 
a firm‟s average value.  
 
Felton, et al. (2003) summarise two main schools of thought in explaining why women are more 
risk averse than men.  The first school uses the biological differences between men and women to 
explain their risk preferences.  For instance, Zuckerman (1994) report that women produce higher 
levels of the enzyme monoamine oxidise than men; monoamine oxidise inhibits sensation seeking 
and thus limits the extent to which risk taking occurs.  The second school of thought suggests socio-
cultural reasons for men taking greater risks than women.  A study by Felton, et al. (2003) notes that 
children are pressured during childhood through peer pressure and social expectations to behave 
according to their cultural gender roles, which results in a greater propensity for men to take risks. 
 
From a psychological perspective, men and women are different in many ways that may influence 
their behaviour.  Byrnes, et al. (1999) review and summarise 150 studies of psychological literature 
examining differences in risk taking between men and women, and demonstrate that women, on 
average, take less risk than men.  This is supported by Seetharaman, et al. (2004) who examine 
personality correlation with accounting anomalies as one of the symptoms of fraud or asset 
misappropriation. Personality is analysed by age, gender, position, educational background and 
collusion. Their survey reports that most fraud cases involved males and they were responsible for 
more than 75 per cent of all losses by fraud.   
 
Moreover, Bernardi and Arnold (1997) find that women in public accounting firms score higher than 
their male colleagues on a moral development measure.  Ford and Richardson (1994) review thirteen 
studies that consider gender as a factor in ethical decision making.  They find that eight of those 
studies support the view that women are more likely to behave ethically than men, while five do not 
support that view.  Moreover, these studies suggest that women are less likely to engage in unethical 
behaviour to gain financial rewards.  This may have a direct impact on earnings management that 
allows managers to gain rewards such as higher compensation because it is linked to reported 
earnings. 
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Males have been found to be more willing than their female counterparts to accept unethical 
behaviour in achieving their goals (Zahra, et al., 2007). Furthermore, Betz, et al. (1989) find that 
men are more likely than women to break the laws against insider trading and to violate company 
policy regarding expense reports, in order to profit personally.  Therefore, if earnings management is 
an illegal practice that involves law breaking and fraud, the previous findings provide evidence of a 
link between the male gender and a proclivity for illegal activities.   
 
Also, if earnings management involves the risk of losing reputation, job or money, making such a 
risky decision may be influenced by the director‟s gender. The presence of women on a firm‟s board 
may reduce the incidence of such risk taking.  
 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) offer an in-depth discussion of the effects of diversity on board 
processes.  They conclude from the literature that board effectiveness is likely to depend heavily on 
social-psychological processes, particularly those pertaining to participation and interaction, the 
exchange of information, and critical discussion.  Participative boards that have an equal power 
distribution between the CEO and the board, allowing for discussion, debate and disagreement, are 
found to be associated with a higher proportion of female board members (Pearce and Zahra, 1991).  
 
In summary, it can be argued that the presence of female directors leads to better board dynamics 
and improved reported earnings quality compared to firms with boards composed of solely one 
gender.  Following Tacheva and Huse (2006), this study measures gender diversity (WOMEN) by 
the proportion of female directors on the board of directors.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: The number of women directors on the board is negatively related to EM 
 
Nomination Committee Independence 
Vance (1983) argues that there are four board committees that greatly influence corporate activities: 
the audit, executive, compensation, and nomination committees. Companies need to be objective in 
the nomination process for directors.  The board needs to have a balanced portfolio of members with 
diverse backgrounds and specialisations. 
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The nomination committee‟s role includes identifying the needs of the company, monitoring board 
composition, developing the selection criteria, assessing board members‟ competencies, reviewing 
succession, evaluating the board‟s performance, and recommending the appointment and removal of 
directors (Pease and McMillan, 1993).  These objective processes assure that independent, 
competent directors are appointed and this, in turn, enhances the effectiveness of the board to meet 
its integrity and monitoring goals. 
 
From an agency theory perspective, nomination committees can play a vital role in enhancing the 
independence of the board and reducing the influence of management (Jensen, 1993; Firstenberg 
and Malkiel, 1994; and Westphal, 1998). Having a nomination committee will effectively delegate 
the director selection process to a group rather than a single person (usually the chairman of the 
board or the CEO), which is independent of the management and which can make independent 
recommendations.  Thus, nomination committees are more likely to meet shareholder interests by 
assuring that new board members are independent and qualified for the role.  
The UK Corporate Governance Combined Code (2003) stresses the importance of establishing a 
nomination process that guarantees that outside directors are truly independent.  The Code‟s main 
principle in nomination committee is that “There should be a formal, rigorous and transparent 
procedure for the appointment of new directors to the board”.  The Code‟s provisions explain that 
“There should be a nomination committee which should lead the process for board appointments 
and make recommendations to the board. A majority of members of the nomination committee 
should be independent non-executive directors.” 
 
When the nomination committee has less than a majority of independent directors, management 
influence over the nomination process can potentially compromise the newly appointed independent 
director because he or she might feel obligated to those who encouraged and supported the 
nomination.  (Lee, et al. 1992). 
 
Empirically, Klein (1998, 2002b) report a negative relationship between board independence and 
audit committee independence when the CEO sits on the nomination committee.  This suggests that 
the presence of executive directors, including the CEO, on the nomination committee gives them 
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significant power over the nomination of directors and this impedes the independence of the board 
and weakens its monitoring process.  Therefore, nomination committees that have a majority of 
executive directors may increase earnings management. 
 
However, Osma and Noguer (2007) investigate the effect of an independent nomination committee 
on earnings management using 155 Spanish firms. In contrast to Anglo-American results, they find 
a positive and significant relationship between earnings management and the proportion of 
independent directors, except when the nomination committee has a majority of institutional 
directors.   
 
The present study extends prior studies by investigating the impact of independent nomination 
committees on earnings management from an Anglo-American perspective, using the UK context.   
 
Nomination committee independence (NOMIND) is calculated as the proportion of independent 
non-executive directors in the nomination committee to total committee members.  Due to the 
varying size of nomination committees, a percentage variable provides a more comparable method 
of measurement. The conclusion of this survey is that nomination committee independence is vital if 
NEDs‟ independence is to be guaranteed.  Accordingly, the sixth hypothesis states that: 
 
H6: Nomination committee independence is negatively associated with earnings management. 
 
Remuneration Committee Independence 
Vance (1983) argues that the remuneration committee plays a significant role in the board‟s 
composition.  Davidson, et al. (1998) argue that the board committee structure and composition is 
likely to impact on management‟s willingness to manage earnings. They find that the composition of 
a firm‟s remuneration committee influences the market‟s perception of golden parachutes.  Their 
explanation of this relationship is that outside directors may be more important on committees (e.g., 
remuneration and audit committees) that handle agency issues.  
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This is also supported by the UK Corporate Governance Code (2003) guidelines which recommend 
the establishment of a remuneration committee that is wholly composed of independent directors.  
The responsibilities of the remuneration committee include reviewing executive remuneration 
packages, incentive schemes, superannuation arrangements and the remuneration of directors. 
 
The Code‟s recommendation of a fully independent remuneration committee, similar to its 
recommendation of a fully independent audit committee, suggests that shareholder/management 
conflicts may be as pronounced in remuneration disputes as they are in audit issues.  The presence 
of an independent remuneration committee minimises the risk of managers determining their own 
remuneration. 
 
One important aspect of the remuneration committee is that, if it discharges its roles adequately, it 
safeguards board independence by preventing independent directors from receiving any 
remuneration other than their fees as directors; this is an important Code condition for their 
independence. 
 
From agency theory perspective, the remuneration committee is a governance mechanism of control 
by the owners (principals) over top management (the agents) that is expected to set a compensation 
package that protects the interest of the shareholders, and to monitor management. Dechow et al. 
(1994) suggest that remuneration committees should adjust CEO compensation to prevent 
opportunistic behaviour.  Thus, the remuneration committee guarantees the competence of 
independent board members and acts as one of the monitors of the CEO. 
 
Clearly, in the absence of the right balance of independent directors representing shareholders‟ 
interests on the remuneration committee, the committee is likely to be a legitimating device for 
managers to set their own remuneration.  The level of remuneration is also important in attracting 
new blood and highly qualified directors; if compensation plans are set to attract them, there is more 
likely to be a high quality board that meets its monitoring and integrity goals. 
 
In addition, the independent remuneration committee has a key role to play in ensuring a fair and 
appropriate remuneration scheme.  This, in turn, ensures that management ownership is designed to 
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align the interests of shareholders and management, which will work towards constraining 
management opportunistic behaviour such as earnings management. 
 
Empirically, Klein (2002b) studies the effect of the presence of the CEO on the remuneration 
committee on the incidence of earnings management.  She finds a positive relation between the 
CEO‟s presence and earnings management practice. 
 
Following the UK Corporate Governance Code (2003) recommendations, remuneration committee 
independence (REMUIND), is measured by a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
remuneration committee is composed entirely of independent directors, and zero otherwise. This 
discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H7: Remuneration committee independence is negatively associated with earnings management. 
 
5.2.2.2 Non-executive Directors’ Commitment  
One perspective of corporate governance not sufficiently explored is NED commitment.  NED 
commitment can be measured by several governance mechanisms, such as their involvement in 
board meetings, NEDs‟ private meetings and their activity fees. 
 
Extensive prior research has investigated board independence and size mechanisms.  This study 
narrows the focus from the board‟s roles in general to the role of NEDs in governing the company.  
Board effectiveness is established on the assumption that outside directors are more vigilant than 
inside directors for various reasons. First, NEDs focus on financial performance, which is a central 
component of monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Secondly, NEDs have an incentive to keep 
their personal reputations as independent directors by monitoring management effectively (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983).  Thirdly, Weisbach (1988) finds that NEDs are more likely than insiders to 
dismiss CEOs following poor performance. 
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Basically, NEDs are the shareholders‟ representatives and, since those shareholders are not involved 
in the firm‟s daily business, the agency problem is raised. Hence, when NEDs‟ commitment is low, 
they do not fulfil their representative role and agency costs can flourish. 
 
One important method of evaluating NED performance, according to the Code (2003, p.10) is 
“Individual evaluation should aim to show whether each director continues to contribute effectively 
and to demonstrate commitment to the role (including commitment of time for board and committee 
meetings and any other duties).”  
 
After extensive reading of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2003), this study proposes two 
governance mechanisms to measure NED commitment, namely, NEDs‟ private meetings and NEDs‟ 
activity fees.  
 
Non-executive Directors’ Private Meetings  
NEDs‟ private meetings are recommended by the UK Corporate Governance Code (2003, p.5).  It 
states that “The chairman should hold meetings with the non-executive directors without the 
executives present”.  According to the Code, one of the responsibilities of NEDs is to satisfy 
themselves on the integrity of financial information and that financial controls and systems of risk 
management are robust and defensible.  One important method of evaluating NED performance, 
according to the Code (2003, p.10), is “Individual evaluation should aim to show whether each 
director continues to contribute effectively and to demonstrate commitment to the role (including 
commitment of time for board and committee meetings and any other duties).”  
 
Previous corporate governance and EM studies focus mainly on NEDs‟ independence rather than 
their commitment.  However, some previous studies conclude that independent boards do not 
necessarily perform better (e.g. Bhagat and Black, 2002; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Dulewicz and 
Herbert, 2004).  
 
These conflicting results may be due to NED independence being a vague concept that is actually 
harder to measure than NED commitment.   Gilson & Kraakman (1991 and Patton & Baker (1987) 
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support the view of critics of the role of NEDs that they may have little involvement in monitoring 
management because they lack real independence, time and sufficient relevant information. 
 
NED independence should not be taken for granted because NEDs are entirely dependent on the 
executive team for information and knowledge about the company (Stiles and Taylor 2002). Their 
lack of knowledge and limited time, compared to executive directors, requires them to work closely 
with the executive directors (Keasey et al. 2002).  As a consequence, their independence may be 
impaired.  
 
Charles (2005) argues that NEDs‟ reliance on the information they receive from staff and external 
advisers has not previously been a problem, since their role has traditionally been one of strategic 
guidance. However, with corporate governance high on today's agenda, it is questionable whether 
NEDs should be so reliant on what they are told; NEDs should dedicate more time to their role in 
order to have more access to the necessary information.   
 
The lack of real NED independence can be deduced from Higgs' (2003) study of more than 600 
executive and non-executive directors of UK-listed companies. It finds that 48 per cent of NEDs are 
appointed through personal contact with a board member, while only 4 per cent are appointed 
through a formal interview.  
  
Thus, when NEDs hold confidential meetings without the presence of executive directors, they may 
be able to overcome this shortcoming because meetings usually provide important information that 
reduces NED dependence on the firm‟s management for information about the business. 
 
Another criticism of NEDs is that they are too busy with other commitments and directorships and 
are only involved with the company on a „part-time‟ basis.  Fich and Shivdasani (2006) detect a 
negative effect of busy boards on several performance ratios caused by the increasing distraction of 
multiple directorships.  Jiraporn et al. (2008) find a negative impact of busy boards on the firm‟s 
value caused by deeper diversification.  They explain this relation by the board members‟ shortage 
of time.  
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These findings are not exclusive to a one-tier corporate governance system, such as in the US; there 
is also a negative effect of busy members of the supervisory board on the performance of a company 
in a two-tier corporate governance system, such as in Germany (Oehmichen et al., 2009). 
 
Song and Windram (2004) conduct a survey of FT 500 UK companies on the operations of UK audit 
committees.  They report that the lack of time is perceived to be the greatest impediment to audit 
committee effectiveness.  They add that pressure from executives is a prevalent problem, even after 
the corporate governance reforms. 
 
Hence, NEDs who can discharge their duties adequately are those who show more involvement in 
the firm‟s business through NED meetings. Indeed, it might be easier to divide NEDs into effective 
and ineffective NEDs based on their commitment rather than their independence. 
Ideally NEDs should be prepared to speak up and ask difficult questions, they should also be 
prepared to differ, negotiate and respect others‟ views (Dixon and Ogan, 2003).  The latter study 
suggests that board effectiveness is related to the degree to which NEDs acting individually and 
collectively are able to create accountability within the board in relation to both strategy and 
performance.  They suggest that a variety of behaviours such as questioning, probing, discussing, 
informing and debating are at the very heart of how NEDs seek to be effective.  
 
NED meetings can give some freedom and courage for NEDs to discuss controversial issues, such 
as accounting choices and methods, which may not be raised in meetings of the full board. 
 
The directors are the shareholders‟ representatives, yet this focus can be kept only by the 
commitment of NEDs.  A greater awareness is required from directors to include more interaction 
and more communication with management that should lead to more understanding of the business.   
A common feature of NEDs is that the majority of them work part-time, as they usually have 
another full-time directorship.  For the NED role of strategy-making, these various positions and 
experience may be very useful for NEDs.  
 
However, for their monitoring role, this can be a drawback. Involvement in a number of businesses 
can lead to missing some board meetings or not being as engaged as they ought to be.  In this study, 
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the concern is more about the monitoring role of NEDs than their strategy making role since it is 
monitoring that is likely constrain EM practices. 
    
Overall, NEDs‟ private meetings are considered as a resource that leads to board diligence. Carcello 
et al. (2002) concede that board diligence includes several more factors than mere board meetings.  
Various prior studies examine the impact of board diligence by considering only the frequency of 
board meetings (Vafeas, 1999; Beasley et al., 2000; Carcello et al., 2002).  
  
This study uses NEDs‟ meetings as an indication of the time and effort they devote to the firm‟s 
affairs, because this may help them to detect EM behaviour.  The UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2003) does not specify the number of NEDs‟ meetings that are considered to be sufficient. Firms‟ 
financial reports also do not specify the number of such meetings held during the year but simply 
state whether or not such a meeting has been held. Consequently, this study uses a dummy variable 
to measure NEDs‟ private meetings (NEDMEET) that takes the value of one if NEDs meet without 
the presence of the executive directors, and zero otherwise.  This discussion leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H8:  There is a negative association between non-executive directors’ private meeting and 
earnings management. 
 
Non-executive Directors’ Fees 
Prior studies document that high share ownership by independent directors reduces the likelihood of 
directors deviating from the interests of shareholders (e.g. Bhagat and Black, 1999; Bhagat et al., 
1999). The Hampel Report (1997, p.14) notes that “NEDs remuneration can be a useful and 
legitimate way of aligning the directors‟ interests with those of shareholders”.  
 
Jensen, (1989) suggest that NEDs who hold a large equity ownership in the firm are likely to have a 
greater incentive to monitor executive directors than those without such a stake.  Empirically, 
Gerety and Lehn (1997) and Beasley (1996) find a negative association between financial reporting 
fraud and NEDs‟ ownership.  Chtourou et al. (2001) find a negative association between earnings 
management and NEDs‟ ownership. 
                   
 
                 
163 
 
However, this study assumes that the workload of NEDs contributes to the determination of the fees 
they are paid.  If NEDs are required to spend more time and effort in their role, they will expect to 
be remunerated accordingly.  This argument is supported by Mallin (2007) who concedes that NEDs 
should be paid a fee commensurate with the amount of time that they are expected to devote to their 
role, and she supported the idea that remunerating NEDs with share options is inappropriate as it 
may give NEDs a rather unhealthy focus on the short-term share price of the company. 
 
Additionally, Adams and Ferreira (2004) use a large panel data set on director attendance behaviour 
in publicly-listed firms for the period from 1996 to 2003.  They provide robust evidence that 
directors are less likely to have board meeting attendance problems when board meeting fees are 
higher.  They suggest that directors appear to perform even for very small financial rewards. 
 
Corporate governance may take the view that well-paid, independent and competent non-executive 
directors who demonstrate their suitability and discharge their roles adequately, are probably the 
cheapest form of insurance available and the most confidant assurance that public investors can have 
against expensive nasty surprises. 
 
This study will measure NEDs‟ fees (NEDFEE) as the percentage of total fees paid to NEDs divided 
by the total number of NEDs.  While no prior studies have examined the link between NEDs‟ fees 
and earnings management, the previous line of reasoning indicates that higher NEDs‟ fees increase 
NEDs‟ commitment to their monitoring duties over the financial reporting process.  Given the 
possible impact of NEDs‟ fees on earnings management, this study hypothesises the following: 
H9:  There is a negative association between non-executive directors’ fees and earnings 
management. 
 
5.3.2.3 Ownership Structure 
As described in the literature review chapter, the ownership structure of a company can be of critical 
importance to the quality and comprehensiveness of the oversight administered in that company 
(Pergola, 2005; Song & Windram, 2004).  Three variables represent the internal and external 
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ownership (namely managerial ownership, institutional ownership and blockholder ownership) are 
used to represent the ownership structure of firms in this study. 
  
Managerial Ownership 
The agency theory suggests that a higher percentage management ownership implies higher firm 
value, since the goals of management and other shareholders are more closely aligned (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  Jensen and Meckling (1976) also use the agency theory to argue that managers 
with a high ownership are less likely to alter earnings for short-term private gains at the expense of 
other shareholders.  Shareholders are likely to perceive that managers‟ interests are aligned with 
their interests when managers become shareholders by acquiring equity shares.  Thus, managers 
with high level of ownership in the firm are more likely to report reliable earnings that reflect the 
underlying economic value of the firm (Warfield et al. 1995). 
 
The empirical literature documents a positive relationship between a firm‟s value and high 
managerial ownership (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996 and Yermack, 1996).  Other empirical 
studies support the argument that capital market pressure leads firms with low managerial ownership 
to make income-increasing accounting choices (e.g. Stein, 1989 and Jensen, 1986). Alexander and 
Cohen (1999) examine the association between ownership structure and corporate crime and find 
that firms with larger managerial ownership commit less corporate crime.  
 
These studies suggest the proposition that high managerial ownership is an effective corporate 
governance mechanism.  In contrast, managers in firms with low managerial ownership are more 
likely to have a short-term horizon and to exploit accounting choices to alleviate accounting-based 
contractual constraints, including ensuring job preservation and maximising incentive compensation 
(Nagy et al., 1999).  
 
While several empirical studies find a negative association between managers‟ ownership and 
earnings management (Gul et al., 2003; Klein, 2002b), some other studies find a negative relation 
between a high level of managerial ownership and earnings management (e.g. Warfield et al., 1995).  
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This may be due to managers with a high level of ownership becoming more risk averse and less 
willing to invest in projects with potentially high payoffs (Wright et al. 2006).  
 
In the UK context, Peasnell, et al. (2005) study this relation by hypothesising that the constraining 
association between earnings management and the proportion of outside directors and the existence 
of an audit committee will be more pronounced when the level of managerial share ownership is 
low.  They measure managerial ownership as equal to one when managerial share ownership is less 
than 5%, and directors‟ ownership is measured by the number of shares beneficially owned by 
inside directors over total number of shares outstanding.  However, they find little support for these 
conjectures. 
 
In spite of some inconclusive results, there is overwhelming support for the notion that managerial 
ownership aligns the interests of owners and managers and provides a device to control risk taking 
behaviour by managers (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Chung and Pruitt, 1996). 
 
Unlike the previous UK evidence provided by Peasnell, et al (2005), but following other prior 
research (e.g. Hutchinson and Gul, 2004; Gul et al., 2002), this study will measure managerial 
ownership (MNGOWN) as the percentage of total shares held by executive directors divided by the 
total number of shares.  Given the impact that managerial ownership is likely to have on earnings 
management, this study hypothesises the following: 
 
H10: High managerial ownership is negatively related to earnings management. 
 
Institutional Ownership  
Institutional investors are considered to be an essential monitoring device and able to control 
managers in more depth than small shareholders can (Black, 1992).  Large institutional investors 
with substantial stakes have the power, resources and ability to monitor, as well as stronger 
incentives to discipline and influence managers‟ behaviour (Coffee, 1991).  The UK Corporate 
Governance Combined Code (2003, p.24) emphasises the institutional investors‟ role in corporate 
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governance stating that, “Institutional shareholders should enter into a dialogue with companies 
based on the mutual understanding of objectives”.  
 
Bushee (1998) finds evidence that indicates managers are less likely to cut R&D to reverse an 
earnings decline when institutional ownership is high.  Moreover, institutional investors are found to 
influence executive compensation (Clay, 2000 and Hartzell and Starks, 2003) and to influence board 
structures (Wu, 2004).  Koh (2003), Hsu and Koh (2005), Liu (2006), Yu (2008), Charitou et al. 
(2007) and Cheng and Reitenga (2009) provide some recent empirical studies that examine the 
association between institutional ownership and aggressive earnings management. They document a 
negative relationship, which suggests that institutional investors, especially long-term ones, are an 
effective governance mechanism. 
 
However, Peasnell et al. (2005), using UK data from 1993 to 1996, examine institutional investors, 
measuring institutional ownership as the number of shares owned by institutional investors over 
total number of shares outstanding,  and find no relation between EM and institutional investors.  
However, this study will measure institutional ownership (INSTOWN) using the average percentage 
of shares outstanding owned by institutional investors, as in Liu (2006).  This study hypothesises the 
following: 
 
H11: High institutional ownership is negatively related to earnings management. 
 
Blockholders' Ownership 
Outside blockholders have more incentives to monitor managers‟ actions than small external 
shareholders because monitoring is more cost-efficient for external blockholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Jensen and Meckling‟s (1976) study was one of the 
first to suggest that monitoring by blockholders can be an effective device to reduce agency costs.  
Many subsequent studies suggest that outside blockholders can effectively monitor managers‟ 
behaviour (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Barclay and Holderness, 1991).  Outside blockholders‟ 
monitoring of managers prospectively restricts managers' discretion with financial reporting and 
helps to mitigate managers‟ incentive to manipulate earnings.  
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It is thought that blockholders ownership, like institutional investor ownership, has a positive 
bearing on governance oversight.  The notion that blockholders have a greater ability than the 
average shareholder to monitor is not only supported theoretically, as discussed earlier, but also 
empirically by the general consensus of prior studies.  Prior findings propose that large outside 
blockholders have an increased incentive to monitor the actions of management due to their larger 
proportional stake in the entity (Cronqvist et al., 2008), and they have stronger voting power 
(Persons, 2006).   
 
In the UK context, Peasnell et al. (2005) study the relationship between blockholders and earnings 
management.   They measure the blockholders as equal to one when their ownership is equal or 
exceeds 10%, and as zero otherwise.  However, they find no relation between these two variables.  
This study extends that of Peasnell et al. (2005) by introducing additional measurements for UK 
firms.  Consistent with Peasnell et al. (2005), blockholders ownership (BLOCK10) is calculated as 
an indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm has an external stockholder owning 10% or 
more of the outstanding shares, and zero otherwise.  These measures have an exception that, if an 
internal or external director has a higher ownership than the blockholders, the latter is excluded from 
this category because another party can overcome and control the blockholders‟ power.  
 
Company annul reports provide the necessary data to populate the blockholders ownership variables.  
In the UK, any entity that holds more than 3% of interest in the firm has to be disclosed in the 
annual report in accordance with sections 198 to 208 of the Companies Act 1985. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H12: A blockholding of 10% or more in a firm is negatively related to earnings management.  
 
5.3.2.4 Audit Committee Effectiveness 
The use of an audit committee is an important part of the decision control system for internal 
monitoring by boards of directors (Fama, 1980 and Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Monitoring is performed 
by external audit (Anderson et al,. 1993), audit committees (Pincus et al., 1989 and Bradbury, 2006) 
and the use of NEDs (Fama, 1980 and Anderson et al., 1993). 
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The audit committee plays a significant role in the monitoring process carried out by the directors of 
the firm and auditing is used by firms to reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986). Kesner (1988) and Vance (1983) maintain that most essential board 
decisions originate at the committee level, and this includes the audit committee.  
 
Recent regulations and recommendations emphasise audit committee effectiveness.  The UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2003) recommends the formation of an independent and active audit 
committee with financial experts. The Blue Ribbon Commission Report on improving the 
effectiveness of corporate audit committees (BRC, 1999) issued a set of ten recommendations 
intended to enhance the independence and effectiveness of audit committees.   Additionally, the 
SEC requires firms to disclose their audit committee‟s membership and activities.  Such regulations 
and recommendations are expected to improve the effectiveness of audit committees in ensuring the 
integrity of the financial reporting process.  
 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2003) emphasises that the audit committee should review the 
significant financial reporting issues and judgments made in preparing the company‟s financial 
statement.  This view is supported by the academic argument that audit committees aim to increase 
the integrity of the financial auditing process (Klein, 2002a) and the quality of financial reporting 
(McMullen and Raghunanadan, 1996).   
 
This study will examine the audit committee characteristics recommended by the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2003) on earnings management, namely, audit committee independence, 
competence, size and frequency of meeting. 
 
Audit Committee Independence 
An audit committee should be independent from management in order to be able to conduct 
effective monitoring, resulting in less opportunistic management behaviour, such as EM.  The 
quality and credibility of financial reporting can be badly affected when the audit committee has low 
or no independence. 
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The UK Corporate Governance Combined Code (2003, p.17) emphasises the audit committee‟s 
independence from managers, as follows: “while all directors have a duty to act in the interests of 
the company, the audit committee has a particular role, acting independently from the executive, to 
ensure that the interests of shareholders are properly protected in relation to financial reporting and 
internal control”.  
 
Vicknair et al. (1993) argue that, in order to function effectively, audit committees must be 
independent of the management as this allows both the internal and external auditors to remain free 
of undue influences and interferences from corporate executives.  Similarly, Choi et al. (2004) find 
that, when members of the audit committee hold shares in their firm, they are less effective in 
mitigating earnings management.  Thus, the independence of the audit committee is a key factor in 
enhancing its role in preventing mis-statements in the financial statements. 
 
Additionally, the UK Corporate Governance Code (2003, p.16) articulates that “The board should 
establish an audit committee of at least three, or in the case of smaller companies, two members. All 
members of the committee should be independent non-executive directors.”   
 
Some prior studies outside the UK have documented the negative relation between audit committee 
independence and EM, measuring audit independence as the percentage of independent directors 
sitting on the audit committee (e.g. DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991; Beasley, 1996 and Bradbury, 
2006). 
 
Therefore, in this study, audit committee independence (AUDITIND) is calculated as the number of 
independent non-executive directors on the audit committee compared to the total number of 
committee members.  Due to the varying size of audit committees, a percentage variable provides a 
more comparable proportionate method of measurement.   
 
Additionally, while this variable could be measured in a dichotomous manner, for example, 
depicting whether or not at least the majority of the committee are considered independent, or 
whether or not the audit committee is fully independent (both have been used in prior studies), it is 
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believed that the scale type variable used in this study gives greater precision in tests. This 
discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H13: Audit committee independence is negatively associated with earnings management. 
 
Audit Committee Financial Experts 
A recently introduced measure to evaluate the audit committee‟s competence is the audit 
committee‟s expertise; this merges independence and expertise using the percentage of independent 
directors with financial experts sitting on the audit committee. 
  
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2003 p.16) introduced audit committee expertise as a new 
recommendation stating that, “The board should satisfy itself that at least one member of the audit 
committee has recent and relevant financial experience.”   The Code defines a financial expert as 
someone who has a professional qualification from one of the professional accountancy bodies 
(Smith Guidance, p. 50).   
 
This study defines a financial expert as an independent director who holds a recent professional 
financial qualification such as CPA, CMA or ACCA. 
 
These experts can be used by the other independent members of the board to help them make 
judgements on professional issues; the independent director with no financial background may be a 
well-intentioned monitor, but financial sophistication is often required to identify financial 
irregularities such as earnings management.  Xie et al. (2003) support this argument by arguing that 
an independent director with a corporate or financial background is likely to be more familiar with 
the different forms of earnings manipulations. 
 
In this study, the personal details provided in the corporate governance report section of company 
annual reports are scrutinised to establish which, if any, of the audit committee members qualified as 
an expert. 
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Chtourou et al. (2001), Choi et al. (2004), Abbott et al. (2004), and Bédard et al. (2004) show that 
the presence of at least one member with financial expertise sitting on the audit committee is 
negatively related to the level of earnings management.    
 
Yermack (2006) finds share price reactions to be sensitive to directors‟ professional qualifications, 
particularly in the area of accounting and finance, while DeZoort and Salterio (2001) find that 
disputes between the auditor and management are more common when audit committee members 
lack financial expertise.  DeFond et al. (2005) find that the market reacts positively to the 
appointment of a financial expert with prior accounting experience but has no reaction to the 
appointment of a non-accounting financial expert.  Their definition for a non-accounting financial 
expert is a CEO or president of a for-profit corporation.  
 
Consistent with the previous studies, this research measures audit committee competence 
(AUDEXP) using a dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least one independent financial 
expert sits on the audit committee, and zero otherwise. This discussion leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H14: The presence of audit committee financial experts is negatively associated with earnings 
management. 
 
Audit Committee Size 
Some studies, such as those of Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996), 
suggest that the number of members on an audit committee affects its decisions.  Bédard et al. 
(2004) argue that the larger the audit committee, the more likely it is to uncover and resolve 
potential problems in the financial reporting process because it is likely to provide the necessary 
strength and diversity of views and expertise to ensure effective monitoring.  Moreover, Chen and 
Zhou (2007) find that firms with a larger audit committee are more concerned about the auditors‟ 
reputation and tend to assign the Big 4 auditors.  Empirical evidence shows that the Big 4 auditors 
are assigned as higher quality suppliers of auditing services.  Braiotta (2000) explains that the audit 
committee should be large enough to have members with a range of professional judgment and 
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experience but not so large as to be unwieldy.  The audit committee needs considerable director 
resources to deal with the complexity of the accounting and financial matters.  
 
Small audit committees that have only one or two members are seen as weak; it is easy for 
management to put pressure on a small committee to gain its support in any dispute with the auditor.  
However, convincing a larger number of people with different backgrounds may be a more difficult 
task. 
 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2003) recommends that the board should establish an audit 
committee with at least three independent directors.  Empirical studies provide mixed evidence on 
the impact of audit committee size on earnings management.  Xie et al. (2003) and Bédard et al. 
(2004) find no significant association between audit committee size, measured by the number of 
directors on the committee, and earnings management.  Similarly, Abbott et al. (2004) find no 
impact of audit committee size on earnings restatement.  On the other hand, Lin et al. (2006) find 
that audit committee size is negatively related to earnings management, implying that a certain 
minimum number of audit committee members may be relevant to the quality of financial reporting.  
 
This study expects firms that commit more directorial resources to their audit committee (in the 
form of a sizable audit committee) are less prone to management opportunistic behaviour.  In this 
study, audit committee size (AUDSIZE) is calculated simply as the number of members reported by 
the company‟s corporate governance report and it is expected that a larger size will have a negative 
association with EM. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H15: Audit committee size is negatively associated with earnings management. 
 
Audit Committee Meetings 
The establishment of an audit committee is meant to ensure continuous communication between 
external auditors, internal auditors and the board, where the committee meets regularly with the 
auditors to review the financial statements and audit processes as well as the internal accounting 
systems and controls.  
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The frequency of meetings indicates an active audit committee that devotes time to rectifying any 
immediate issues and offers a better review and oversight environment, which, in turn, may assist in 
detecting earnings management. 
 
Earlier studies consider the frequency of audit committee meetings as an indicator of the level of 
diligence exercised by the audit committee members.  Diligent audit committees enhance the level 
of oversight, resulting in improved financial reporting quality.  Klien (2000) supports this argument 
by stating that the audit committee‟s primary function is to oversee the financial reporting process. It 
achieves this goal by meeting regularly with the firm‟s outside auditors and internal financial 
managers to review the corporation‟s financial statements, audit process, and internal accounting 
controls. 
 
The importance of audit committee meetings as a sign of diligence is acknowledged by (The UK 
code, 2003, p.17) Corporate Governance Code that says, “It is recommended there should be not 
fewer than three meetings during the year”. 
 
Xie, et al. (2001) argue that audit committee meeting frequency is associated with reduced levels of 
discretionary current accruals and expect that more active audit committees will be more effective 
monitors.  Beasley et al. (2000) find that firms with fraud records had fewer audit committee 
meetings than those without fraud records.  However, Spira (1999) concludes that audit committees 
meetings are largely ceremonial and that they are largely ineffective in improving financial 
reporting.  
 
As with earlier research, this study uses the number of audit committee meetings (AUDMEET) to 
indicate the level of diligence exercised by its members.  Company corporate governance reports 
disclose the number of meetings held each year by the audit committee.  This discussion leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H16: The number of Audit committee meetings is negatively associated with earnings management. 
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5.3.2.5 External Audit Factors 
Auditor independence (Non-Audit Fees) 
Watts and Zimmerman (1983) define auditor independence as the probability of an auditor reporting 
a discovered breach in the financial reports. This implies that auditor independence is synonymous 
with auditor objectivity and the ability to withstand client pressure to assent to substandard 
reporting.  
 
The contractual relationship between the owner (principal) and the manager (agent) is modelled by 
the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  The auditor is hired by the owner to produce 
information used in contracting with the manager (Antle, 1982; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986).  Thus, 
the auditor is deemed to be an agent and is assumed to behave to maximise expected value, while 
taking investigative acts and rendering reports under conditions of moral hazard.  The moral hazard 
exists because the auditor acquires information about audit quality that is not observable by the 
client (Antle, 1982).  
 
As a result, the auditors could, for example, decide to decrease efforts in carrying out the audit to 
decrease audit costs or give up their independence and accept side-payments from management for 
not reporting truthfully, as the owner expects.  In cases where auditors accept such side-payments, 
their independence is impaired. Consulting services that generate non-audit fees could be used to 
give side-payments a legitimate appearance (Antle, 1984). 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit that managers of companies hire independent auditors to cut 
agency costs.  This view is endorsed by Watts and Zimmerman (1983) who report that about 85% of 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) companies voluntarily hired independent auditors in 1926, 
several years before the Securities Acts mandated external auditing.  Thus, the appointment of 
independent auditors has both theoretical and empirical support as a mechanism to reduce agency 
costs.  
 
However, when auditors perform non-audit services, they are employed by the client. Hence, a 
conflict of interest may arise when the assigned auditor, whose job is to monitor management and 
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their behaviour on behalf of the shareholders, is employed, by the same management he is 
monitoring, to conduct consulting services that generate revenue for the auditor.  Auditors that 
provide consulting services to their audit clients are also actually auditing information that is 
influenced by their recommendations.  Auditors that provide consulting services may also give 
management advice on taxes, depreciation and impairment while, simultaneously, assuring 
shareholders on the integrity of financial statements.  
 
Regulators are concerned about two effects of non-audit services provided by auditors.  First, non-
audit service fees can make auditors financially dependent on their clients.  Regulators believe that 
auditors become financially dependent on their clients if the non-audit services fees are higher than 
the audit fees. Regulators fear that auditors will perceive that the benefits of sacrificing their 
independence in order to retain significant clients outweigh potential costs, such as reputation loss 
and litigation expenses.  As a result of this economic bonding, they are less likely to face 
management pressure for financial misreporting (DeAngelo 1981).   
 
The second effect is the consulting nature of non-audit services, which places auditors in managerial 
roles and, thus, potentially threaten their objectivity about the work they audit (Kida 1980).  The 
relation between the provision of NAS and the auditor independence, both in appearance and in 
mind, is well documented in the previous auditing literature (e.g. Jenkins & Krawczyk, 2002; 
Francis & Ke, 2004; Chien & Chen, 2005; Krishnan et al. 2005; Mishra et al., 2007).  
 
Most of the prior studies report a negative effect of NAS on perceived independence.  Independent 
auditors play an essential role in decreasing managers‟ opportunistic behaviour.  Mautz & Sharaf 
(1961) suggest that, if auditors are not perceived as independent, financial statements are perceived 
as more doubtful and thus social costs are incurred.  Ashbaugh et al. (2003) argue that NAS captures 
the economic dependence of the client and the relative value of NAS in relation to total fees paid to 
the auditor.  Frankel et al. (2002) find that the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees as a measure of 
auditor independence has a positive relationship with discretionary accruals.   
 
Additionally, it is argued that audit fees are more likely to reflect auditing efforts, which in turn 
produce better accrual quality.  Consequently, a positive association between audit fees and accrual 
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quality is expected.  Empirically, several studies have documented a positive relation between audit 
fees and earnings management.  Gul et al. (2003) examine these linkages using 648 Australian 
firms, and their results show that there is a positive association between earnings management and 
audit fees.  Many other previously quoted empirical studies suggest a positive association between 
audit fee and accrual quality (e.g. Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Antle et al., 2006; 
Srinidhi et al., 2007).  
 
The former studies mainly use two measures of audit and non-audit fees, namely. the natural 
logarithm of each set of fees and the ratio of each set of fees to total fees (Frankel et al., 2002; 
Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Ferguson et al., 2004; Reynolds et al., 2004; Huang et al., 2007).  
 
The Companies Act 1989 (Disclosure of Remuneration for Non-audit Work) 1991 Regulations 
requires UK companies (other than small and medium-sized ones) to disclose, in a note to their 
annual accounts, the remuneration paid to their auditors for non-audit work, separately from the 
audit fees.  Therefore, in this study, non-audit fees and audit fees data are collected directly from 
firms‟ annual reports rather than from other electronic sources, such as FAME. This ensures the 
highest accuracy and the highest consistency with this study‟s other corporate governance variables 
collected from the same annual reports. It also facilitates a precise judgment on the complex 
classifications of various types of fees. This discussion leads to the following two hypotheses: 
 
H17:  Higher Non-audit fees are positively associated with earnings management  
H18: Higher Audit fees are negatively associated with earnings management  
 
Audit Quality: Industry Specialised Auditor 
DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the joint probability of the auditor discovering, observing 
and reporting financial statement errors.  As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the use of big 
name auditors as a proxy for auditing quality may need to be reconsidered because the literature 
reveals conflicting results without plausible explanations.   
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Another reason for the need to narrow the audit quality measurement is that the Big 4 audit firms 
now dominate the auditing market.  In this study, using another proxy for audit quality is essential as 
the Big 4 auditors audit more than 98 percent of firms in this research sample, which may destroy 
the statistical reliability of the results.   
 
This study would face a similar problem if it used auditor opinion as an audit quality measurement 
because the study sample includes very few cases of auditors issuing qualified opinions.  There are 
less than ten instances of an auditor issuing an unclean audit report in the sample for the period 
2003-2006.  Thus, testing qualified audit reports as a measure of audit quality is also statistically 
unreliable and is thus rejected for use in this study.  
 
Another measure of audit quality presented in the prior research is auditor rotation.  In this study‟s 
sample, there are 36 cases of firms switching to another auditor, which represents about 8% of the 
sample observations.  This test may be more powerful than the previous measures but it is still not 
very reliable.  However, in this study, this test will be conducted as a sensitivity analysis. 
 
Some studies narrow the audit quality measurement to an auditor‟s industry specialisation and find 
more logical and consistent results (e.g., Craswell et al., 1995 and Beasley and Petroni, 2001).  Prior 
studies use several different proxies to measure auditor industry specialisation because this is not 
directly observable.  Market share is the most frequently used proxy, based on the assumption that 
industry expertise is built by repetition in similar settings.  
 
The market share approach defines an industry specialist as an audit firm that has differentiated 
itself from other audit firms in terms of its market share within a specific industry.  The assumption 
is that the firm with the largest market share has developed the largest knowledge base within that 
particular industry.  Moreover, a significant market share within an industry can reflect a highly 
sophisticated industry-specific audit technology that, in turn, leads to higher audit quality.  Using 
market share as a proxy for auditor industry specialisation represents industry superiority over other 
auditors.  The higher the market share, the more industry expertise the auditor has compared to its 
competitors.  Mayhew and Wilkins (2002) note that having a high market share implies that the 
auditor successfully differentiates itself from its competitors in terms of audit quality. 
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It is reasonable to speculate that an industry specialist auditor (SPAUD) has a positive incremental 
impact on the quality of financial reports relative to a non-specialist auditor.  Previous studies that 
measure the specialised auditor by market share provide support for that view (e.g. Balsam et al., 
2000; Gramling et al., 2000; Carcello and Nagy, 2002). Additional evidence reveals that clients of 
industry-specialist audit firms are ranked higher in terms of disclosure quality by financial analysts 
(Dunn and Mayhew, 2004). 
 
Furthermore, the extended literature provides evidence that clients of non-specialist auditor‟s report 
higher absolute discretionary accruals than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of specialist 
auditors (e.g., Balsam et al. 2003; Krishnan, 2003).  Overall, these studies suggest that both firms 
and users may benefit when firms hire industry specialist auditors because the specialised auditor 
enhances the accounting and auditing quality. 
 
However, using market share as a measure of specialisation has some limitations (Gramling et al., 
2001; Krishnan, 2001). For example, there is ambiguity about whether the advantages of 
specialising in an industry accrue from auditing a large number of clients or a few large clients.  
 
The portfolio share ratio is an alternative to the industry market share ratio.  It is not used in this 
study because it is highly correlated with industry size and it tends to ignore smaller industries (Neal 
and Riley, 2004).  In addition, studies using the portfolio approach tend to lack variation in industry 
expertise when companies are matched on size and industry because industry size is highly 
correlated with this measure (Stanley et al., 2007). 
 
To address these shortcomings, this study uses two proxies to measure auditor industry 
specialisation.  First, similar to prior studies by Balsam et al. (2003), Carcello and Nagy (2004), 
Krishnan (2003),  Dunn and Mayhew (2004) and Lim et al. (2008), industry market share is 
calculated for each audit firm as the revenue from audit clients within a specific industry divided by 
the total revenues of all audited companies within that industry. 
 
The second measure, following Mayhew and Wilkins (2003), is the number of clients in a specific 
industry audited by the same auditor.  For the sake of comprehensiveness, such a base avoids the 
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bias towards large clients that is implied by using sales as the base, as in the previous measure.  
Thus, if the auditor has a number of small clients in the same industry and has developed the 
knowledge base to be a specialist, this is captured by the number-of-clients measure but not by the 
market share measure. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H 19: Firms that are audited by a specialised auditor have less earnings management  
 
5.3.3 Measurement of the Control Variables 
In addition to the independent variables discussed above, a number of control variables are included 
in this study to control for firm characteristics that can influence the extent of EM.  The inclusion of 
non-corporate governance variables to control for other company characteristics that can influence 
the EM is considered fundamental to ensuring that the tests focus more precisely on the differences 
created by variations in corporate governance.  As this study aims to determine whether or not there 
is a relation between both corporate governance attributes and external audit factors and the 
incidence of EM, it is essential that other factors that influence EM are also controlled. 
 
It is difficult to control for some incentives to engage in EM behaviour, such as management style, 
integrity and corporate culture because they are problematic to measure (Archambeault, 2002).  The 
review of prior research determines that, among the various measurable incentives, six variables are 
of particular relevance to this study.  
 
These six control variables are firm size, firm performance, leverage, firm growth, cash flow from 
operations and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  Below, these control variables 
are considered individually, along with the method of measurement for each variable.  However, no 
prediction is made for the coefficient sign.  
 
Firm Size 
Booth et al. (2002) and Peasnell et al. (2005) suggest that internal governance structures are 
substitutable and firms can choose a governance practice that is right for them.  This implies that 
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firms of different size may need different corporate governance structures and that small and large 
firms are not necessarily similar in their corporate governance structures.  
 
Boone et al. (2007) find that, as firms become larger and more diversified, the size of the board 
increases.  Firm size is, therefore, taken as a proxy for the complexity of the firm (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Booth & Deli, 1996).  Dalton et al. (1998) find that board size has a greater impact on small 
firms than on large firms. Similarly, Lehn et al. (2004) find that board size is positively related to 
firm size but negatively related to growth opportunities.   
Thus, the scale and complexity of a large firm can obscure any relationship between board 
characteristics and EM.  As the firm‟s size increases, the agency costs are expected to increase and 
allow for greater managerial discretion and opportunism (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 
In addition, it is argued that larger firms have more potential for earnings management (e.g. Bartov, 
1993).  Watts and Zimmerman (1990) state that larger firms face higher political costs and hence 
have stronger incentives to manage earnings in order to reduce the potential political risk.  Pincus 
and Rajgopal (2002) suggest that large firms have more pressure placed on their management to 
report more predictable earnings.  Lobo and Zhou (2006) note that large firms may have more 
opportunities to manipulate earnings because of the complexity of their operations and the difficulty 
for observers to understand such complex activities 
 
Thus, the size of the firm is likely to affect various characteristics of corporate governance and 
earnings quality.  Hence, in this study, firm size (SIZE) is included as a control variable to examine 
the relationship between both corporate governance characteristics and external audit factors and 
EM.  Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets at the year-end as in many 
previous studies (e.g. Jaggi et al., 2009; Machuga and Teitel, 2009 and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 
2010).  The information required to populate the variable is sourced from DataStream. 
 
Firm Performance 
For the purpose of this study, an accounting based measure is used to control for the firm‟s 
performance by using the return on assets (ROA).  ROA is used in many studies on both EM and 
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corporate governance (e.g. Kothari et al., 2005; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Carter et al., 2003). ROA 
is an indicator of the management‟s ability to efficiently utilise corporate resources (assets) that 
ultimately belong to shareholders.  Furthermore, Carter et al. (2003) find that ROA is highly 
significant in explaining Tobin‟s Q and the firm‟s value.  Thus, ROA can be considered as a robust 
measure of firm performance. 
 
In this study, following Ashbaugh, et al. (2003), ROA is calculated as net income divided by the 
total assets at the beginning of the testing period. The information required to populate the variable 
is sourced from DataStream. 
 
Firm Leverage 
Leverage represents the debt structure of a company and is used in numerous studies to proxy for a 
debt covenant violation (Efendi et al., 2007; Erickson et al., 2004 and Elayan, et al. 2008).  
Leverage is found to be positively correlated with EM practice, as understating liabilities or 
overstating assets may be used to avoid debt covenant violations.  Efendi et al. (2007) suggest that 
when a firm is close to default on accounting-based debt covenants, the management may mis-state 
the accounting numbers to avoid the consequences of default. 
 
Other studies, such as those of Dechow et al. (1996), Richardson, Tuna, & Wu (2002) and Person 
(2005) link leverage with EM, financial restatements and fraud respectively.  Jiang et al. (2008) 
suggests that leverage changes may have differing impacts on earnings management.  DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994) present evidence that managers of highly leveraged firms have incentives to make 
income increasing discretionary accruals to avoid a debt covenant violation.  
 
However, Becker et al. (1998) find that leverage is negatively associated with the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals.  These studies indicate that increased leverage may provide an incentive that 
fosters EM.  In the literature on corporate governance and EM, leverage is widely used as a control 
variable (e.g. Becker et al., 1998; DeAngelo et al., 1994; Gul and Tsui, 2001; Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996; Jelinek, 2007; Jiang et al., 2008 and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 2010).   
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Taking the above into account, this study considers that the incentive to manage earnings with the 
aim to avoid a debt covenant violation needs to be controlled by including a variable that measures 
leverage.  Following these prior studies, debt reliance is represented by the level of leverage.  
Leverage (LEV) is calculated as total long-term debt divided by total assets.  The information 
required to populate the variable is sourced from DataStream. 
 
Firm Growth 
Consistent with a number of earlier studies (Carcello et al., 2004; Abbott et al., 2004; Abbott et al., 
2000; Beasley, 1996 and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 2010), this study controls for the effect of 
company growth.  It is essential to control for a firm‟s pace of development because, in times of 
rapid growth, a company may experience pressure to maintain or exceed anticipated growth rates.  
The pressure to achieve a targeted rate of growth, or alternatively to mask downturns, may create an 
incentive for management to engage in EM (Carcello et al. 2004). 
 
Skinner and Sloan (2002) find evidence that growth stocks have significantly greater negative 
market responses to earnings disappointments than do value stocks.   This result implies that growth 
firms have greater incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises. 
 
Furthermore, Matsumoto (2002) documents that a rapidly growing firm is more likely to manage 
earnings.  Among other studies that find growth is related to EM are those of Abdularahman and Ali 
(2006); Huang et al. (2008) and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010).  
 
Based on  Myers‟ (1977) and Gaver et al., (1995) definition of growth opportunities as the 
difference between a firm‟s value and existing assets, this study measures growth (GROWTH) as 
the market-to-book assets ratio (MTB).  MTB utilises the market value of assets as a proxy for a 
firm‟s value and the book value of assets as a proxy for existing assets.  A higher MTB represents 
greater growth opportunities.  The information required to populate the variable is sourced from 
DataStream. 
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Cash Flows from Operating Activities (CFO) 
This study also controls for the effect of cash flows from operating activities (CFO) to capture 
performance differences across firms in different industries and to control for the effect of economic 
activity on earnings management.  Another reason to use CFO is to control for the association 
between abnormal accruals and operating cash flows.  
 
Jiang et al. (2008), Lobo and Zhou (2006) and Becker et al. (1998) note that firms with a strong 
operating cash flow performance are less likely to manage discretionary accruals upwards because 
they are already performing well. Conversely, firms with a low operating cash flow are more likely 
to manage discretionary accruals downwards.  Dechow et al. (1995) shows that CFO influences the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals, and higher CFOs are associated with lower discretionary 
accruals.   
 
Consistent with prior research, such as that of Peasnell et al. (2005), this study defines CFO as cash 
flows from operating activities divided by total assets at the beginning of the period.  The 
information required to populate the variable is sourced from DataStream. 
 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
Since 2005, almost all publicly listed companies in Europe are required to prepare financial 
statements in accordance with IFRS (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002). This study sample covers the 
period from 2003 to 2006; hence, firms that reported in 2003 and 2004 are considered pre-IFRS 
firms, whereas firms that reported in 2005 and 2006 are considered post-IFRS firms.  IFRS has had 
a large affect on company measurement and reporting methods, as documented by previous 
research.  
 
Ball et al. (2000) show that the impact of accounting standards on the valuation of assets and 
liabilities and the recognition of costs and revenues still differs widely across countries.  Moreover, 
IFRS adoption tends to increase the firm‟s market liquidity decrease its cost of capital and increase 
its equity valuation (Daske et al., 2008). Undoubtedly, this has a direct impact on earnings 
management.   
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Chen et al. (2001) compare reported earnings under Chinese GAAP with IFRS and conclude that 
reported earnings under Chinese GAAP are 20-30 percent larger than the restated earnings under 
IFRS.  Comparing the German GAAP with IFRS, Zimmerman and Gontcharov (2001) find that the 
level of earnings management is broadly the same. No study has compared the difference in 
earnings management between UK GAAP and IFRS; therefore this study will examine this issue. 
Barth et al. (2008) compare characteristics of accounting amounts for firms that adopt International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) to a matched sample of firms that do not, for a number of different 
countries.  They find that in the post-adoption period, adopting firms show less earnings 
management, which suggests that firms applying IFRS generally exhibit an improvement in 
accounting quality between the pre- and post-adoption periods in terms of earnings management.  
 
Dye (1993) finds that rigid accounting standards increase managers‟ ability to manipulate the 
accounts opportunistically and thus weaken the effectiveness of this type of standard.  Ewert and 
Wagenhofer (2005) support this argument by finding that tighter accounting standards can increase 
rather than decrease the total earnings management.  Similar results are documented by Nelson et al. 
(2002).  They conduct a survey based study for more than 250 audit partners, investigating their 
experience with more than 500 earnings management attempts by their clients. They find a positive 
association between the precision of accounting rules and the structuring of transactions by a firm‟s 
managers.  The structuring of transactions required by rigid accounting standards allows managers 
to violate specific provisions in some accounting standards.  
 
Goodwin et al. (2009) examine whether a firm‟s corporate governance system affects how 
accurately the impact of accounting changes is reported to shareholders.  They particularly focus on 
the relation between corporate governance measures and accounting forecast errors that arise with 
the adoption of IFRS by listed Australian firms.  They reveal evidence that corporate governance 
mechanisms are associated with the likelihood and magnitude of managerial forecast errors. 
 
Moreover, Duh et al. (2009) examine whether the International Accounting Standards (IAS) No. 36 
“Impairment of Assets”, which allows reversals of asset impairment losses, provides an opportunity 
for earnings management and whether a corporate governance mechanism can mitigate this 
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behaviour.  Their results show that firms avoid an earnings decline in a subsequent period.  They 
also find that an effective corporate governance mechanism could mitigate such behaviour.  
 
The previous studies support the argument that the relation between EM and corporate governance 
can be affected by the introduction of IFRS.  Therefore, this study introduces a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if a firm uses IFRS, and zero otherwise. 
 
5.4 Empirical Research Models 
This research utilises two models to test the research hypotheses.  There are several reasons that 
support this division.  Firstly, the correlation coefficient associated with the independent variables 
BRDIND and AUDIND in one side and AUDIND and NOMIND in the other side is more than 
75%, which indicates that multicollinearity can be a problem if all variables are included in the same 
model.  This multicollinearity problem is common in this kind of research and many studies control 
it using different means. Examples of studies that find a high correlation between corporate 
governance variables are Klein (2002a), Xie, et al. (2003), Ramsay et al. (2006) and Benkel et al. 
(2006). 
  
As pointed out by Baum (2006), one way to solve this issue is to omit the collinear variables from 
the regression.  Thus, to mitigate the multicollinearity problem, two models are established here 
following Xie et al.(2003) and Ramsay et al. (2006): one without audit committee variables (the 
board model) and one  with the audit committee and external audit variables (the audit model), as in 
many recent studies, such as those of Lin et al. (2006); Lei (2007); Rainsbury et al. (2009) and 
Baxter and Cotter (2009).   
 
Another reason for separating this study into two models is that some corporate governance research 
has argued that various governance mechanisms can substitute one another (Carcello et al., 2002; 
Rediker and Sith, 1995; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996 and Boo and Sharma, 2008).  
 
Carcello et al. (2002) investigate the relationship between corporate governance and audit fees.  
They replace the board of directors‟ attributes with audit committee‟ attributes (i.e. size, meetings 
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and expertise).  Their results confirm a positive relationship between audit committee independence 
and audit committee expertise and audit fees.   
 
On the other hand, previous studies of the interaction between audit committee attributes and 
external audit services often assume that they are complementary, and that improved governance is 
associated with higher audit fees, although the evidence for this is inconclusive.  Hay et al. (2008) 
revisit this issue and examine whether the „substitution‟ or „complementary controls‟ views apply. 
They find that measures of internal auditing, corporate governance, and concentration of ownership 
are all positively related to audit fees, consistent with the complementary explanation. 
 
Therefore, to avoid the potential substitution problem that may exist between boards of directors 
attributes and audit committee attributes, this study constructs a separate model for each set of 
attributes.  
 
Finally, by separating this study into two models, it is possible to investigate the affect of the audit 
function on earnings management separately from the effect of board composition and ownership 
structures.  The second model will study both audit committee characteristics that represent the 
internal governance mechanisms and external auditor independence and quality, which represent the 
external audit mechanisms.  This approach is used by some recent studies, such as those of Lin et al. 
(2006), Lei (2007), Rainsbury et al. (2009) and Baxter and Cotter (2009).  Therefore, the empirical 
models with the main variables of this study‟s tests are formed as follows. Details of all the 
variables and their alternative measures are presented in table 5.6 at the end of this chapter.  
 
First Empirical Model: 
DACj = γ 0 + γ1 BRDIND jt + γ 2 BRDSIZE jt + γ 3 BRDMEET jt + γ 4 CHAIRCODjt + γ 5 CHAIRIND jt 
+ γ 6 WOMEN jt + γ 7 NOMIND jt + γ 8 REMUIND jt + γ 9 NEDMEET jt + γ 10 NEDFEE jt + γ 11 
MANGOWN jt + γ 12 INSTOWN jt + γ 13 BLOCK jt + γ 14 IFRS jt + γ 15SIZE jt +γ 16 LEV jt + γ 17 
GROWTH jt + γ 18 CFO jt + γ 19 ROA jt  
  
DAC Absolute value of the discretionary accruals estimated by the Kaothari, et 
al. (2005) model. 
 
Board Composition: 
BRDIND The proportion of independent non-executive directors to total board 
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members. 
BRDSIZE The number of directors in the board. 
BRDMEET The number of board meetings held annually by the board of directors. 
CHAIRCOD A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the chairman is 
independent according to the chairman independence criteria 
recommended by the Code, and zero otherwise. 
CHAIRIND A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the chairman is 
independent according to the NEDs independence criteria recommended 
by the Code, and zero otherwise. 
WOMEN The percentage of female directors to total board members. 
NOMIND The proportion of independent non-executive directors in the nomination 
committee to total committee members. 
REMUIND A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the remuneration 
committee is composed entirely of independent directors, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
NEDs’ Commitment: 
NEDMEET A dummy variable that takes the value of one if NEDs meet with 
chairman without the presence of the executive directors, and zero 
otherwise. 
NEDFEE Total fees paid to NEDs divided by the total number of NEDs.  
 
 Ownership Structures: 
MANGOWN The percentage of total shares held by executive directors divided by the 
total number of shares.  
INSTOWN The average percentage of shares outstanding owned by institutional 
investors: 
BLOCK A dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm has an external 
stockholder owning 10% or more of the outstanding shares, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Control Variables: 
LEV Total long-term debt divided by total assets. 
GROWTH Market-to-book ratio. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets at year-end. 
CFO Cash flows from operating activities divided by beginning of period total 
assets. 
ROA Net income divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year. 
IFRS A dummy variable that take the value of one if a firm uses IFRS, and 
zero otherwise. 
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Second Empirical Model: 
 
DACj = γ 0 + γ1 NAF jt + γ 2 AF jt + γ 3 SPEAUD jt + γ 4 AUDSIZE jt + γ 5 AUDMEET jt + γ 6 AUDIND 
jtj + γ 7 AUDEXP jt + γ 8  MANGOWN jt + γ 9 IFRS jt + γ 10 SIZE jt +γ 11  LEV jt + γ 12  GROWTH jt 
+ γ 13 CFO jt + γ 14 ROA jt  
 
DAC Absolute value of the discretionary accruals estimated by the Kaothari et 
al. (2005) model. 
 
External Auditor Factors: 
NAF The natural logarithm of non-audit fees  
AF The natural logarithm of audit fees 
SPEAUD A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm is audited by a 
specialised auditor, and zero otherwise. 
 
Audit Committee Characteristics: 
AUDSIZE The total number of members on the audit committee. 
AUDMEET The yearly number of audit committee meetings. 
AUDIND The proportion of independent non-executive directors in the audit 
committee to total committee members.   
AUDEXP A dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least one independent 
financial expert sits in the audit committee, and zero otherwise. 
 
Control Variables: 
MANGOWN The percentage of total shares held by executive directors divided by the 
total number of shares. 
LEV Total long-term debt divided by total assets. 
GROWTH Market-to-book ratio. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets at year-end. 
CFO Cash flows from operating activities divided by beginning of period total 
assets. 
ROA Net income divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year. 
IFRS A dummy variable that take the value of one if a firm uses IFRS, and 
zero otherwise. 
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5.5 Sample Selection and Data Collection Procedures  
5.5.1 Sample Selection 
This study covers four years of reporting periods from November 2003 to December 2006. There 
are several reasons for this choice.  Firstly, this study uses The UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2003) as a guide for corporate governance variables and this Code has been effective since 
November 2003. Secondly, the introduction of the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) in 2005 makes it possible to compare the effect of these standards on the quality of financial 
reporting by comparing the pre-IFRS period that covers years 2003 and 2004 with the post-IFRS 
period that covers years 2005 and 2006.  Thirdly, due to the large amount of data that has to be 
hand-collected for the corporate governance variables, limiting the study period to four years makes 
that task viable. 
 
The initial sample for this study is the FTSE 350 Index, which is the top 350 UK listed firms by 
total market capitalisation.  Targeting the FTSE 350 firms ensures both statistical power in the tests 
and maximum data availability. Furthermore, all FTSE 350 firms implement corporate governance 
mechanisms recommended by the UK Corporate Governance Code (2003) to the same level, 
whereas medium and small firms have a lower level of corporate governance recommendations.  For 
instance, (the UK Code, 2003, p.9) states that “The board should establish an audit committee of at 
least three, or in the case of smaller companies, two members, who should all be independent non-
executive directors”.  
 
Financial, regulated and mining industries (see table 5.1) are then excluded from the initial sample.  
The reasons for excluding these industries are as follows. 
 
Compared to other industries, regulated industries have an incentive to adopt conservative 
accounting practices and to defer income recognition because their revenues are set on fixed 
accounting rates of return.  Therefore, capturing management‟s opportunistic manipulations is 
difficult.  Financial companies are omitted because their special accounting practices mean that the 
discretionary accruals model does not apply to them, as illustrated in previous empirical studies (e.g. 
Peasnell et al., 2000b; Chtourou et al., 2008).  Companies in the mining industry are excluded 
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because of their different practice of income recognition and because the market value of mining 
firms differs from that of other firms as it includes other major factors, such as the value of any real 
operating options (Brennan and Schwartz, 1985). 
 
               Table 5.1 Sample size and selection procedures for the study period. 
Description 2003 2004 2005 2006 Pooled 
 
Initial sample (FTSE 350) 
 
283 
 
350 
 
350 
 
350 
 
1333 
Excluded:       
Financial, insurance and investment companies (46) (64) (66) (69) (244) 
Mining and regulated companies (19) (21) (21) (22) (83) 
Missing annual reports or shorter than 12 months fiscal y (28) (22) (17) (11) (78) 
Missing corporate governance data (65) (54) (46) (40) (205) 
Missing DataStream information (37) (29) (24) (21) (112) 
Industries smaller than 6 firms  (31) (21) (26) (20) (98) 
Outliers  (9) (11) (9) (13) (42) 
Final sample for first model    
Missing audit fees data 
Final sample for second model        
48 
(8) 
40 
128 
 (6) 
122 
141 
(6) 
135 
154 
(3) 
151 
471 
(23) 
448 
 
 
This study includes industries with sufficient firm observations to ensure unbiased estimation.  
Therefore, industry groups with less than six observations are also excluded from the sample, 
following prior research (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996a). 
 
Moreover, extreme outliers are dropped from the sample due to the regression sensitivity to them.  
Firms with extreme values for earnings management are not excluded from the sample as outliers 
because these are potentially the observations that represent large negative accruals (e.g., big bath), 
or large positive accruals, which may actually represent management discretion. If extreme 
discretionary accrual observations were deleted, it may eliminate the firms that practise earnings 
management, which is the focus of this study.  However, following Li (2007), the observations in 
the top and bottom 0.5 percent of the distribution of some variables such as operating income, total 
assets and cash flow from operations are deleted to mitigate the effects of outliers. 
 
Missing corporate governance variables are mainly due to the lack of disclosure by some of the 
sample firms of both non-executive directors meetings and information about chairman 
independence. 
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The final usable sample is 471 firm years for the first model.  Then, some firms were also excluded 
because they do not provide clear details of audit and non-audit fees.  Thus, the final usable sample 
for the second model is 448 firm years. 
 
Table 5.2 indicates that the firms are normally distributed from an industry perspective.  The 
Construction & Building Materials, Restaurants Pubs & Breweries and Media & Photography 
industries, collectively, account for one third of the sample.  The other thirteen industries each 
represent from 4% to 8% of the total sample. 
 
It should be noted that, in order to calculate earnings management accurately, industries that contain 
less than six firms are excluded, except in cases where such an industry shares some characteristics 
with another industry. In those cases, this research combines the two industries under the name of 
the larger industry.  For example, the Travel & Leisure industry is combined with the Leisure, 
Entertainment & Hotels industry; the Food & Drug Retailers industry is combined with the General 
Retailers industry. 
 
 
5.5.2 Data Collection 
Data on corporate governance variables is hand collected from the 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 
annual reports for each firm (source: Northcote).  The process involves an examination of the 
directors‟ profiles and the corporate governance report to identify the independence and the activity 
of the board subcommittees and their members. 
 
Audit independence and quality data are also collected from each firm‟s annual reports to ensure the 
maximum accuracy and comparability with corporate governance data. Earnings management is 
calculated based on data collected from the DataStream. Data for the control variables group are 
also collected from the DataStream. 
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5.6 Analytical Procedures 
This section will discuss the statistical methods employed for data analysis.  The statistical methods 
for analysing data are classified into two broad categories: one is parametric and the other is non-
parametric.  In general, the nature and characteristics of the study data will determine which method 
should be used.  
 
Gujarati (2003) suggests four critical assumptions that must be met before utilising parametric tests: 
1) Assumption of normality.  Under this assumption, samples must be drawn from normally 
distributed populations.  A normal distribution is an idealised sample which is based on a population 
of an infinite number of cases and which takes the form of a bell or an inverted-U. 
 
2) Assumption of Linearity.  This assumption suggests that the model should have linear parameters. 
Table 5.2 
 
             Industry Distribution of the Sample  
        First Model                            Second Model 
Industry group  Number  Percentage Number  Percentage 
Aerospace & Defence 28 0.06 26 0.06 
Business Support Services 20 0.04 20 0.04 
Chemicals 19 0.04 17 0.04 
Computer Software & Services 23 0.05 20 0.04 
Construction & Building Materials 44 0.10 41 0.09 
Distributors 26 0.06 24 0.05 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 27 0.06 26 0.06 
Engineering & Machinery 19 0.04 19 0.04 
Food Producers & Processors 24 0.05 21 0.05 
General Retailers 35 0.08 31 0.07 
Health 18 0.04 18 0.04 
Leisure Entertainment & Hotels 31 0.07 31 0.07 
Media & Photography 39 0.09 37 0.08 
Support Services 33 0.07 33 0.07 
Transport 17 0.04 17 0.04 
Restaurants Pubs & Breweries 43 0.10 42 0.09 
Total  471 100% 448 100% 
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3) Assumption of homoscedasticity.  This assumption requires the variance or standard deviation of 
the dependent variable within the group to be equal. 
 
4) Assumption of independence of error terms.  Under this assumption the error terms are 
independent from one another and therefore no serial correlation exists. 
  
In general, parametric tests are more powerful when all assumptions are met and when the variables 
under analysis are measured on at least an interval scale (Judge et al. 1985).  However, if any of the 
previously mentioned assumptions are violated by the nature of data; non-parametric tests become 
more appropriate (Balian, 1982).  
 
According to Judge et al. (1985), non-parametric statistical techniques can be considered as an 
alternative to the parametric techniques to avoid the need for making numerous assumptions, as is 
the case with parametric techniques.  Non-parametric methods are deemed to be distribution free 
since they make no assumption with regard to the distribution of scores in the population.  Also, 
non-parametric techniques do not require the measurement of data on an interval scale and do not 
require data to meet the stringent assumption of the normality and homogeneity of variance required 
by the parametric method.  
 
Therefore, the assumptions of the parametric tests will be tested in the next chapter using Skewness-
Kurtosis to check for the normality assumption, as suggested by Mark (2008). To test the 
homosedasticity assumption, the most common test is used, namely, visual inspection of the 
residuals.  According to Mark (2008) the residuals are plotted in a graph against the independent 
variable that is suspected of causing the problem of heteroscedasticity.  If the magnitude of the 
residuals seems to be related to the value of the independent variable, then there is a high possibility 
of heteroscedasticity.  A numerical test of linearity (White, 1980) will also be conducted using 
STATA.  
 
Finally, to test for multicollinearity, this study applies correlation coefficient and variance inflation 
factors (VIF) tests.  The tolerance factor and variance inflation factor of each corporate governance 
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and external audit variables are calculated.  A tolerance factor close to 0, and a value of the variance 
inflation factor greater than 10, shows the presence of multicollinearity in the models.  Hair et al. 
(1998) and. Kennedy (2008) suggests that a VIF of more than 10 indicates harmful multicollinearity. 
 
Given the above discussion, the previous various tests are conducted to test the data against the OLS 
assumptions.  Non-parametric tests are adopted in this study to analyse the data.  This is because the 
data of this study does not meet the conditions required for the parametric tests, as will be illustrated 
in the next chapter. 
 
Under the violation of normality, OLS estimates are inefficient (Greene, 2007). The estimated 
standard errors are biased and inconsistent and, thus, the results‟ test statistics are biased and 
inconsistent (Baltagi, 2001; Greene, 2007).  Provided that coefficients are constant over time, 
estimating using pooled regression becomes more efficient.  Also pooled estimation is a simple way 
to examine the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications (Beaver, 1998). The primary 
advantage of a pooled regression over a cross-section is that it allows for greater flexibility in 
modelling differences in sample specific behaviour (Greene, 2007).   
 
Another reason for the preference of a GLS regression over pooled OLS regression is due to the 
important assumptions of homoscedasticity and no serial correlation in pooled OLS (Greene, 2007).  
For the estimator to be considered consistent and unbiased, pooled OLS requires the errors in each 
time period to be uncorrelated with the independent variables in the same time period.  A GLS 
regression has the additional advantage that it corrects for the omitted variable bias, and the 
presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in pooled time series data.   
 
In such circumstances, this research applies the pooled GLS (random effect) regression over the 
four-year test period.  This methodology allows for the examination for variations among cross-
sectional units simultaneously with variations within individual units over time (Baum, 2006).   It 
assumes that regression parameters do not differ between various cross-sectional units and do not 
change over time, which strengthens the reliability of the coefficient estimates. 
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Random-effect versus Fixed-effect 
There are two basic approaches used to account for relationships within or between each cross-
section (Baltagi, 2001).  First, the least squares dummy variable (fixed effect) approach assumes that 
the individual constant is a group specific constant term in the regression model.  Second, the 
generalised least squares (random effect) approach assumes that the individual constant is a group 
specific disturbance similar to the error term, except for each group (Greene, 2007). There is a trade-
off between the efficiency of the random effect approach and the consistency of the fixed effect 
approach. 
 
A common practice in economic research is to make the choice between both approaches based on 
the Hausman (1978) test.  The Hausman specification test facilitates to the differentiation between 
random and fixed effects models by testing for correlation between the x variables and the 
individual random effects εi. Hausman test check for strict exogeneity. If no correlation is found, 
random effects should be employed but if correlation exists, fixed-effects should be employed. 
Thus, an essential assumption for selecting the random-effect estimation is that the unobserved 
heterogeneity should not be correlated with the independent variables.  
 
In this study, following McKnight and Weir (2009) the Hausman test is used to check this 
assumption and to test the appropriateness of using the random-effects estimation. The insignificant 
result obtained from the Hausman test χ2 of 14.04 (p = 0.27) shows that the assumptions for the 
random effects estimation are not violated. 
 
Despite the Hausman test, Johnston and DiNardo (1997, as cited in Gujarati and Porter, 2009), state 
that there is no simple role to navigate past the Scylla of fixed-effects and the Charybdis of 
measurement errors and dynamic selection; panel data does not offer a cure-all for an 
econometrician‟s problems.  Nevertheless, for this study, the random effect approach is selected as a 
superior approach, based on the Hausman test and the following reasons. 
 
Greene (2007) argues that the fixed effect approach may only be relevant to the cross-sectional firms 
in the tested sample and cannot be generalised outside that sample.  In addition, Greene (2007) 
                   
 
                 
196 
 
suggests that when the cross-sectional firms sample is drawn from a large population, the individual 
specific constant terms can be viewed as randomly distributed across cross-sectional firms.  In this 
study, the sample is drawn from a large population that consists of the UK FTSE 350 Index firms 
over four years, so Greene‟s view may apply. 
 
Judge et al. (1985) argue that, when the number of time series data is small and the number of cross-
sectional units is large, the statistical inference is conditional on the observed cross–sectional units 
in the sample.  Hence, the choice of the random effect approach is preferable.  This study covers 
four years of time series data and has a relatively large number of cross-sectional units, which make 
the random effect approach more appropriate.  Moreover, the fixed effects approach uses a dummy 
variable to identify firms. This, in turn, would result in a large number of parameters relative to the 
number of observations.  Thus, the power of the model would be weakened due to the loss of 
degrees of freedom. 
 
Therefore, a pooled cross-sectional GLS (random effects) model is used to test the proposed 
relationships.  Statistical analysis of the data is then performed using the computer programme, 
STATA.  This package provides a platform where both univariate and multivariate testing methods 
can be applied to the research design utilised by this study.  
 
In general, the major statistical techniques used in this part of the study are descriptive analysis of 
the data, which includes the analysis of the overall mean scores, standard deviations, median, 
minimum and maximum and for each individual variable; and  the univariate means differences test 
and the non-parametric pooled GLS (random effect) regression test, which test for the existence of a 
relationship between earnings management and attributes of corporate governance and external audit 
factors. 
 
5.7 Summary 
Selecting the appropriate research methodology and data collection techniques is a very critical 
stage in conducting any research project because they ensure that the research goals will be 
achieved.   This chapter has provided a detailed description of the steps taken to prepare for the 
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analysis phase of this study.  These steps include illustrations of EM measurement, the measurement 
of the independent and control variables, the sampling process and data collection issues, the 
research design, and the selection of the appropriate analytical methods. The chapter also provides 
information about what issues were considered when implementing each step.   
 
To summarise the methodology described in this chapter, this research uses corporate disclosure 
data collected from annual reports and DataStream to empirically test indicators of corporate 
governance, external audit factors and earnings management. Firms in the FTSE 350 index is the 
initial sample selected for this study and the 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 financial years comprise the 
period used to apply the study.  Then, financial, mining and regulated industries are excluded from 
the sample due to the different nature of their accounting practices.  This research will adopt the 
positivism approach and due to the independence of corporate governance factors over time, a cross-
sectional approach is applied to test the hypotheses, and models are tested using pooled GLS 
regression. 
 
The following Results and Discussion chapter presents the results of the tests selected to analyse the 
data gathered according to the steps described in this chapter.   The summary of the variables and 
their measurement is presented in table 5.3 below. 
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Table (5.3) Summary of variables and their measurements 
 
Symbol Variable Operationalisation 
EM Earnings management 
Absolute value of the discretionary accruals estimated by the 
Kaothari et al. (2005) model. 
BRDSIZE Board size The number of directors on the board. 
BRDIND Board independence 
The proportion of independent non-executive directors to total 
board members. 
BRDMEET Board meetings 
The number of board meetings held annually by the board of 
directors. 
CHAIRIND 
Chairman 
independence 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the chairman 
is independent according to the NEDs independence criteria 
recommended by the Code, and zero otherwise. 
CHAIRCOD 
Chairman 
independence 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the chairman 
is independent according to the chairman independence 
criteria recommended by the code, and zero otherwise.  
WOMEN Gender diversity The percentage of female directors to total board members. 
NOMIND 
Nomination committee 
independence 
The proportion of independent non-executive directors on the 
nomination committee to total committee members. 
REMUIND 
Remuneration 
committee 
independence 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
remuneration committee is composed entirely of independent 
directors, and zero otherwise. 
NEDMEET 
Non-executive 
directors private 
meetings 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if NEDs meet 
with chairman without the presence of the executive directors, 
and zero otherwise. 
NEDFEE NEDs fees Total fees paid to NEDs divided by the total number of NEDs. 
AUDIND 
Audit committee 
independence 
The proportion of independent non-executive directors in the 
audit committee to total committee members.   
AUDEXP 
Audit committee 
competence 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least one 
independent financial expert sits in the audit committee, and 
zero otherwise. 
AUDSIZE Audit committee size  The total number of members on the audit committee. 
AUDMEET 
Audit committee 
meetings 
The yearly number of audit committee meetings. 
MANGOWN 
Management 
ownership 
The percentage of total shares held by executive directors 
divided by the total number of shares. 
INSTOWN Institutional ownership 
The average percentage of shares outstanding owned by 
institutional investors 
BLOCK 
Blockholder 
ownership  
A dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm has an 
external stockholder owning 10% or more of the outstanding 
shares, and zero otherwise. 
NAF1 Non-audit fees The natural logarithm of non-audit fees  
NAF2 Non-audit fees Ratio of non-audit fees to total fees 
AF1 Audit fees The natural logarithm of audit fees 
AF2 Audit fees Ratio of audit fees to total fees 
SPEAUD1 Specialised auditor 
The revenue of audit firm‟s clients within a specific industry 
divided by the total revenues of all audited companies within 
that industry. 
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SPEAUD2 Specialised auditor 
The number of clients in a specific industry audited by the 
same auditor 
LEV Leverage Total long-term debt divided by total assets. 
GROWTH Growth Market-to-book assets ratio 
SIZE Size The natural logarithm of total assets at year-end 
CFO CFO 
Cash flows from operating activities divided by beginning of 
period total assets. 
ROA Performance Net income divided by the total assets at the end of the year. 
IFRS IFRS 
A dummy variable that take the value of one if a firm uses 
IFRS, and zero otherwise. 
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Chapter Six 
Data Analysis and Discussion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the data analysis based on the research methods detailed in the 
previous chapter.  Tests are performed with the objective of providing empirical evidence to answer 
the primary research question: 
 “Do corporate governance and external audit constrain earnings management practice in the 
UK?”  
 In this chapter, the 19 hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter are tested using both of the 
empirical research models adopted for this research.  Section 6.2 illustrates the development of the 
variables for discretionary accruals.  Section 6.3 presents and discusses the descriptive statistics and 
univariate analysis.  Section 6.4 presents and discusses the correlation coefficients.  Section 6.5 
illustrates and discusses the results of testing the hypotheses.  Section 6.6 presents and discusses 
further analysis and the robustness checks.  Section 6.7 summarises the analysis and the findings. 
 
6.2 Earnings Management (Discretionary Accruals) 
As discussed in the chapter five, the present study uses discretionary accruals as a measure of 
earnings management. Discretionary accruals (DAC) are defined as the difference between total 
accruals and non-discretionary accruals, where discretionary accruals are estimated using the 
Kothari et al (2005) model as follows:  
 
TA it = ά (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it   - Δ REC it) / TA it -1 +  β 2    (PPE it / TA it -1) +   β 3   ROA it -1 + ε it                       
 
TA = Total accruals, A = Beginning of year total assets, ΔREV = Change in net revenue, ΔREC= 
Change in account receivables, PPE = Gross Property, plant, and equipment, ROA= Lagged return 
on assets. 
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Absolute discretionary accruals are used as the magnitude of the deviation of reported earnings 
rather than the direction of EM. Table 6-3 presents the descriptive statistics for the estimated 
coefficients of the earnings management model during the period 2003-2006. 
 
To estimate the coefficients of the above accruals model, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is 
used to estimate the equation by industry for each year.  The resulting model from the above 
equation is then used to calculate discretionary accruals through the difference between total 
accruals and non-discretionary accruals for each firm.  The calculation of total accruals covers 16 
industries over four financial years.  
 
Table 6.1 
Descriptive Statistics for EM Model Coefficients 
Parameter Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
ά 790.4 -1727.6 -24093.2 92521.5 
β1 0.059 -0.004 -0.441 0.210 
β 2 -0.082 -0.075 -0.707 0.178 
β 3    -0.423 -0.380 -0.726 0.180 
 
 
In order to assess the ability of this study‟s earnings management model to discriminate between 
discretionary and non-discretionary accruals, table 6.1 provides a summary of the statistical 
properties of the model‟s coefficients.  Consistent with expectations, the sign of the property, plant, 
and equipment (PPE) variable is negative because it represents an income-decreasing accrual (i.e., 
depreciation and amortisation expense).  
 
The ˆβ1 coefficient (change in revenues) is, on average, positive. However, the sign of the change in 
revenues coefficient is not as direct as the PPE variable.  This is because a change in revenues can 
result in income-increasing or income-decreasing changes in some working capital accounts. For 
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instance, increases in accounts receivable cause income-increasing changes and increases in 
accounts payable cause income-decreasing changes.  From table 6.1, the mean of the revenue 
coefficient shows that income-increasing dominates the sign of the change in the revenues variable. 
 
Moreover, the model is significant at the level of 1%.  The Kothari et al. (2005) model has an 
explanatory power of 57 %.  Therefore, it appears that the model is well specified and produces 
credible estimates for separating total accruals into their discretionary and non-discretionary 
components.  (Bernard and Skinner, 1996 and Davidson et al., 2005). 
 
6.3 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analyses 
The descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in table 6.2 for the first model and in table 
6.3 for the second model.  Each table separates the variables based on the level of discretionary 
accruals into low and high discretionary accruals based on whether the firm‟s level of discretionary 
accruals is lower or higher than the yearly cross-sectional median.  
 
Separating firms into two groups based on the indicator of earnings management enables an 
investigation of whether corporate governance attributes are more effective when managers have 
incentives to manage earnings and it is also expected to provide more information on the 
characteristics of the firm (i.e. size, performance and growth).  The following section will discuss 
the descriptive statistics and the univariate tests.  Although the data is considered to be non-
parametric, both parametric (t-test) and non-parametric (Mann Whitney test) tests are applied as a 
mean of robustness. 
 
6.3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analyses for the First Model 
The descriptive statistics of discretionary accruals (DAC) in the first model, as presented in table 
6.2, show that the absolute value of DAC for the companies in this study sample has a small mean 
value of 0.05, whereas the minimum value is much closer to 0 (0.0001).  These findings are 
consistent with Klein (2002b) who obtains a minimum value of absolute DAC among large US 
firms of 0.00002.  However, the mean of absolute DAC among US companies in Xie et al. (2003) 
study is higher at 0.10.  Othman and Zeghal (2006) report closer means of absolute DAC among 
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Canadian and French companies of 0.06 and 0.03, respectively. Additionally, the importance of 
discretionary accruals rests with the assumption that discretionary accruals represent managers‟ 
discretion over accruals. This assumption is partly validated by the significant difference between 
DAC means. 
 
This study sample shows low and high percentages of independence in both boards of directors and 
nomination committees, at around 44% and 69%, respectively.  However, 75% of the sample firms 
have fully independent remuneration committee rather than the 100% independence level 
recommended by the Code.  These statistics show a relatively high compliance rate with the UK 
corporate governance recommendations on boards‟ and nomination committees‟ independence but 
not with the remuneration committee independence recommendation.    
 
Table 6.2 also shows that firms with high discretionary accruals display lower means of board 
independence and nomination committee independence than firms with a low level of discretionary 
accruals.  When the Code‟s chairman independence criteria are applied, around 84% of the chairmen 
can be considered to be independent. However, when the Code‟s NEDs‟ independence criteria are 
applied to chairmen, only 51% of them are deemed to be independent.  As expected, CHAIRIND 
shows a significant difference between the high and low earnings management groups, at a 1% level 
in both tests. 
 
This result, along with the previous results on the board independence and nomination committee 
independence, emphasises the importance of the independence characteristic in constraining 
earnings management, as prior studies have documented (Peasnell et al., 2000b; Peasnell et al., 
2005; Chtourou et al., 2001; Klein, 2002b and Xie et al., 2003). 
 
However, remuneration committee independence shows no significance in the difference between 
the two groups.  This is relatively reasonable as the average compliance with the Code‟s 
recommendation regarding this committee is low compared to compliance with the Code‟s 
recommendations on board of directors and nomination committee independence, as discussed 
previously in this section. 
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Comparing the means for board size shows that larger boards are associated with a low level of 
discretionary accruals.  This is consistent with the overwhelming majority of the previous studies.  
 
The average board size in this study is about 9 members (mean = 9.22).  Board size in the UK 
appears to be smaller than board size in US firms (e.g., mean size of about 11 in Bhagat & Black, 
2002) but larger than for firms in Australia (e.g., mean size of about 7 in Kiel & Nicholson,  2003). 
The previous UK study by Peasnell, et al. (2005) reports a mean board size of around 8 members.  
 
The difference between this study‟s board size mean and that reported by Peasnell, et al. (2005) may 
be due to one or both of following reasons.  First, there may have been an increase in board size in 
the UK during the last 10 years, which represents the difference between the sample periods of the 
two studies.  Secondly, this increase is most likely due to the larger average firm size in this study 
sample compared to Peasnell et al.‟s (2005) sample.  This study uses the FTSE 350 Index, which is 
dominated by large firms, whereas Peasnell, et al. (2005) study all UK listed companies, so that 
their study includes more small sized firms, which tend to have smaller boards. 
 
The mean of the number of female directors sitting on FTSE 350 boards is less than one (.07), which 
may be considered as a slightly disappointing figure.  Previous research suggests that the diversity 
of UK boards, measured as the proportion of FTSE 100 directorships held by women, has risen 
considerably in recent years.  For example, the proportion of directors that are female more than 
doubled from 3.7% to 8.6% in FTSE 100 Index firms in the period from 1995 to 2003 (Conyon & 
Mallin, 1997, Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004).  In a more recent study, Grosvold, et al. (2007) present 
figures that indicate that the proportion of FTSE 100 directorships held by female directors roughly 
doubled over the period from 1999 to 2005, rising from 4.9 to 10.5.  This study shows that the 
proportion of female directors is about 6% in this sample of firms, and it increased from 5% in 2003 
to 8% in 2006.  Comparing this study with previous studies, the figures show that, on average, FTSE 
100 Index firms have more female directors than the FTSE 350 Index firms in this sample.  
 
The relatively low proportion of female directors found in this study supports the findings of 
Brammer, et al. (2007) that both ethnic and gender diversity are very limited, and that diversity is 
somewhat less pronounced in executive positions.  Their study is based on identifying all directors 
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on the main boards of 543 UK PLCs from the FTSE All-Share Index in 2002.  Obviously, there is 
much yet to be done to improve the gender balance of corporate boards in the UK.  
 
Even though this study finds that women have more presence (a mean of .07) on the boards of 
companies in the lower level of earnings management group compared to their presence (a mean of 
.06) on boards in the high level of earnings management group, this study finds no support for the 
hypothesis that the presence of female directors on companies‟ boards reduces earnings 
management practices.  
 
In terms of NED commitment, only 58% of our sample firms hold at least one NEDs‟ private 
meeting each year, whereas boards meet, on average, more than 8 times a year.  The average NED 
fee (without log) is £39,000, and it increased dramatically from average of £34,000 in 2003 to 
£43,000 in 2006.  This supports the notion that there is a strong demand for qualified (assumed to be 
highly paid) independent directors to conform with recent recommendations on corporate 
governance.  Additionally, firms with high levels of earnings management are found to have fewer 
NEDs‟ private meetings and to pay lower NED fees, as expected in the NEDs‟ commitment 
hypotheses.  These differences are found to be significant in both tests.  
 
In terms of ownership structures, the typical sample firm has a mean managerial ownership of 3% 
and a mean institutional ownership of 24%, with 54% of the study sample having at least one 
external block holder whose stake exceeds 10%.  These levels are comparable to those reported in 
previous studies of the UK.  For example, Peasnell et al (2005) report means of managerial 
ownership of 2% and institutional ownership of 21%, with 53% of firms having a large blockholder. 
These results are also similar to Short and Keasey‟s (1999) descriptive statistics. 
 
Contrary to this study‟s hypothesis, institutional ownership, management ownership and 
blockholders are slightly higher in the high earnings management group, but no significant 
difference is found.  Nevertheless, some previous studies have also documented this contradiction.  
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) provide evidence that the use of discretionary accruals is more 
pronounced in firms with a high managerial ownership, more specifically where the CEO‟s potential 
total compensation is closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings.  Ronen et al.‟s (2006) 
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empirical study supports this relationship.  This result is also consistent with the empirical findings 
of Yu (2008), who uses the percentage of the largest blockholder and investigates its association 
with discretionary accrual and finds that the level of earnings management in a firm with large 
shareholders is higher than that of a firm without large shareholders by 17% of the sample mean and 
by 30% of the median. 
  
In the low earnings management group, half of the firms report according to IFRS, whereas in the 
high earnings management group only around a third of the firms use IFRS.  Less risky firms seem 
to have more earnings management.  The results relating to leverage are consistent with Becker et 
al. (1998) who find that leverage is negatively associated with the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals.  Both IFRS use and leverage show a significant difference according to the earnings 
management level in both tests. 
 
Interestingly, the CFO mean is similar to that of Peasnell et al. (2005) who conducted their study on 
UK firms between 1993 and 1996.  The typical sample firm has a mean of - 0.11 for CFO. The 
average ROA is –0.11, which is slightly lower than reported ROA values for Australian firms 
studied by Kiel & Nicholson (2003) and Goodwin et al. (2008) and lower than the average ROA in 
the US firms studied by Huang et al. (2007).  
 
6.3.2 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analyses for the Second Model 
The descriptive statistics of DAC for the second model show that the absolute value of DAC in 
FTSE 350 companies has a small mean value of 0.07, whereas the minimum value is much closer to 
0 (0.0001).  These findings are consistent with previously mentioned studies in the previous section.  
 
In the second model, as table 6.3 shows, audit fees are 55% of the total fees and non-audit fees are 
45%.  Three out of four audit fees variables show a significant difference between the two earnings 
management groups.  NAF1 is the only variable that shows inconsistency with the other proxies of 
auditor independence. 
 
Table 6.3 also shows that only 22% of the sample firms employ a specialised auditor measured by 
market share and 31% employ a specialised auditor measured by the number of audited clients. 
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However, both SPEAUD1 and SPEAUD2 means do not differ significantly according to the 
earnings management level. 
 
 
The average number of audit committee meetings in this sample is 3.45, which is smaller than the 
US figure of 4.53 reported by Xie et al (2003).  This is may be due to the different corporate 
governance requirements in each country.  In the US, the BRC (1999) recommends that audit 
committees meet at least once quarterly, whereas the UK Combined Code (2003) recommends at 
least three meetings a year.   However, average audit committee size of 3.58 and number of 
meetings 3.45 in the UK, as shown by this study, are higher than in Australia on the basis of figures 
reported by Davidson et al. (2005). They examine 434 firms listed on the ASX for the financial year 
ending in 2000 and report an average audit committee size of 2.56 and an average of 2.50 meetings.  
Firms with low discretionary accruals tend to have a larger mean of audit committee size than firms 
with a high level of discretionary accruals.  These results are significant in both tests and consistent 
with previous findings by Yang and Krishnan (2005), who find that audit committee size is 
negatively related to earnings management.   
 
However, contrary to this study‟s hypothesis, the number of audit committee meetings is larger in 
the high earnings management level group than in the other group.  The audit committee meeting 
result suggests that audit committee directors now have a busy schedule of bureaucratic meetings, 
which makes them less responsive to corporate challenges and, indeed, less attentive to monitoring 
needs.  This result supports the argument of Lipton and Lorsch (1992) who points out that those 
meetings are not necessarily functional because, given their limited time; they restrict the 
meaningful exchange of ideas among directors or with managers. 
 
As expected, the means of audit committee independence show that an independent audit committee 
is associated with a low level of discretionary accruals.  This is consistent with prior studies, such as 
those of Beasley (1996) and Bradbury (2006) that empirically find that audit committee 
independence is strongly associated with lower levels of earnings management. 
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Table 6.2 Pooled Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test for First Model 
Full Sample Low EM High EM T-test Mann Whitney test 
Variables Mean Min Max Median Sd Skewness Kurtosis Mean sd Mean sd t-value Prob. z-value Prob. 
DAC 0.057 0.000 0.988 0.043 0.069 6.275 74.241 0.019 0.012 0.096 0.080 18.590 *** 18.914 *** 
BRDIND 0.443 0.000 0.778 0.444 0.133 -0.131 3.277 0.456 0.135 0.430 0.131 -2.079 ** -2.068 ** 
BRDMEET 8.500 4.000 19.000 8.000 2.546 0.845 4.339 8.450 2.368 8.550 2.715 0.431  0.182  
BRDSZE 9.224 4.000 20.000 9.000 2.426 0.979 4.651 9.105 2.509 9.342 2.339 1.066  1.404  
WOMEN 0.068 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.092 1.405 4.875 0.072 0.096 0.063 0.089 -1.093  -0.960  
NOMIND 0.691 0.000 1.000 0.667 0.228 -0.551 3.344 0.718 0.200 0.664 0.250 -1.738 * -2.080 ** 
REMUIND 0.749 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.434 -1.148 2.319 0.744 0.438 0.754 0.431 0.263  0.911  
CHAIRND 0.515 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.500 -0.059 1.003 0.570 0.501 0.459 0.500 -2.858 *** -2.837 *** 
CHAIRCOD 0.845 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.362 -1.909 4.643 0.861 0.346 0.829 0.377 1.225  0.971  
NEDFEE 1.004 0.286 2.958 0.968 0.262 1.398 9.684 1.187 0.265 0.989 0.260 -1.625 * -1.545 * 
NEDMEET 0.588 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.493 -0.357 1.127 0.639 0.481 0.538 0.500 -2.254 ** -2.244 ** 
MANGOWN 0.033 0.000 0.630 0.000 0.088 3.652 17.877 0.028 0.084 0.037 0.093 -1.109  -1.460  
INSTOWN 24.78 0.000 95.22 23.12 15.32 1.045 4.742 23.62 14.05 25.93 16.42 1.547  1.334  
BLOCK 0.541 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.499 -0.165 1.027 0.517 0.501 0.565 0.497 1.062  1.062  
IFRS 0.441 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.497 0.236 1.056 0.487 0.501 0.396 0.490 -2.020 ** -2.014 ** 
SIZE 6.042 4.561 7.422 6.025 0.573 0.183 2.803 6.018 0.520 6.067 0.622 0.925  0.927  
LEVG 24.89 0.000 117.7 23.39 18.00 0.971 4.756 27.20 19.04 22.60 16.63 -2.815 *** -2.544 *** 
GROWTH 0.116 -0.948 5.876 0.069 0.416 8.191 98.683 0.076 0.199 0.156 0.552 2.111 ** 0.849  
CFO -0.111 -0.447 0.128 -0.098 0.075 -0.682 4.723 -0.101 0.058 -0.121 0.087 -3.013 *** -2.944 *** 
ROA -0.113 -0.400 0.325 -0.102 0.086 -0.484 5.472 -0.107 0.070 -0.119 0.100 -1.593 * -1.305  
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As shown in table 6.3, about 77% of audit committees in this study meet the UK (2003) Corporate 
Governance Code‟s requirement of having at least one financial expert as a member of the audit 
committee.  Comparing the means of AUDEXP, shows that those audit committees with a financial 
expert tend to have significantly lower levels of discretionary accruals in both tests.  
 
In terms of the control variables, IFRS, CFO and MANAGOWN are still significant in both models.  
GROWTH is the only variable that produces inconclusive results in both tests in both models; the t-
test shows a significant positive difference but the significance disappears in the non-parametric test.  
This may be due to GROWTH being highly skewed, which makes the t-test result unreliable and 
incomparable with the Mann Whitney test results.   
 
This biasing may result from the time period utilised by this study.  Certain industries, but not all, 
may have experienced a particularly high period of growth during this time frame. This may have 
caused a skew in the data and resulted in inconsistent results.   However, due to the contradictory 
nature of this variable result, it is deemed appropriate to conduct a separate test in the sensitivity 
analysis section that excludes this variable from the main regressions in both models. 
 
The results of the descriptive statistics emphasise the need to consider the level of discretionary 
accruals when testing the impact of corporate governance attributes and external audit factors on 
earnings management.  These results are investigated further in the multivariate analysis section. 
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Table 6.3 Pooled Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test  for the Second Model 
Full Sample Low EM High EM T-test Mann Whitney test 
Variables Mean Min Max Median sd Skewness Kurtosis Mean sd Mean sd t-value Prob. z-value Prob. 
DAC 0.068 0.000 0.990 0.049 0.083 5.159 44.786 0.024 0.014 0.113 0.098 18.910 *** 13.852 *** 
NAF1 -0.258 -2.000 2.699 -0.301 0.611 0.321 3.860 -0.223 0.599 -0.291 0.622 1.035  1.189  
AF1 -0.203 -2.155 1.253 -0.222 0.488 -0.077 3.137 -0.154 0.480 -0.253 0.492 -2.033 ** -2.209 ** 
NAF2 0.449 0.000 0.978 0.415 0.226 0.268 2.434 0.436 0.219 0.505 0.249 2.180 *** 2.652 *** 
AF2 0.551 0.022 1.000 0.586 0.226 -0.271 2.438 0.565 0.219 0.495 0.249 -2.006 *** -2.662 *** 
SPEAUD1 0.226 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.354 2.000 5.000 0.159 0.366 0.134 0.341 -0.775  -0.775  
SPEAUD2 0.318 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.466 0.782 1.611 0.305 0.462 0.331 0.471 0.589  0.588  
AUDSIZE 3.584 2.000 8.000 3.000 0.859 1.070 5.708 3.728 0.911 3.439 0.780 -3.808 *** -3.722 *** 
AUDMEET 3.456 1.000 8.000 3.000 1.200 0.366 3.876 3.339 1.159 3.573 1.231 1.765 * 2.143 ** 
AUDIIND 0.836 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.233 -1.303 3.981 0.858 0.228 0.813 0.236 -2.549 *** -2.123 ** 
AUDEXP 0.776 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.417 -1.325 2.756 0.807 0.395 0.649 0.480 -3.298 *** -3.330 *** 
MANGOWN 0.032 0.000 0.630 0.000 0.088 3.652 17.877 0.025 0.078 0.041 0.097 2.497 ** 1.938 ** 
IFRS 0.431 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.497 0.236 1.056 0.519 0.501 0.364 0.482 -3.405 *** -3.443 *** 
SIZE 5.973 4.561 7.179 5.967 0.422 0.019 2.693 5.686 0.275 6.260 0.340 2.858 *** 3.132 *** 
LEVG 22.82 0.000 117.7 23.39 18.00 0.971 4.756 23.41 16.66 26.37 19.170 1.371  1.702  
GROWTH 0.101 -0.948 5.876 0.069 0.416 8.191 98.683 0.126 0.276 0.106 0.520 -2.874 *** -0.547  
CFO -0.117 -0.447 0.128 -0.098 0.075 -0.682 4.723 -0.098 0.062 -0.124 0.084 -4.479 *** -3.863 *** 
ROA -0.111 -0.400 0.325 -0.102 0.086 -0.484 5.472 -0.112 0.077 -0.113 0.095 0.524  0.150  
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6.3.3 Industry-wise Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.3.1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables based in the industry type. 
Separating firms into groups based on the industry type highlights the difference in practice of 
corporate governance and earnings management, in diverse characteristics and regulations that 
may not apply to other industries.  
 
Following prior studies by Frankel et al. (2002) and Srinidhi and Gul, (2007), this study conducts 
industry-wise descriptive statistics for both models‟ variables for each of the six largest 
industries in this research sample, which represents more than 60% of the firms in the sample, 
namely, Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries, Construction & Building Materials, Media & 
Photography, Leisure, Entertainment & Hotels, General Retailers and Support Services. 
 
The descriptive statistics of discretionary accruals (DAC) variable, as presented in table 6.3.1, 
shows that the absolute value of DAC for the companies in this study sample, varies based on 
industry type. Leisure, Entertainment & Hotels industry shows a slightly lower DAC mean than 
the pooled sample mean, while the Media & Photography and the Construction & Building 
Materials industry show slightly higher DAC means. However, both industries are very close to 
the pooled sample mean of around 0, 05.   
 
The Media & Photography and the Construction & Building Materials industry‟s high DAC 
means may differ because they are highly complex industries that may have more motives and 
scope than others to manage earnings. The Media & Photography industry involves in more 
digital and web based transactions while the Construction & Building Materials industry 
includes firms with complex contracting and revenue recognition issues, which may make it 
difficult for independent directors and external auditors to detect earnings management.  This 
result supports the findings of Beasley et al. (2000) that the nature of fraud differs by industry 
and that certain industries have more particular types of fraud than other industries. 
 
In terms of board composition variables, BRDIND and BRDMEET are about 40% and 8 
respectively for all industries. However, Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries industry shows the 
largest board size mean of around 11 members. Female directors that present in the General 
Retailers industry boards are considerably high while their presence in the Support Services and 
Construction & Building Materials are considerably low. 
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The study sample shows low and high percentages of independence in both nomination and 
remuneration committees within the Media & Photography industry and Leisure, Entertainment 
& Hotels industry respectively, which is line with their mean of earnings management means. 
These statistics also show a relatively high compliance rate with the UK corporate governance 
recommendations on boards‟ and nomination committees‟ independence.    
 
In terms of NED commitment, only 58% of the sample firms hold at least one NEDs‟ private 
meeting each year, whereas boards meet, on average, more than 8 times per year.  The average 
NED fee (without log) is £39,000. Independent directors who work in the Restaurants, Pubs & 
Breweries industry receive the highest fees (around £43,000) while the Support Services industry 
pay much less fees than the average (around £31,000).   
 
In terms of ownership structures, the Support Services industry has a low mean of managerial 
ownership of 1% but has high means of both institutional ownership and block holder whose 
stakes exceed 10%.  These levels are comparable to those statistics reported in the previous 
section, in that the same industry pay less for independent directors and restrict managers 
ownership which may be due to the influence of external ownership held by institutional 
investors.  
 
Regarding external auditor factors, Construction & Building Materials industry require less non-
audit fees comparing to other industries which may be due to the fact that this industry is more 
likely not to employ a specialised auditor.  In contrast, Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries industry 
pay high non-audit fees and are more likely to employ a specialised auditor.  These differences 
support the argument of (Craswell et al. 1995) that the demand for and supply of non-audit 
services, as well as the effect of the specialised auditor, can differ by industry. 
 
In terms of audit committee characteristics, the average number of audit committee meetings and 
the average audit committee size do not appreciably vary between industries. However, the 
Construction & Building Materials industry and Leisure, Entertainment & Hotels industry show 
a high compliance with the corporate governance combined code (2003) recommendations 
regarding the audit committees independence and financial expertise, while Restaurants, Pubs & 
Breweries show much lower compliance with these recommendations. 
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In terms of the control variables, the Media & Photography industry shows the lowest 
compliance with IFRS. Construction & Building Materials industry has less risky firms that 
report the lowest leverage mean and the fastest growing industry while Leisure, Entertainment & 
Hotels industry are highly leveraged and low in growth. Interestingly, the CFO and ROA means 
do not largely vary between industries, however, Support Services and General Retailer 
industries slightly outperform other industries.  
 
In conclusion, the previous descriptive statistics show some variations in certain corporate 
governance variables based on the type of industry in which the company operates.  In average, 
Leisure, Entertainment & Hotels industry shows a high compliance with the corporate 
governance combined code (2003) recommendations and less earnings management while Media 
& Photography shows much lower compliance with these recommendations and higher earnings 
management. 
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Table 6.3 Industry-wise Descriptive Statistics 
Industry name 
Restaurants, Pubs & 
Breweries Media & Photography 
Leisure, Entertainment 
& Hotels General Retailers Support Services 
Construction & 
Building Materials 
Variables Mean Median St Mean Median St Mean Median St Mean Median St Mean Median St Mean Median St 
DAC 0.044 0.031 0.060 0.075 0.074 0.044 0.036 0.026 0.041 0.067 0.061 0.058 0.062 0.060 0.060 0.078 0.069 0.045 
BRDIND 0.434 0.500 0.176 0.368 0.364 0.098 0.474 0.500 0.109 0.464 0.500 0.107 0.375 0.333 0.099 0.400 0.400 0.087 
BRDMEET 7.347 7.000 1.508 8.524 9.000 2.713 8.931 8.000 2.751 8.553 9.000 2.446 7.160 7.000 2.444 8.860 8.000 2.426 
BRDSZE 11.143 10.000 3.317 9.048 9.000 1.658 8.793 9.000 2.077 8.263 8.000 1.688 8.200 8.000 1.354 9.465 9.000 1.638 
WOMEN 0.100 0.091 0.093 0.091 0.100 0.070 0.074 0.000 0.104 0.131 0.106 0.137 0.018 0.000 0.070 0.034 0.000 0.056 
NOMIND 0.687 0.750 0.299 0.544 0.600 0.282 0.863 1.000 0.222 0.812 0.775 0.192 0.653 0.750 0.316 0.717 0.750 0.154 
REMUIND 0.592 1.000 0.497 0.381 0.000 0.498 0.931 1.000 0.258 0.789 1.000 0.413 0.600 1.000 0.500 0.884 1.000 0.324 
CHAIRIND 0.469 0.000 0.504 0.484 0.000 0.468 0.655 1.000 0.484 0.526 1.000 0.506 0.560 1.000 0.507 0.488 0.000 0.506 
NEDMEET 0.388 0.000 0.492 0.762 1.000 0.436 0.643 1.000 0.488 0.658 1.000 0.481 0.400 0.000 0.500 0.442 0.000 0.502 
NEDFEE 42985 44000 10555 40476 42000 9765 39319 37500 6153 38572 37500 7825 31457 30000 6880 37372 36000 8712 
AUDSIZE 3.429 3.000 0.736 3.381 3.000 0.669 3.586 4.000 0.628 3.737 4.000 0.828 3.320 3.000 0.557 3.302 3.000 0.708 
AUDIIND 0.727 1.000 0.360 0.790 0.750 0.234 0.917 1.000 0.165 0.872 1.000 0.177 0.893 1.000 0.169 0.942 1.000 0.124 
AUDEXP 0.571 1.000 0.500 0.810 1.000 0.402 0.966 1.000 0.186 0.789 1.000 0.413 0.720 1.000 0.458 0.953 1.000 0.213 
AUDMEET 3.980 4.000 1.521 3.571 3.000 1.287 4.310 4.000 0.891 3.605 4.000 1.054 3.720 4.000 1.021 3.744 4.000 0.727 
NAF 0.511 0.500 0.204 0.490 0.500 0.244 0.468 0.444 0.274 0.475 0.482 0.250 0.500 0.425 0.235 0.417 0.408 0.242 
AF 0.489 0.500 0.204 0.510 0.500 0.244 0.532 0.556 0.274 0.525 0.518 0.250 0.500 0.575 0.235 0.583 0.592 0.242 
SPEAUD  0.467 1.000 0.283 0.351 1.000 0.303 0.179 0.000 0.294 0.300 0.500 0.307 0.240 0.000 0.207 0.079 0.000 0.254 
MANGOWN 0.031 0.000 0.070 0.059 0.000 0.138 0.040 0.000 0.079 0.061 0.000 0.144 0.019 0.000 0.036 0.028 0.000 0.049 
INSTOWN 29.16 29.00 16.83 23.48 22.00 17.56 26.21 25.50 13.84 23.69 22.50 16.74 34.80 34.50 15.28 31.51 35.00 19.97 
BLOCK 0.755 1.000 0.434 0.333 0.000 0.483 0.621 1.000 0.494 0.684 1.000 0.471 0.739 1.000 0.449 0.419 0.000 0.499 
IFRS 0.510 1.000 0.505 0.333 0.000 0.483 0.414 0.000 0.501 0.395 0.000 0.495 0.520 1.000 0.510 0.442 0.000 0.502 
SIZE 6.236 6.338 0.548 6.190 6.531 0.782 6.305 6.277 0.305 5.972 5.858 0.533 5.582 5.660 0.391 6.115 6.022 0.334 
LEVG 0.301 0.303 0.139 0.395 0.388 0.145 0.427 0.413 0.208 0.227 0.172 0.217 0.287 0.301 0.188 0.144 0.126 0.106 
GROWTH 0.102 0.065 0.164 0.082 0.054 0.141 0.028 0.046 0.441 0.026 0.051 0.182 0.141 0.076 0.195 0.115 0.102 0.130 
CFO 0.107 0.083 0.079 0.105 0.072 0.093 0.098 0.110 0.060 0.137 0.106 0.091 0.180 0.174 0.100 0.083 0.086 0.066 
ROA 0.100 0.082 0.076 0.109 0.075 0.089 0.101 0.078 0.075 0.144 0.107 0.101 0.154 0.127 0.110 0.122 0.128 0.054 
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6.4 Correlation Coefficients 
This section presents both the Pearson correlations and the Spearman rank correlation among the 
variables of corporate governance, the external audit and firm characteristics. The correlation 
coefficients are checked for the presence of high collinearity among regressors.  Table 6.4 presents 
both the Pearson correlations and the Spearman rank correlation for the first model, and table 6.5 
presents both the Pearson correlations and the Spearman rank correlation for the second model.  
 
6.4.1 First Model Correlation Coefficients 
From the correlation coefficients for the first model, shown in table 6.4, no high correlation is found 
among the variables.  As a result, collinearity does not appear to create a threat to the interpretation 
of regression coefficients of the independent variables in this model. However, from the Pearson 
correlation, the highest coefficient is 0.59 between cash from operations (CFO) and return on assets 
(ROA) This correlation is expected and is found in previous studies, such as that of Abdul Rahman 
and Ali et al. (2006) who report even higher collinearity (67%) but considered this collinearity to be 
harmless. 
 
Another significant and relatively high correlation (50%) is between firm size (SIZE) and board size 
(BRDSIZE). This is found in many similar prior studies, suggesting that large firms have large 
boards.  All these variables are included in the same model since the correlations are not strong 
(lower than 0.800). Gujarati (2003) and Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black (1995) recommend 0.80 
as the threshold at which multicollinearity concerns may threaten the regression analysis. Further, 
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests were carried out. 
 
The significant and relatively high correlation between board independence, on one side, and NED 
fees and NEDs‟ private meetings, on the other side, shows that, as the ratio of independent members 
on the board increases, the more committed are the NEDs.  There are other significant and relatively 
high correlations that show that firms with an independent board have high ROA and large size. 
 
Consistent with the previous studies, it is found that management ownership is high when firms 
have less independence and less active boards with a non-independent chairman (Lasfer, 2006).  
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Management ownership is also significantly and negatively correlated with measures of NEDs‟ 
commitment. 
 
6.4.2 Second Model Correlation Coefficients 
Looking at the correlation coefficients in table 6.5, it is clear that there is no high correlation among 
the independent variables in the second model.  As a result, collinearity does not appear to create a 
threat to the interpretation of regression coefficients of the independent variables in this model.  
Two correlation statistics in the second model are especially noteworthy.  Coefficients of 0.56 and 
0.53 respectively, between firm size, on one side, and non-audit fees and audit fees, on the other 
side, suggest that large firms pay more audit and non-audit fees than do smaller firms.  Hence, any 
analysis that does not include size faces a potentially large omitted-variable bias. 
 
Firm size is also positively and significantly correlated with audit committee size and independence.  
Audit committee size is also positively and significantly correlated with audit fees and non-audit 
fees with coefficients of 18% and 30%, respectively.  Audit committee independence is also 
correlated with NAF and AF, but with smaller coefficients.  All in all, large firms require both 
effective internal and external audit processes through a large audit committee and a large audit firm 
that charges larger audit and non-audit fees. 
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* denote significance at the 0.05 level 
 
 
 
Table 6.4 Pearson (Top) and Spearman (Bottom) correlations coefficients for First Model 
    BRDIND BRDMET BRDSZE WOMEN REMIND NOMIND CHAIRND CHARCOD NEDFEE NEDMEE MANGWN INSTOW BLOCK IFRS ROA SIZE LEVG GRWTH CFO 
BRDIND  0.036 0.050 0.125* 0.073 0.225* 0.181* -0.009 0.293* 0.239* -0.198* -0.084 -0.034 0.109* 0.120* 0.399* 0.105* -0.113* 0.078 
BRDMEET 0.056  -0.196* -0.139* 0.033 0.100* 0.098* 0.169* -0.019 0.065 -0.127* -0.063 0.015 0.033 0.147* -0.012 0.027 0.024 0.136* 
BRDSZE 0.030 -0.196*  0.035 -0.006 -0.067 -0.109* -0.059 0.134* 0.035 0.000 -0.103* -0.086 0.002 0.028 0.489* 0.013 -0.023 0.063 
WOMEN 0.133* -0.150* 0.006  0.035 0.016 0.104* -0.098* 0.127* 0.026 -0.047 -0.054 0.072 0.106* -0.003 0.202* -0.023 -0.073 -0.047 
REMIND 0.065 0.019 -0.010 0.050  0.022 -0.007 0.015 0.048 0.054 -0.056 -0.030 0.077 0.080 -0.005 0.068 0.003 -0.121* 0.008 
NOMIND 0.278* 0.114* -0.015 -0.010 -0.001  0.147* 0.056 0.021 0.167* -0.041 0.024 0.053 -0.012 -0.031 0.010 0.008 -0.072 -0.081 
CHAIRND 0.200* 0.102* -0.114* 0.069 -0.012 0.181*  0.405* 0.165* 0.146* -0.117* -0.027 0.098* 0.100* -0.031 0.065 0.001 -0.013 0.009 
CHAIRCOD 0.007 0.141* -0.037 -0.111* 0.019 0.099* 0.394*  0.050 0.160* -0.202* 0.009 0.039 0.052 -0.030 -0.008 0.067 -0.067 0.010 
NEDFEE 0.221* -0.010 0.120* 0.119* 0.039 0.000 0.175* 0.051  0.070 -0.172* -0.053 0.000 0.334* -0.019 0.438* 0.147* -0.001 0.018 
NEDMEET 0.233* 0.076 0.032 -0.004 0.054 0.162* 0.147* 0.146* 0.067  -0.093* -0.032 -0.029 0.078 0.084 0.056 -0.024 0.052 0.055 
MANGOWN -0.175* -0.156* -0.047 -0.026 -0.019 -0.022 -0.102* -0.192* -0.165* -0.118*  0.017 0.024 -0.160* -0.076 -0.234* -0.154* 0.079 -0.153* 
INSTOWN -0.074 -0.051 -0.086 -0.020 -0.047 0.063 -0.044 0.022 -0.027 -0.012 -0.014  0.319* -0.054 0.076 -0.153* -0.064 -0.024 0.024 
BLOCK -0.049 0.017 -0.067 0.058 0.077 0.020 0.092* 0.035 -0.037 -0.047 0.063 0.287*  0.025 -0.002 -0.103* -0.039 -0.138* -0.076 
IFRS 0.119* 0.027 0.014 0.112* 0.068 -0.018 0.092* 0.043 0.311* 0.068 -0.045 -0.019 0.012  -0.113* 0.090 0.017 0.140* 0.035 
ROA 0.029 0.124* 0.002 -0.066 -0.019 -0.016 -0.034 -0.057 -0.041 0.079 -0.054 -0.002 -0.014 -0.119*  0.240* 0.175* 0.119* 0.598* 
SIZE 0.382* 0.015 0.500* 0.164* 0.068 0.068 0.069 -0.015 0.381* 0.065 -0.259* -0.166* -0.105* 0.084 0.216*  0.304* -0.107* 0.275* 
LEVG 0.090* 0.016 -0.016 -0.060 0.021 0.046 0.037 0.081 0.082 -0.009 -0.150* -0.039 -0.020 0.006 0.082 0.235*  -0.1657* 0.137* 
GROWTH 0.026 0.002 0.016 -0.045 -0.024 -0.060 -0.024 -0.087 -0.008 -0.009 -0.002 -0.032 -0.100* 0.007 0.082 0.015 -0.057  -0.078 
CFO 0.063 0.154* 0.001 -0.105* -0.004 -0.034 0.016 0.017 0.005 0.089 -0.163* -0.047 -0.101* 0.014 0.632* 0.246* 0.087 -0.043  
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* denote significance at the 0.05 level 
 
 
Table 6.5 Pearson (Top) and Spearman (Bottom) correlations coefficients for Second Model 
 NAF1 AF1 SPEAUD1 AUDSIZE AUDMEET AUDIIND AUDEXP MANGOWN IFRS SIZE LEVG GROWTH CFO ROA 
NAF1  0.520* 0.054 0.214* -0.036 0.113* -0.041 -0.127* 0.113* 0.525* 0.158* 0.006 0.068 0.120* 
AF1 0.581*  0.035 0.279* -0.042 0.137* -0.003 -0.258* 0.069 0.471* 0.133* -0.075 0.187* 0.180* 
SPEAUD1 0.025 0.033  -0.047 0.065 -0.010 -0.005 -0.014 -0.023 0.016 0.164* -0.050 0.014 0.047 
AUDSIZE 0.187* 0.301* -0.068  -0.043 0.022 0.067 -0.073 0.024 0.284* 0.009 0.158* 0.092* 0.065 
AUDMEET -0.006 -0.045 0.063 -0.019  0.010 -0.047 0.038 -0.123* -0.008 -0.045 -0.021 -0.025 0.023 
AUDIIND 0.151* 0.200* -0.010 0.036 -0.012  0.101* -0.020 0.070 0.183* -0.042 -0.018 0.067 0.089 
AUDEXP -0.027 0.020 -0.008 0.082 -0.047 0.081  -0.033 0.033 0.012 -0.021 0.068 -0.005 0.003 
MANGOWN -0.225* -0.285* -0.007 -0.095* 0.111* -0.084 0.011  -0.045 -0.254* -0.150* -0.002 -0.163* -0.054 
IFRS 0.106* 0.069 -0.024 0.022 -0.15* 0.082 0.053 -0.144*  0.084 0.006 0.007 0.014 -0.114* 
SIZE 0.564* 0.536* 0.038 0.250* -0.006 0.189* 0.023 -0.251* 0.087  0.235* 0.015 0.246* 0.214* 
LEVG 0.1875* 0.216* 0.153* 0.012 -0.036 -0.006 -0.026 -0.141* 0.009 0.276*  -0.057 0.087 0.082 
GROWTH -0.176* -0.179* -0.084 -0.087 -0.020 -0.075 0.039 0.097* 0.126* -0.131* -0.158*  -0.043 0.082 
CFO 0.125* 0.163* 0.005 0.114* -0.033 0.040 -0.006 -0.173* 0.027 0.287* 0.131* -0.108*  0.632* 
ROA 0.202* 0.278* 0.069 0.127* 0.050 0.144* 0.001 -0.094* -0.125* 0.272* 0.177* 0.132* 0.610*  
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NAF and AF have a relatively high correlation (0.58), which may suggest that firms that pay more 
audit fees also receive large amounts of non-audit services.  However, given these relatively high 
correlations, this study calculates variance inflation factors (VIF) for both models and finds that VIF 
values are within acceptable limits.  Table 6.6 shows the VIF and tolerance coefficients of each 
independent variable.  Gujarati (2003, p.339) suggests that a VIF value of less than 10 is acceptable; 
the maximum VIF value in both models for CFO is 1.87.  
 
The mean of VIF for both models is 1.36 and 1.26 respectively.  Thus, multicollinearity does not 
appear to be a problem in either of the two models. 
 
 
Table 6.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VIF Test Results 
First Model 
 
Second Model 
Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF 
CFO 1.870 0.535 CFO 1.810 0.554 
ROA 1.790 0.557 ROA 1.810 0.554 
BRDSZE 1.670 0.598 AF1 1.610 0.621 
BRDIND 1.450 0.690 NAF1 1.460 0.684 
NEDFEE 1.370 0.729 LEVG 1.190 0.844 
CHAIRND 1.350 0.741 AUDSIZE 1.170 0.853 
CHAIRCOD 1.320 0.759 SPEAUD1 1.160 0.861 
MANGOWN 1.190 0.842 MANGOWN 1.120 0.891 
BRDMEET 1.170 0.851 SIZE 1.120 0.893 
WOMEN 1.170 0.857 IFRS 1.080 0.925 
IFRS 1.170 0.858 AUDIIND 1.070 0.937 
BLOCK 1.160 0.863 GROWTH 1.060 0.945 
INSTOWN 1.150 0.873 AUDMEET 1.050 0.950 
NOMIND 1.150 0.873 AUDEXP 1.050 0.956 
SIZE 1.120 0.880    
NEDMEET 1.130 0.882    
LEVG 1.120 0.890    
GROWTH 1.040 0.961    
REMIND 1.030 0.974    
Mean VIF 1.360  Mean VIF 1.26  
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6.5 Tests of Hypotheses (Multivariate Analyses) 
Generally, the results of this analysis are consistent with the univariate analysis.  In this section the 
relevant regression test will be chosen and the justifications for the selected method will be 
discussed.  Then, the results will be illustrated and compared with prior findings with particular 
attention to the previous UK findings, if available.  The results and discussion of the first model will 
come first, and then the results and discussion of the second model will follow.  The results for the 
control variables for both models will be discussed together as they show qualitatively similar 
results for both models.    
 
Regression analysis, which is one of the most commonly used techniques of multivariate analysis, is 
applied in this study.  This study examines the effect of multi variables on earnings management as 
a dependent variable; thus a multiple regression is considered to be suitable in this study.  The 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is considered to be a powerful technique when the model 
contains both dummy and continuous variables (Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999), as is the case in 
this study.  However, the use of OLS regression is subject to the conditions, illustrated in the 
previous chapter. 
 
In the descriptive analysis, it can be seen that both skewness and kurtosis for some variables show 
high values.  Data is considered to be normal if the standard skewness is within ±1.96 and standard 
kurtosis is ± 2 (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006).  The dependent variable and most of the independent 
variables are not normally distributed, as shown in tables 6.1 and 6.2. Different transformation 
methods are applied and some of the variables are still not normally distributed.  
 
The lack of normality of the dependant variable (DAC) is expected as this study deliberately does 
not eliminate the outliers of this variable, as firms with extreme values of earnings management 
potentially provide the observations that represent large negative accruals (e.g., big bath ) or large 
positive accruals, which may actually represent management discretion. By excluding extreme 
discretionary accrual observations, the study may eliminate those cases of the earnings management 
that are the focus of this research.   
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Therefore, normality, which is one of the important assumptions of the parametric test, is not 
satisfied.  Nevertheless, this is expected in this type of study (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006). Kao 
and Chen (2004) suggest that OLS is not suitable for the regression when the dependent variable is 
the absolute value of earnings management that is limited to only positive values. 
 
Generally, parametric tests are more powerful when all assumptions are met.  However, if any of the 
OLS assumptions are violated by the data; non-parametric tests become more appropriate (Balian, 
1982).  According to Zhang and Liu (2009), non-parametric statistical techniques can be considered 
as an alternative to parametric techniques to avoid the need for satisfying the assumptions required 
by parametric techniques. Non-parametric tests are considered to be a distribution-free method as 
they make no assumption with regard to the distribution of the sample scores.  Additionally, non-
parametric tests do not require the measurement of data on an interval scale and do not require data 
to meet the rigorous assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance required by the 
parametric methods.  
 
Given the above discussion, non-parametric tests are applied in this study to analyse the data.  This 
is because the data of this study do not meet the conditions required for the parametric tests.  
Therefore, GLS instead of OLS regression is adopted as a multivariate test technique. 
 
6.5.1 Results and Discussion of the First Model 
Table 6.7 reports the GLS regression of discretionary accruals on board composition and ownership 
structure.  The adjusted R2 obtained for this model is fairly comparable with those in similar studies, 
for example, those of Frankel et al. (2002), Ashbaugh, et al. (2003), Abdul Rahman and Ali, (2006) 
and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010).  The constant is negative and highly significant at p<0.01. 
 
6.5.1.1 Board of Directors Composition 
Board independence 
Consistent with the first hypothesis that states there is a negative relationship between earnings 
management and the proportion of independent directors on the board, the result indicates that there 
is a negative and significant relationship (coefficient = -.046 and  p<.10) between board 
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independence and the indicator of earnings management.  This finding is in line with the previous 
findings of Klein (2002b), Xie et al. (2003), Peasnell et al. (2005), Davidson et al. (2005), Benkel et 
al. (2006), Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) and Lo, et al. (2010) that boards with a high 
proportion of independent directors are negatively related to earnings management.  
 
Nevertheless, the result is different from that of some studies conducted outside the Anglo-
American countries, especially in Asian countries such as Malaysia (Abdul Rahman and Ali, et al., 
2006), Indonesia (Siregar and Utama, 2008) and Hong Kong  (Jaggi et al., 2009), where no 
significant relationship is found between outside directors and earnings management.  The Asian 
results may be different due to the dominance of family-controlled firms in these countries, which 
may result in family dominance over board matters as a result of weak corporate governance 
regimes in countries with less investor protection, as discussed in the literature review chapter.  
 
This result is consistent with previous UK findings by Peasnell et al. (2005) who indicate that the 
likelihood of managers making income-increasing abnormal accruals to avoid reporting losses and 
earnings reductions is negatively related to the proportion of independent directors on the board. 
 
Board Meetings 
Inconsistent with this study‟s expectation, the coefficients of BRDMEET are insignificant in all of 
the models.  A possible explanation of this result is that the number of board meetings is an 
indication of the board‟s reaction to urgent business or special circumstances rather than an 
indication of the board‟s regular monitoring of the firm‟s financial reporting quality.  This 
suggestion is supported by Lorsch and MacIver‟s (1989) survey of US firms‟ boards in the 1980s 
that presents evidence that the frequency of board meetings increases in times of crises and major 
challenges. Vafeas‟ (1999) empirical study of US boards in the early 1990s also suggests that one 
way in which boards react to poor performance and challenging business circumstances is by 
increasing the number of board meetings; the study provides evidence that the frequency of board 
meetings increase following financial distress. 
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          Table 6.7 Results of the First Model 
              First Model Main Regression (GLS) 
DAC Exp Signe Coef. z P>z 
Board Composition 
BRDIND - -0.046 -1.670 * 
BRDMEET - 0.001 1.010  
BRDSZE - -0.003 -1.920 ** 
WOMEN - -0.022 -0.620  
REMIND - 0.009 1.230  
NOMIND - -0.043 -2.860 *** 
CHAIRCOD + 0.009 1.230  
CHAIRIND - -0.016 -1.680 * 
NED Commitment 
NEDFEE - -0.035 -2.530 *** 
NEDMEET - -0.005 -0.750  
Ownership Structures 
MANGOWN - -0.037 -0.980  
BLOCK - 0.017 2.560 *** 
INSTOWN - 0.000 1.090  
Control Variables 
SIZE ? 0.041 4.810 *** 
IFRS ? -0.001 -0.200  
LEVG ? -0.001 -3.690 *** 
GROWTH ? 0.002 0.230  
CFO ? -0.203 -3.590 *** 
ROA ? 0.012 0.250  
_cons  -0.099 -2.240 *** 
Adj R-2 17%    
Wald chi2 71.74***    
 
 
In fact, this result suggests that directors now have a busier schedule of bureaucratic meetings that 
makes them less responsive to essential challenges and, indeed, less attentive to monitoring needs.  
This result supports the argument of Lipton and Lorsch (1992), who point out those board meetings 
are not necessarily functional because, given their limited time; they restrict the meaningful 
exchange of ideas among directors or with managers. 
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Taking the result of BRDSIZE into consideration, along with the result of the ineffective impact of 
BRDMEET, the non-binding of board meetings can have a joint interpretation.  These results 
suggest that if the board size is large, board meetings may not be the best means of communication 
between directors.  As the board size increases, there are more people to share the responsibilities 
but communication is less effective.  Thereby, more board meetings may be more fruitful only for 
small-sized boards.  Given that the board size is generally large in this study sample, as shown in the 
descriptive analysis, board meetings may not be very effective in monitoring management activities. 
 
Therefore, this study argues that the number of meetings may not always be an effective 
characteristic of the board of directors.  This is supported by previous findings. Adams et al. (2009) 
conducts a large survey to investigate directors‟ roles as advisors and monitors of management.  He 
finds that directors who primarily monitor management perceive that they participate less in 
boardroom discussion during the meetings than other directors, and that the CEO often asks them 
for advice.    
 
However, this result should not be interpreted as if the diligence of the board directors is an 
ineffective mechanism in constraining earnings management; there are many other measures of the 
board diligence that can not be captured by quantitative research methods.  Carcello et al. (2002) 
concede that board diligence includes many more factors than mere board meetings, for instance, 
preparation before meetings, attentiveness, participation during meetings, and post-meeting follow-
up.  However, the number of board meetings is the only measure that is publicly available. 
 
Board Size  
This study finds that board size is significantly and negatively associated with earnings 
management.  The result indicates that larger boards are more effective in monitoring financial 
reporting.  This supports the argument of John and Senbet (1998) that an increase in board size 
increases the board‟s monitoring capacity.  Large boards are likely to increase financial expertise 
and diversity on the board.  Ebrahim (2007) finds that the independence of the audit committee is 
actually dependent on board size as the probability of having a totally independent audit committee 
is more pronounced in firms with a large board.  This study‟s result also supports the findings of 
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Zahra and Pearce (1989) that board size can increase the independence of the board and counteract 
managerial entrenchment.  Additionally, Salterio (2001) and Klein (2002a) argue that small board 
size limits the number of independent directors available to serve on the audit committee, and they 
report evidence that audit committee independence increases with the size of the board.  
 
These findings support the argument presented by Zahra and Pearce (1989) that larger boards are 
more capable than smaller boards of monitoring the actions of management.  Hence, smaller boards 
may be more likely to be “captured” by top managers or controlled by major institutional investors 
and blockholders, with the result that monitoring by the independent directors is weakened.  
 
The negative association between large boards and the empirical indicator of earnings management 
is similar to the findings of Peasnell et al. (2005), Chtourou et al. (2001), Xie et al. (2003) and Yu 
(2008).  They find that board size is strongly and negatively associated with lower levels of earnings 
management.  
 
However, some evidence from Asian markets provided by Kao and Chen (2004) using Taiwan and 
Abdul Rahman and Ali, et al (2006) using Malaysia, shows a significant positive relationship 
between board size and the empirical indicator of earnings management.  Both studies are conducted 
in less developed countries.  Thus, these different results may be due to the different markets and 
corporate governance regimes in which these studies were based.  Another plausible explanation for 
the opposite findings of these Asian based studies is that firms in developing countries are more 
family-controlled and they have more family members on their boards. Thus, an increase in the 
board size may not always lead to better governance. 
 
Chairman Independence 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the chairman‟s independence (CHAIRIND) is negatively associated with 
the level of earnings management.  The negatively signed coefficient (β = 0.016, p < 0.10) on 
CHAIRIND supports this study‟s argument and hypothesis.  This suggests that the chairman‟s 
independence plays an important role in constraining earnings management behaviour.  
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In terms of the comparison between the chairmen‟s independence measured according to the Code‟s 
chairman independence criteria (CHAIRCOD) and the chairman‟s independence measured 
according to the Code‟s NED independence criteria (CHAIRIND), the latter is more effective in 
constraining earnings management. Interestingly, it is found that the Code‟s independence criteria 
might be loose since this study documents a positive but insignificant association between earnings 
management and CHAIRCOD.  When the Code‟s NED independence criteria (which are stricter 
than its independence criteria for the chairman) are applied to the chairman, this study finds a 
significant negative relation between earnings management and chairman independence.  
 
This result generally supports the argument of Abbott et al. (2004) and Fama & Jensen (1983) that 
an independent chairman (who is neither the firm‟s founder nor the CEO) can be expected to 
improve board monitoring by providing independent monitoring of the CEO‟s work.  This result is 
also in line with the argument of Chau, et al. (2006) who find that concentrated decision-making 
power as a result of a non-independent chairman may impair the board‟s oversight and monitoring 
roles.      
 
Board Gender Diversity 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that the number of women directors on the board is negatively associated with 
earnings management.  The insignificantly negative coefficient of the number of women directors 
does not support this hypothesis.  Therefore, this study does not support the view that gender 
diversity leads to superior earnings quality.  
 
Some previous studies document a positive effect of the role of women on boards and find that 
women enhance the quality of decision making (Smith et al., 2006; Huse & Solberg, 2006), that 
women are generally more risk averse than men (Watson and McNaughton, 2007); and that gender 
is a factor in ethical decision making (Ford and Richardson, 1994). 
 
However, no study, including this one, documents an association between accrual quality and the 
presence of women on company boards.  This may be due to the relatively small proportion of board 
members who are women (true also for the UK, as shown in the descriptive analysis section), which 
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does not permit them to be powerful enough to make a difference to monitoring. This finding may 
also support the view that women members are still treated as tokens of gender diversity rather than 
as a source of invaluable input to board activities. 
 
However, this result does not necessarily contradict the notion that women‟s presence on firms‟ 
boards may be useful and positive in general. Nevertheless, it means that the low number of women 
on the boards of FTSE 350 firms does not give them sufficient monitoring power to reduce earnings 
management practice. 
 
Nomination Committee Independence 
Consistent with hypothesis 6 that there is a negative relationship between earnings management and 
the proportion of independent directors on the nomination committee, the result indicates a negative 
significant relationship (coefficient= -.043 and p<.01) between an independent nomination 
committee and earnings management. 
 
This finding supports the regulatory stress on the importance of having independent nomination 
committees that increases the likelihood of the independence of the nominated directors.  This result 
also supports theoretical arguments in prior studies that nomination committees can play a vital role 
in enhancing board members' independence and reducing the influence of management (Jensen, 
1993 and Westphal, 1998).  Additionally, this result indirectly contradicts Klein (2002b), who finds 
no relation between the presence of the CEO on the nomination committee and the incidence of 
earnings management.  The limitations of Klein (2002b) were discussed in the literature review 
chapter.  
 
However, this difference between Klein‟s (2002b) result and that of other studies may be due to a 
possible correlation between the nomination committee and the audit committee in her study that 
affects her result.  She does not provide correlation analyses but the present study separates the 
nomination and audit committees in two models to avoid the high correlation that is found.  It might 
also be due to both a better earnings management proxy employed by this study and the different 
method of measuring the nomination committee‟s effectiveness.  Another possibility is that 
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nomination committees have become more effective as a result of the reforms in corporate 
governance since 1995, which was the basis for Klein‟s (2002b) study.  
 
The significant results in this study for large board size, audit committee independence and 
nomination committee independence support the argument raised by Klein (2002a) that board sub-
committee (i.e. audit committee and nomination committee) assignments are influenced by board 
size; large boards have more directors to contribute to the sub-committees and this enables the work 
load to be distributed over a greater number of directors. 
 
Remuneration Committee Independence 
Hypothesis 7 predicts a significant negative relationship between the occurrence of earnings 
management and a fully independent remuneration committee, as recommended by the Code.  As 
reported in table 6.7, the hypothesis is not supported as no significant negative association is found 
between the occurrence of an earnings management and an independent remuneration committee. 
 
Agency theory hypothesises that the independent remuneration committee has a key role in ensuring 
a fair and appropriate remuneration scheme, which, in turn, ensures that management ownership 
incentives are designed to increase the alignment of the interests of shareholders and management. 
Such an alignment helps to constrain management opportunistic behaviour such as earnings 
management. 
 
However, though the proponents of the agency theory argue that high managerial ownership is a 
good governance mechanism and should have a negative effect on earnings manipulation; this study 
finds that managerial ownership has no effect on the level of earnings management.  This result may 
indicate that the remuneration committees in this study‟s sample firms do not discharge their 
expected role effectively, or that they may be independent in appearance but not in fact. 
 
However, this result supports the findings of many UK prior studies that document the lack of 
effectiveness of remuneration committees in the UK.  Main and Johnston (1993) use a sample of 
220 large publicly held British companies to examine the role of the remuneration committee in 
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British boardrooms.  They find remuneration committees to be associated with higher levels of pay 
and no positive impact on the incentive structure of pay.  Their result indicates a strong social 
influence that affects the remuneration payments approved by remuneration committees.  
Additionally, Forbes and Watson (1993) examine the UK system of corporate governance and 
executives' remuneration.  Their study offers empirical evidence that the remuneration process is 
largely under the control of the executive directors themselves.  A similar finding offered by Proned 
(1992) and based on an examination of the structure of remuneration payments (cash and stock 
options) is that there is no significant relationship between this and the existence of a remuneration 
committee.  This argument is supported by Forbes and Watson (1993) who comment on the findings 
of the previously discussed studies that “There is little evidence that the current remuneration 
committees in the UK are having the desired effect”. 
 
In contrast, Klein (2002b), using data from 1991 to 1993 on earnings manipulation for a sample of 
687 large, listed U.S. firms, finds a positive relation between the presence of the CEO in the 
remuneration committee and earnings management.  However, this different result might be due to a 
possible correlation between the remuneration committee and the audit committee and /or the 
different measures of both dependent and independent variables that affected her results, as 
explained above.  Another possibility is that remuneration committees may be more effective in the 
USA than in the UK.  
 
All in all, even though the remuneration committee has been introduced in many countries to carry 
out an essential part of the governance required by recent recommendations on corporate 
governance, it seems that these committees have not yet achieved the degree of independence that 
enables them to discharge their duties adequately. 
 
6.5.1.2 Non-Executive Directors’ Commitment 
Non-Executive Directors’ Private Meetings 
Hypothesis 8 predicts a significantly negative relationship between the occurrence of earnings 
management and NEDs‟ private meetings.  As shown in table 6.7, the hypothesis is not supported.  
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No significantly negative association exists between the occurrence of earnings management and 
NEDs‟ private meetings but the coefficient shows a negative direction, as hypothesised. 
 
A dummy variable taking the value of one if the NEDs meet without the presence of executive 
directors at least once a year, and zero otherwise, is used to determine the effect of these meetings.  
However, using a continuous variable may have allowed for the larger scope to capture the effect of 
such confidential meetings and thus the result might have been different.  Unfortunately, there is 
insufficient disclosure to enable the researcher to examine this variable in continuous form; the 
majority of the study sample firms only disclose whether a meeting has taken a place or not and they 
do not specify the number of meetings that were held during the financial year.  
 
The finding of NEDMEET may have two explanations.  First, NEDs‟ private meetings may be a 
good indicator of the independent directors‟ diligence and commitment but the dummy variable 
could not capture the effect of these private meetings on earnings management.  Secondly, as both 
board meetings and audit committee meetings do not show a significant effect on earnings 
management in this and many prior studies, meetings in general may not be a suitable measure of 
diligence and activity.  This result may give some support to the argument that a great deal of 
independent director activity occurs outside of formal meetings (Gendron and Bédard, 2006; Spira, 
2002; Turley and Zaman, 2007). 
 
Non-Executive Directors’ Fees 
Using non-executive directors fees (NEDFEE) as a measure of independent directors‟ commitment, 
the result shows that NEDFEE is significantly (p-value = 0.01) and negatively related with the 
earnings management indicator (as hypothesised).  This finding is consistent with the notion that 
committed independent outside directors are effective monitors of accrual management and that 
firms with highly paid outside directors tend to be less involved in accrual management.  
 
This result confirms the study assumption that the workload of a NED contributes to the 
determination of the fees paid.  NEDs who are required to spend more time and effort in the role 
expect to be remunerated accordingly.  This finding, therefore, supports the UK regularity 
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recommendation on Greenbury‟s guidance that non-executive directors should be paid for their time 
and efforts. 
 
This result provides modest support for the findings of Adams and Ferreira (2004) who use a large 
panel data set on directors‟ attendance at board meetings in publicly-listed firms for the period from 
1996 to 2003.  They provide robust evidence that directors are less likely to have attendance 
problems at board meetings when board meeting fees are higher.  They suggest that directors appear 
to perform their monitoring roles for even very small financial rewards. 
 
6.5.1.3 Ownership Structures 
Managerial Ownership 
According to the agency theory, hypothesis 10 predicts that managerial ownership (MANAGOWN) 
is negatively associated with earnings management.  The coefficient on MANAGOWN is negative 
but insignificant.  This coefficient remains negative in all the models.  However, this hypothesis is 
not supported.  This result may be because managerial ownership in this study sample is negligible. 
Table 6.2 shows a managerial ownership mean of .03 and a median of .08.  Given this low level of 
managers‟ equity interest, it is unlikely that managerial ownership can mitigate the potential conflict 
of interests arising from the separation of control and ownership.   
 
This result is inconsistent with that of Warfield et al. (1995) though they report a significantly 
higher managerial ownership mean of 21%.  Additionally, the earnings management proxy is 
different in their study as they use a five-year average of prior period accruals, whereas this study 
uses the performance adjusted accruals model of Kothari et al. (2005).  They report a mean of 
absolute discretionary accruals of 26%, which is much higher than the .05 of this study and 
significantly different to those of many other studies that report results that oppose their findings.  
 
The evidence on directors‟ ownership is mixed, and some previous studies have even found that 
managerial ownership is positively related to discretionary accruals (Gul et al., 2003; Bergstresser 
and Philippon, 2006; Ronen et al., 2006).  
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This study‟s result is identical to that of the most recent study in the UK (Laux and Laux, 2009) that 
finds no affect of managerial ownership on earnings management.  Their results show that an 
increase in CEO equity incentives does not necessarily increase earnings management.  
 
Additionally, this study‟s result is consistent with previous findings in the UK of Peasnell et al. 
(2005) who hypothesise that the constraining association between earnings management and an 
independent board and independent audit committee will be more pronounced when the level of 
managerial share ownership is low.  They do not document a direct relationship between earnings 
management and managerial ownership.  Although, this study uses a different measure of 
managerial ownership to that of Peasnell, et al (2005), both findings reveal the same result. 
 
These results, along with the previous UK findings, do not support agency theory predictions but 
they are in harmony with the stewardship perspective that professional managers and shareholders 
do not have any conflict of interest and that there is a convergence between managers‟ interests and 
organisational goals (Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Davis et al., 1997). 
 
Institutional Investors’ Ownership 
Prior research points out that institutional investors focus on the long-term value of stocks (Bushee, 
1998).  Research also indicates that institutional investors are more sophisticated investors and have 
better access to financial information (El-Gazzar, 1998; Bartov et al., 2001).  Therefore, institutional 
ownership in the firm is considered to contribute to good corporate governance and serve as an 
additional monitoring mechanism of the financial reporting process.  This study‟s result does not 
support this stream of research as INSTOWN is found to be insignificant in all models examined.  
 
The majority of the evidence documented in the previous literature is that institutional ownership 
has a negative effect on earnings management. Examples are the studies of Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam (1998), Bushee (2001), Yu (2008) and Charitou et al. (2007) using U.S. data;  Koh 
(2003) and Koh and Hsu (2005) using Australian data;  Park and Shin (2004) using Canadian firms; 
and  Osma and Noguer (2007) using Spanish data. 
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This result does not support the hypothesis that institutional ownership constrains EM. However, 
this result is consistent with the previous UK evidence of Peasnall et al. (2000) and Peasnall et al. 
(2005) who find that no association between accruals and institutional investors.  This may raise 
questions about the role and the characteristics of British institutional investors and their awareness 
of, and reaction to, management discretion. 
 
A reasonable explanation of the no-finding result for institutional ownership in this study is the 
different characteristics and strategies of UK and US institutional investors.  Ferreira and Matos 
(2006), as cited in Khurshed et al. (2007), investigate firm and country level characteristics for types 
of firms that attract institutional investors globally.  They find that institutional investors prefer 
large, liquid stocks with good corporate governance practice.  However, Khurshed et al. (2007) 
show that UK institutional investors prefer smaller firms, firms with smaller boards, and firms with 
a shorter listing history and low trading liquidity.  They also find that UK institutional investors are 
negatively associated with dividend yield after the tax exemption of dividend income was 
terminated.  This finding also supports the result of Short and Keasey (1999) who demonstrate 
fundamental differences in corporate governance practice in the US and UK and argue that these 
differences have contributed to a very different non-linear relationship between ownership and firm 
performance in the two countries. 
 
Another possible explanation for the difference between the findings of this study and the previous 
US, Canada and Australian findings, on the other side, is different measurements of both 
institutional ownership and earnings management.  Prior studies measure the institutional ownership 
in different ways, such as institutional non-blockholders and active institutional blockholders, and 
they measure earnings management differently, such as using R&D spending and the modified 
Jones model, without adjusting for firm performance.  Nevertheless, in the robustness check, this 
study examines the non-linear relationship between institutional ownership and earnings 
management to investigate whether a „U‟ relationship exists, as some prior studies have suggested.  
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Blockholders’ Ownership 
Surprisingly, and contrary to hypothesis 12, blockholders‟ ownership is found to be positively 
related to earnings management at a 1% level.  This contradicts the hypothesis that blockholders 
benefit the firm by aligning the interests of shareholders and directors.  
 
The agency framework developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) argues that the existence of large 
shareholders can be expected to lower opportunistic earnings management.  However, the opposite 
relationship between blockholders ownership and earnings management found in this study suggests 
that blockholders ownership is not as effective as propagated by agency theorists in reducing agency 
problems, and particularly in constraining earnings management.  Empirically, many previous 
studies could not document any effect of the blockholder in preventing opportunistic earnings 
management (Park and Shin, 2003; Abdul Rahman and Haniffa, 2005; Abdul Rahman and Ali, 
2006).  In the UK context, Goergen et al. (2005) study the corporate governance system and assert 
that the way in which the ownership of listed companies is concentrated in the hands of corporate 
directors and of passive institutional investors creates its own type of agency problems. 
 
This result is consistent with the findings of the recent study of Zhong et al. (2007) who use a large 
sample of US firms from 1994 to 2003 to examine the two competing views concerning the effect of 
blockholders on earnings management.  The first view is that outside blockholders, with a higher 
motivation and ability to monitor managers' actions than small shareholders, might reduce earnings 
management.  The second view states that outside blockholders require a higher return from firms in 
their portfolio and, because they pose an intervention threat to the firm's management, they may 
increase managers' incentives to conduct income-increasing earnings management.  Zhong et al. 
(2007) reveal a result that is consistent with the second view, indicating that outside blockholders 
ownership is positively associated with discretionary accruals.  As a robustness test, they use a 
dummy variable of BLOCK using 20%, 25%, and 30% cut-off points to test for the non-linear effect 
of ownership, and different measures of earnings management, and they still do not find a different 
result. 
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This result is also consistent with the empirical findings of Yu (2008) who uses the percentage of 
stocks owned by the largest blockholders and investigates its association with discretionary accruals.  
The earnings management level of a firm with large shareholders is found to be higher than that of a 
firm without large shareholders by 17% of the sample mean and 30% of the median.  
 
One possible conjecture concerning this result is that large shareholders may expropriate the 
interests of other investors and stakeholders by colluding with management, as observed by Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997).  Furthermore, concentrated ownership enables blockholders to use accounting 
information to their own advantage; for instance through income-decreasing in order to diminish the 
other shareholders‟ residual claims (Claessens et al., 2000). 
 
Zhong et al. (2007) suggest that another possible explanation of this contrasting result is that the 
positive association between blockholders and discretionary accruals is caused by the positive 
relationship between estimated discretionary accruals and earnings volatility.  Zhong et al. (2007), 
suggests that blockholders may be positively associated with earnings volatility because firms with 
more volatile earnings need patient and dedicated investors who are not sensitive to short-term 
performance volatility which support the previously discussed argument of Khurshed et al. (2007) in 
the institutional ownership section above. 
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6.5.2 Results and Discussion of the Second Model 
The second model of this study examines the association between discretionary accruals, as an 
indicator of earnings management, and external auditor factors and audit committee effectiveness.  
Table 6.8 reports the GLS regression results for this model.  The adjusted R2 obtained in this model 
is fairly comparable with those in similar studies, for example those by Frankel et al. (2002) and 
Ashbaugh, et al. (2003). The constant is negative and significant at (p<0.10). 
 
6.5.2.1 Audit Committee Effectiveness 
Audit Committee Independence  
Hypothesis 13 expects that audit committee independence (AUDIND) is negatively associated with 
the level of discretionary accruals.  As expected, a negative association between (AUDIND) and the 
empirical indicator of earnings management is found (β=0.040, z=2.65, p<0.01).  
This result is consistent with US and Australian findings (Klein, 2002a; Bedard et al., 2004; Benkel 
et al., 2006), and with international evidence on the importance of an independent audit committee. 
Bradbury (2006) uses 139 firms from Singapore and 113 firms from Malaysia while Piot and Janin 
(2007) uses a sample of SBF 120 Index French companies and both studies find that audit 
committee independence is an effective attribute on constraining earnings management practice. 
 
However, there are opposite findings. Abdul Rahman and Ali et al. (2006) use 97 Malaysian firms 
and find insufficient evidence of a negative relationship between earnings management and 
independent audit committees.  Their result may be influenced either by different types of earnings 
management or the small size of their sample.  Despite this study, there is global acceptance of the 
view that that audit committee independence helps to reduce earnings management. 
 
Peasnell et al. (2005) examine whether the incidence of earnings management by UK listed firms in 
fiscal years ending between 1993 to1996 depends on outside board members and the existence of an 
audit committee.  They find no evidence that the presence of an audit committee directly affects the 
extent of income-increasing manipulations to meet or exceed these thresholds; audit committees also 
do not appear to have a direct effect on the degree of downward manipulation when pre-managed 
earnings exceed these thresholds by a large margin.  Peasnell et al. (2005) offer the conjecture for 
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their failure to detect an audit committee effect that it might be because the great majority of firms 
in their sample have such a committee.  However, their results are based on the mere existence of an 
audit committee and they do not research its independence and competence, which are two factors 
that can greatly enhance the efficiency of the monitoring process and, thus, a reduction in earnings 
management.  
 
Given that, primarily, large board size, audit committee independence and nomination committee 
independence display significant results, the findings of this study augment the argument raised by 
Klein (2002a) that board sub-committee (i.e. audit committee and nomination committee) 
assignments are influenced by board size since large boards have more directors to contribute to the 
sub-committees, which are then able to distribute the work load over a greater number of directors. 
 
Audit Committee Financial Expertise 
Hypothesis 14 predicts that audit committee expertise (AUDEXP) is negatively associated with the 
level of earnings management.  The negatively signed coefficient (β = 0.022, Z=2.62, p < 0.01) on 
AUDEXP supports this hypothesis.  This suggests that the presence of a financial expert on the audit 
committee plays an important role in carrying out the committee‟s monitoring responsibility and in 
constraining earnings management behaviour.  Thus, the result suggests that audit committees that 
include at least one member with financial expertise are likely to discourage management from 
manipulating the earnings figures in annual reports. 
 
This finding supports the recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Combined Code 
(2003) that audit committees should include at least one member with relevant financial experience 
in order to be effective monitors of the financial reporting process.  It also supports the findings of 
Song and Windram‟s (2004) evaluation of the proposals of the Cadbury Committee (1992) in the 
UK and the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) in the US relating to audit committees. They examine 
the effectiveness of UK audit committees in improving the quality of financial reporting and 
documented that financial literacy is an important determinant of the audit committee‟s 
effectiveness.  This result is also consistent with the vast majority of the previous research that 
investigates the effect of financial experts on earnings management, such as that of Choi et al. 
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(2004),  Park and Shin (2003), Carcello et al. (2006), Chen (2007), Baxter and Cotter (2009) and  Lo 
et al. (2010). 
 
However, it contrasts with the finding of Abdul Rahman and Ali et al. (2006) that there is evidence 
of a negative relationship between earnings management and the presence of a financial expert on 
the audit committee.  Their result may be due to the type of earnings management they examined or 
to their small sample size of only 97 companies. 
 
Audit Committee Size  
No significant relationship is found between audit committees size (AUDSIZE) and the level of 
discretionary accruals.  This result may support the argument that larger audit committees do not 
significantly enhance the quality of financial reporting. 
 
This result is inconsistent with prior research that finds that larger audit committees are associated 
with lower quarterly earnings management (Yang and Krishnan, 2005), fewer earnings restatements 
(Lin et al., 2006) and enhanced financial reporting quality (Felo et al., 2003).  However, this result 
is similar to that of the vast majority of studies, such as those of Xie et al. (2003), Abbott et al. 
(2004), Bédard et al. (2004), Davidson et al. (2005) and Baxter and Cotter (2009), that examine the 
effect of audit committees size on earnings management, and fail to find a significant impact of 
audit committee size on earnings management.  
 
However, although no statistically significant relationship is detected, a negative directional sign of 
the coefficient is observed, which, along with the significant negative finding of the univariate test, 
lends modest support to hypothesis 15 that large audit committees may improve accounting 
reporting quality. 
 
Audit Committee Meetings  
The tests for hypothesis 16 regarding the relationship between the number of audit committee 
meetings (AUDMEET) and earnings management show insignificant relationships. This result may 
support the argument that the number of audit committees meetings does not significantly enhance 
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the quality of financial reporting.  However, although no statistically significant relationship is 
detected, a negative directional sign of the coefficient is observed. 
 
This result is similar to that of Davidson et al. (2005) who report an insignificant relationship 
between the number of audit committee meetings and earnings management.  Additionally, Abdul 
Rahman and Ali et al. (2006) find insufficient evidence for a negative relationship between earnings 
management and the frequency of audit committee meetings.  It is also similar to the finding of 
Baxter and Cotter (2009) who investigate whether audit committees are associated with earnings 
quality in Australia.  They use two measures of earnings quality, based on the Jones (1991) and 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) models.  Their results indicate no association between audit committee 
meetings and both earnings quality measures.  As discussed in the literature chapter, the vast 
majority of studies that investigate the relationship between earnings management and audit 
committee meetings document that no association exists.  This result is also in line with the 
conclusion of Spira (1999) that audit committee meetings are largely ceremonial and that they are 
largely ineffective in improving financial reporting.  
 
Although Ebrahim (2007) does not document a direct relationship between earnings management 
and the number of audit committee meetings, he examines the relationship between earnings 
management and the activity of both the board and the audit committee.   Using a sample of 
manufacturing companies, he finds that earnings management is negatively related to both board 
and audit committee independence and documents that the negative relationship between board and 
audit committee independence with earnings management is stronger when the audit committee is 
more active.  However, this result is not valid for board activity.  Thus, audit committee meetings 
may have an indirect effect on earning quality and this is examined in the sensitivity analysis section 
under the audit committee aggregate score. 
 
The finding of AUDMEET may have another explanation. The number of meetings may not be a 
good indicator of the audit committee‟s diligence and activity; this mirrors earlier comments in this 
and other studies that neither board meetings nor NEDs‟ private meetings show a significant effect 
on earnings management.  
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Instead, this result may provide some support for the argument that a great deal of independent 
director activity occurs outside of formal meetings (Gendron and Bédard, 2006, Spira, 2002 and 
Turley and Zaman, 2007).  The latter use a case study approach, interviewing nine individuals at one 
UK company, including the audit committee chair, internal and external auditors, and senior 
managers.  They find that the audit committee‟s greatest impact comes through informal processes.  
They report that audit committee members tend not to raise complex, probing questions or views 
during board or audit committee meetings, but they influence governance outcomes through 
informal meetings with the auditors.  
 
6.5.2.2 External Audit Factors 
Audit and Non-Audit Fees 
In this model, the coefficient on the first measure of non-audit fees (NAF1) is positive and 
significant (β=0.017, z=2.46, p<0.01), suggesting that, as the magnitude of non-audit fees generated 
by a client increases, the level of discretionary accrual increases. This result supports hypothesis 17. 
 
The coefficient on the first measure of audit fees (AF1) is negative and significant (β=0.028, z= -
2.99, p<0.01), suggesting that, as the audit fees generated by a client increases, the level of earnings 
management decreases.  This result supports hypothesis eighteen. 
 
These results suggest that when a client generates relatively higher levels of non-audit fees 
compared to the fees received from all other clients of the audit firm, the level of earnings 
management increases.  They also suggest that, for clients who are a significant source of revenues 
for the audit firm, particularly fees from non-audit services, there appears to be greater discretion 
over financial reporting by the auditor.  This is consistent with the regulatory concern that non-audit 
fees impair auditor independence.  
 
This study uses several methods to measure both audit and non-audit fees.  The second method of 
measurement for the non-audit fees variable is the proportion of non-audit fees in the total fees 
(NAF2), and the measurement of the audit fees variable is the proportion of audit fees in the total 
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fees (AF2).  The multivariate analysis in table 6.8 also shows the results for these alternative 
variables.  
 
NAF2 and AF2 are not included in the same model as this would introduce a high level of 
multicollinearity into the analysis.  The results for both variables support the main findings, namely, 
that non-audit fees have a significant and positive relationship with earnings management, while 
audit fees show a negative and significant association with earnings management.  
 
These client-importance based findings are generally consistent with prior UK evidence, such as that 
of Srinidhi and Gul (2007). The auditor impairment results are also consistent with those of Sharma 
(2001) and Sharma and Sidhu (2001) who report that auditors are more willing to issue positive 
audit opinions to clients that generate greater non-audit fees, and with Dee et al. (2006) who find 
that higher proportions of non-audit fees are associated with higher income-increasing accruals, 
implying lower quality of earnings. 
 
The negative audit fees result is also consistent with Stanley and DeZoort (2007) who document an 
inverse relation between audit fees and the likelihood of financial restatements. It is also similar to 
Gul et al. (2003) who use 648 Australian firms; their regression results show a negative association 
between earnings management and audit fees.  This supports the argument that the auditing market 
is more regulated than the non-audit services market (Srinidhi et al., 2007).  It also supports the 
view that audit fees are more likely to reflect auditing efforts, which in turn produce better accrual 
quality.  
 
Comparing the result with previous UK studies, this result is consistent with all prior UK evidences; 
these results are similar to Gore et al. (2001) who report a positive association between non-audit 
fees, measured as the ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees, and earnings management for non-
Big 5 clients, but not for Big 5 clients.  In addition, this result is inconsistent with the evidence of 
Antle et al. (2006) find that higher non-audit fees, as measured by the ratio of non-audit to audit 
fees, increase abnormal accruals while higher audit fees decrease abnormal accruals. These results 
are also consistent with prior UK evidence by Ferguson et al. (2004) who document a positive 
association between NAF and discretionary accruals. 
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This result supports the stream of research that argues that NAF can impair auditor independence in 
appearance, as argued by Solomon et al. (2005), Francis (2006), Lai and Krishnan (2009) and Quick 
and Warming-Rasmussen (2009).  It also supports the concern of regulatory bodies, such as the 
SEC, that NAF may be a threat to auditor independence. 
 
All in all, this study‟s result supports the large number of previous research findings, such as those 
of Gore et al. (2001), Frankel et al. (2002), Larcker and Richardson (2004), Solomon et al. (2005), 
Cahan et al. (2008) and Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2009), that auditors are perceived to be 
less independent when they provide additional  services.  Furthermore, this is consistent with 
regulatory concern that non-audit fees impair the auditor‟s independence.  
 
Specialised Auditor  
Hypothesis 19 expects that auditor industry specialisation is negatively associated with the level of 
discretionary accruals.  As expected, SPEAUD (β=0.019, z=1.86, p<0.05) shows a negative 
significant association with the level of discretionary accruals.  However, the second measure of 
specialised auditor, based on the number of audited firms for each auditor, does not show a 
significant association with discretionary accruals.  The first measure of specialised auditor is more 
sophisticated and has been used extensively in the prior research, whereas the second measure may 
not reflect client–specific knowledge as it is based only on the number of clients regardless of their 
importance and the complexity of their operations.  
 
This result supports the concerns about reduced audit quality due to a lack of client-specific 
knowledge.  It is consistent with evidence suggesting that auditor industry specialisation is 
positively related to financial reporting quality (e.g., Elder and Zhou, 2002; Balsam et al., 2003; 
Krishnan, 2003; Stanley and DeZoort, 2007; Bloomfield and Shackman, 2008; Gul et al., 2009), 
greater compliance with auditing standards (O'Keefe et al., 1994), disclosure quality (Dunn and 
Mayhew, 2004), and concern about reputation losses and litigation exposure (Lim and Tan, 2007). 
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6.5.3 Control Variables: Results and Discussion 
This section discusses the results for the control variables in both models; they are dealt with 
together since they are the same control variables and they show broadly similar results.  Tables 6.4 
and 6.5 present the control variable results.  All control variables are subjected to a number of 
multivariate tests in both models in order to determine whether additional company characteristics 
have any effect on earnings management.  The results are generally consistent with findings in the 
prior literature. 
 
CFO and SIZE are statistically significant in both models, while GROWTH and IFRS do not exhibit 
any statistically significant differences in either model.  Furthermore, LEVG and ROA produce 
inconclusive results, in that no significance is detected through the tests of one of the models and 
significance is identified in the other model.  The next section presents and discusses the result for 
each control variable. 
 
Firm Performance (ROA) 
The result for ROA shows inconclusive results for the effect of performance on the earnings 
management indicator.  The first model finds an insignificant positive relationship while the second 
model finds a significant positive relationship.  
 
This later result is consistent with the prior studies that find that firms with a strong performance are 
more likely to manage discretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 1995).  Kasznik (1999) suggests that 
firm performance tends to have a positive relation with DAC.  
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Table 6.8 Second Model Main Test (GLS) 
DAC Exp sign Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z 
Audit committee Effectiveness 
AUDIIND - -0.040 -2.650 *** -0.043 -2.920 *** -0.046 -3.040 *** -0.040 -2.600 *** 
AUDEXP - -0.022 -2.620 *** -0.023 -2.770 *** -0.023 -2.770 *** -0.022 -2.600 *** 
AUDSIZE - -0.003 -0.750  -0.005 -1.250  -0.005 -1.310  -0.003 -0.600  
AUDMEET - -0.002 -0.770  -0.002 -0.680  -0.002 -0.760  -0.003 -0.920  
External Audit Factors 
NAF1 + 0.017 2.460 ***       0.017 2.430 *** 
AF1 - -0.028 -2.990 ***       -0.028 -3.020 *** 
NAF2 +    0.036 2.360 ***       
AF2 -       -0.035 -2.250 ***    
SPEAUD1 - -0.019 -1.860 ** -0.018 -1.800 * -0.017 -1.660 *    
SPEAUD2 -          -0.003 -0.380  
Control Variables 
MANGOWN ? -0.011 -0.260  0.009 0.230  0.020 0.480  -0.012 -0.300  
IFRS ? -0.008 -1.030  -0.008 -1.090  -0.009 -1.200  -0.007 -1.000  
SIZE ? 0.034 3.860 *** 0.033 3.820 *** 0.032 3.710 *** 0.034 3.900 *** 
LEVG ? 0.000 1.210  0.000 1.170  0.000 0.910  0.000 1.000  
GROWTH ? -0.013 -1.530  -0.012 -1.340  -0.012 -1.400  -0.013 -1.430  
CFO ? -0.265 -4.220 *** -0.275 -4.460 *** -0.303 -4.830 *** -0.261 -4.140 *** 
ROA ? 0.102 1.900 ** 0.095 1.790 * 0.102 1.890 ** 0.098 1.810 * 
_cons  -0.082 -1.410 * -0.083 -1.460 * -0.041 -0.700 * -0.087 -1.490 * 
Adj R-2 19%                                                 17%                                          17%                                            18%                      
Wald chi2 51.24***                                              63.22***                                   62.46***                                     58.47*** 
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Firm Size (SIZE)  
Prior studies suggest that large firms have more pressure on their management to report more 
predictable earnings (Pincus and Rajgopal, 2002).  Thus, managers are likely to engage in earnings 
management to achieve this predictability.  Consistent with prior studies‟ findings such as 
Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) and with expectations of agency theory, SIZE is found to have a 
significant positive relationship with earnings management at a level of p=.01 in both models.  
 
Leverage (LEVG)  
Leverage represents the debt structure of a company and is used in numerous studies as a measure for 
debt covenant violations (Erickson et al., 2004; Elayan et al., 2008). In this study, highly leveraged 
companies are found to be less involved in fraudulent practices, such as earnings management.  
 
This result is consistent with Becker et al. (1998) who find that leverage is negatively associated with 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals.  The negative relationship between leverage and 
discretionary accruals is consistent with a conservative accounting attitude that responds to debt 
holders‟ concerns in assessing potential loans, or in monitoring borrowers‟ ability to pay back 
existing loans (Watts, 2003).  Even though firms close to violating debt constraints have incentives to 
manage earnings upward to meet debt covenants, their opportunities to manage earnings may be 
more limited.  
 
In the second model, LEVG shows an insignificant relationship with earnings management, which is 
consistent with the finding of Jiang et al. (2008) who suggests that leverage changes may have 
differing impacts on earnings management. 
 
Firm Growth (GROWTH) 
Previous studies have shown inconclusive results on the expected effect of a firm‟s growth on 
discretionary accruals (e.g. Abbott et al., 2004; Carcello et al., 2004 and Ashbaugh et al. 2006). 
GROWTH shows no significant relationship with discretionary accruals, which is the same as the 
univariate analysis result using the Mann Whitney non-parametric test. 
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Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) 
The result shows that CFO is significantly (p-value = 0.01) and negatively related with the earnings 
management indicator.  This finding is consistent with the notion that CFO influences the magnitude 
of the discretionary accruals.  It is also consistent with the prior studies that find that firms with a 
strong CFO performance are less likely to manage discretionary accruals because they are already 
performing well (Jiang et al., 2008; Lobo and Zhou, 2006 and Becker et al., 1998)  
 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
No significant relationship is found between IFRS and the level of discretionary accruals.  This result 
may support the argument that the introduction of the IFRS did not make a significant difference to 
the British companies in terms of earnings manipulation.  However, although no statistically 
significant relationship is detected, a negative directional sign of the coefficient is observed in both 
models, thus lending modest support to the notion that the introduction of IFRS may have improved 
accounting reporting quality. 
 
It is difficult to compare this result with prior studies as no study has examined the effect of IFRS on 
discretionary accruals in the UK or a similar institutional context.  Different countries have different 
accounting standards and a comparison of the earnings management level prior to and post the new 
accounting standards can be expected to produce different results.  However, this result is 
inconsistent with the findings of Barth et al. (2008) who used Germany as a case study 
 
6.5.4 Further Analyses and Robustness Checks 
6.5.4.1 Alternative Measurement of Earnings Management 
In addition to applying the Kothari et al. (2005) model of estimating DAC using total accruals 
(TAC), this study applies the same model using only the current accruals (CAC). 
 
Guenther (1994) and Becker et al. (1998) suggest that management have greater discretion over 
current accruals than long-term accruals. In the UK, Gore et al., (2007) find that discretionary 
working capital accruals have the effect of significantly increasing the frequencies of firms achieving 
earnings targets both overall and by small margins. Sloan (1996) reports that most of the variations in 
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total accruals are driven by current accruals.  Current accruals adjustments involve current assets and 
liabilities that support the daily operations of the firm. In addition, Peasnell et al., (1998)  argue that 
working capital accruals include such judgmental items as provisions for doubtful debts, warranties 
and inventory obsolescence, which prior research shows are used to manage earnings (e.g. 
McNichols & Wilson, 1988).  
 
Current accruals can be manipulated easily by managers, for example, through advancing revenues 
recognition before receiving the cash or by delaying expenses recognition through low provision for 
bad debts.  Therefore, discretionary current accruals may be a superior proxy for earnings 
management than discretionary long-term accruals.  Ashbaugh et al. (2003), and some recent other 
studies, focus on the discretionary current accruals by applying the modified Jones model using 
current accruals instead of total accruals as a dependent variable, after eliminating property, plant and 
equipment (PPE) from the model.  Consistent with Ashbaugh et al. (2003), this study measures 
current accruals by net income before extraordinary items, plus depreciation and amortisation, and 
minus operating cash flows, scaled by lagged total assets.  
  
Due to the fact that this study does not examine any particular event and focuses on the magnitude 
rather than the direction of earnings management, the absolute value of DAC as a dependent variable 
is used. In addition, the absolute value is used because earnings management can involve either 
income increasing or income decreasing accruals to meet earnings targets (Warfield et al., 1995; 
Klein, 2002b and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 2010). Examples of recent studies that use this 
measure include those of Klein (2002b), Chung & Kallapur (2003), Benkel et al. (2006), Choi and 
Lee (2009) and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010).  The estimation of this model follows these 
equations. 
 
CAC it    / TA it -1   = ά (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it) / TA it -1 + ε it                       
 
Dechow et al. (1995) test several models for detecting earnings management and find that adding the 
change in receivables to the Jones model leads to a more powerful measure to detect earnings 
management.  Therefore the change in receivables (Δ REC) is added to the previous equation, thus: 
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CAC it    / TA it -1   = ά (1 / TA it -1) + β1(Δ REV it   - Δ REC it) / TA it -1 + ε it                       
 
Additionally, Kothari et al. (2005) argue that the DAC, as estimated by both the Jones and the 
modified Jones models, may result in severe measurement error in DAC when these models do not 
control for the prior performance of the company.   They propose a model that includes an intercept 
and control for the firm‟s performance using the lag of return on assets (ROA) to mitigate the 
problematic heteroskedasticity and mis-specified issues of the Jones and the modified Jones models 
in estimating accruals. 
 
Following Ashbaugh et al. (2003), this study adds the return on assets of the previous year (ROA) as 
an additional regressor to the cross-sectional modified Jones model in the current accrual model.  
Thus, the final equation to calculate the current discretionary accruals (CDAC) is as follows: 
 
CAC it    / TA it -1   = ά (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it   - Δ REC it) / TA it -1 +   β 2    ROA it -1 + ε it                    
 
First Model Results Using the Alternative Proxy of Earnings Management 
The Ashbaugh et al. (2003) model is used to calculate earnings management, and then the same 
model is re-tested as an additional analysis that investigates the effect of the board of directors‟ 
composition and ownership structure variables in constraining current earnings management practice.  
Table 6.9 reports the GLS regression of current accruals on the board composition and ownership 
structure variables.  The adjusted R2 obtained in this model is fairly comparable with Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003) and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010).   
 
Consistent with the main test, the coefficient on board independence (BRDIND) is negative and 
significant (β=0.041, z= -1.59, p<0.10), suggesting that, as the number of independent directors in a 
firm increases, the level of current accruals decreases.  Additionally, board size (BRDSIZE) shows a 
significant negative relationship with the level of earnings management, as in the main model. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of independent nomination committee (NOMIND) is negative and 
significant (β=0.028, z= -1.97, p<0.05), suggesting that an independent nomination procedure 
constrains the level of the current accruals.  This suggests that the board characteristics previously 
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found, in the main model, to affect the long term discretionary accruals, continue to have the same 
affect on current discretionary accruals.  
 
Consistent with the main test, CHAIRIND is negatively associated with the level of current 
discretionary accruals.  The coefficient on CHAIRIND is stronger, as it is significant at the p=0.01 
level, compared with p=0.10 in the main model.  The second measure of chairman independence, 
based on the Combined Code independence criteria for chairmen (CHAIRCOD) also does not show a 
significant association with current discretionary accruals as predicted.  
 
In terms of the NED‟s commitment variables, consistent with the main test, NEDs‟ fees (NEDFEE) 
shows a negative significant relationship with current discretionary accruals at a 10% level, which is 
lower than the significance level in the main model. NEDMEET still shows no significant association 
with different measures of earnings management.  This enhances the main test findings regarding the 
importance of NEDs‟ fees as a measure of NED‟s efforts and commitment in constraining earnings 
management behaviour.  
 
Interestingly, BLOCK does not show a significant positive relationship with the second indicator of 
earnings management, which may make the main test findings sensitive and inconsistent with 
different types of accruals.  This result suggests that blockholders may apply pressure on the 
management for long-run return but not for short-term or current benefits.  
 
Additionally, as previously found in the main test, other control variables show the same directions 
and significance in relation to the second measure of earnings management except for leverage 
LEVG and ROA. The former shows the same direction but with a coefficient below the significance 
level (p value = 0.17) and the latter shows a significant positive association with the current accruals. 
 
Second Model Results Using Alternative Proxy of Earnings Management 
The Ashbaugh et al. (2003) model is used to calculate earnings management, and then the models are 
retested as an additional analysis that investigates the effect of the external auditor and audit 
committee variables in constraining current earnings management practice.  Table 6.9 reports the 
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GLS regression of current accruals on the external auditor and audit committee variables.  The 
adjusted R2 obtained in this model is fairly comparable with that in similar studies, for example those 
of Frankel et al. (2002) and Ashbaugh et al. (2003). The constant is negative and highly significant at 
p<0.01. 
 
In terms of audit committee characteristics, consistent with the main test, both audit committee 
independence and expertise show a negative significant relationship with current discretionary 
accruals at a 1% level.  This enhances the previous findings in the main test about the importance of 
these two variables in constraining current earnings management behaviour.  Additionally, as 
previously found in the main test, both audit committees size and number of meetings do not appear 
to have a statistically significant effect on the current earnings management indicator.   
 
Consistent with the main test, the coefficient on non-audit fees (NAF) is positive and significant 
(β=0.021, z=2.72, p<0.01), suggesting that, as the relative non-audit fees generated by a client 
increases, the level of current accrual increases.  The coefficient on audit fees (AF) is negative and 
significant (β=0.021, z= -2.12, p<0.05), suggesting that, as the relative AF generated by a client 
increases, the level of current accruals decreases.  These results suggest that when a client generates 
relatively higher levels of non-audit fees compared to the fees received from all other clients of the 
audit firm, the level of earnings management increases.  This result also suggests that clients that are 
a significant source of revenues for the audit firm, particularly fees from non-audit services, appear to 
permit greater discretion over financial reporting by the auditor.  Thus, this is consistent with 
regulatory concern that non-audit fees may impair the auditor‟s independence.  
 
Additionally, consistent with the main test, auditor industry specialisation is negatively associated 
with the level of current discretionary accruals.  The coefficients on SPEAUD are β=0.020, z= -1.87 
and p<0.05.  However, the second measure of specialised auditor, based on the number of firms 
audited by each auditor, does not show a significant association with current discretionary accruals. 
Other control variables show the same direction and significance as in the main model. 
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Table 6.9 Alternative EM Proxy (Current Accruals) 
First Model 
 
Second Model 
CDAC 
Exp 
singe Coef. z P>z CDAC 
Exp 
singe Coef. z P>z 
BRDIND - -0.041 -1.590 * NAF1 + 0.021 2.720 *** 
BRDMEET - 0.002 1.320  AF1 - -0.021 -2.120 ** 
BRDSZE - -0.004 -2.310 ** SPEAUD1 - -0.020 -1.870 ** 
WOMEN - -0.044 -1.280  AUDSIZE - -0.003 -0.720  
REMIND - 0.009 1.290  AUDMEET - -0.001 -0.290  
NOMIND - -0.028 -1.970 ** AUDIIND - -0.041 -2.570 *** 
CHAIRND - -0.017 -2.610 *** AUDEXP - -0.019 -2.240 *** 
CHAIRCOD + -0.003 -0.340  MANGOWN ? -0.007 -0.170  
NEDFEE - -0.021 -1.630 * IFRS ? -0.011 -1.420  
NEDMEET - 0.001 0.220  SIZE ? -0.022 -2.570 ** 
MANGOWN - -0.028 -0.800  LEVG ? 0.000 1.820 * 
BLOCK - 0.009 1.510  GROWTH ? -0.013 -1.490  
INSTOWN - 0.000 0.670  CFO ? -0.300 -4.630 *** 
SIZE ? 0.019 2.320 ** ROA ? 0.140 2.550 *** 
IFRS ? -0.008 -1.310  
 
LEVG ? 0.000 -1.100  
 
GROWTH ? 0.001 0.200  
 
CFO ? -0.372 -6.980 *** 
 
ROA ? 0.235 5.230 *** 
 
_cons 0.020 0.480  _cons 0.251 4.420 *** 
Adj R-2 17% Adj R-2 17% 
Wald chi2 73.25*** Wald chi2 61.94*** 
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6.5.4.2 Signed Earnings Management Test 
Following Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Gul et al. (2006), this research partitions the earnings 
management sample into firms with positive (income-increasing) discretionary accruals and firms 
with negative (income-decreasing) discretionary accruals, as the incentives to manage earnings could 
be different for the two directions.  This partition provides evidence on whether or not there is any 
differential relation between the corporate governance and external auditor variables with 
discretionary accruals and whether they are conditional on income-increasing or income-decreasing 
accruals.  
 
The First Model Results of Signed Earnings Management Test 
Table 6.10 reports the GLS estimate of both income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals on corporate governance variables and ownership structures. The adjusted R2 obtained in 
this model is fairly comparable with that in similar studies, for example those of Dimitropoulos and 
Asteriou (2010).  The constant is negative and highly significant at p<0.01 and p<0.10, respectively. 
 
Consistent with the main test result for the absolute value of discretionary accruals, both the income-
decreasing and income-increasing models find a negative coefficient on BRDIND and NOMIND.  
This result supports the view that the board characteristics used in this study are effective in reducing 
both income-decreasing and income-increasing accruals behaviour.  The results for both attributes 
show a significant negative coefficient at 1% level in the income-decreasing sample but a negative 
significant at only a 10% level in the income-increasing sample. This may imply that the board of 
directors‟ characteristics and the nomination committee‟s independence are more effective in 
constraining the income-decreasing type of managers‟ discretion. Moreover, BRDSZE show 
insignificant relationship with either direction of EM. Board size seems to be more effective in 
constraining EM in total but not in a particular direction. 
 
The relation between earnings management and chairman independence differs based on the earnings 
management direction.  In the income-decreasing practice, CHAIRIND still has a negative and 
significant relation with negative discretionary accruals, as in the main results.  However, 
CHAIRIND has no effect on reducing the income-increasing practice.  Interestingly, the chairman‟s 
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independence according to the Code (CHAIRCOD) has a positive and significant relationship 
(coefficient = .028, z=2.54 and p = .01) with positive discretionary accruals, a result that supports this 
study‟s criticism of the Code‟s chairman independence criteria. 
 
Therefore, the independent chairman is only effective in constraining the earnings-decreasing type of 
earnings management practice; he or she seems to be ineffective in preventing managers from 
increasing the reported earnings through earnings management practice.  This may be due to the fact 
that most chairmen are remunerated, in part, by share ownership, although this is supposedly 
insignificant, and they may not try to constrain managers‟ behaviour that would benefit them.  
 
The CHAIRCOD result is interesting as one of this study‟s criticisms of the Code‟s chairman 
independence criteria is that it allows the chairman to have share options and a large equity 
ownership; chairmen who have equity ownership may overlook management attempts to manage 
earnings upwards, as found in this analysis. 
  
This result is supported by the previous findings of this study related to the signed earnings 
management relationship with independent directors on the board and nomination committee, none of 
which show different effects based on the direction of managers‟ discretion activity.  This might be 
due to NEDS not being rewarded by share ownership because it is prohibited by the Code‟s NED 
independence criteria.  Thus, this result supports this study‟s previous recommendation that the 
Code‟s NED independence criteria should be applied to chairmen. 
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Table 6.10 First Model Signed Earnings Management Test 
Negative Earnings Management (Decreasing) Positive Earnings Management (Increasing) 
DAC - Exp Signe Coef. z P>z DAC+ Coef. z P>z 
BRDIND - -0.092 -2.350 *** BRDIND -0.054 -1.630 * 
BRDMEET - 0.002 1.130  BRDMEET 0.001 0.420  
BRDSZE - -0.003 -1.660  BRDSZE -0.003 -1.690  
WOMEN - 0.026 0.540  WOMEN -0.079 -1.610 * 
REMIND - 0.004 0.430  REMIND 0.004 0.450  
NOMIND - -0.053 -2.690 *** NOMIND -0.031 -1.650 * 
CHAIRCOD + 0.003 0.370  CHAIRCOD 0.028 2.540 *** 
CHAIRIND - -0.020 -1.640 * CHAIRIND -0.006 -0.470  
NEDFEE - -0.033 -1.960 ** NEDFEE -0.030 -1.920 ** 
NEDMEET - -0.006 -0.690  NEDMEET -0.009 -0.920  
MANGOWN - -0.036 -0.760  MANGOWN -0.036 -0.690  
INSTOWN - 0.000 1.110  INSTOWN 0.000 1.200  
BLOCK - 0.006 0.510  BLOCK 0.022 2.650 *** 
IFRS ? -0.005 -0.630  IFRS 0.007 0.780  
SIZE ? 0.054 4.880 *** SIZE 0.006 0.450  
LEVG ? -0.001 -3.520 *** LEVG 0.000 -0.990  
GROWTH ? 0.001 0.090  GROWTH 0.036 1.240  
CFO ? -0.209 -2.670 *** CFO -0.122 -1.530 * 
ROA ? 0.017 0.260  ROA 0.017 0.280  
_cons  -0.147 -2.720 *** _cons 0.074 0.960  
  Adj R-2 17%        R-2 18%  
 Wald chi2 69.24***                 Wald chi2 68.14***  
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Interestingly, the gender diversity (WOMEN) variable shows a negative and significant relationship 
at the 10% level with positive discretionary accruals.  The risk of increasing earnings may exceed 
the risk of decreasing earnings and, thus, this result may support the argument that women are more 
risk averse than men.  In the UK, corporate governance codes give guidance on board composition 
and on board directors‟ duties but they are silent on gender diversity as a corporate governance 
practice.  However, in the USA, the National Association of Corporate Directors Blue Ribbon 
Commission recommends that gender, race, age, and nationality diversity should be considered in 
the selection of directors.  This result may lend some support to the American regularity gender 
recommendations. 
 
The NEDs‟ commitment measures (NEDFEE and NEDMEET) both show the same result as in the 
original model.  However, NEDFEE has a lower significant p-value than the main test result, but 
there is no difference in the effect of NEDs‟ fees in either income-increasing or income-decreasing 
earnings management.  
 
BLOCK shows no significant relationship with negative discretionary accruals. However, it is still 
positively significant at a 1% level with positive discretionary accruals.  This result supports the 
view that concentrated ownership permits outside blockholders to use accounting information to 
their own advantage, to require a higher return from firms in their portfolio and to pose a bigger 
threat of intervention to the firm's management.  Therefore, they may increase managers' incentives 
to conduct income-increasing earnings management, as also documented by Zhong et al. (2007).  
 
Among the control variables, SIZE, CFO and LEVG have a significant association with income-
decreasing accruals.  This result supports claims in prior studies that higher discretionary accruals 
are associated with larger sized firms, in line with the political costs hypothesis, and with lower 
leverage firms, in line with the debt covenant hypothesis. The LEVG result is also consistent with 
that of Becker et al. (1998) who find that leverage is negatively associated with the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. 
 
However, in the income-increasing accruals model, although all the control variables show the same 
signs as those shown in the previous models, only CFO shows a statically significant relationship 
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with the measure of positive discretionary accruals.  This may be due to the small sample of 112 
firms in the positive discretionary accruals model. 
 
Second Model Signed Earnings Management Test 
Table 6.11 reports the GLS estimate of both income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals on the external auditor and audit committee variables.  The adjusted R2 obtained in this 
model is fairly comparable with that in similar studies, for example those of Frankel et al. (2002), 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010).  The constant is negative and highly 
significant at p<0.01.  
 
Regarding the audit committee‟s characteristics, audit committee independence (AUDIND) has a 
significant negative effect on the negative discretionary accruals, consistent with the main 
regression.  However, this effect is not significant (though negative with p. value=.15) in reducing 
the positive discretionary accruals.  However, audit committee expertise (AUDEXP) shows a 
continuous significant negative relation with both directions of earnings management.  
 
Audit committee size (AUDSIZE), consistent with the main model‟s result, has no effect in either 
directions of earnings manipulation.  However, interestingly, the number of audit committee 
meetings (AUDMEET), which does not show a significant effect in the main regression for 
unsigned discretionary accruals, shows a significantly negative relation at 5% level with negative 
discretionary accruals only.  This is consistent with this study‟s finding that audit committees in 
general are more effective in constraining downward earnings management. 
 
In the income-decreasing discretionary accruals sample, the coefficient on NAF is positive and 
significant, suggesting that when a client provides a relatively higher proportion of non-audit fees, 
the level of negative discretionary accruals increases.  Moreover, the coefficient on AF is negative 
and significant (β=.032, z=-2.06, p<0.05).  This suggests that when a client pays a relatively higher 
proportion of audit fees, compared to non-audit fees, the level of negative discretionary accruals 
decreases.  
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In the income-increasing discretionary accruals sample, the coefficient on NAF is positive and 
significant (β=0.029, z=2.18, p<0.05), suggesting that as the NAF generated by a client relative to 
other clients increases, the level of positive discretionary accruals also increases.  Furthermore, the 
coefficient on AF is negative and significant, suggesting that when the audit fees are a relatively 
higher proportion of the total fees, the level of positive discretionary accruals decreases.  This is in 
line with some recent evidence (e.g. Dee et al., 2006) that higher proportions of non-audit fees are 
associated with higher income-increasing accruals, implying a lower quality of earnings. 
 
However, the coefficient on SPEAUD is negative and significant only in the income-increasing 
discretionary accruals sample and insignificant in the income-decreasing discretionary accruals 
sample. This suggests that specialised auditors might be more effective in constraining the income-
increasing type of earnings management.  
 
It seems that the specialised auditor and audit committee independence complement each other since 
the former tends to constrain the positive discretionary accruals, while the latter tends to reduce 
negative discretionary accruals.  Unsurprisingly, audit committees behave in the same way as the 
board of directors in that both are more effective in constraining managers‟ aggressive downward 
earnings management and less effective in cases of income-increasing earnings management. Audit 
committee members have share ownership in their firms and this may affect on their monitoring 
behavior, this research results show that independent directors are less effective in constraining 
positive EM. This conclusion offer a modest support to the finding of Archambeault et al. (2008) 
who find a significant positive relation between audit committee members ownership and financial 
restatement likelihood. They add that Short-term options may reduce oversight quality by causing 
audit committee members to focus heavily on short-term performance. 
 
This result is in line with findings of Nelson et al. (2003) who use a field-based questionnaire in 
which 253 auditors from big audit firms recalled and described 515 specific experiences they had 
with clients who they believe were attempting to manage earnings.  They find that when managers 
manage earnings to increase current-year income, auditors require managers to adjust their attempts.  
However, when managers manage earnings to decrease current-year income, auditors require 
managers to adjust their attempts only if they identify them as material or if the attempts are 
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committed by small clients. Additionally, Becker et al., (1998) find that clients of brand name 
auditors are associated with income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Also, Chen et al. (2006) find 
that industry specialist auditors are related to less income increasing earnings management. 
 
6.5.4.3 Parametric (OLS) with Robust Standard Errors and Pooled Regression Tests 
This study adopts a non-parametric test based on the nature of the data.  Previously, the assumptions 
of the OLS regression were discussed and GLS regression was deemed to be more suitable for this 
study.  However, interestingly, some research questions the importance of satisfying the three 
assumptions of OLS tests before employing parametric tests.  With reference to the assumptions of 
normality and homoscedasticity, a number of studies assess the impact of the samples with non-
normal distributions and unequal variances on the values of parametric tests.  The results suggest 
that violation of these two assumptions generally has slight effects on the values of these tests.  One 
exception to this finding is where both the size of samples and variances are unequal.  However, 
some researchers argue that this exception take places even with equal sample sizes (Wilcox, 1987).  
Regarding the third assumption, some research suggests that parametric tests can also be applied 
with ordinal variables since tests apply to numbers and not to what those numbers refer to (Wilcox, 
1987).  
 
Even though it is common to use the non-parametric tests in earnings management studies, some 
prior studies choose the solution of doing nothing about the problem of not meeting the parametric 
test assumptions and carry on using this type of test while recognising its limitations (see e.g., 
Peasnell et al., 2005; Davidson et al., 2005; Abdul Rahman and Ali et al., 2006; Benkel et al., 2006 
and Jaggi et al., 2009). 
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Table 6.11 
Second Model Signed Earnings Management Test 
Negative Earnings Management (Decreasing) Positive Earnings Management (Increasing) 
DAC- Exp Sig Coef. z P>z DAC+ Coef. z P>z 
AUDIIND - -0.058 -2.160 ** AUDIIND -0.062 -1.600  
AUDEXP - -0.041 -2.760 *** AUDEXP -0.042 -2.370 *** 
AUDSIZE - 0.006 0.730  AUDSIZE 0.006 0.810  
AUDMEET - -0.009 -1.890 ** AUDMEET -0.011 -1.420  
NAF + 0.031 2.550 *** NAF 0.030 2.180 ** 
AF - -0.032 -2.060 ** AF -0.031 -1.860 ** 
SPEAUD - -0.018 -0.990  SPEAUD -0.017 -2.030 ** 
MANGOWN ? -0.052 -0.790  MANGOWN -0.040 -0.620  
IFRS ? -0.006 -0.440  IFRS -0.008 -0.670  
SIZE ? -0.027 -1.800 * SIZE -0.023 -1.630 * 
LEVG ? 0.000 -0.450  LEVG 0.000 -0.260  
GROWTH ? -0.016 -1.260  GROWTH -0.016 -0.780  
CFO ? -0.143 -1.560 * CFO -0.136 -1.250  
ROA ? 0.064 0.810  ROA 0.072 0.950  
_cons  0.368 3.690 *** _cons 0.354 2.690 *** 
Adj R-2 17% Adj R-2 12% 
Wald chi2 63.55*** Wald chi2 77.19*** 
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Another point is that one of the main assumptions for the OLS regression is the homogeneity of 
variance of the residuals. If the model is well-fitted, there should be no pattern to the residuals 
plotted against the fitted values. If the variance of the residuals is non-constant then the residual 
variance is said to be "heteroscedastic.". One common method to correct for heteroscedasticity is the 
use Robust Standard Errors or as it called in some text books as (Huber/White estimators or 
sandwich estimators of variance).   
 
 
Table 6.12 Parametric Test (OLS) Regression 
First Model Second Model 
DAC Coef. t P>t DAC Coef. t P>t 
BRDIND -0.046 -1.660 * AUDIND -0.041 -2.680 *** 
BRDMEET 0.002 1.150  AUDEXP -0.022 -2.640 *** 
BRDSZE -0.003 -1.840 ** AUDSIZE -0.004 -0.840  
WOMEN -0.018 -0.490  AUDMEET -0.002 -0.770  
REMIND 0.009 1.240  NAF1 0.016 2.310 *** 
NOMIND -0.045 -2.980 *** AF1 -0.026 -2.710 *** 
CHAICOD 0.009 1.230  SPEAUD1 -0.019 -1.880 ** 
CHAIRIND -0.015 -1.560 * MANGOWN -0.008 -0.200  
NEDFEE -0.032 -2.340 ** IFRS -0.007 -0.560  
NEDMEET -0.004 -0.540  SIZE 0.034 3.810 *** 
INSTOWN 0.000 1.150  LEVG 0.000 1.180  
SIZE 0.040 4.660 *** GROWTH -0.013 -1.500 *** 
MANGOWN -0.030 -0.800  CFO -0.265 -4.200 *** 
BLOCK 0.017 2.540 ** ROA 0.100 1.830 ** 
IFRS 0.011 1.020      
LEVG -0.001 -3.540 ***     
GROWTH 0.003 0.400      
CFO -0.195 -3.430 ***     
ROA 0.002 0.030      
_cons -0.105 -2.360 *** _cons -0.078 -1.330 * 
Adj R-2 17% Adj R-2 18% 
F-statistics 41.24*** F-statistics 59.34*** 
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Robust standard errors address the problem of errors that are not independent and identically 
distributed. The use of robust standard errors will not change the coefficient estimates provided by 
OLS, but they will change the standard errors and significance tests.  Hence, robust standard errors 
OLS regression is more trustworthy in the case of heteroscedasticity presence.  
 
In this sensitivity analysis, following Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010), a parametric test using 
Robust Standard Errors OLS with fixed effect is adopted as a robustness check of the main findings.  
Table 6.12 shows that there are no differences between the main analysis using the non-parametric 
test and the results of the parametric test for both models.  The R square is similar; the results show 
the same level of significance and the coefficients show the same directions for all variables, except 
for BRDSIZE, where the significance level drops from 1% to 5%.  This result shows that using 
different relevant statistical techniques, these results show that this study‟s findings are robust. 
 
Another sensitivity analysis adopted in this study is the pooled test.  The main tests apply a panel 
data test, thus, in order to check the sensitivity of findings a pooled test that assumes that all 
observations have occurred at the same point of time.  This analysis uses a panel of a firm-level, 
fixed effects specification which is also assumed to address the endogeneity issue Lehn et al. (2004). 
The rationale for industry fixed effects is that they control for the underlying economic environment 
that might jointly determine corporate governance structures Lehn et al. (2004). As shown in table 
6.13, this study‟s findings are robust to the pooled data test in both models. 
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Table 6.13 Pooled Regression with fixed effect 
 
First Model Second Model 
DAC 
Exp 
Sig Coef. P>t DAC Coef. P>t 
BRDIND - -0.046 * AUDIIND -0.039 *** 
BRDMEET - 0.001  AUDEXP -0.019 ** 
BRDSZE - -0.003 ** AUDSIZE -0.003  
WOMEN - -0.022  AUDMEET -0.001  
REMIND - 0.009  NAF1 0.019 *** 
NOMIND - -0.043 *** AF1 -0.021 ** 
CHAIRCOD + 0.009  SPEAUD1 -0.021 ** 
CHAIRIND - -0.016 * MANGOWN -0.013  
NEDFEE - -0.035 *** IFRS -0.010  
NEDMEET - -0.005  SIZE -0.018 ** 
MANGOWN - -0.037  LEVG 0.000 ** 
INSTOWN - 0.000  GROWTH -0.013  
BLOCK - 0.017 ** CFO -0.277 *** 
IFRS ? -0.001  ROA 0.131 *** 
SIZE ? 0.041 ***    
LEVG ? -0.001 ***    
GROWTH ? 0.002     
CFO ? -0.203 ***    
ROA ? 0.012     
_cons -0.099 *** _cons 0.220 *** 
Adj R-2 10% Adj R-2 13% 
F-statistics 37.34*** F-statistics 91.86*** 
 
 
6.5.4.4 Endogeneity Test 
Although most studies of EM employ single-equation regression models, few recent researches have 
suggested that a simultaneous equations approach might be more appropriate, since models that 
containing corporate governance or ownership variables suffer from endogeneity (McMeeking et al., 
2006; Larcker and Rusticus, 2008; Coles et al. 2008 and McKnight and Weir, 2009).  
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This study uses an instrumental variables (IV) two-stage regression (2SLS) approach analysis. It 
adopts the approach used by Coles et al. (2008) and McKnight and Weir (2009) and uses the lagged 
values of the endogenous variables as instruments. In the analysis, all board composition, NED 
commitment, audit committee, ownership structures and external audit factors are treated as 
endogenous. 
 
First, a Hausman test is used to investigate whether there is any endogeneity bias for the 
independent variables (e.g. Greene, 2003, p. 83). Hausman test show insignificant evidence of an 
endogeneity bias at the 5% level (w2 ¼ 3.169, (p = 0.17)), which has two important implications. 
First, similar results should be obtained using either OLS or 2SLS. Second, the lagged independent 
variables are likely to be valid instrument variables because they pass the Hausman test.  
 
The 2SLS results are shown in table 6.14. The 2SLS results are in agreement with the OLS results 
reported earlier. Some variables have either more or less significant level but direction and 
significance remained the same. Thus, endogeneity does not appear to unduly affect this study 
results. 
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Table 6.14 Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
First Model Second Model 
DAC Coef. t P>t DAC Coef. t P>t 
BRDIND -0.059 -2.11 ** AUDIND -0.047 -2.800 *** 
BRDMEET 0.001 0.6  AUDEXP -0.023 -2.510 *** 
BRDSZE -0.003 -2.11 ** AUDSIZE -0.003 -0.590 
 WOMEN -0.052 -1.43  AUDMEET -0.001 -0.430  
REMIND 0.007 0.98  NAF1 0.020 2.550 *** 
NOMIND -0.038 -2.53 *** AF1 -0.018 -1.770 * 
CHAICOD 0.013 -2.08 ** SPEAUD1 0.047 1.790 * 
CHAIRIND -0.020 1.78 * MANGOWN 0.004 0.090  
NEDFEE -0.034 -2.55 *** IFRS -0.011 -1.400  
NEDMEET -0.003 -0.43  SIZE -0.027 -2.850 *** 
INSTOWN 0.000 1.13  LEVG 0.000 0.440  
SIZE 0.047 5.41 *** GROWTH -0.011 -1.150 *** 
MANGOWN -0.052 -1.34  CFO -0.292 -4.310 *** 
BLOCK 0.017 2.53 *** ROA 0.149 2.580 *** 
IFRS 0.011 1.020      
LEVG -0.001 -4.05 ***     
GROWTH 0.002 0.2      
CFO -0.233 -4.12 ***     
ROA 0.034 0.72      
_cons -0.105 -2.360 *** _cons 0.279 4.500 *** 
AdjR-2 12% AdjR-2 6% 
F-statistics 31.65*** F-statistics 24.83*** 
 
 
6.5.4.5 Audit Committee and Board of Directors Cut-Off Measures 
Following prior research, such as that of Davidson et al. (2005), this study also examines the 
sensitivity of audit committee variables to specific cut-offs.  Davidson et al. (2005) and Klein 
(2002a) do not find any association between the level of discretionary accruals and the fully 
independent audit committee.  However, Bédard et al. (2004) document a negative relation between 
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a fully independent audit committee and discretionary accruals.   In addition, Bronson et al. (2009) 
suggest that wholly independent audit committees are significantly positively associated with the 
likelihood that an audit firm issues a going-concern opinion to a financially distressed client and is 
negatively associated with the likelihood of auditor dismissal following the delivery of a going-
concern opinion.  Their findings provide support for the SOX requirement of 100% independent 
audit committees and for those opposed to easing the SOX requirements for smaller and foreign 
companies 
 
Following the recommendation of the UK Corporate Governance Combined Code (2003), this study 
measures the audit committee variables using cut-off basis.  First, AUDIND is substituted by 
FULAUD with a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the audit committee is comprised entirely 
of independent directors and 0 otherwise.  AUDEXP continues to be measured as a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the audit committee has at least one financial expert and 0 otherwise.  
AUDSIZE is also substituted with a dummy variable AUDSIZE3 that takes the value of 1 if the 
audit committee is comprised of three or more members and 0 otherwise.  This study also applies a 
similar dummy variable to AUDMEET and replaces it with AUDMEET3 that takes a value of 1 if 
the audit committee meets at least three times a year, and 0 otherwise.  Then the analysis with these 
three cut-off variables is repeated.  The coefficients are consistent with the original model and are 
insensitive to this test. 
 
These test results do not provide support for two of the UK corporate governance recommendations 
of the Combined Code (2003).  First, the recommendation of Smith‟s guidance is that “There should 
be no fewer than three meetings during the year for the audit committee" is not supported.  The 
number of meetings should be left to the committee to decide based on the need for such meetings.  
Secondly, the recommendation that firms should establish an audit committee that consists of at 
least three independent members is also not supported.  The audit committee size result shows that 
audit committees with three or more members are not more effective than audit committees with less 
than three members. 
 
The result of the cut-off measures in table 6.15 shows that fully independent audit committees are 
significantly and negatively related to earnings management.  However, the significance of this 
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variable is at the 10% level compared to the 1% level in the main test.  This finding is similar to the 
recent conclusion of Bronson et al. (2009) who test Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX), which requires all listed companies to maintain an audit committee that is 100% 
independent. They examine whether a completely independent audit committee is necessary to 
obtain the expected monitoring benefits and their results provide support for the SOX requirement.  
The result is also similar to the findings of Bédard et al. (2004) who document a negative relation 
between fully independent audit committees and discretionary accruals, though their result does not 
hold good for firms with audit committees composed of over 50% but less than 100% independent 
directors.  
 
Collectively, in terms of the effect of fully independent audit committees, this study‟s result is 
similar to most previous US findings such as those of Bédard et al. (2004) and Bronson et al. 
(2009), but it contrasts with the finding of Davidson et al. (2005) using Australian data.  
 
Moreover, this study tests whether the „magic‟ number of 50% of the board members being 
independent non-executive directors has a significant influence on earnings management.  
According to the UK Corporate Governance Code (2003, p.13) “Except for smaller companies, at 
least half the board, excluding the chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined by 
the board to be independent”.  
 
Thus, a dummy variable to represent firms with 50% or more independent non-executive directors is 
introduced and the first model is retested.  In table 6.15, the result shows a significant negative 
relationship between the dummy variable and earnings management. This suggests that a majority of 
independent non-executive directors on the board is effective in achieving board independence. 
 
Furthermore, this study conducts a sensitivity analysis for its non-findings related to the effect of an 
independent remuneration committee.   In the main test, a dummy variable taking the value of one if 
the remuneration committee is fully independent, and zero otherwise, is used to measure this effect.  
However, using a continuous variable may allow for a larger scope to capture the effect of such an 
important committee and thus, the result may have been different. 
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Table 6.15 Board of Directors and Audit Committee Cut-Off Measures 
Alternative Board Independence and Remuneration Independence Measures Alternative Audit Committee Measures 
First Model Second Model   
(BRDIND) Alternative Measure (REMIND) Alternative Measure 
(AUDMEET), (AUDIND) and (AUDSIZE) 
Alternative Measures 
DAC Coef. z P>z DAC Coef. z P>z DAC Coef. z P>z 
BRDIND2 -0.017 -2.280 ** BRDIND -0.049 -1.660 * FAUDIND -0.011 -1.750 * 
BRDMEET 0.001 1.130  BRDMEET 0.001 0.990  AUDEXP -0.024 -2.820 *** 
BRDSZE -0.003 -1.570 * BRDSZE -0.003 -1.940 ** AUDMEET3 0.016 1.550  
NOMIND -0.048 -3.320 *** NOMIND -0.044 -2.900 *** AUDSIZE3 0.002 0.300  
REMIND 0.008 1.130  REMIND2 0.006 0.390  NAF1 0.014 1.980 ** 
WOMEN -0.023 -0.620  WOMEN -0.019 -0.530  AF1 -0.030 -3.260 *** 
CHAIRCOD 0.006 0.800  CHAIRCOD 0.008 1.160  SPEAUD1 -0.020 -1.950 ** 
CHAIRND -0.014 -1.410 * CHAIRND -0.016 -1.630 * MANGOWN -0.009 -0.200  
NEDFEE -0.035 -2.530 *** NEDFEE -0.035 -2.530 *** IFRS -0.009 -1.250  
NEDMEET -0.006 -0.900  NEDMEET -0.005 -0.740  SIZE 0.034 3.830 *** 
MANGOWN -0.033 -0.880  MANGOWN -0.038 -0.990  LEVG 0.000 1.290  
BLOCK 0.018 2.660 *** BLOCK 0.018 2.680 *** GROWTH -0.012 -1.420  
INSTOWN 0.000 1.080  INSTOWN  0.000 1.030  CFO -0.272 -4.310 *** 
IFRS -0.002 -0.300  IFRS -0.001 -0.140  ROA 0.103 1.900 ** 
SIZE 0.036 4.490 *** SIZE 0.041 4.810 ***     
LEVG -0.001 -3.680 *** LEVG -0.001 -3.610 ***     
GROWTH 0.002 0.200  GROWTH 0.002 0.230      
CFO -0.200 -3.540 *** CFO -0.202 -3.550 ***     
ROA 0.019 0.400  ROA 0.009 0.190      
_cons -0.087 -1.990 ** _cons -0.097 -2.190 ** _cons -0.133 -2.480 *** 
AdjR-2 15% AdjR-2 16% AdjR-2 17% 
Wald-Chi 74.02*** Wald-Chi 60.58*** Wald-Chi 61.44*** 
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Prior research such as that of Davidson et al. (2005) and Klein (2002a) does not find any association 
between the level of discretionary accruals and a fully independent audit committee.  However, they 
document a significant relationship between the level of discretionary accruals and cases of a 
majority of independent directors on the committee.  Following prior research, such as that of 
Davidson et al. (2005), this study also examines the sensitivity of the remuneration committee 
findings to a different measure.  Therefore, as an additional analysis, this study constructs a 
continuous variable that represents the percentage of the independent directors on the remuneration 
committee. The mean of this variable is 0.89 and when the variable is retested, an insignificant result 
is revealed, supporting the main findings of this research.  The result, shown in table 6.15, enhances 
the finding of this study that remuneration committees are not very effective in discharging their 
duties.  
 
6.5.4.6 Auditor Switch 
Auditor switches (or opinion shopping) usually signal the high possibility of earnings management 
and lower-quality of auditing (Becker et al., 1998; Nelson et al., 2002).  Nevertheless, empirical 
results of whether firms can achieve „„opinion shopping‟‟ through an auditor switch are mixed 
(Craswell, 1988; Krishnan, 2003; Schauer, 2008).  It is argued that there are differences in industrial 
knowledge and auditing resources for incumbent auditors and their successors.  Hence, management 
may be able to manipulate accounting numbers when switching between auditors (Nelson et al., 
2002; Kim and Kross, 2005). Additionally, the measures of NAF for these firms that changes 
auditor are based on audit and non audit fees paid to different auditors. Therefore, switching auditors 
will negatively affect audit quality and, consequently, decrease the credibility of financial 
statements. 
 
This study re-examines the relationship between earnings management and external audit factors 
while controlling for auditor switch and find whether the results are affected by this essential factor.  
As in prior studies, this research tests the extent of earnings management following auditor changes.  
Managers may change auditors to enable them to engage in opportunistic behaviour by exploiting 
the unfamiliarity of the new auditor with the firm's business.  Prior research indicates that changing 
auditors indicates a lower quality audit and a greater likelihood of earnings management.  
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Only 36 cases of auditor switch are identified in this study‟s sample firms for the period from 2003 
to 2006.  The findings, shown in table 6.16, do not support the notion that auditor changes, on 
average, affect the earnings quality while other results show the same direction and significance as 
the main model results.  This result supports those of DeFond and Subramanyam (1998), Ferguson 
et al. (2004) and Davidson et al. (2006), who also find no evidence of pervasive income-increasing 
earnings management and auditor changes in their sample firms. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.16 
Test of The Effect of Auditor Switch 
DAC Coef. z P>z 
AUDIIND -0.039 -2.570 *** 
AUDEXP -0.022 -2.580 *** 
AUDSIZE -0.003 -0.770  
AUDMEET -0.002 -0.770  
NAF1 0.017 2.420 *** 
AF1 -0.029 -3.110 *** 
SPEAUD1 -0.020 -1.940 ** 
AUDSWT -0.021 -1.030  
MANGOWN -0.011 -0.260  
IFRS -0.008 -1.040  
SIZE 0.033 3.750 *** 
LEVG 0.000 1.240  
GROWTH -0.013 -1.510  
CFO -0.271 -4.300 *** 
ROA 0.110 2.030 ** 
_cons -0.077 -1.330  
AdjR-2 18% 
Wald-Chi 69.77*** 
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6.5.4.7 The Aggregated Audit Committee Score 
Corporate governance has multiple dimensions and each function may substitute for or complement 
others within a given dimension to form an optimal governance structure.   Some recent researches 
have investigated the effect of corporate governance, especially the audit committee, in score format 
rather than for individual variables.  Jiang et al. (2008) examine the relation between corporate 
governance and earnings management using a Gov-Score developed by Brown & Caylor (2006) that 
includes size and composition of board of directors, composition of audit committee, and extent of 
institutional ownership.  In the post-Sarbanes–Oxley period, they find higher levels of corporate 
governance are associated with lower earnings management.  
 
Dey (2005) applies a comprehensive set of individual governance variables to measure different 
corporate governance dimensions.   Her results show that the composition and functioning of certain 
corporate governance attributes are significantly related to the reporting credibility of firms that 
have high agency costs.   Similarly, Jenkins (2002) uses four components to measure audit 
committee effectiveness and finds a negative relationship between discretionary accruals and audit 
committee effectiveness.  Additionally, Lei (2007) measures audit committee effectiveness with a 
composite proxy based on the three characteristics of audit committee size, meeting frequency and 
the proportion of accounting experts. 
 
Similar to Brown and Caylor (2006), this study creates a governance score (AUDSCORE).  Brown 
and Caylor (2006) code fifty-one governance variables as either zero or one depending on whether 
the firm‟s governance standards are minimally acceptable.   Therefore, this study constructs an 
index for each firm by assigning one point for each governance standard that is satisfied by meeting 
the minimum standard recommended by the UK Corporate Governance Code (2003).  
 
The aim of this test is to investigate whether the audit committee variables function better 
collectively or individually.  Therefore, this study uses an aggregated audit committee score 
consisting of four governance variables as an indicator of a firm's overall audit committee 
effectiveness.  These four variables are a fully independent audit committee with at least three 
members, one of whom is a financial expert that meets at least three times a year. If these four audit 
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committee variables together serve as a signal of an effective audit committee and strong corporate 
governance, investors might usefully perceive that a higher aggregated audit committee score is 
likely to relate to less earnings management. 
 
Thus a dummy variable is introduced that takes the value of one if the audit committee meets all 
four conditions, and zero otherwise.  All previous audit committee variables tested in the main 
model are excluded to avoid the multicolliniarity problem, and then the analysis is repeated.  The 
results are illustrated in table 6.17 and show that AUDSCORE has a negative significant relationship 
(coefficient -0.014 and p<0.01) with discretionary accruals. 
 
This result shows that audit committees are better when they exhibit all effectiveness characteristics 
simultaneously.  This implies that audit committees that are composed of at least three members, all 
of them independent and including at least one financial expert, and which meet at least three times 
a year, do constrain earnings management better than audit committees that do not exhibit all four 
variables, and that this is a more powerful measure of effectiveness than any of the individual 
variables. This result also implies that the findings of the second model are robust. 
 
Table 6.17 
The Aggregated Audit Committee Score Test 
DAC2 Coef. z P>z 
AUDSCOR -0.014 -3.440 *** 
NAF1 0.017 2.480 *** 
AF1 -0.028 -3.120 *** 
SPEAUD1 -0.019 -1.900 ** 
MANGOWN -0.007 -0.180  
IFRS -0.010 -1.360  
SIZE 0.033 3.840 *** 
LEVG 0.000 1.210  
GROWTH -0.013 -1.460  
CFO -0.267 -4.240 *** 
ROA 0.103 1.900 ** 
_cons -0.112 -2.130 *** 
AdjR-2 19% 
Wald-Chi 50.39*** 
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6.5.4.8 Cross-Listing 
There are some differences between the U.K. and the U.S. in terms of corporate governance 
regimes, accounting standards and legislation.  In response to a wave of financial scandals in the 
U.S., the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) attempted to restore investors' confidence by promulgating 
disclosure of a variety of accounting-related corporate governance mechanisms.  
 
Leuz (2006) and Li, et al. (2008) argue that government-enforced regulations can produce better 
disclosures that enable firms and investors to make decisions.  Similar to this argument, Cohen et al. 
(2008) find that earnings management behaviour declined significantly after the passage of SOX.  
Chang and Sun (2009) also find a significantly negative association between earnings management 
and independent audit committees after the passage of SOX but no significant findings for these 
associations prior to SOX.  These findings indicate the SOX provisions are effective in reducing 
earnings management and affect the relationship between earnings management and corporate 
governance in cross-listed foreign firms. 
 
Consequently, in the US, all cross-listed foreign firms are now required to meet the same SEC 
requirements as US firms, including the SOX requirements. This could pressure UK cross-listed 
firms to apply both the UK and the US strict requirements, thus, producing different (presumably 
better) financial outcomes than their counterparts that are listed only in the UK market and that 
apply only the UK regulations.  Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006) argue that the US capital markets 
and the SEC are reputed to have the most restrictive regulations regarding the quality of financial 
reporting but they find no evidence to support that argument. 
 
Thus, it is expected that cross-listed firms manage earning less, which may be due to the pressure of 
the various listing, accounting and corporate governance requirements of the different stock 
markets.  Therefore, this study tests, as an additional control variable, the effect of cross-listing on 
the management practice of earnings management.   A dummy variable is introduced that takes the 
value of 1 if the company is cross-listed in a foreign capital market, and zero otherwise.  The data is 
gathered from DataStream.  About 73% of this study‟s sample firms are cross-listed outside the UK, 
and over 90% of them are cross-listed in one or more of the US capital markets.  
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After including this variable and rerunning the regression test for both models, as evidenced in table 
6.18, it is found that a cross-listing status neither affects the magnitude of earnings management, nor 
changes the previously documented findings of this study.  This result is consistent with that of 
Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006) who use data for UK, Germany and France between 1992 and 2000.  
This result does not support the argument of Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008) and Chang and Sun (2009) 
that government-enforced regulations can produce better disclosures and reduce earnings 
management practice.  
 
However, cross-listing in the second model shows a negative relationship with earnings 
management at a 10% level, which may suggest that cross-listed firms manage earnings less as they 
are subject to greater corporate governance and disclosure requirements.  This result supports the 
findings of Chang and Sun (2009) who reveal a negative association between earnings management 
and audit-committee independence after SOX, an association that is not found in the pre-SOX 
period.  
 
6.5.4.9 Controlling for "Big Bath" Effect 
Following prior research, such as that of Frankel et al. (2002) and Srinidhi and Gul (2007), this 
study includes a dummy variable (LOSS) that takes the value of one if the firm has reported a loss in 
the period, and zero otherwise, to control for "big bath" type charges that could indicate poor accrual 
quality.  Studies (e.g. Healy, 1985) also argue that firms tend to use “big bath” when they realise 
that they may not be able to manage earnings to meet targets.  This variable is also used by some 
other research to control for managers‟ incentive to avoid earnings decreases and losses Chen and 
Zhou (2007). After replicating the analysis with this indicator variable, the results proved to be 
robust, as shown in table 6.18. 
 
6.5.4.10 Analysis of Size Effects 
A potential issue concerning the relation between earnings management, on the one hand, and 
corporate governance and audit and non-audit fee magnitudes, on the other, is whether EM and 
corporate governance reflect the firm size and whether the fee magnitudes reflect the client firm‟s 
size more than they reflect economic bonding. 
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To address this concern, this study follows Krishnan and Parsons (2008) and reconstitutes 
observations in the two groups to minimise differences in firm size.  Models one and two were re-
estimated after excluding very small firms and very large firms.  Benkel et al. (2006) find support 
for the hypothesis that higher board and audit committee independence are associated with reduced 
levels of earnings management in large firms but not in small firms.  
 
Some previous studies (e.g. Siregar and Utama, 2008) use cut-off percentages, while others (e.g. 
Davidson et al., 2005) use capital market classifications.  In checking robustness, this study follows 
Davidson et al. (2005), who exclude firms not in the Top 500 ASX listed firms by market 
capitalisation, and it excludes large firms that belong only to the FTSE 100 Index and small firms 
that belong only to the FTSE 350 Index, before rerunning the test using medium firms that belong 
only to the FTSE 250 Index.  This process produces a sample of 294 firm-year observations.  The 
results in table 6.19 show no significant differences with the main regression results.  Some 
attributes, such as SPEAUD1, AF1 and BRDIND, have a stronger relation with earnings 
management than they do in the main test.  The control variable ROA becomes significantly related 
to earnings management at the 10% level.  This result is expected as the variation in ROA may have 
decreased as the sample becomes more homogenous. 
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                                                                      Table 6.18 Test of Cross-Listing and Big Bath Effects 
First Model Second Model 
 Cross-Listing Test Big Bath Test  Cross-Listing Test Big Bath Test 
DAC Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z DAC Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z 
BRDIND -0.047 -1.710 * -0.046 -1.680 * AUDIIND -0.038 -2.480 *** -0.041 -2.660 *** 
BRDMEET 0.001 0.990  0.001 1.030  AUDEXP -0.021 -2.510 *** -0.022 -2.590 *** 
BRDSZE -0.003 -1.940 ** -0.003 -1.940 ** AUDSIZE -0.002 -0.530  -0.003 -0.730  
WOMEN -0.023 -0.650  -0.022 -0.600  AUDMEET -0.002 -0.810  -0.002 -0.780  
REMIND 0.009 1.240  0.008 1.140  NAF1 0.019 2.730 *** 0.017 2.410 *** 
NOMIND -0.043 -2.840 ** -0.043 -2.840 *** AF1 -0.026 -2.850 *** -0.028 -3.020 *** 
CHAIRCOD 0.009 1.240  0.009 1.230  SPEAUD1 -0.018 -1.790 * -0.019 -1.870 ** 
CHAIRND -0.016 -1.680 * -0.016 -1.650 * MANGOWN -0.021 -0.490  -0.011 -0.270  
NEDFEE -0.035 -2.550 *** -0.036 -2.570 * IFRS -0.008 -1.070  -0.007 -1.010  
NEDMEET -0.005 -0.730  -0.005 -0.740  SIZE 0.036 4.050 *** 0.033 3.720 *** 
MANGOWN -0.038 -0.990  -0.038 -0.990  LEVG 0.000 1.340  0.000 1.220  
INSTOWN 0.000 1.090  0.000 1.070  GROWTH -0.014 -1.570  -0.013 -1.480  
BLOCK 0.017 2.530 *** 0.017 2.580 * CFO -0.258 -4.110 *** -0.263 -4.180 *** 
IFRS -0.001 -0.190  -0.002 -0.230  ROA 0.108 2.000 ** 0.087 1.520 * 
SIZE 0.041 4.830 *** 0.041 4.830 ***        
LEVG -0.001 -3.700 *** -0.001 -3.690 ***        
GROWTH 0.002 0.230  0.002 0.260         
CFO -0.204 -3.600 *** -0.203 -3.580 ***        
ROA 0.010 0.210  0.011 0.220         
CROSSLIST -0.005 -0.620     CROSSLIST -0.017 -1.750 *    
LOSS    -0.007 -0.590  LOSS    0.011 0.730  
_cons -0.096 -2.160 ** -0.099 -2.230 ** _cons -0.083 -1.440  -0.080 -1.370  
AdjR-2 17% 19% AdjR-2 18% 21% 
Wald-Chi 71.2*** 67.45*** Wald-Chi 59.12*** 44.12*** 
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6.5.4.11 Industry Analysis 
The relation between earnings management, on one side, and corporate governance and the external 
auditor, on the other side, could also be driven by the type of industry in which the company 
operates.  Recent research suggests that discretionary accruals estimated cross-sectionally can be 
noisy and biased towards the resulting tests if the firms in the sample are not homogeneous (Dopuch 
et al., 2005) as cited in Gul et al. (2009). Industry analysis is carried out in order to investigate this 
potential issue of whether this study‟s results would change based on the industry type.  The demand 
Table 6.19 Analysis of Size Effects (Medium Sized Firms) 
First Model Second Model 
DAC Coef. z P>z DAC Coef. z P>z 
BRDIND -0.065 -2.340 ** AUDIIND -0.045 -2.740 *** 
BRDMEET 0.002 1.310  AUDEXP -0.022 -2.460 *** 
BRDSZE -0.003 -1.970 ** AUDSIZE -0.008 -1.560  
WOMEN -0.042 -1.180  AUDMEET -0.002 -0.570  
REMIND 0.009 1.270  NAF1 0.023 2.600 *** 
NOMIND -0.043 -2.890 *** AF1 -0.031 -2.650 *** 
CHAIRCOD 0.005 0.760  SPEAUD1 -0.022 -2.010 *** 
CHAIRIND -0.016 -1.660 * MANGOWN -0.020 -0.440  
NEDFEE -0.027 -1.880 ** IFRS -0.013 -1.670  
NEDMEET 0.003 0.500  SIZE -0.009 -0.840  
INSTOWN 0.000 0.470  LEVG 0.000 1.520  
SIZE 0.025 2.700 *** GROWTH -0.027 -2.500 *** 
MANGOWN -0.039 -1.000  CFO -0.224 -3.290 *** 
BLOCK 0.013 1.930 ** ROA 0.102 1.740 * 
IFRS 0.009 0.850      
LEVG 0.000 -2.660 ***     
GROWTH -0.002 -0.280      
CFO -0.107 -1.870 **     
ROA 0.080 1.640 *     
_cons 0.004 0.080  _cons 0.206 2.930 *** 
AdjR-2 11% AdjR-2 15% 
Wald-Chi 86.33*** Wald-Chi 73.49*** 
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for, and supply of, non-audit services, as well as the effect of the specialised auditor, can differ by 
industry (Craswell et al., 1995).  
 
Following prior studies by Frankel et al. (2002) and Srinidhi and Gul, (2007), this study conducts an 
industry-wise analysis of the effect of economic bonding variables on earnings management for each 
of the six largest industries in our sample which represent more than 60% of the firms in the sample, 
namely, Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries (RPB), Construction & Building Materials (CBM), Media 
& Photography (MP), Leisure, Entertainment & Hotels (LEH), General Retailers (GR) and Support 
Services (SS).  Consistent with Carcello et al. (2002) and Abbott et al. (2006), this study includes an 
industry dummy variable for each one of these industries.  Dummy variables take the value of one if 
the firm belongs to that particular industry, and zero otherwise.  In table 6.20 and table 6.21, the 
dummy variables are named by their shortened forms shown above. 
 
The results, shown in table 6.20 and table 6.21, reveal that, except for CBM in the second model, 
which is positively and significantly related to earnings management at the 5% level, there are only 
insignificant coefficients with earnings management.  The CBM result may differ because it is a 
highly complex industry that may have more motives and scope than others to manage earnings.  It 
includes firms with complex contracting and revenue recognition issues as well as difficulties in 
applying corporate governance recommendations, which may make it difficult for external auditors 
to detect earnings management.  This result supports the findings of Beasley et al. (2000) that the 
nature of fraud differs by industry and that certain industries have more particular types of fraud 
than other industries. 
 
The results for the other five industries show no effect on the directions or the significance of the 
coefficients for both corporate governance and ownership variables in the first model and for audit 
committee and external audit variables in the second model. These results show that this study‟s 
results are not driven by the type of industry. 
                   
 
                 
278 
 
 
Table 6.20   The First Model Industry Analyses 
DAC Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z 
BRDIND -0.048 -1.730 * -0.045 -1.640 * -0.048 -1.720 * -0.046 -1.670 * -0.045 -1.620 * -0.046 -1.680 * 
BRDMEET 0.001 0.990  0.001 1.020  0.001 1.040  0.001 1.010  0.001 0.990  0.001 1.010  
BRDSZE -0.003 -1.950 * -0.003 -1.910 ** -0.003 -1.970 ** -0.003 -1.920 ** -0.003 -1.930 ** -0.003 -1.920 ** 
WOMEN -0.021 -0.580  -0.021 -0.590  -0.020 -0.540  -0.022 -0.620  -0.024 -0.660  -0.023 -0.630  
REMIND 0.009 1.190  0.009 1.250  0.009 1.170  0.009 1.230  0.009 1.230  0.009 1.220  
NOMIND -0.041 -2.750 *** -0.043 -2.880 *** -0.043 -2.870 *** -0.043 -2.860 *** -0.043 -2.870 *** -0.043 -2.860 *** 
CHAIRCOD 0.009 1.250  0.009 1.200  0.008 1.180  0.009 1.230  0.009 1.220  0.009 1.230  
CHAIRND -0.016 -1.690 * -0.016 -1.680 * -0.016 -1.650 * -0.016 -1.670 * -0.016 -1.690 * -0.016 -1.670 * 
NEDFEE -0.036 -2.590 *** -0.035 -2.540 *** -0.035 -2.540 * -0.035 -2.510 *** -0.034 -2.450 *** -0.035 -2.530 *** 
NEDMEET -0.005 -0.790  -0.005 -0.730  -0.005 -0.760  -0.005 -0.740  -0.005 -0.680  -0.005 -0.750  
MANGOWN -0.035 -0.930  -0.037 -0.970  0.000 1.100  0.000 1.090  0.000 1.110  0.000 1.090  
INSTOWN 0.000 1.080  0.000 1.090  -0.037 -0.980  -0.037 -0.970  -0.036 -0.960  -0.037 -0.970  
BLOCK 0.016 2.450 *** 0.017 2.580 *** 0.017 2.560 * 0.017 2.550 * 0.017 2.590 *** 0.017 2.560 *** 
IFRS -0.001 -0.190  -0.001 -0.200  -0.001 -0.200  -0.001 -0.200  -0.002 -0.240  -0.001 -0.200  
SIZE 0.042 4.870 *** 0.041 4.780 *** 0.042 4.850 *** 0.041 4.800 *** 0.041 4.770 *** 0.041 4.810 *** 
LEVG -0.001 -3.610 *** -0.001 -3.630 *** -0.001 -3.700 *** -0.001 -3.690 *** -0.001 -3.720 *** -0.001 -3.690 *** 
GROWTH 0.002 0.200  0.002 0.220  0.002 0.210  0.002 0.230  0.002 0.260  0.002 0.230  
CFO -0.204 -3.590 *** -0.201 -3.540 *** -0.206 -3.620 *** -0.203 -3.580 *** -0.201 -3.530 *** -0.203 -3.590 *** 
ROA 0.011 0.230  0.011 0.220  0.011 0.240  0.012 0.250  0.011 0.230  0.011 0.240  
                   
LEH -0.018 -1.000                 
RPB    -0.008 -0.710              
MP       -0.009 -0.660           
SS          0.000 -0.020        
CBM             0.006 0.740     
GR                0.001 0.150  
_cons -0.101 -2.280 ** -0.097 -2.200 ** -0.102 -2.290 ** -0.099 -2.240 ** -0.099 -2.250 ** -0.099 -2.240 ** 
AdjR-2 12% 13% 12% 12% 13% 13% 
Wald-Chi 81.33*** 79.44*** 80.26*** 81.14*** 78.16*** 79.54*** 
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Table 6.21   The Second Model Industry Analyses 
DAC Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z 
NAF1 0.02 2.40 *** 0.02 2.51 *** 0.02 2.44 *** 0.02 2.47 *** 0.02 2.47 *** 0.02 2.32 ** 
AF1 -0.03 -2.99 *** -0.03 -2.96 *** -0.03 -2.98 *** -0.03 -2.97 *** -0.03 -2.90 *** -0.03 -2.94 *** 
SPEAUD1 -0.02 -1.87 ** -0.02 -1.82 * -0.02 -1.86 ** -0.02 -1.77 * -0.02 -1.89 ** -0.02 -1.95 ** 
AUDSIZE 0.00 -0.74  0.00 -0.62  0.00 -0.74  0.00 -0.74  0.00 -0.83  0.00 -1.02  
AUDMEET 0.00 -0.74  0.00 -0.85  0.00 -0.77  0.00 -0.84  0.00 -0.74  0.00 -0.60  
AUDIIND -0.04 -2.60 *** -0.04 -2.63 *** -0.04 -2.65 *** -0.04 -2.66 *** -0.04 -2.66 *** -0.04 -2.77 *** 
AUDEXP -0.02 -2.60 *** -0.02 -2.64 *** -0.02 -2.62 *** -0.02 -2.64 *** -0.02 -2.63 *** -0.02 -2.69 *** 
MNGOWN -0.01 -0.28  -0.01 -0.20  -0.01 -0.26  -0.01 -0.19  -0.01 -0.26  -0.01 -0.24  
IFRS -0.01 -1.03  -0.01 -1.07  -0.01 -1.03  -0.01 -1.04  -0.01 -1.03  -0.01 -0.98  
SIZE 0.03 3.85 *** 0.03 3.88 *** 0.03 3.86 *** 0.03 3.88 *** 0.03 3.88 *** 0.03 3.76 *** 
LEVG 0.00 1.22  0.00 1.09  0.00 1.11  0.00 1.13  0.00 1.04  0.00 1.35  
GROWTH -0.01 -1.52  -0.01 -1.54  -0.01 -1.53  -0.01 -1.54  -0.01 -1.55  -0.01 -1.43  
CFO -0.27 -4.22 *** -0.27 -4.22 *** -0.26 -4.17 *** -0.26 -4.17 *** -0.26 -4.11 *** -0.26 -4.18 *** 
ROA 0.10 1.87 ** 0.10 1.84 * 0.10 1.88 ** 0.10 1.88 *** 0.10 1.79 *** 0.09 1.67 * 
MP 0.00 0.30                 
GR    -0.01 -0.74              
SS       0.00 0.15           
LEH          -0.01 -0.68        
RPB             -0.01 -0.90     
CBM                0.04 1.99 ** 
_cons -0.08 -1.43  -0.08 -1.42  -0.08 -1.41  -0.08 -1.40  -0.08 -1.37  -0.08 -1.30  
AdjR-2 15% 16% 16% 16% 15% 16% 
Wald-Chi 68.33*** 66.14*** 65.98*** 65.47*** 67.98*** 65.78*** 
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6.5.4.12 Change in Fees 
Cahan et al. (2008) argue that significant growth in non-audit fees creates an economic bond 
between the auditor and the client such that the auditors do not test managers‟ reporting decisions.  
This study examines changes in fees, and growth in audit and non-audit fees, between 2003 and 
2004, 2004 and 2005, and 2005 and 2006.  Following Cahan et al. (2008), this study repeats the 
regression analysis using alternative variables for both non-audit and audit fees magnitudes.  Two 
alternative variables are used, the change in non-audit fees from last year to the current year 
(CHNAF), and the change in audit fees from last year to the current year (CHAF).   
 
The results of these alternative variables, shown in table 6.22, are consistent with the continuous 
variable results in the main regression.  The growth in both fee variables is found to be significant 
and the sign of the coefficients are as expected. 
 
Table 6.22 
Test of the Auditor Fees Changes 
DAC Coef. z P>z 
CHNAF 0.078 3.620 *** 
CHAF 0.061 2.910 *** 
SPEAUD1 -0.011 -1.060  
AUDSIZE -0.002 -0.450  
AUDMEET 0.002 0.750  
AUDIIND -0.037 -2.380 *** 
AUDEXP -0.017 -1.960 ** 
MANGOWN 0.034 0.870  
IFRS 0.006 0.770  
SIZE 0.050 5.610 *** 
LEVG 0.000 1.650 * 
GROWTH -0.003 -0.340  
CFO -0.263 -3.700 *** 
ROA 0.088 1.370  
_cons -0.226 -3.790 *** 
AdjR-2 17% 
Wald-Chi 63.59*** 
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6.5.4.13 Growth 
GROWTH is the only variable that produces inconclusive results in both univariate tests in both 
models; when using t-test it shows a significant positive difference but the significance disappears in 
the non-parametric test.  This may be due to GROWTH being highly skewed, which makes the t-test 
results unreliable and incomparable to the Mann Whitney tests.  However, in the multivariate tests 
for both models, GROWTH revealed consistent results.   
 
This biasing may result from the time frame of this study.  Certain industries, but not all, may have 
experienced a particularly high period of growth during this period.  This may have caused data 
skew and inconsistent results.  However, due to the contradictory nature of the results, it was 
deemed appropriate to conduct a sensitivity analysis that excludes this variable from the main 
regressions in both models.  The results, presented in table 6.23, show that all variables reveal the 
same results, which suggests that this study‟s results are insensitive to the elimination of the 
GROWTH variable. 
 
6.5.4.14 Non-Linear Effect of Institutional and Blockholders Ownership on Earnings 
Management 
The majority of evidence in the previous literature shows that institutional ownership has a negative 
effect on earnings management, such as Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1998), Bushee (2001), Yu 
(2008) and Charitou et al. (2007) use US data; Koh (2003) and Koh and Hsu (2005) use Australian 
data; Park and Shin (2004) use Canadian firms; and Osma and Noguer (2007) use Spanish data. 
 
However, this study‟s result shows no significant relationship between institutional ownership and 
earnings management, and this is consistent with UK evidence by Peasnall et al. (2000) and Peasnall 
et al. (2005) that no association exists between accruals and institutional investors.  As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, a possible reason for the different result is the use of different measures of 
both institutional ownership and earnings management.  
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Table 6.23 
Main Regressions without GROWTH Variable 
First Model Second Model 
DAC Coef. z P>z DAC Coef. z P>z 
BRDIND -0.043 -1.570 * AUDIIND -0.040 -2.520 *** 
BRDMEET 0.001 0.930  AUDEXP -0.020 -2.340 *** 
BRDSZE -0.003 -1.570 * AUDSIZE -0.004 -0.990  
WOMEN -0.018 -0.510  AUDMEET -0.001 -0.260  
NOMIND -0.039 -2.610 *** NAF1 0.020 2.680 *** 
REMIND 0.007 0.980  AF1 -0.019 -1.980 ** 
CHAIRND -0.016 -1.620 * SPEAUD1 -0.019 -1.790 * 
CHAIRCOD 0.009 1.200  MANGOWN -0.006 -0.150  
NEDFEE -0.034 -2.470 *** IFRS -0.010 -1.400  
NEDMEET -0.005 -0.710  SIZE -0.023 -2.700 *** 
MANGOWN -0.037 -0.960  LEVG 0.000 1.920 ** 
INSTOWN 0.000 1.090  CFO -0.300 -4.710 *** 
BLOCK 0.016 2.390 *** ROA 0.142 2.590 * 
IFRS -0.001 -0.120  _cons 0.255 4.650 * 
SIZE 0.037 4.410 ***     
LEVG -0.001 -3.810 ***     
CFO -0.180 -3.210 ***     
ROA 0.018 0.380      
_cons -0.078 -1.790 *       
AdjR-2 14% R-2 16% 
Wald-Chi 79.45*** Wald-Chi 66.31*** 
 
Nevertheless, in this robustness check, the test assumes the co-existence of transient and long-term 
oriented institutional investors, implying a non-linear association between institutional ownership 
and earnings management.  Besides the simple linear relation between institutional ownership and 
earnings management, as predicted by the prior literature (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1998) and 
adopted in the main tests, this study examines the non-linear relationship between institutional 
ownership and earnings management to investigate whether a U-shaped relationship exists, as some 
prior studies argue. 
 
Following Koh (2003), this study predicts a concave association between institutional ownership 
(INSTOWN) and earnings management.  Applying a quadratic function specification, INSTOWN 
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and its square value (INSTOWNSQ) are introduced to capture the predicted concave relation.  A 
concave relation predicts a positive coefficient for INSTOWN and a negative coefficient for 
INSTOWNSQ.  According to Koh (2003), the estimated „turning point‟ should not be over-
interpreted, as there is no theoretical prediction in relation to the explicit ownership point at which 
this occurs.  The result shows no significant effect of high and low institutional ownership on 
earnings management.  This result may suggest that no non-linear relationship exists between 
institutional ownership and earnings management in the UK, contrary to findings in the US and 
Australia, but supporting the argument of the uniqueness of British institutional investors, as 
suggested by Khurshed et al. (2007). 
 
Another sensitivity test is carried out to investigate the surprising result of the positive relationship 
between BLOCK and earnings management.  The agency theory predicts that a concentrated 
blockholder ownership enables a large shareholder to have extra power on the firm‟s board, and this 
may be the initial motivation rather than holding the firm‟s equity, while low ownership stakes lead 
to little or no incentive to monitor managers as that activity is economically unbeneficial.  Thus, 
blockholders that monitor managers' actions obtain the benefit of their monitoring only by the 
percentage of stocks they own but all have to bear the costs of their monitoring (Zhong et al., 2007). 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) support this view empirically, finding that large equity holders have 
incentives to bear the fixed costs of collecting information and engaging in monitoring management.  
Hence, smaller blockholders may behave differently from the larger blockholders that were found to 
encourage earnings management.  
 
In the main test, BLOCK is defined as any investor that holds more than 10% of the company‟s 
shares.  This test will investigate whether a blockholder that owns between 5% and 10% of the 
company‟s shares encourages the management to manipulate earnings figures.  A dummy variable 
(BLOCK 5%) that has the value of one if a blockholder has more than 5% but less than 10% of the 
company shares and zero otherwise, is introduced and the main regression is re-tested.  
 
Interestingly, BLOCK 5% does not significantly increase earnings management as did BLOCK 
10%.   The result, presented in table 6.24, shows that BLOCK 5% has no significant effect on 
earnings management practice. This may be due to the fact that small blockholders do not have 
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sufficient power to use accounting information to their own advantage or they expropriate other 
investors and stakeholders by colluding with management.  
 
This result may extend Zhong et al.‟s (2007) finding that outside blockholder ownership is 
positively associated with discretionary accruals. In a robustness test, they use a dummy variable of 
BLOCK using 20%, 25% and 30% cut-off points to test for the non-linear effect of ownership and 
they use different measures of earnings management but still find the same result.  They assume that 
more block ownership leads to better governance but they find the opposite. However, they do not 
examine a lower ownership concentration, as this study does. 
 
6.5.4.15 Internal and External Audit Separate Effects 
Previous studies of the interaction between audit committee attributes and external audit services 
often assume that they are complementary, and that improved governance is associated with higher 
audit fees, although the evidence about this issue is inconclusive. Hay et al. (2008) revisit this issue 
and examine whether the „substitution‟ or „complementary control‟ views apply.  They find that 
measures of internal auditing, corporate governance and concentration of ownership are all 
positively related to audit fees, consistent with the complementary explanation.  However, to avoid 
the possibility of the potential substitution problem that may exist between external auditor 
attributes and audit committees attributes, this study constructs a separate test for each set of 
attributes.  
 
Moreover, by testing each of the effects separately, it is possible to investigate the affect of the audit 
function on earnings management without considering the affect of the external auditor.  Therefore, 
in this sensitivity analysis, two separate tests are conducted. The first test includes the external audit 
factors that relate to auditor independence and quality.  In the second test, the internal audit 
functions, represented by audit committee effectiveness, are tested.  The aim is to find out whether 
there is any substitution effect between the two groups of attributes. 
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Table 6.24 
Non-Linear Effect of Institutional Ownership and Blockholders Ownership in Earnings 
Management 
Effect of Long Term (INSTOWN) Effect of Block 5% 
DAC Coef. z P>z DAC Coef. z P>z 
BRDIND -0.046 -1.660 * BRDIND -0.048 -1.710 * 
BRDMEET 0.001 1.000  BRDMEET 0.001 1.090  
BRDSZE -0.003 -1.940 ** BRDSZE -0.003 -1.870 ** 
WOMEN -0.022 -0.600  WOMEN -0.019 -0.510  
REMIND 0.009 1.240  REMIND 0.010 1.420  
NOMIND -0.044 -2.900 *** NOMIND -0.044 -2.900 *** 
CHAIRCOD 0.009 1.240  CHAIRCOD 0.010 1.460  
CHAIRND -0.016 -1.690 * CHAIRND -0.016 -1.580 * 
NEDFEE -0.035 -2.540 *** NEDFEE -0.035 -2.510 *** 
NEDMEET -0.005 -0.760  NEDMEET -0.005 -0.800  
MANGOWN -0.038 -1.010  MANGOWN -0.030 -0.790  
INSTOWN 0.001 0.770  INSTOWN 0.000 1.320  
INSTOWSQ -0.004 -0.490  BLOCK5% 0.009 0.900  
BLOCK 0.017 2.590 *** IFRS -0.002 -0.220  
IFRS -0.002 -0.230  SIZE 0.041 4.770 *** 
SIZE 0.041 4.800 *** LEVG -0.001 -3.700 *** 
LEVG -0.001 -3.660 *** GROWTH 0.000 -0.020  
GROWTH 0.002 0.200  CFO -0.215 -3.780 *** 
CFO -0.201 -3.530 *** ROA 0.021 0.440  
ROA 0.011 0.230  _cons -0.104 -2.250 ** 
_cons -0.089 -1.820 **     
AdjR-2 14% AdjR-2 13% 
Wald-Chi 79.11*** Wald-Chi 74.85*** 
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Table 6.25 
Test of Internal and External Audit Effects Separately 
External Governance Effect Internal Governance Effect 
DAC Coef. z P>z DAC Coef. z P>z 
NAF1 0.017 2.460 *** AUDIIND -0.044 -2.940 *** 
AF1 -0.033 -3.610 *** AUDEXP -0.023 -2.770 *** 
SPEAUD1 -0.019 -1.870 ** AUDSIZE -0.005 -1.200  
    AUDMEET -0.002 -0.860  
MANGOWN -0.007 -0.170  MANGOWN 0.009 0.240  
IFRS -0.009 -1.250  IFRS -0.006 -0.910  
SIZE 0.033 3.760 *** SIZE 0.033 3.840 *** 
LEVG 0.000 1.540  LEVG 0.000 0.940  
GROWTH -0.016 -1.780 * GROWTH -0.010 -1.120  
CFO -0.260 -4.080 *** CFO -0.283 -4.580 *** 
ROA 0.088 1.620 * ROA 0.102 1.920 ** 
_cons -0.150 -2.860 *** _cons -0.069 -1.230  
AdjR-2                       14% AdjR-2                          12% 
Wald-Chi               79.33*** Wald-Chi                 77.19*** 
 
 
 
The results for both models are consistent with those of the main test.  The external auditor factors 
still have significant effects on earnings management, and some audit committee variables 
(independence and expertise) also show a significant effect on earnings management, as they do in 
the main test. Therefore, this study‟s findings are robust for the potential substitution problem.  
 
6.6 Overall Summary 
This chapter reports the results of empirical findings on the association between four important sets 
of variables, namely, board composition, ownership structures, audit committee effectiveness and 
external audit factors, and the extent of earnings management in the FTSE 350 Index firms over the 
period of four years from 2003 to 2006.  
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Two types of analysis, univariate and multivariate, are adopted to analyse the data of this study.  The 
univariate test applies both T test and Mann Whitney tests.  The multivariate analysis adopts a 
regression analysis.  Several further analyses are conducted and discussed and other sensitivity tests 
are performed and compared with the main findings.  In general, these findings suggest that firms 
with effective corporate governance mechanisms and an independent specialised auditor undertake 
less accruals management.  
 
Overall, in terms of the first model, independent and large boards are effective in constraining 
earnings management practices.  The results also suggest that an independent nomination committee 
performs its intended monitoring roles.  Chairman independence, measured according to the Code‟s 
independence criteria for NEDs, is a more effective monitoring device than chairman independence 
that is measured according to the Code‟s independence criteria for chairmen. 
 
Moreover, committed NEDs, measured by their fees, are an important monitoring mechanism that 
reduces earnings management.  Additionally, blockholders with more than 10% ownership are 
found to collude with managers, while blockholders with less than 10% ownership have less power 
to effect the financial reporting.  Other ownership factors, namely institutional ownership and 
managerial ownership, have no effect on the level of earnings management. 
 
In terms of the second model, independent and industry specialised external auditors constrain 
managers‟ discretions.  The results also suggest that an independent audit committee with 
financially experienced members performs its intended functions.  
 
Regarding the direction of earnings management, generally speaking, corporate governance 
attributes relating to both board of directors and audit committee are good mechanisms for 
constraining negative earnings management but less effective in constraining positive earnings 
management, while the external auditor‟s attributes are good mechanisms for constraining positive 
earnings management less effective in constraining negative earnings management. An independent 
chairman may ignore managers‟ attempts to involve in positive earnings management while female 
directors do not take this risk. 
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The results of this study are consistent across both discretionary and current accrual measures for 
earnings management.  Results are not sensitive to the type of industry or the size of the firm.  Other 
sensitivity analyses use alternative methods of analysis and alternative independent variables to 
measure for the possible effects of other variables. These sensitivity analysis results are also largely 
consistent with the main results.  The consistency in the results strengthens the validity of the result s 
and the recommendations drawn from them.  
 
Overall, although not all corporate governance variables support the stated hypotheses; this study 
has achieved its objective by identifying the attributes that answer the research question.  This study, 
therefore, finds that the agency theory offers the most extensive explanation of the association 
between both the corporate governance and the external audit mechanisms and earnings 
management practice.  The next chapter will provide a summary of this study, the implications of 
this research and avenues for further research. 
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Chapter Seven 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises this research study and its major findings.  It will be organised as follows: 
1. Restatement of the research problem and research question 
2. Description of the research methods undertaken to answer the research question 
3. Summary of the research results 
4. Implications of this research 
5. Limitations of this research 
6. Avenues for further research 
 
7.2 Restatement of the Research Problem and Research Question  
Opportunistic earnings management practice produces accounting earnings that do not reflect a 
firm‟s true financial performance.  Earnings management is likely to reduce the quality of reported 
earnings, their usefulness for investment decisions, and investor confidence in the financial reports. 
However, when managers‟ opportunistic behaviour is restricted by monitoring systems, accounting 
earnings are more reliable and of higher quality (e.g. Wild, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996).  
Specifically, two monitoring systems, corporate governance and the external audit, are suggested by 
accounting theories and the prior literature to be effective in aligning the interests of managers and 
shareholders, reducing managers‟ opportunistic behaviour and, thus, improving the quality of 
reported earnings.  
 
The aim of this research is to investigate, empirically, the effect of corporate governance and the 
external audit on earnings management practice in the UK. Therefore, the primary research question 
is: 
“Do corporate governance and external audit constrain earnings management practice in the 
UK?”  
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7.3 Summary of Research Methodology 
Using agency theory, this study explores the effects of the corporate governance and external audit 
systems on helping to increase financial reporting quality and to reduce opportunistic behaviour.  A 
review of the relevant literature identifies four categories of corporate governance, namely, board of 
directors‟ composition, non-executive directors‟ (NEDs‟) commitment, audit committee 
effectiveness and ownership structures.  The factors identified for the external audit are auditor 
independence and audit quality.  
 
Consistent with prior research (e.g. Kothari et al., 2001; Becker et al., 1998; Jones, 1991; Healy, 
1985), the study computes discretionary accruals using aggregate accruals models as a method to 
measure earnings management.  Discretionary accruals are estimated using the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals as estimated by the performance adjusted accruals model (Kothari et al., 
2005). 
 
Two models are constructed and a set of hypotheses stated.  These models are tested using a sample 
of firms derived from the top 350 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange.  Firms in the 
financial, mining and regulated industries are excluded due to their different accrual choices and 
valuation processes.  The study covers the period of four financial years from 2003 to 2006.  
Nineteen hypotheses are derived from both models and tested using univariate and multivariate 
techniques to investigate whether corporate governance attributes and external audit factors 
significantly constrain discretionary accruals. 
 
7.4 Summary of the Research Results 
Nineteen hypotheses and the key findings of their tests are summarised in table 7.1. The overall 
results suggest that corporate governance attributes and external audit factors constrain the 
likelihood of earnings management practice in the UK.  
 
Consistent with hypothesis 1 that there is a negative relationship between earnings management and 
the proportion of independent directors on the board, the result indicates that there is a negative and 
significant relationship between board independence and the indicator of earnings management. 
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Inconsistent with hypothesis 2, the coefficients of the number of board meetings is insignificant in 
all of the models.  A possible explanation of this result is that the number of board meetings is an 
indication of the board‟s reaction to urgent business or special circumstances rather than an 
indication of the board‟s regular and effective monitoring of the financial reporting quality of the 
firm.  
 
Considering hypothesis 3, this study finds that board size is significantly and negatively associated 
with earnings management.  The result indicates that larger boards are more effective in financial 
reporting monitoring.  Taken together, the results on board size and the impact of board meetings 
suggest that if the board is large, as is the case for most of the firms in this sample, board meetings 
may not be the best means of communication between directors.   
 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the independence of the board chairman is negatively associated with the 
level of earnings management.  The negatively signed coefficient on chairman independence 
supports this hypothesis.  This suggests that the chairman‟s independence plays an important role in 
constraining earnings management behaviour.  
 
In terms of the comparison between chairman independence that is measured according to the 
Code‟s chairman independence criteria and chairman independence that is measured according to 
the Code‟s NED independent criteria, only the latter has a significant effect on earnings 
management.  Interestingly, it is found that the code independence criteria might be weak since this 
study documents a positive but insignificant association between earnings management and 
chairman independence according to the Code‟s chairman independence criteria, whereas chairman 
independence measured by its NED independence criteria shows a significant negative relationship 
with earnings management. 
 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that the number of women directors on the board is negatively associated with 
earnings management.  The insignificantly negative coefficient on the number of women directors 
does not support this hypothesis.  Therefore, in respect to gender diversity, this study does not 
support the view that gender diversity leads to superior earnings quality.  
                   
 
                 
292 
 
 
Table 7.1: Summary of Hypotheses and Findings 
     N Hypothesis Findings 
H1 There is a negative relationship between independent boards and EM Supported and significant at p < 0.10   
H2 The number of board meetings is negatively associated with EM. Not supported 
H3 There is a negative relationship between large board size and EM. Supported and significant at p < 0.05 
            H4 Chairman independence is negatively associated with EM. Supported and significant at p < 0.10 
H5 The number of women directors on the board is negatively related to EM. Not supported 
H6 Nomination committee independence is negatively associated with EM. Supported and significant at p < 0.01 
H7 Remuneration committee independence is negatively associated with EM. Not supported 
H8 NED private meetings frequency is negatively associated with EM.  Not supported 
H9 NED fees are negatively associated with EM. Supported and significant at p < 0.01 
H10 High managerial ownership is negatively related to EM. Not supported 
H11 High institutional ownership is negatively related to EM. Not supported 
H12 A blockholding of 10% or more in a firm is negatively related to EM. Not supported and significant at p < 0.01 
H13 Audit committee independence is negatively associated with EM. Supported and significant at p < 0.01 
H14 Audit committee expertise is negatively associated with EM. Supported and significant at p < 0.01 
H15 Audit committee size is negatively associated with EM. Not supported 
H16 Audit committee meetings are negatively associated with EM. Not supported 
H17 Non-audit fees are positively associated with EM. Supported and significant at p < 0.01 
H18 Audit fees are negatively associated with EM. Supported and significant at p < 0.01 
H19 Firms audited by a specialised auditor have less EM. Supported and significant at p < 0.10 
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Consistent with hypothesis 6 that there is a negative relationship between earnings management and 
the proportion of independent directors on the nomination committee, the result indicates that there 
is a negative significant relationship between an independent nomination committee and earnings 
management.  This finding supports the regulatory stress on the importance of having independent 
nomination committees that enhance the likelihood of the independence of the nominated directors. 
   
Hypothesis 7 predicts a significantly negative relationship between the occurrence of earnings 
management and fully independent remuneration committees, as recommended by regulatory codes.  
The result of this study does not support this hypothesis and it is in line with many other studies that 
document the lack of effectiveness of remuneration committees in the UK.  
 
Using non-executive directors‟ fees as a measure of independent directors‟ commitment, the result 
shows that NED fees are significantly and negatively related with earnings management indicator, 
as proposed in hypothesis 8.  This finding is consistent with the notion that committed independent 
outside directors are effective monitors of accrual management and that firms with highly paid 
outside directors tend to be less involved in accrual management.  
 
Hypothesis 9 predicts a significantly negative relationship between occurrence of earnings 
management and NED private meetings.  The results do not support this hypothesis.  No 
significantly negative association exists between occurrence of earnings management and NED 
private meetings but the coefficient shows a negative direction, as hypothesised. 
 
According to the agency theory, hypothesis 10 predicts that managerial ownership is negatively 
associated with earnings management.  The coefficient is negative but insignificant.  This coefficient 
remains negative in all the models.  However, this hypothesis is not supported. 
 
Hypothesis 11 reflects the view that the presence of institutional ownership in a firm is considered to 
be an element of good corporate governance and to provide an additional monitoring mechanism of 
the financial reporting process.  This study‟s result does not support this view as the effect of 
institutional investors is found to be insignificant in all the models examined.  However, this result 
is consistent with the previous UK evidence; a reasonable explanation of the non-finding result of 
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institutional ownership in this study is the different characteristics and strategy between the UK 
institutional investor and the US institutional investor as documented by prior research. 
 
Blockholders ownership is surprisingly found to be positively related to earnings management, so 
hypothesis 12 is not supported by this study.  This contradicts the argument that blockholders 
benefit the firm by aligning the interests of shareholders and directors.  It could be that, along with 
the benefits that enhanced monitoring by blockholders may bring, this increased scrutiny may have 
negative side effects. When blockholders are closely monitoring the company‟s financial affairs, 
managers may feel pressurised to ensure that positive financial results are achieved.  This type of 
predicament may provide incentives to managers for earnings management practice.  
 
Another possible reason for this result is that large shareholders may expropriate the interests of 
other investors and stakeholders by colluding with management, as observed by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997).  Furthermore, concentrated ownership enables blockholders to use accounting information to 
their own advantage, for instance by ignoring income decreasing activity in order to diminish the 
other shareholders‟ residual claims (Claessens et al. 2000).  However, further sensitivity analysis 
shows that blockholders with less than 10% ownership have less power to interfere the financial 
reporting.   
 
In the second model, hypothesis 13 expects that audit committee independence will be negatively 
associated with the level of discretionary accruals.  As expected, a negative association between 
independent audit committees and the empirical indicator of earnings management is found. 
 
The significant results shown in this study for large board size, audit committee independence and 
nomination committee independence stress the argument raised by Klein (2002a) that board sub-
committees (i.e. audit committee and nomination committee) assignments are influenced by board 
size since large boards have more directors to contribute to the sub-committees and, thus, the work 
load is distributed over a greater number of directors. 
 
Hypothesis 14 predicts that audit committee expertise is negatively associated with the level of 
earnings management.  The significant negatively signed coefficient on AUDEXP supports this 
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hypothesis.  The result suggests that audit committees that include members with accounting or 
financial management expertise are likely to discourage management from manipulating the 
earnings in the annual reports. 
 
Contrary to hypothesis 15, no significant relationship is found between the audit committee size and 
the level of discretionary accruals.  This result may support the argument that larger audit 
committees do not significantly enhance the quality of financial reporting more than smaller ones. 
 
The tests for hypothesis 16 regarding the relationship between number of audit committee meetings 
and earnings management show insignificant relationships.  This result may support the argument 
that audit committee meetings are largely ceremonial and that they are ineffective in improving 
financial reporting.  This finding may also mean that the number of its meetings is not a good 
indicator of the audit committee‟s diligence and activity, especially as both board meetings and 
NED private meetings did not show a significant effect on earnings management in this and many 
prior studies.  
 
In term of external audit factors, the coefficient of different measures of non-audit fees are positive 
and significant suggesting that, as the magnitude of non-audit fees generated by a client increases, 
the level of discretionary accruals increases. This result supports hypothesis 17.  Furthermore, the 
coefficient of audit fees are negative and significant, suggesting that, as the relative audit fees 
generated by a client increase, the level of earnings management decreases. This result supports 
hypothesis 18.  This result suggests that clients who are a significant source of non-audit revenues 
for the audit firm may permit greater discretion over financial reporting by the auditor.  Thus, this is 
consistent with regulatory concern that non-audit fees impair the auditor‟s independence. 
 
Hypothesis 19 expects that auditor industry specialisation will be negatively associated with the 
level of discretionary accruals.  As expected, industry specialised auditor shows a negative 
significant association with the level of discretionary accruals supporting the concerns about 
reduced audit quality due to a lack of client-specific knowledge.   
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When applying the alternative earnings management indicator that is based on current accruals 
rather than long term accruals, the results in both models are qualitatively the same, except for 
blockholders‟ ownership. Interestingly, BLOCK does not show a significant positive relationship 
with the second indicator of earnings management, which may make the previous findings in the 
main test sensitive and inconsistent with different types of accruals.  This result suggests that 
blockholders may apply pressure on the management for long run return but not for short or current 
benefits.  
 
This research also partitions the earnings management sample into firms with positive (income-
increasing) discretionary accruals and firms with negative (income-decreasing) discretionary 
accruals, as the incentives to manage earnings could be different for the two directions.  
 
The independent chairman is effective in constraining earnings management decreasing practice, but 
not effective in preventing managers from increasing the earnings through accruals management 
practice.  Interestingly, the chairman‟s independence according to the Code (CHAIRCOD) has a 
positive and significant relationship with positive discretionary accruals, a result that supports this 
study‟s criticism of the Code‟s chairman independence criteria. 
 
These results may be due to most of the chairmen being subject to share ownership (although 
supposedly insignificant) and they may not try to constrain manager‟s behaviour that would benefit 
them.  The CHAIRCOD results is interesting as one of this study‟s criticisms of the Code‟s 
independence criteria is that they allow the chairman to have options and a large equity ownership 
and a chairman with such ownership may not apply pressure on management to constrain managing 
earnings upwards, as found in this analysis. 
 
Interestingly, the WOMEN variable shows a negative and significant relationship at 10% level with 
positive discretionary accruals.  The risk of increasing earnings may exceed the risk of decreasing 
earnings and, thus, this result may support the argument that women are more risk averse than men.  
 
Blockholder ownership shows no significant relationship with negative discretionary accruals.  
However, it is still positively significant at a 1% level with positive discretionary accruals.  This 
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result supports the view that concentrated ownership permits outside blockholders to use accounting 
information to their own advantage, require a higher return from firms in their portfolio and pose a 
bigger threat of intervention to the firm's management.  Therefore, they may increase managers' 
incentives to conduct income-increasing earnings management, as also documented by Zhong et al. 
(2007). 
 
Interestingly, the number of audit committee meetings (AUDMEET), which did not show a 
significant effect in the main regression for unsigned accruals, shows a significantly negative 
relation at the 5% level with negative discretionary accruals only.  This is consistent with the 
findings of this study that audit committees in general are more effective in constraining downward 
earnings management. 
 
The coefficient on industry specialised auditor (SPEAUD) is negative and significant only in the 
income-increasing discretionary accruals sample and insignificant in the income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals sample.  This suggests that specialised auditors might be more effective in 
constraining the income-increasing type of earnings management.  
 
Collectively, it seems that the specialised auditor and audit committee independence complement 
each other as the specialised auditor seems to be more concerned with constraining positive 
discretionary accruals, while the independent audit committee seems to be more concerned to reduce 
negative discretionary accruals.  Unsurprisingly, audit committees behave in the same way as the 
other corporate governance attributes in that they are more effective in constraining managers‟ 
aggressive downward earnings management and less effective in cases of income increasing 
earnings management.  
 
The results of this study are consistent across both discretionary and current accrual measures for 
earnings management.  Results are not sensitive to the type of industry or the size of the firm.  Other 
sensitivity analyses test alternative analysis methods, alternative measures of independent variables 
and the possibility of the effects of other variables.  These sensitivity analysis results are also largely 
consistent with the main results.  The consistency in the results strengthens their validity and 
recommendations drawn from them.  
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In general, these findings suggest that firms with effective corporate governance mechanisms and 
independent specialised auditors undertake less earnings management.  Although not all corporate 
governance variables support the stated hypotheses, the study has achieved its objective by 
identifying the attributes that answer the research question.  This study, therefore, finds that agency 
theory offers a generally good explanation of the associations between both corporate governance 
mechanisms and external audit factors with earnings management practice.   
 
7.5 Potential Limitations of the Research 
Although this thesis was theoretically conducted on a systematic basis under the supervision of 
qualified and specialised supervisors, there are potential limitations of this research, and the reader 
should be aware of these when interpreting its research findings.  These research limitations are 
divided into two groups, namely, data and sample limitations and constructs and variables 
limitations. Nevertheless a considerable effort was made on ensuring that the objectives of this 
research study were met and the research question was answered. 
 
7.5.1 Data and Sample Limitations: 
The selection of the study sample is based on predetermined criteria.  Examining a non-random 
sample of firms, as this study does, introduces an inherent bias and possible inaccurate associations 
arising from the sample design.  However, because there is a limited number of firms that disclose 
comprehensive and relevant corporate governance information publicly, it is very difficult for 
corporate governance studies in the UK to select firms randomly. 
 
Another sampling concern is sample size in relation to the validity of statistical conclusions and the 
probability that the statistical results are representative of the actual relationship within the data set.  
The sample used in this study is limited to the top 350 UK firms, thus introducing a size bias.  
However, the size bias is likely to reduce survivorship bias over the study period because larger 
firms are less likely than smaller firms to be delisted. 
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Finally, this study uses UK data; care should be taken in generalising its results to stock markets in 
other countries that have different regulations, practices, and economic features and whose capital 
market may exhibit different characteristics in terms of size, number of listed firms and market 
valuation.  However, the similarity in the results of the study and the results of research in other 
countries indicates a high degree of generalisability.  Even within the UK, generalisability of the 
results to all publicly listed firms is reduced by the exclusion of some firms due to the nature, or the 
small size, of the industry in which they operate.  
 
7.5.2 Constructs and Variables Limitations  
The use of earnings management in this study as an indicator of earnings quality may have some 
limitations. Whilst its use can be justified theoretically, it cannot be accurately measured 
empirically.  This limitation is minimised through the clear operational definitions of the measure 
provided in chapter three. 
 
In terms of the dependent variable (discretionary accruals), the literature indicates a high level of 
measurement errors in the accrual models commonly used to detect earnings management. Another 
limitation is that earnings management activities are often assumed to be opportunistic rather than 
informative but discretionary accruals may reflect either management‟s opportunistic behaviour or 
management discretion in signalling relevant information.  Currently, no clear method exists for 
making this distinction. 
 
Construct validity is important when variables are newly developed, as is the case with NEDs‟ 
commitment in this study.  NEDs‟ fees and NEDs‟ private meetings are assumed to measure the 
commitments of NEDs and, even though a theoretical justification is presented in chapter three, 
these indicators may not accurately represent NEDs‟ commitment. 
 
Some external audit variables such as non-audit fees, audit fees and industry specialised auditor are 
subject to great debate about whether they indicate auditor independence and audit quality.  
However, the existing literature offers no better measures and they are used extensively in auditing 
research.  
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Furthermore, the examination of a certain set of corporate governance attributes and external audit 
factors is a limitation that needs to be taken into account when interpreting the findings. If other 
corporate governance and external audit characteristics contribute to the quality of the accounting 
measures, then the parameter estimates may be biased.  
 
A further limitation of the study is that there may be other factors that influence earnings quality, in 
addition to earnings management, corporate governance and the external auditor.  While additional 
tests serve to limit variances in general company characteristics, and additional control variables are 
identified for inclusion in tests to control further potential influencers of earnings management 
incidence, it is highly probable that other factors, not controlled in these tests, could affect financial 
reporting quality.  However, as this study does not aim to test causality, but rather the relation 
between earnings management and attributes of corporate governance and the external audit, the 
affect of this limitation on the findings might be considered to be of minor consequence. 
 
7.6 Implications of the Research 
Despite its potential limitations, this research contributes to the existing literature on the effect of 
corporate governance and the external audit on earnings management and on improving the quality 
of reported earnings in general.  It documents evidence that both corporate governance and the 
external auditor help to constrain earnings management.   
 
This study has practical implications for corporations‟ needs to satisfy shareholders and to attract 
potential investors.  Measuring the impact of monitoring systems such as corporate governance and 
the external audit allows decision makers to evaluate the role of these monitoring systems in 
enhancing shareholders‟ perception of the quality of financial informat ion.  If shareholders are able 
to obtain reliable information about corporate performance, their financial decisions can become 
more accurate and effective. 
 
This study reveals findings that will enable investors and stock market participants to improve their 
decision-making.  Measuring the different aspects of corporate governance and the external audit 
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allows investors to be mindful of management‟s capacity to manipulate accounting earnings for 
opportunistic purposes, and to evaluate the reliability of accounting numbers. 
 
The corporate governance authorities, especially in the UK, can use this study as empirical support 
for developing their regulations and making further recommendations on corporate governance.  
Stock market authorities can also employ this study‟s results to evaluate the current disclosure 
requirements of corporate governance practices and the role of the external auditor in improving the 
quality of accounting reports.  New corporate governance regulations and revisions of exist ing 
corporate governance codes should be based on evidence from empirical studies such as evidence 
offered by this research.  
 
This study provides evidence that not only does board of directors‟ independence enhance the 
quality of financial information but also that the commitment of board members is important in this 
regard.  Readers of accounting reports can use the data on NEDs‟ fees as an indicator of NEDs‟ 
professionalism and commitment.  A central theme of recent corporate governance reforms in UK, 
US and internationally is the requirement for a greater proportion of independent directors on the 
board and its sub-committees so that the interests of shareholders can be properly represented 
(Higgs Report 2003, p. 35).  Indeed, this study finds that board independence, audit committee 
independence, nomination committee independence and chairman independence are all important 
attributes that significantly reduce earnings management.  Thus, NEDs‟ independence should be 
safeguarded and strengthened in future corporate governance recommendations. 
 
This study‟s results also show the importance of the neglected role of the chairman in enhancing the 
quality of reported earnings.  This study fails to find evidence that the chairman‟s independence, as 
measured by the chairman‟s independence criteria stated in the UK Corporate Governance 
Combined Code (2003), produces effective corporate governance. But it does show that the 
chairman‟s independence, as measured by the Code‟s criteria for non-executive director 
independence, significantly decreases the propensity for earnings management.  This suggests that a 
stricter definition of the chairman‟s independence would enhance the effectiveness of corporate 
governance.  This result may indicate that the Code‟s current criteria for chairman independence do 
not deliver its expected benefits.  This research suggests that chairmen should be subject to the same 
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strict criteria for independence that the Code recommends for NEDs, which this study shows might 
lead to better detection of earnings management.  Therefore, consideration needs to be given to 
amending the chairman independence recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance 
Combined Code (2003) to prohibit participation in the firm‟s employee stock options and/or pension 
schemes.  Furthermore, like NEDs, a chairman should be considered non-independent when serving 
on the board for more than nine years.  
 
This study also finds that the diligence of the board of directors and its sub-committees cannot be 
measured merely by the number of meetings. Thus, better measures of directors‟ diligence, such as 
attendance at meetings, length of meetings, meeting agendas, and participation in meetings, should 
be considered for inclusion in future codes and disclosure requirments. 
 
Regarding the effectiveness of the audit committee in constraining earnings management, this 
research provides support for only two of the four recommendations of the UK Corporate 
Governance Combined Code (2003).  The recommendation in Smith‟s guidance that there should be 
at least three meetings during the year is not supported.  It would seem that the number of meetings 
should be left to the committee to decide based on the need for such meetings.  The recommendation 
that an audit committee should consist of at least three independent members is also not supported.  
This study shows that audit committees with three or more members are not more effective than 
those with fewer members.  However, the other two recommendations, namely, that audit 
committees should be fully independent and that they should include a financial expert, are 
empirically supported. 
 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2003, p.12) recommends that “Except for smaller companies, 
at least half the board, excluding the chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined 
by the board to be independent”.  This study‟s results show a significant negative relationship 
between earnings management and a majority of independent non-executive directors on the board, 
and, this supports this Code recommendation. 
 
The results of this research provide evidence to support the ongoing regulatory concern about the 
impairment of the auditor‟s independence if audit and non-audit services are provided 
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simultaneously. This study finds that auditors‟ independence is impaired when they conduct non-
audit services for their audit clients and that this, in turn, affects the quality of financial information.  
 
The findings of the study help to identify which corporate governance attributes are likely to impact 
on financial reporting quality.  They show that the independence of the board of directors, an 
independent chairman, an independent nomination committee and an independent audit committee 
are all important attributes, and that larger boards and a financial expert sitting on the audit 
committee are effective in enhancing earnings quality.  While the 2003 UK Code addresses each of 
these issues to an extent, evidence presented in this study indicates that these important facets of 
corporate governance may warrant further consideration. 
 
Furthermore, this study contributes to the ongoing debate on the feasibility of harmonising corporate 
governance practices around the globe.  Theoretically, in the literature review chapter, and 
empirically, in the results and discussion chapter, this study shows that corporate governance 
efficiency differs in different countries, probably as a result of their various macro and micro 
economic characteristics such as stock markets regulations, disclosure requirements, firms‟ 
ownership structures and firms‟ size.  
 
Finally, this study contributes to the corporate governance research by providing comprehensive 
statistics on the issue of corporate governance compliance in the UK. Data shows that FTSE 350 
Index firms have a high compliance with recommendations about board of directors‟ independence 
and audit committee independence and expertise.  However, the corporate governance 
recommendations concerning the independence of remuneration and nomination committees, NEDs‟ 
private meetings and gender diversity still show unsatisfactory compliance.     
 
7.7 Avenues for Future Research 
This study‟s results provide evidence that a number of corporate governance attributes are 
significantly related to the incidence of earnings management.  However, there are several areas that 
are not covered by this study but that could be relevant to corporate governance and the occurrence 
of earnings management.   
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Thus, one possible avenue for future research is testing additional corporate governance attributes 
that may influence earnings quality.  Examples for such additional attributes are the size of 
remuneration and nomination committees and the number of their meetings, whether the CEO sits 
on these committees, and attendance rates at meetings of the board and its sub-committees. 
 
Another avenue for further research is to take the corporate governance attributes and external audit 
factors found to be effective in constraining earnings management in this study and investigate their 
effects on other aspects of earnings quality, such as auditor opinion, accounting conservatism, 
restatements and fraud.  It would also be interesting to investigate the effect of these factors on a 
firm‟s performance and audit quality.  
   
Although earlier research shows that institutional ownership, block ownership and high managerial 
ownership reduces the likelihood of earnings management, the empirical evidence provided by this 
study indicates that no such relationship exists. This contradiction in findings suggests that the 
influence of these various ownership structures on managers opportunistic behaviour may go 
beyond what is recommended by regulation; conceivably, there may be other aspects of these 
ownership structures, not tested by this study, that determines the effectiveness of these monitoring 
mechanisms.   
 
Since this study‟s results relating to ownership structures are consistent with the previous UK 
evidence, questions arise about the role and characteristics of British institutional investors and 
blockholders and their awareness and reactions toward management discretions.  Ferreira and Matos 
(2006) and Khurshed et al. (2007) document some major differences between institutional investors 
in the US and the UK but it would be interesting to look further at institutional and blockholders‟ 
effectiveness as monitoring devices in different countries.  If there are important differences, 
variables based on regulatory recommendations would understandably exhibit little variance. The 
true differences in the effectiveness of ownership structures would necessitate the testing of 
additional variables such as the presence of long-term institutional investors and blockholders on 
company boards and the interaction between managerial ownership and other corporate governance 
attributes. 
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An additional area worthy of further research is the effect of different types of non-audit fees on 
auditor independence and, thus, on audit quality.  Although this research finds that non-audit fees 
impair auditor independence and encourage earnings management, some types of non-audit services 
may enhance the auditor‟s knowledge and familiarity with the client‟s business.  
 
This study and previous research documents the positive influence of specialised auditors on audit 
quality and earnings quality.  However, it would be of interest to explore more thoroughly why this 
association occurs.  What exactly distinguishes the specialised auditor from others?  To what extent 
does the specialised auditor factor interact with other monitoring factors, such as audit committees, 
non-audit fees, Big 4 audit firms and auditor turnover?  Exploring these issues could contribute 
substantially to the literature on corporate governance and on audit and earnings quality. 
 
As this study covers large firms and excludes certain industries, an opportunity arises for further 
research into the impact of both corporate governance and the external audit on earnings 
management in smaller companies or in companies in the regulated, mining and financial industries.  
 
Replication of this research using data from other international stock markets is likely to provide 
insight into different markets responses to corporate governance, external auditor roles and earnings 
management.  Furthermore, as motives for practising earnings management is well covered in the 
literature, it would also be of great interest if future research could address the issue of managers‟ 
motives for complying with corporate governance, whether that is to increase perceived reporting 
quality, to satisfy shareholders and regulators, or to achieve some other objectives. 
 
7.8 Summary 
This chapter presents a summary and the conclusions of this research.  After restating the research 
problem and question, it outlines the research methods undertaken to answer the research quest ion.  
The results of this research are summarised and their implications are discussed.  The potential 
limitations of this research are then presented before avenues for future research are highlighted. 
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The study proposes and finds that corporate governance and the external auditor, collectively, 
constrain earnings management.  The results reveal that board size and independence, audit 
committee independence and competence, nomination committee independence, chairman 
independence, the level of NEDs‟ fees and independent and specialised external auditor are all 
negatively associated with earnings management at significant levels. 
 
The primary contribution to knowledge of the research is to extend the literature on the role of 
corporate governance and the external audit in constraining earnings management practice.  Its 
results are useable by stock market participants in their evaluation of the roles of corporate 
governance and the external auditor in enhancing the quality of reported earnings.  The findings will 
also help regulators to define effective corporate governance attributes and to assess the 
requirements for disclosure of corporate governance practices.  
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